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This thesis centers on Lutheran theologian Paul Althaus (1888–1966), one of 
the most contentious figures of twentieth-century Protestant theology and an 
architect of the Erlangen Opinion on the Aryan Paragraph. Althaus has been the 
object of a polarising scholarly debate on account of his ambiguous relationship to 
National Socialism and his ambivalent views on the so-called ‘Jewish Question.’ The 
investigation of the latter of these two points is the chief research objective of the 
thesis. That is, how did Althaus understand the ‘Jewish Question,’ especially in its 
theological dimension, and what did he envision as its solution?  
 
In the following pages, I suggest that Althaus fits together two separate but 
coherent strands of thought—inclusion and exclusion—into a paradoxical socio-
theological vision for the Jews. The predominance of the scholarly literature falters 
on his theology of Jews and Judaism because it interprets the evidence more or less 
according to a binary model (philosemitism/antisemitism or inclusion/exclusion). But 
on this point Althaus resists facile classification because his approach to the ‘Jewish 
Question’ is dialectical. As such, it requires a dialectical interpretive approach to 
account for the function of ‘Jews’ within the wider logic of his theological system, 
including his doctrines of creation, the church, and the state. The study’s ultimate 
conclusion is that Althaus comes to interpret Jewish existence according to a 
dialectic of pathology and performance (according to which Jews are both a danger 
to and an indispensable factor for the life of the German Volk), resulting in an 
inclusive quarantine of Jewish persons within both civil and ecclesial communities. 
 
The argument proceeds along four movements. The first movement considers 
Althaus’ völkisch writings during the Weimar Republic (1918–1933) in order to 
uncover the basic categories—pathology and performance—through which Althaus 
interprets Jewish existence. Movement II surveys Althaus’ attitudes toward the Jews 
under National Socialism (1933–1945), with special reference to the Erlangen 
Opinion on the Aryan Paragraph, a document which recommended that Jewish men 
be restricted from pastoral office in the Deutsche Evangelische Kirche. Movement III 
demonstrates that, even in the knowledge of the Nazi regime’s crimes against the 
Jews, Althaus relinquished the dialectic of pathology and performance only gradually 
and incompletely in the postwar period (1945–Althaus’ death in 1966). The 
dissertation’s fourth movement approaches Althaus as a case study in the viability of 
Lutheran social ethics in light of his xenophobic articulation of the doctrine of the 
orders of creation. Insofar as Althaus brought this doctrine to bear on questions 
concerning the place of Jews in German society and in the German churches, his 
example raises broader dogmatic questions for a post-Shoah world. The thesis 
concludes with a proposal for doctrinal repair with resources found within the 
Lutheran tradition itself, with particular attention to the theologia crucis.  
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CHAPTER I | INTRODUCTION  
 
 Where Paul Althaus is known in the anglophone world, he is known, as likely 
as not, as something of a villain. Althaus (1888–1966), longtime professor of 
systematic theology in Erlangen, has been obscured behind the Protestant giants of 
the twentieth century, save for a degree of unwelcome notoriety (and later, infamy) 
as the theologian who greeted the rise of National Socialism as ‘a gift and miracle of 
God.’1 Beyond this, though, he appears in many respects as a perfectly ordinary 
Protestant thinker, and a curious choice for a doctoral dissertation. In the words of 
Paul Knitter, Althaus  
may be considered one of the lesser stars in the theological constellation of 
this century. . . . He gathered no theological school around himself, he ignited 
no theological bombs, he offered no shatteringly new insights. Althaus was a 
thinker who had something to say, who was respected and listened to; but he 
was not—like Barth, Bonhoeffer, Bultmann and Tillich—one of the 
‘fashioners’ of Protestant thinking of this century.2 
 
His theology was not epoch-making, but Althaus did exercise wide influence, 
especially in Lutheran circles, as a systematician and ethicist, biblical exegete, and as 
a pastor and preacher. He was perhaps the preeminent Luther scholar of his 
generation, having followed his mentor Karl Holl as the president of the prestigious 
Luther Society, a post he held for over three decades until 1964. He was a prolific 
writer whose work was read ‘all over Germany.’3 He remains a central figure in the 
history of Lutheran confessionalism.  
                                                 
1 Paul Althaus, ‘Das Ja der Kirche zur deutschen Wende,’ in Die deutsche Stunde der Kirche 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1934), 5. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations from German texts 
are my own.  
2 Paul Knitter, Towards a Protestant Theology of Religions: A Case Study of Paul Althaus and 
Contemporary Attitudes, Marburger Theologische Studien (Marburg: N.G. Elwert Verlag, 1974), 1.  
3 Karlmann Beyschlag, Die Erlanger Theologie (Erlangen: Martin Luther Verlag, 1993), 184. For a 
sympathetic overview of Althaus’ life and work, see Wenzel Lohff, ‘Paul Althaus,’ in Tendenzen der Theologie 
im 20. Jahrhundert: Eine Geschichte in Porträts, ed. Hans Jürgen Schultz (Stuttgart: Kreuz-Verlag, 1966). For an 
exhaustive bibliography of Althaus’ publications, see Wenzel Lohff, ‘Bibliographie der Veröffentlichungen von 
Professor D. Paul Althaus,’ in Dank an Paul Althaus: Eine Festgabe zum 70. Geburtstag, dargebracht von 
Freunden, Kollegen, und Schülern, ed. Walter Künneth and Wilfried Joest (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1958), 246–
72. For a bibliography specific to Althaus’ Luther scholarship, see Gottfried Petzold, ‘Veröffentlichungen von 
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 Althaus’ enduring significance, however, is in large part an accident of 
history. He was at the height of his intellectual powers and professional prestige at 
the moment of the Nazi Machtergreifung; the prime of his career coincided directly 
with the National Socialism’s short-lived tenure. As a result, despite his irenic 
personality he found himself at the centre of the explosive theological debates of 
those turbulent years. Chief among these debates, and the subject of this study, was 
the so-called Judenfrage. The ‘Jewish Question’—that is, ‘the constant discussion in 
German society about the proper status of Jews’4—dominated public discourse 
during the waning years of the Weimar Republic.  
Although the ‘Jewish Question’ had been chiefly a socio-legal discussion 
among scientists, politicians, and makers of social policy, it held a special theological 
content for Althaus. Beginning in the late Weimar period he would comment on the 
theological meaning of Jewish existence and its significance for German 
Volksgemeinschaft. By the early 1930s, Althaus had established a reputation as ‘a 
knowledgeable expert on questions of Judaism’ and a prominent interpreter of the 
‘Jewish Question.’5 As Nazi measures against the Jews increased, he went on to play 
an instrumental part in deliberations about the place of Jewish persons in the 
Deutsche Evangelische Kirche (DEK). Along with colleague Werner Elert (1885–
                                                 
Paul Althaus über Luther, eine Auswahl,’ Luther 29 (1958), 12–13. For Althaus’ wide-reaching influence, see 
also Herntrich Volkmar, ‘Paul Althaus dem Siebzigjährigen,’ Luther Jahrbuch XXV (1958). See also Walther 
von Loewenich, ‘Paul Althaus als Lutherforscher,’ Luther Jahrbuch XXXV (1968), 9–47. On Althaus’ 
contributions to German church practice, see Martin Nicol, ‘Paul Althaus (1888–1966),’ in Gottesdienst als Feld 
theologischer Wissenschaft im 20. Jahrhundert: Deutschsprachige Liturgiewissenschaft in Einzelporträts, ed. 
Benedikt Kranemann and Klaus Raschzok, Liturgiewissenschaftliche Quellen und Forschungen 98 (Münster: 
Aschendorff Verlag, 2011). 
4 The definition is Götz Aly’s. See Why the Germans? Why the Jews? Envy, Race Hatred, and the 
Prehistory of the Holocaust, trans. Jefferson Chase (New York, NY: Picador, 2014), 65. Aly offers a useful 
summary of the various social, financial, and cultural factors that contributed to discourse over the ‘Jewish 
Question’ from about 1800 to the rise of the NSDAP in the early 1930s. There are points, however, at which his 
analysis is perhaps too psychological: Germans are depicted as suffering from an inferiority complex on a 
national scale and Aly locates the prehistory of the Holocaust primarily in Germans’ material envy of Jews.  
5 Marikje Smid, Deutscher Protestantismus und Judentum 1932/1933, Heidelberger Untersuchungen zu 




1954), he drafted the Erlangen Opinion on the Aryan Paragraph, which is an 
important artefact not only of the Kirchenkampf, but also of the complex and 
ambivalent history of Christian antisemitism.  
 Althaus therefore remains an important case study for any Christian 
theologian with an interest in Jewish-Christian dialogue. His theology of the ‘Jewish 
Question,’ which reached its climax in a document that called for the prohibition of 
‘Jewish’ pastors in the DEK, represents a unique permutation of Christian anti-
Judaism, as I will argue below. What is striking about Althaus, moreover, is precisely 
his contextual moderacy. There are authoritarian and xenophobic components to his 
thought, but he was not a fanatic that one can easily dismiss or disregard. In fact, 
Althaus understood himself to be combatting what he considered wild racial 
antisemitism. In so doing, however, he problematised Jewish existence in ways more 
subtle, but no less damaging, than his more openly-antisemitic contemporaries. 
Moreover, some elements of his brand of moderate anti-Judaism remain largely 
evident in Christian theology after the Shoah. Simply put, Althaus was a centrist—a 
prospect that ‘must be frightfully unsettling for moderate and conservative 
theologians of every time and place.’6  
Althaus’ approach to the ‘Jewish Question’ is a poignant example of the ways 
in which orthodox doctrines (especially in the Lutheran tradition) can be distorted 
into complicity with toxic ideologies. The study focuses narrowly on Althaus, but 
with a broader view to the viability of Lutheran dogmatics, specifically the doctrine 
of the orders of creation, as a suitable basis for the ethical enterprise. In recent days 
this kind of historical investigation into ethno-nationalist theologies has taken on a 
                                                 
6 Jack Forstman, Christian Faith in Dark Times: Theological Conflicts in the Shadow of Hitler 
(Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1992), 202.  
 
 4 
greater urgency, as Christian theologians must once again wrestle with questions of 
national and ecclesial self-understanding under the pressures of the mass migration 
and resurgent nationalisms, both in Europe and North America.   
ONE | STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION  
 
 ‘Jewry [das Judentum],’ wrote Althaus in 1930, ‘represents a völkisch 
question, without doubt. But today it is more important to emphasise that Jewry 
poses a theological question!’7 For Althaus, the ‘Jewish Question’ had two distinct 
yet interrelated dimensions: one socio-political and one theological (although the two 
dimensions often coincided). Like many of his contemporaries, he worried over the 
socio-political influence of the ‘Jewish spirit’ as it mounted a ‘foreign invasion’ 
[Überfremdung] into the public sector. He spoke of Judaism and its diseased 
spirituality as a ‘threat’ to German life. He looked on in despair as the infection 
spread; ‘the Jews’ came to represent everything he feared most: secularism, 
urbanism, and modernism.8 So far, Althaus is hardly unique; a distinct ‘Protestant 
antisemitism’ shaped the prevailing mentality of most pastors and churchmen in his 
Bavarian context.9 Antisemitic rhetoric targeting Jews as both the spiritual and 
cultural enemies of the German Volk, such as that of Adolf Stoecker, for instance, 
had been circulating since the nineteenth century.10 But for Althaus the ‘Jewish 
Question’ would always be first and foremost a theological question. And his 
theological deliberations on the meaning and destiny of Israel—what he called the 
                                                 
7 Paul Althaus, ‘Die Frage des Evangeliums an das moderne Judentum,’ Zeitschrift für systematische 
Theologie 7 (1930), 196.  
8 So argues Robert Ericksen in Theologians Under Hitler: Gerhard Kittel, Paul Althaus, and Emanuel 
Hirsch (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985), 108.  
9 See Axel Töllner, Eine Frage der Rasse? Die Evangelisch-Lutherische Kirche in Bayern, der 
Arierparagraf und die bayerischen Pfarrfamilien mit jüdischen Vorfahren im ‘Dritten Reich,’ Konfession und 
Gesellschaft 36 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2007), especially 21–42.  
10 See Gerhard Lindemann, ‘Christian Teaching about Jews in Protestant Germany (1919–1945),’ 
Kirchliche Zeitgeschichte 16:1 (2003), 37–41.  
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‘dark, depressing riddle’—did yield something unique: a dialectical interpretation of 
Jewish existence, according to which Jews are not to be expelled or assimilated, but 
quarantined.  
 This brings us to the project’s chief research question: how did Althaus 
understand the ‘Jewish Question,’ especially in its theological dimension, and what 
did he envision as its solution? Put another way, what did Althaus believe the 
purpose of Jewish existence to be? The answer is not straightforward. His theology 
of the ‘Jewish Question’ is rife with ambivalence, which is not the same thing as 
ambiguity: Althaus fits together two separate but coherent strands of thought—
inclusion and exclusion—into a paradoxical socio-theological vision for the Jews. 
The predominance of the scholarly literature falters on his theology of Jews and 
Judaism because it interprets the evidence more or less according to a binary model 
(philosemitism/antisemitism or inclusion/exclusion). Yet on this point Althaus resists 
facile classification because, in my view, his approach to the ‘Jewish Question’ is 
dialectical. As such, it requires a dialectical interpretive approach to account for the 
function of ‘Jews’ within the wider logic of his theological system, including his 
doctrines of creation, the church, and the state. This dialectical reading is the primary 
contribution of the thesis.11  
Namely, I argue the following: beginning in Althaus’ Weimar writings, Jews 
are portrayed as existing in a dialectical relationship to all human communities, but 
especially to Germans. According to this dialectical relationship they must be 
contained because of the danger they pose to the peoples around them and yet 
                                                 
11 Scholars of Hegel will be disappointed to learn that there is, so far as I can tell, no moment of 
Aufhebung in Althaus’ theology of the ‘Jewish Question.’ The dialectic of pathology and performance, as I will 
argue in chapters six and seven, remains unresolved right up through the end of his life. Inclusion and exclusion, 




preserved within every society on account of their performative symbolic functions. 
Althaus therefore handles the ‘Jewish Question’ according a dialectic of pathology 
and performance. The result is a vision that I have elsewhere called inclusive 
quarantine—inclusive, because Jews are conceived as an indispensable factor in the 
life of the Volk; quarantine, because Althaus invokes the language of pathology and 
infection to characterise the nature of Jewish relationship to other peoples. In this 
paradoxical framework, Jewish persons simultaneously threaten to destroy the 
communities—both civil and ecclesial—in which they are situated while also 
performing constructive theological functions for those same communities.12  
‘In his comments [on the ‘Jewish Question],’ explains Axel Töllner, ‘Althaus 
fluctuated between insight into the special role of the Jews, which was somehow 
salvation-historical in nature, and the perception of a fundamental cultural and ethnic 
foreignness between Jews and Germans.’13 Althaus, then, regarded the Jews as a 
people both vitally important and utterly strange. As a result, he contemplated neither 
the total inclusion nor the total exclusion of Jewish persons from German society, but 
rather envisioned the Jews as a foreign Volk both a part of and apart from other 
human communities. In this respect, his theology of the ‘Jewish Question’ possesses 
a dynamism and complexity beyond much of the unsophisticated anti-Judaism of his 
era. At the same time, the dialectic of pathology and performance is a subspecies of 
what Stephen Haynes has called the ‘dialectic of fear and necessity,’ a tension which 
defines much Christian thinking about Jews.14 This should come as no surprise: 
Althaus conceptualised Judaism within the confines of the classical ‘witness people’ 
                                                 
12 See Ryan Tafilowski, ‘Inclusive Quarantine: The Pathology and Performance of Jewish Existence in 
the Erlangen Opinion on the Aryan Paragraph,’ Studies in Christian-Jewish Relations 10:1 (2015): 1–29.  
13 Töllner, Eine Frage der Rasse?, 35.  
14 See Stephen Haynes, Reluctant Witnesses: Jews and the Christian Imagination (Louisville, KY: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 1995), 184.  
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mythology that has dominated the Christian imagination since the patristic age. Even 
though Althaus amends the mythology in significant ways, his general approach 
conforms to the historical pattern: Jews are dangerous but indispensable.  
TWO | BIOGRAPHY AND INTELLECTUAL INFLUENCES 
 
In the spring of 1947 Althaus found himself in an unexpected position: called 
to account for his political attitudes before the Allied denazification commission. He 
searched his international contacts in an effort to debunk allegations of his 
entanglement with National Socialism. The report from abroad was disappointing. 
The English missiologist Nathaniel Micklem offered his honest but hardly 
resounding support. Micklem’s response doubles as a concise summary of Althaus’ 
reputation in the anglophone world:  
I am quite certain that you will not have been a member of the Nazi Party, 
and I am quite certain that you must have hated much that was done by the 
Party. It would also be true to say that we have not in this country heard of 
your name as offering special resistance to the Nazis or their Church 
government [sic]. Your name is well known in this country as a theologian of 
weight and repute.15 
 
Micklem’s lukewarm endorsement presaged the controversy that has surrounded 
Althaus’ legacy in the years since. The scholarly literature is divided on the question 
of how to understand his political commitments under National Socialism, yielding 
dissenting interpretations of the theological underpinnings of his political ethics. A 
central crux of the debate is whether there is some fatal flaw in his theology that 
rendered it susceptible to National Socialism. In particular, scholars have asked 
whether Althaus’ doctrine of Uroffenbarung (primal revelation) and his Theologie 
der Schöpfungsordnungen (theology of the orders of creation) created a point of 
                                                 
15 Nathaniel Micklem to Paul Althaus, May 16, 1947, Althaus Nachlass 12.5, Friedrich-Alexander 
Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, 1. Hereafter, the Althaus Nachlass shall be referenced with the abbreviation ‘NA’ 
(Nachlass Althaus).   
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contact with the racial ideology of National Socialism.16 There is no consensus on 
the precise nature and extent of Althaus’ relationship to National Socialism. Nor is 
there an agreement on whether his posture toward Jews and Judaism has a distinct 
theological content, or whether those attitudes are symptomatic of his socio-cultural 
inheritance. We will return to these questions in due course.  
 It had not always been this way, however. In the decades before his removal 
from the professoriate (and subsequent reinstatement), Althaus had enjoyed a long 
and successful academic career, first at the University of Rostock, and then in 
Erlangen, where he remained until his death. Theology had always been in his blood. 
He was born the son of a Lutheran pastor, Paul Althaus the elder (1861–1925), who 
himself was professor of practical and systematic theology at the universities of 
Göttingen and Leipzig.17 The year 1906 saw the younger Althaus undertake his own 
theological studies in Tübingen under the Swiss Reformed scholar Adolf Schlatter 
(1852–1938). Schlatter had a profound impact on Althaus, both personally and 
professionally. Althaus modeled his own church-oriented academic work after his 
mentor’s, and he came to a special appreciation of the ‘wideness’ of Schlatter’s 
theology. This wideness—the openness to God’s activity in history, nature, and 
                                                 
16 Althaus exposited his famous (and controversial) doctrine most clearly in ‘Ur-Offenbarung,’ Luther 
46:1 (1935), 4–32. For an overview of the concept, see Horst Pöhlmann, ‘Das Problem der Ur-Offenbarung bei 
Paul Althaus,’ Kerygma und Dogma 16 (1970): 242–58; Wenzel Lohff, ‘Zur Verständigung über das Problem der 
Ur-Offenbarung,’ in Dank an Paul Althaus, 151–70; and Joo-Hoon Choi, Das Konzept der Ur-Offenbarung bei 
Paul Althaus: In seiner Bedeutung für die Stellung des Christentums unter den Weltreligionen, Untersuchungen 
zum christlichen Glauben in einer säkularen Welt 2 (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2006), chapter 3. On the 
doctrine of the orders of creation, see Walter Sparn, ‘Paul Althaus,’ in Profile des Luthertums: Biographien zum 
20. Jahrhundert, ed. Wolf-Dieter Hauschild (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlaghaus, 1998), 7–12. For a 
comprehensive account of Althaus’ Schöpfungsordnungslehre within the history of the Erlangen School, see 
Nathan Howard Yoder, Ordnung in Gemeinschaft: a critical appraisal of the Erlangen contribution to the orders 
of creation, American University Studies VII:338 (New York, NY: Peter Lang, 2016), chapter 2.  
17 Paul Althaus d. Ä. was deeply influential for the younger Althaus, who edited a volume of his 
father’s work which was published posthumously. He also wrote a biography of his father. See Paul Althaus, d. 
Ä., Forschungen zur evangelischen Gebetsliteratur, ed. Paul Althaus (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1927) and Paul 
Althaus, Aus dem Leben von D. Althaus—Leipzig (Leipzig: Dorffling and Franke, 1928). For an overview of 
Althaus’ early life, see Gotthard Jasper, Paul Althaus (1888–1966): Professor, Prediger und Patriot in seiner Zeit 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013), 18–32.  
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human experience—is discernible in Althaus’ own doctrine of Uroffenbarung.18 It is 
also possible that Althaus inherited part of his deep ambivalence toward Jews and 
Judaism from Schlatter; their views in the mid-1930s bear a significant 
resemblance.19 
 In Tübingen Althaus also studied with the famed church historian Karl Holl 
(1866–1926), a chief architect of the so-called Luther Renaissance. From Holl 
Althaus took a commitment to the Lutheran doctrine of justification by faith and a 
focus on the connection between systematic and existential questions in Luther’s 
theology.20 Holl himself had an affinity for authoritarian politics—he had joined the 
Vaterlandspartei movement in 1917—and this impacted his interpretation of Luther, 
whom he regarded as something of a German folk-hero.21 Althaus went on to 
Göttingen to work with the Luther scholar Carl Stange (1870–1959), with whom he 
would later co-edit the Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie beginning in 1923. In 
                                                 
18 See Paul Althaus, ‘Adolf Schlatters Gabe an die systematische Theologie,’ in Beiträge zur Förderung 
christlicher Theologie, ed. Paul Althaus (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1938). For more on Schlatter’s influence on the 
young Althaus, see Gotthard Jasper, ‘Theologiestudium in Tübingen vor 100 Jahren—im Spiegel der Briefe des 
Studienanfangers Paul Althaus an seine Eltern,’ Zeitschrift für neuere Theologiegeschichte 13:2 (2006).  
19 Schlatter published an antisemitic tract in 1935, by which time Althaus had already made several 
public remarks on the ‘Jewish Question.’ See Schlatter, Wird der Jude über uns siegen? Ein Wort für die 
Weihnachtszeit (Essen: Freizeiten Verlag zu Delbert im Rheinland, 1935). It is worth noting that two of 
Schlatter’s other pupils, Gerhard Kittel and Walter Grundmann, ‘became leading figures in National Socialist 
exegesis,’ in the words of Anders Gerdmar. See his Roots of Theological Anti-Semitism: German Biblical 
Interpretation and the Jews, from Herder and Semler to Kittel and Bultmann, Studies in Jewish History and 
Culture 20 (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 254. Kittel’s exegetical work became notorious for its anti-Judaism. See 
Ericksen, Theologians Under Hitler, chapter 2 and Alan Steinweis, Studying the Jew: Scholarly Antisemitism in 
Nazi Germany (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 73–75. Grundmann founded the Institute for 
the Eradication of Jewish Influence on German Church Life at the University of Jena. See Susannah Heschel, The 
Aryan Jesus: Christian Theologians and the Bible in Nazi Germany (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2008), chapter 2. 
20 Walter von Loewenich, ‘Paul Althaus als Lutherforscher,’ 12.   
21 See James Stayer, Martin Luther, German Savior: German Evangelical Theological Factions and the 
Interpretation of Luther, 1917–1933 (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2000), chapter 2. Stayer argues 
that Holl and the Luther Renaissance provided resources for theologians who would later recruit Luther to 
support a völkisch worldview. This development is perhaps detectable in Althaus. For instance, see his Luther 
und das Deutschtum (Leipzig: Deichert, 1917) in which Althaus identifies Luther’s personality and message as 
representative of the distinct German type. Roland Kurz has shown that, especially during the First World War, 
Althaus regarded Luther as the ‘archetype of the German [der Urtyp des Deutschen].’ See 
Nationalprotestantisches Denken in der Weimarer Republik: Voraussetzungen und Ausprägungen des 
Protestantismus nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg in seiner Begegnung mit Volk und Nation. Die Lutherische Kirche—
Geschichte und Gestalten 24 (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2007), 423–25, 475. For further discussion of 
the influence of the Luther Renaissance on Althaus, see Karl Kupisch, ‘The Luther Renaissance,’ Journal of 
Contemporary History 2:4 (1967), 47–48. 
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the meantime, he completed his doctoral dissertation—Principles of German 
Reformed Dogmatics22—in 1914, the same year that saw his promotion to 
Privatdozent in Göttingen. The First World War, during which he worked as a 
chaplain at a military hospital and as a pastor among German expatriates in Łódź, 
Poland, interrupted his academic career until 1920, when he received a call to a 
professorship in systematic theology and New Testament at Rostock. Althaus was to 
make his name, however, as a champion of the Erlangen School.  
 By the time Althaus joined the faculty in 1925, Erlangen had been a bastion 
of confessional Lutheranism for generations. The faculty achieved its first golden age 
during the nineteenth century on the reputations of historical theologian Johann 
Hoefling (1802–1853), ethicist Gottlieb von Harless (1806–1879), and systematician 
Johann von Hofmann (1810–1877). Althaus and Elert, in the mind of at least one 
interpreter, led the way into the second golden age of Erlangen theology.23 The 
Erlangen School, as Lowell Green has noted, is best thought of not as an institution, 
but as a theological method.24 This method grew out of the revivalism movement 
[Erweckungsbewegung] of the eighteenth century, which in Erlangen took the form 
of a distinctive ‘theology of experience [Erfahrungstheologie].’25 Above all, the 
Erlangen School understood itself as the opponent of theological liberalism. Since 
the Old Prussian Union of 1817, the Erlangen theologians occupied themselves with 
the tenacious defence of the confessional identity to such an extent that ‘Erlangen,’ 
                                                 
22 Published as Die Prinzipien der deutschen reformierten Dogmatik im Zeitalter der aristotelischen 
Scholastik (Leipzig: Deichet, 1914).  
23 Beyschlag, Die Erlanger Theologie, 184.  
24 Lowell Green, The Erlangen School of Theology: Its History, Teaching, and Practice (Fort Wayne, 
IN: Lutheran Legacy, 2010), 28–29.  
25 Beyschlag, Die Erlanger Theologie, 24–25.  
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writes Reinhard Slenczka, ‘became a catchword for politically conservative, right-
wing confessional theology.’26 
 The Erlangen School, as Hans Christof Brennecke has observed, has always 
straddled the line between Lutheranism and nationalism.27 This penchant for 
conservative politics was compounded by a distinct theology of history. The 
School’s hallmark Erfahrungstheologie is characterised by an openness to God’s 
self-revelation in historical events and natural structures of communal life (such as 
the Volk). Harless and Hofmann were the early pioneers of the 
Schöpfungsordnungslehre, and their influence on Althaus’ thought-system is 
probably clearest here.28 Following Hofmann’s emphasis on historical developments 
as episodes in Heilsgeschichte, Erlangen theologians began to regard history 
(including political and social movements) as the arena of God’s self-disclosure—a 
precedent that, of course, Althaus would fatefully seize upon in the early 1930s with 
his public endorsement of Hitler. By the middle of the 1920s, the Erlangen 
theologians, with Althaus, Elert, and church historian Hans Preuß (1876–1951) at the 
forefront, had already forged a distinctly völkisch approach to Lutheran theology, 
which was disseminated widely not only in Bavaria, but throughout Germany. 
‘Through their programmatic synthesis of confessional Lutheranism and German 
Volkstum,’ explains Berndt Hamm, ‘[Althaus and Elert] attracted considerable 
                                                 
26 Reinhard Slenczka, ‘Paul Althaus: A Representative of the Erlangen School,’ Logia XXII:2  
(2013), 6.  
27 See Hans Christof Brennecke, ‘Zwischen Luthertum und Nationalismus: Kirchengeschichte in 
Erlangen,’ in Geschichtswissenschaft in Erlangen, Erlanger Studien zur Geschichte 6 (Erlangen and Jena: Palm & 
Enke, 2000). For Brennecke, Erlangen’s history of parochial Lutheran confessionalism is ‘almost embarrassing’ 
in retrospect, and it culminated in the scholarship of Hans Preuß, an open supporter of National Socialism (262–
67). 
28 ‘History, as the passage of God through the world as well as in an organic view of all other 
knowledge together with history and theology was an integral part of [the School’s] thought’ (Green, The 
Erlangen School, 34). On Harless and Hofmann, see Yoder, Ordnung in Gemeinschaft, 9–44. 
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attention and cleared a path, theologically and paradigmatically, for the Lutheran 
regional churches into National Socialism.’29  
 I have provided this brief sketch of Althaus’ intellectual development in order 
to situate his theology and to set the stage for the debate regarding his legacy. The 
exact nature of Althaus’ relationship to National Socialism is a question with which I 
have dealt elsewhere and is not of immediate concern to this thesis.30 However, the 
wider discussion regarding Althaus’ political commitments is critical for our 
investigation insofar as it reveals the binary approach to the study of his socio-
political theology. The dichotomous terms of the debate—where Althaus appears as 
a misguided patriot on one side and an ‘esteemed pastor-professor turned zealous 
Nazi’31 on the other—expose a need for an alternative approach to Althaus research 
with a greater awareness of the ambivalence of his theological method in general and 
the dynamism of his theology of the ‘Jewish Question’ in particular. There exists at 
present no systematic attempt to elucidate Althaus’ approach to Jews and Judaism in 
the English language. Where this task has begun in German scholarly literature, there 






                                                 
29 Berndt Hamm, ‘Werner Elert als Kriegstheologe: Zugleich ein Beitrag zur Diskussion “Luthertum 
und Nationalsozialismus,”’ Kirchliche Zeitgeschichte 11:2 (1998), 208. Though in my view he overstates the 
case, Hamm holds Elert more responsible than Althaus for this state of affairs. Elert’s bellicose ethical system, 
according to Hamm, ‘presents itself as precisely the kind of religiosity that a totalitarian and militaristic regime of 
the twentieth century must have welcomed’ (234). Gotthard Jasper, a much more sympathetic commentator than 
Hamm, nevertheless agrees that by the 1930s Erlangen theology had taken on a strongly völkisch tone, which 
eventually found an ‘echo’ in rising antisemitism and the National Socialist movement, ‘even though the men 
who produced the theology were neither radical antisemites nor National Socialists.’ See ‘Die Friedrich-
Alexander-Universität in der Weimarer Republik und im Dritten Reich,’ in Erkenntnis durch Erinnern: Aufsätze 
und Reden, ed. Everhard Holtmann (Erlangen und Jena: Palm & Enke, 1999), 257–58. 
30 See Ryan Tafilowski, ‘Exploring the Legacy of Paul Althaus,’ Lutheran Quarterly 31:1  
(2017): 64–84.  
31 Charles Marsh, Strange Glory: A Life of Dietrich Bonhoeffer (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 
2014), 215. Elsewhere Marsh labels Althaus an ‘opportunist’ who colluded with National Socialism (192).  
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THREE | BETWEEN GUILT AND INNOCENCE: THE LEGACY OF PAUL ALTHAUS 
 
Political and theological decisions are complicated. As Anders Gerdmar has 
shown, theological antisemitism develops out of a myriad of factors, including 
cultural prejudice, nationalism, political pressures, and perhaps above all personal 
temperament.32 It is therefore a precarious enterprise to establish Althaus’ precise 
motives in his comments about the Jews. However, the scholarly debate has sought 
to uncover—and in some cases separate—the various influences that give his 
theology of Judaism its unique character. Discourse surrounding Althaus’ legacy can 
be distilled roughly into two overarching narrative-types: narratives of suspicion and 
narratives of sympathy. Of course, no interpretation conforms completely to either 
narrative, but this schematic allows us to trace the general contours of the debate. As 
we shall see, the two narrative types, whose conclusions differ significantly, offer 
important insight into Althaus’ theology of the Jews while at the same time 
presenting new problems and leaving important questions unresolved. Only in recent 
years have several studies emerged that challenge this dichotomous paradigm by 
discerning something of the ambivalent nature of Althaus’ theology of the ‘Jewish 
Question.’    
Variants of what I have called the narratives of suspicion are characterised by 
close scrutiny of Althaus’ political decisions surrounding the National Socialist years 
and by the ethical indictment of his völkisch theology. Althaus’ critics are unanimous 
that his theology is antagonistic toward Jews, but there is some debate on the 
character of this antisemitism. Nonetheless, these narratives do not hesitate to speak 
of Althaus’ guilt for legitimising a regime that perpetrated crimes against the Jews. 
                                                 
32 Gerdmar, Roots of Theological Anti-Semitism, 601–09.  
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For example, Richard Gutteridge charges Althaus as ‘the most evil German 
theologian in the National Socialist era, at least in terms of effect.’33 Others have 
identified Althaus—and the theological tradition he represents—as an explicit organ 
of the genocidal war against the Jews.34 While the exact judgments vary from author 
to author, this narrative condemns Althaus for lending theological credibility and 
pastoral license to National Socialist ideology. In many cases, criticism of Althaus 
amounts more or less to criticism of Lutheran political and social ethics in general. 
Althaus’ moral failure, so the argument goes, is the inevitable outcome of a flawed 
ethical system.35 The shorthand version of this narrative type—‘Althaus, Nazi 
theologian’—has dominated English-speaking discourse in particular since the 
publication of Robert Ericksen’s seminal study Theologians Under Hitler in 1985.  
Variants of what I have called the narratives of sympathy are generally 
charitable in their judgment of Althaus’ politics and more attentive to the ethical 
quandary in which many German clergy found themselves during the Third Reich. 
These narratives caution against moralising historiography of a time in which 
theological decisions were clouded by Nazism’s ambiguous relationship with 
Christianity, and by traditional Lutheran teachings on secular authority and statecraft. 
These interlocutors speak of Althaus’ unintentional complicity with National 
                                                 
33 Gutteridge’s comment was conveyed to Robert Ericksen in a personal interview. See Robert 
Ericksen, ‘The Political Theology of Paul Althaus: Nazi Supporter.’ German Studies Review 9:3 (1986), 564. For 
Gutteridge, ‘it is certain that [Althaus] enormously encouraged others altogether less well trained in theological 
sense and altogether more ardent and uncontrolled in pro-Nazi enthusiasm to attempt to justify a form of volkish 
[sic] outlook, such as his religious support and vindication of the Nazi racial program.’ See Open Thy Mouth for 
the Dumb! The German Evangelical Church and the Jews 1879–1950 (London: Basil Blackwell, 1976), 274.  
34 Michael Steele: ‘[Althaus was] removed from the horrible physical acts of violence perpetrated 
against Other victims [but] distance does not serve to reduce [his] culpability.’ Christianity, The Other, and the 
Holocaust (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2003), 88–89. See also Arlie Hoover, ‘German Christian 
Nationalism: Its Contribution to the Holocaust.’ Holocaust and Genocide Studies 4:3 (1989), 314. 
35 For arguments of this type, see Wolfgang Tilgner, Volksnomostheologie und Schöpfungsglaube: Ein 
Beitrag zur Geshichte des Kirchenkampfes (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1966), 180; Eberhard Hübner, 
Evangelische Theologie in unserer Zeit: Darstellung und Dokumentation (Bremen: Carl Schünemann Verlag, 
1966), 97–101; Hans Tiefel, ‘The German Lutheran Church and the Rise of National Socialism.’ Church History 
41:3 (1972), 331–35; and Forstman, Christian Faith, 121–32, 197–202.  
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Socialism, and can even speak of his innocence.36 Virtually all scholars within this 
narrative type agree that Althaus should not be remembered as a perpetrator; his 
crime, ironically, was actually his ‘innocent naiveté [unschuldsvolle Naivität].’37 
This interpretation is mostly German in provenance, as many of these scholars are 
bound to Althaus by personal and confessional commitments.38 The shorthand 
version of this narrative type—‘Althaus, misguided patriot’—seeks to 
counterbalance, and in some cases overturn, more damning portraits.  
As these competing narratives seek to pull his legacy in different directions, 
Althaus for the time being remains suspended between guilt and innocence. 
A | SUSPICION   
 
 Among the most critical accounts is that of British historian Richard 
Gutteridge, who isolates Althaus as the single most culpable theologian of the 
National Socialist era.39 In Gutteridge’s interpretation, it is precisely Althaus’ 
moderate nature that makes him so sinister; his gravitas furnished National Socialism 
with a veneer of respectability, legitimising the movement in ways that crude forms 
of antisemitism and crass jingoism could not. Gutteridge’s conclusions are echoed 
later by American historian Arlie Hoover, who identifies Althaus as paragon and 
proponent of a toxic romantic-Christian Germanism.40 For Gutteridge and Hoover, 
Althaus’ strident nationalism, which at first blush appears to be run-of-the-mill 
patriotic bombast, in reality spawned a perverse völkisch morality according to which 
                                                 
36 Hans Schwarz has characterised Althaus as an ‘innocent ally’ of the Nazi regime. See ‘Paul Althaus 
(1888–1966),’ Lutheran Quarterly 25:1 (2011): 28–51.  
37 Helmut Thielicke, Zu Gast auf einem schönen Stern: Erinnerungen (Hamburg: Hoffmann und 
Campe, 1984), 85.  
38 See, for example, the memoirs of Wolfgang Trillhaas [Aufgehobene Vergangenheit: Aus meinem 
Leben (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1976)] and Walther von Loewenich [Erlebte Theologie: 
Begegnungen, Erfahrungen, Erwägungen (München: Claudius Verlag, 1979)], both former students of Althaus 
who became his colleagues on the Erlangen faculty.  
39 See Gutteridge, Open Thy Mouth, 274. 
40 See Hoover, ‘German Christian Nationalism,’ 312–13.  
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‘it is much easier for you to commit genocide with a clear conscience.’41 Yet 
Gutteridge and Hoover seem to overstate the case: neither contemplates the 
indispensable prophetic function of Jewish persons (either as individuals or as a 
construct) in Althaus’ theology of the ‘Jewish Question.’ Genocide, as we shall see 
below, actually destroys Althaus’ vision for Jewish existence.  
On the strength of his Theologians Under Hitler, American historian Robert 
Ericksen emerged as the most prominent and prolific Althaus commentator in the 
English-speaking world. Ericksen’s primary study locates Althaus as a mediator 
between two theologians—Gerhard Kittel (1888–1948) and Emanuel Hirsch (1888–
1972)—with more pronounced National Socialist sympathies. This portrayal is 
consistent with the depiction of Althaus in Ericksen’s early work: a patriotic 
conservative who, despite his mediatory personality, lapsed into National Socialism 
and ‘limited antisemitism’ on account of his neo-conservatism and ‘parochial’ vision 
for Germany.42 Ericksen sustains a negative judgment of Althaus over the course of 
subsequent publications. By the time we reach Ericksen’s mature work, Althaus 
appears as a völkisch theologian ‘eager to ride the Hitler bandwagon.’43  
Ericksen understands Althaus’ antisemitism in generally cultural terms, 
arguing that although Althaus was influenced to some degree by racial theory, he 
supported National Socialist discrimination against Jews out of a ‘personal aversion’ 
for Jews and what they represented culturally.44 ‘[Althaus] attacked Jews,’ says 
Ericksen, ‘primarily as the representatives of the Enlightenment, modernity, and 
                                                 
41 Ibid., 314. 
42 Ericksen, Theologians Under Hitler, 115.  
43 Robert Ericksen, Complicity in the Holocaust: Churches and Universities in Nazi Germany 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 118. However, in his early work Ericksen had already identified 
Althaus as an ‘accessory to Nazi crimes’ (‘The Political Theology of Paul Althaus,’ 566). 
44 Ericksen, Theologians Under Hitler, 108.  
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moral disintegration. That is to say, he stereotyped Jews as the main causes of all 
those changes in modern Germany which he most feared and disliked.’45 While 
Ericksen’s socio-cultural hypothesis remains in force throughout his writings, he 
later argues that Althaus gradually came to accept the pseudo-scientific racial 
ideology of National Socialism more fully.46  
Ericksen is right to identify the doctrine of the orders of creation, specifically 
the theology of the Volk, as the driving force behind Althaus’ views on the ‘Jewish 
Question.’ Ericksen’s Althaus is ‘a product of Christian theology, not [a] monstrosity 
created by the exigencies of the Nazi regime.’47 That is to say, it was Althaus’ 
theology that prevented him from protesting the persecution of the Jews. Ericksen’s 
valuable account of Althaus as an ‘accessory to Nazi crimes’ has proven influential, 
but it does suffer deficiencies. The evidence indicates that Althaus never subscribed 
to racial theory to the degree Ericksen alleges. Moreover, while Ericksen does 
identify the ways in which Althaus uses the Jews as negative symbols, but he does 
not at all explore the Jews’ constructive and performative functions in his wider 
theological system. In short, Ericksen contributes to a limited and dichotomous 
paradigm of discourse by emphasising only the negative pole of Althaus’ dialectical 
theology of the ‘Jewish Question.’ 
 American theologian Jack Forstman is also critical of Althaus, but has a 
clearer grasp on the dialectical nature of his theology. For Forstman, Althaus’ 
positive reception of National Socialism is not a result of unquestioned commitment 
                                                 
45 Robert Ericksen, ‘Emerging from the Legacy? Protestant Churches and the Shoah,’ Kirchliche 
Zeitgeschichte 17:2 (2004), 374. Cf. Ericksen, ‘The Political Theology of Paul Althaus,’ 561.  
46 Ericksen, ‘Emerging from the Legacy?,’ 374–75. Ericksen elsewhere concludes that Althaus 
accepted the ‘racist ideal of the German Volk.’ See ‘Assessing the Heritage: German Protestant Theologians, 
Nazis, and the “Jewish Question,”’ in Betrayal: German Churches and the Holocaust, ed. Robert Ericksen and 
Susannah Heschel (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2012), 25.  
47 Robert Ericksen and Susannah Heschel, ‘The German Churches and the Holocaust,’ in The 
Historiography of the Holocaust, ed. Dan Stone (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 299.  
 
 18 
to the regime’s ideology, but an equivocal theological method: ‘We must not suppose 
that Althaus was a blindly ideological Nazi. . . . Barth employed the vigorous 
dialectic of Yes and No; Althaus used the more cautious dialectic of “on the one 
hand . . . on the other.”’48 As opposed to Barth, who had the vocabulary to flatly 
denounce Nazism, Althaus struggled to find a prophetic edge to his theology. Yet 
Forstman recognises the difficulty in casting moral judgments on these theologians 
who worked under Hitler’s shadow. He writes, ‘Looking back on the Third Reich, 
we have no problem with clarity . . . but we presume to our own peril that from the 
other side of 1933 everything was clear.’49 Nevertheless, Althaus’ story is one of 
failure; that he later recognised his error and fell silent is for Forstman ‘a pathetically 
modest credit.’50 With specific reference to the ‘Jewish Question,’ however, 
Forstman’s depiction of the Althausian dialectic of ‘Yes and No’ should be qualified 
to reflect a more robust vision of inclusive quarantine.  
Erlangen church historian Berndt Hamm likewise concludes that Althaus, 
along with his colleague Werner Elert, implicated himself in a web of complicity 
with the National Socialist regime.51 Yet what is most problematic for Hamm is the 
form of discourse to which Althaus resorted to come to terms with the National 
Socialist past after the regime’s collapse. In the context of post-Shoah discourse, 
Hamm distinguishes between the language of ‘guilt’ [Schuld], which implies moral 
agency and therefore responsibility, and the language of ‘fate’ [Verhängnis], which 
presupposes inescapable determinism that exempts the subject from moral 
                                                 
48 Forstman, Christian Faith, 198.  
49 Ibid., 15.  
50 Ibid., 202.  
51 Berndt Hamm, ‘Schuld und Verstrickung der Kirche: Vorüberlegungen zu einer Darstellung der 
Erlanger Theologie in der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus,’ in Kirche und Nationalsozialismus, ed. Wolfgang 
Stegemann, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1992).  
 
 19 
culpability.52 By resorting to the language of Verhängnis in the post-Shoah period, 
Althaus divests German crimes of conscious agency and frames Christian guilt 
outside of ‘the sphere of perpetration and complicity, and characterises it as a passive 
omission [and thereby] trivialises it . . . through embedding it in the context of the 
unequally greater guilt of others . . .’53 Althaus’ postwar sermons, according to 
Hamm, really serve an ‘exculpatory function’ as they allow ‘guilt to disappear 
behind an imposed destiny’: 
 The problem with the Althausian way of preaching, which has so much to say 
about the suffering of the German people and its Christians and so little to say 
about its perpetration [Täterschaft], lies not in that Althaus has no concept of 
the culpable entanglement [schuldhaften Verstrickung] that both his Erlangen 
hearers and he himself shared. . . . That Althaus denied the guilt of Christians 
and their church is not the problem, but rather how he speaks of it and how he 
deals with it . . .54 
 
 In this way, Althaus exhibits what Hamm has called the ‘syndrome of displacing 
one’s own fault’—a form of excuse-making Vergangenheitsbewältigung that will 
never be able to come to terms with the past in a constructive way.55 
 Hamm argues that Althaus’ antisemitism is rooted deeply in his theology. 
Even though both Elert and Althaus ‘felt themselves free from any antisemitism,’ for 
each theologian ‘the blood-nature of race [Blutsbeschaffenheit der Rasse] is a 
fundamental component of national identity.’56 In Hamm’s reading, blood, race, and 
nationhood form the starting point for Althaus’ theology of the Jews. His theology, 
anchored firmly in the völkisch tradition, grew so parochial that it blinded him to 
                                                 
52 Ibid., 13–14. 
53 Ibid., 17.  
54 Ibid., 17. Emphasis in the original.  
55 Ibid., 16. Victoria Barnett has characterised this recollective strategy as the ‘machtlos phenomenon.’ 
See Bystanders: Conscience and Complicity during the Holocaust (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000), 18–19. 
Hamm’s comments have drawn heated criticism from former Erlangen University rector Gotthard Jasper, who 
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anything other than the suffering of Germans, even in light of the cataclysm that the 
Nazi war machine had wrought on the Jews and the other peoples of Europe. In his 
postwar sermons, Althaus eulogises fallen German soldiers and mourns displaced 
German refugees but speaks not a word ‘about the millions of murdered Jews.’57 For 
Hamm, then, Althaus’ theology alienated the Jews in life and denied them dignity in 
death. For all of its strengths, however, Hamm’s analysis does not account for the 
versatility of the Jews in Althaus’ theological system, in which the Jews fulfill a 
number of theological functions, some of them constructive. Hamm judges correctly 
that for Althaus the Jews represent a danger, but underestimates the integral role 
Jews play—beyond that of enemies—in Althaus’ theology.  
In his study of socio-theological trends among conservative theologians and 
churchmen during the Weimar Republic, Roland Kurz considers Althaus’ work an 
archetypal expression of Protestant nationalism in the university context.58 Like other 
scholars, Kurz sees the First World War, chiefly Althaus’ time in Poland, as the 
period during which his nationalist sympathies took root. It was during these years, 
long before his work as a university professor, that Althaus came to think of German 
history within the Sonderweg tradition, by which he interpreted the war as a holy 
crusade: Germany was struggling not only for its own greatness, but for the ‘blessing 
of the world.’59 It was through this ideological commitment to German 
exceptionalism that Althaus came to further develop the concepts of the Volksberuf 
(‘ethno-national mission’) and the Konfliktgesetz (‘law of conflict’)—both of which 
would prove influential for his attitudes toward the Jews. However, Kurz does not 
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reckon fully with the ways in which Althaus brings his völkisch nationalism to bear 
on the ‘Jewish Question,’ as we will see below. 
Kurz’s careful examination of the evolution of Althaus’ political ideas helps 
to make Althaus’ eventual decision to support National Socialism intelligible, if not 
defensible. The study’s key contribution, though, is its penetrating analysis of the 
eschatological dimension of Althaus’ völkisch outlook, which is especially clear in 
his early preaching. Althaus’ Łódź sermons reflect the ‘classical hope of nationalist 
Protestantism’: the German Volk, fortified by Luther and Lutheran Christianity, 
called to lead Europe in preparing the way of the Kingdom of God. ‘Because God 
wants to raise the German Volk up to be the leading nation in Europe,’ Kurz explains, 
‘it must follow him dutifully and give everything for the Vaterland, the highest 
earthly good.’60 This völkisch nationalism produced at least two critical outcomes: 1) 
Althaus demanded absolute obedience to the ordinances of creation, even though the 
questions of whether the Volk’s actions are just or whether there is hope of victory 
always remain unclear, and as a result 2) he ‘sacramentalised’ death for Volk and 
Vaterland, which, it seems to me, is something he did with violence generally. On 
account of these ‘misjudgments with catastrophic consequences,’ says Kurz, Althaus 
became an unwitting forerunner of Nazi propagandist Joseph Goebbels, whose 
invocation of ‘total war’ called for complete sacrifice for the war effort regardless of 
the cost.61  
For these reasons Kurz condemns Althaus’ nationalist worldview as 
unchristian:  
Althaus’ assessment of war is to be rejected decisively: the ‘God-willed hate’ 
for the enemy is a symbiosis between social Darwinism, eschatology, and a 
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doctrine of creation that goes beyond Christianity; a crusade mentality, which 
without doubt has been represented throughout the church’s history, but 
nevertheless cannot be accepted as Christian because it stands in opposition 
to the concept of tolerance, among other things.62 
 
Given that Kurz places Althaus’ aggressive völkisch thought outside of the authentic 
Christian tradition, it is perhaps not surprising that he understands Althaus’ 
antisemitic comments in largely socio-political terms. For Kurz, Althaus’ hostility 
toward Jewish presence in Germany has no theological content: ‘His antisemitism 
was the product of an anti-liberal worldview and not motivated by race or religious 
or Christian ideas: he wanted to combat individualism, the greatest danger for the 
concept of a homogenous national body [Volkskörper].’63 Kurz is correct on that 
score, but he has only solved one-half of the equation: Althaus harboured a socio-
political fear of Jews, of course, but he also considered Jews theologically 
significant. In this regard, his posture toward the ‘Jewish Question’ is profoundly 
theological and cannot be explained solely as cultural prejudice. In separating 
ideology from theology, which is a common strategy in the literature, Kurz has 
overlooked the performative function of the Jews in Althaus’ imagination.  
 Tanja Hetzer has also identified the development of a racially motivated and 
anti-egalitarian political theology across Althaus’ professional career. The 
progression began with his work as a military chaplain in Poland, where he first 
became acquainted with völkisch nationalism and where he first developed his 
‘blood-ideology’ [Blutsideologie] out of a fear that ethnic Germans would be 
‘polonised.’64 By combining this militaristic völkisch nationalism, animated by a 
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salvation-historical vision for the German Volk, with his doctrine of the orders of 
creation, ‘Althaus created a new foundation for antisemitism.’65 Through his 
influence as a chief representative of the Protestant middle—those belonging neither 
to the Bekennende Kirche nor to the Deutsche Christen—Althaus contributed 
theological credibility to National Socialism during the Kirchenkampf. By this 
‘ideological “road-paving” [Straßenbau] which prepared the way for Hitler . . . 
[Althaus endorsed] an ideology which reinforced obedience to the state and provided 
encouragement for an anti-egalitarian model of society.’66 Like Kurz, Hetzer sees 
Althaus not as a misguided patriot, but as a Nazi herald.  
 Hetzer locates the roots of Althaus’ xenophobic nationalism in his experience 
with the völkisch movement in Poland, which had trained him to define national 
identity in terms of cultural and racial purity. Althaus’ völkisch theology, which is 
especially hostile in targeting foreign threats to the Volk, in turn rendered him 
susceptible to antisemitic rhetoric. As a result, he came to view the stereotypical Jew 
as a social and spiritual contagion—and a threat to the survival of the German 
people. Althaus’ new strain of antisemitism, argues Hetzer, is compounded by his 
ideological commitment to the supremacy of the state. As a result, when the National 
Socialist government levied disenfranchising legislation against the Jews, Althaus 
turned a blind eye. 
 Within this intellectual framework, says Hetzer, Althaus could not envision a 
solution to the ‘Jewish Question’ that would allow Germans and Jews to share the 
same public space—including the church. For this reason, Althaus not only approved 
                                                 
65 Hetzer, ‘Deutsche Stunde,’ 237–38.  
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of political legislation against the Jews in the secular sphere, but he ultimately 
applied the ideology of the Aryan Paragraph in the ecclesiastical community as 
well.67 The Erlangen Opinion thus represents a pastoral form of Althaus’ racially 
motivated and prejudicial Volk-theology. In Hetzer’s judgment, Althaus used this 
theology as a weapon to deprive Jews of their rights: ‘He supplied a decisive 
contribution to the disenfranchisement of the Jews with his theological opinion on 
the introduction of the Aryan Paragraph into the ecclesiastical sphere. . .’68 As a 
representative of the church, Althaus provided theological ammunition in the war 
against the Jews and must be remembered as an opponent of human rights as a 
result.69 Hetzer’s analysis is broadly correct; however, the evidence suggests that 
Althaus did maintain a place for Jewish persons within German society, including its 
ecclesial spaces: the margins.  
B | SYMPATHY 
 
With his article ‘Die Theologie von Paul Althaus,’ Marburg theologian Hans 
Grass aims to ‘do justice to Althaus,’ even while conceding that the events of the 
twentieth century have made it impossible to justify his political attitudes.70 Even 
though he cannot apologise for Althaus totally, Grass does seek to rationalise his 
decisions. In particular, Althaus’ heritage—his conservative upbringing, Lutheran 
training, and military service—made it ‘very difficult’ for him to resist National 
Socialism’s early political platform.71 Grass does recognise the dangerous 
possibilities of Althaus’ Uroffenbarungslehre, for example, but is at pains to salvage 
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his theology from the wreckage of his ‘temporary susceptibility to National 
Socialism.’72 As part of this interpretive approach, Grass minimises Althaus’ militant 
writings as ‘embarrassments [Peinlichkeiten].’73 However, to dismiss bellicose and 
xenophobic rhetoric—which manifested in the marginalisation of Jewish persons 
both in civil society and in the DEK—merely as an embarrassment is to obscure (and 
to excuse) a dangerous expression of Lutheran theology. In the end, though, Grass 
reverts to a strategy common to the narratives of sympathy. By warning against those 
who would ‘easily play the role of backward-facing prophets,’ Grass not only 
absolves Althaus, but exempts him from moral scrutiny altogether.74 
Paul Knitter employs a similar interpretive technique in his article ‘Die 
Uroffenbarungslehre von Paul Althaus—Anknüpfungspunkt für den 
Nationalsozialismus?’ Here, Knitter seeks to untangle Althaus’ difficult legacy by 
reading his thought as a ‘solution’ [Lösung] of theology and ideology, which can be 
distilled into two separate component parts.75 With this device, Knitter frames 
Althaus’ positive reception of National Socialism as a visceral reflex and not a 
theological decision. In this way, he attempts to extricate Althaus’ theology from his 
ideology, which he defines as a ‘primordial [ursprüngliche] . . . behavior and 
conviction which is in its nature and its origin above all socio-political and not 
theological.’76 Within the logic of the argument, Althaus’ problematic political 
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commitments are attributed to his socio-cultural makeup in order to preserve his 
theology. It is worth noting here that Knitter has an interest in vindicating Althaus’ 
Uroffenbarungslehre. The success of Knitter’s wider theological project—
ecumenical dialogue between Protestants and Roman Catholics regarding the world’s 
religions—depends a great deal on the integrity of the concept of Uroffenbarung, 
which he believes to hold great promise for a Protestant approach to the non-
Christian world.77 
Knitter also applies this hypothesis to Althaus’ comments on the ‘Jewish 
Question,’ which, he admits, are ‘perhaps the gloomiest aspect of Althaus’ “Yes” to 
the political revolution.’78 Althaus’ antisemitism, then, is really a residual cultural 
artefact, an instinct. In fact, according to Knitter, Althaus’ explicit theology of the 
Jews works to mitigate against fanatical antisemitism, even while his ideology 
perpetuated anti-Jewish prejudices and stereotypes. Knitter flatly concludes that 
‘Althaus was against any form of antisemitism,’ but provides little in the way of 
evidence for that claim, other than Althaus’ recommendation that the German 
churches retain the Old Testament in worship.79 Yet Knitter does not appear to have 
considered the ways in which Althaus, as I will illustrate below, uses the Old 
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Testament to denigrate Jews and Judaism. Ultimately, this is because his 
presuppositions about the origins of Althaus’ attitudes toward the ‘Jewish Question’ 
cause him to misjudge the evidence. Knitter is unwilling to concede that there is any 
theological substance to Althaus’ antisemitism that would require reconsideration in 
light of the Shoah. Instead, Althaus’ hostility toward the Jews is minimised as one 
particularly ‘embarrassing’ feature of his ideological makeup.80  
This artificial distinction between theology and ideology, however, is foreign 
to Althaus’ thought, and for this reason has drawn criticism from other interpreters.81 
Althaus’ writings indicate that his views of Jews and Judaism, while culturally 
influenced to be sure, are theologically grounded. In every instance, he confronts the 
‘Jewish Question’ as an explicitly theological question and proposes an explicitly 
theological answer. Knitter’s manufactured ideology/theology construct overlooks 
the critical function of the Jews in the logic of Althaus’ theological system. 
Moreover, because Althaus’ decisions are complex, I am skeptical about whether it is 
possible to disentangle ideology from theology—or from any other factor—based on 
the evidence. At any rate, Knitter’s binary approach fails to reckon with Althaus’ 
dialectical theology of Judaism, which resists dichotomous resolution.  
In his detailed history of the Erlangen School, Karlmann Beyschlag 
champions Althaus as ‘the last great Erlangen theologian.’82 Beyschlag repurposes 
perhaps the most commonly criticised dimension of Althaus’ theology—its 
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equivocating indecision and lack of critical prowess—as ‘theological versatility.’83 
However, it is Beyschlag’s historiographical method that is most striking: he diverts 
the discussion from Althaus the public theologian to Althaus the private individual. 
In fact, says Beyschlag, it is impossible to understand Althaus without having 
‘personally experienced [his] spiritual charisma.’84 However, by setting the 
parameters of the debate in this way, Beyschlag effectively disqualifies virtually all 
of Althaus’ critics from the discussion, and, in effect, exempts his own theological 
tradition from examination. ‘Karlmann Beyschlag,’ in the words of Tanja Hetzer, ‘is 
a representative of a generation of theologians who obviously want not only to guard 
their academic teacher Paul Althaus from any kind of criticism, but who also want to 
hear nothing about a critical historical reflection on his theology itself.’85 
American theologian Lowell Green also seeks to preserve the integrity of 
Althaus’ theology in his two meticulously researched apologies for the Erlangen 
theology faculty during the National Socialist years.86 The books are an answer to 
‘intolerable denunciations by those living in an easy post-Hitler era who were 
scolding those who had done their best in dark and cloudy times.’87 As a standing 
motif, Green is adamant that not one of the Erlangen theology faculty ever 
capitulated to National Socialist ideology. Yet the historical record forces Green to 
take creative positions to support that claim.88 For example, Green argues that Elert 
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only pretended to be a Nazi in order to sabotage the regime’s attempts to curtail 
academic freedom in the university.89 In the end, Green acknowledges Althaus’ 
public support for the nascent National Socialist government only with great 
reluctance, suggesting his endorsement was merely a benign misjudgment.90 
 Green’s personal and confessional relationships to Althaus radically impact 
the way he approaches the evidence regarding Althaus’ opinions about the ‘Jewish 
Question.’ Green routinely interprets texts—many of which appear self-evidently 
antisemitic—in such a way as to exonerate his mentor.91 This overarching 
assumption dictates Green’s exegesis: ‘To be sure, Althaus acknowledged, the 
church must acknowledge the existence of a “Jewish Problem,” or even of a “Jewish 
Threat.” But this dare never lead to Antisemitism [sic]. . . . At no time did Althaus 
manifest so-called Jew hatred.’92 Althaus’ hostile attack on the corrosive spirit of 
‘Judaism’ in his Weimar writings, for instance, is considered a perfectly defensible 
example of a purely theological anti-Judaism. On this basis, Green defends the 
Erlangen Opinion, whose positive response to the Aryan Paragraph should be 
excused because its authors, ‘writing on September 25, 1933, were without a clue 
regarding the dreadful racism that was about to break out in Germany.’93  
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Though it has met with harsh criticism,94 Green’s analysis succeeds insofar as 
it complicates the dominant narrative that rests on an uncritical presumption that 
Althaus was simply a Nazi theologian. Green does call into question a prevailing 
assumption in English-speaking Althaus scholarship that is on the verge of cliché. 
Yet his intractable commitment to confessional Lutheranism (and personal loyalty to 
Althaus) forces him to contort the evidence in support of conclusions that test the 
limits of credibility. There is indeed room for dissenting interpretations of Althaus’ 
ambivalent legacy, but the historical record simply cannot support Green’s claim that 
Althaus and the Erlangen faculty led the German churches in the struggle against 
National Socialism.95  
Lutheran theologian Hans Schwarz, another of Althaus’ students, confronts 
the suspicion surrounding Althaus’ theology since his collusion with National 
Socialism, asking rhetorically, ‘What is so fatal in Althaus’ theology and what 
tainted his reputation?’96 Schwarz judges that Althaus’ theology has been pulled out 
of shape by overly-critical historiography. In the turbulent days of the 1920s and 
1930s, suggests Schwarz, Althaus was merely trying to navigate between the 
fanatical Deutsche Christen on one side and the deficient theology of Karl Barth on 
the other.97 Thus it follows that the Ansbach Memorandum’s criticism of the Barmen 
Declaration, to which we will turn in due course, is a matter of confessional 
precision, not an expression of uncritical support for National Socialism.  
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In the same way, Schwarz situates Althaus’ antisemitic statements within the 
popular anti-Judaic rhetoric of the age; in this context, his theology appears moderate 
because it is not motivated by racial animus.98 Nevertheless, Schwarz does criticise 
the elements of Althaus’ political history that are clearly problematic, but he also 
stresses the difficulty of making moral judgments about Althaus’ ambivalent legacy. 
He captures that tension in his memorable characterisation of Althaus as an ‘innocent 
ally’ of the National Socialist regime.99 The phrase portrays Althaus as both a 
perpetrator and a victim, betrayed by his own naïve misuse of legitimate Lutheran 
doctrines. For Schwarz, the final word on Althaus is not one of guilt but one of 
tragedy. Nathan Howard Yoder, a recent student of Schwarz’s, has come to similar 
conclusions, though there is a case to be made that his account belongs within the 
narratives of ambivalence. Yoder’s reading of Althaus is broadly sympathetic, 
however, as it is part of a wider attempt to rehabilitate the Erlangen School’s much-
maligned orders of creation tradition. And while Yoder does flatly condemn the 
‘ideological’ elements that invaded Althausian theology, he also minimises Althaus’ 
antisemitic rhetoric as an ‘unfortunate association.’100 
Erlangen political scientist Gotthard Jasper’s magisterial Paul Althaus (1888–
1966): Professor, Prediger und Patriot in seiner Zeit is the most comprehensive 
study of Althaus to date. Though he devotes most of the biography to other topics, 
Jasper is of course aware of the controversy surrounding Althaus’ political views, 
especially in the years immediately before the Nazi seizure of power. However, he 
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contends that Althaus’ militant comments in the late Weimar era have been grossly 
misunderstood because they have been torn from the context to which they were 
originally speaking.101 In fact, says Jasper, Althaus developed his christianised 
nationalism to offer patriotic Germans a moderate alternative to the Deutsche 
Christen movement that still affirmed the validity of the authoritarian state without 
degenerating into radicalism.102 His nationalistic writings of the early 1930s, 
therefore, must be read not as an unqualified endorsement of the new state, but as an 
attempt to win over ‘the silent majority of the Deutsche Christen’ to his moderate 
völkisch position.103  
Though Jasper does acknowledge Althaus’ temporary public support for the 
National Socialist government, he attributes that decision to the influence of his 
conservative socio-cultural makeup. Jasper’s Althaus is motivated above all by a 
romanticised vision for a Christian Volk, so he did indeed hope—albeit ‘all too 
gullibly’—for a new beginning for Germany in 1933, but not any more than another 
conservative Protestant with a similar background would have.104 He believed the 
National Socialist government promised order and stability and a renewal of 
Christian values. In the end, Jasper laments that ‘moralising and accusatory’ 
historiography have overlooked these complex factors.105 
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been maligned by his critics, who have created a ‘one-sided’ view of Althaus in the years since (385–88).  
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Jasper also knows that Althaus harboured an attitude toward Jews that 
appears unacceptable today, but again insists that he inherited that attitude from his 
culture: ‘His environment afforded him only an abstract, prejudicial, quasi-portrait of 
“typical Jews” and of “typical Jewish character” as a foil to hold opposite the ideal of 
“Germanness.”’106 It follows that Althaus’ mild antisemitism was not the result of a 
deliberate theological logic, but was instead merely a residual provincialism that 
could have been obviated had he been raised in a more cosmopolitan environment. 
Had Althaus accepted a call to Berlin in 1929, for example, his view of Judaism 
would have been expanded by encounters with ‘numerous distinguished colleagues 
and other faculty, who would have dismantled his abstract, negative picture of the 
Jew.’107 In support of his interpretation, Jasper points correctly to the fact that 
Althaus did not define German national character primarily by race or blood, but by 
cultural and historical determination, leaving open the hypothetical possibility that 
Jews could truly be German.108  
On the whole, though, Jasper minimises Althaus’ antisemitic attitudes by 
explaining them away as a residual provincial prejudice, thereby extracting them 
from the substance of Althaus’ theology. At no point does Jasper fully reckon with 
the pathological dimension of the Althaus’ dialectical theology of the ‘Jews.’ On the 
contrary, Jasper’s Althaus should be remembered for his ‘opposition against the 
ideological dictatorship of National Socialist rule, against the persecution of the 
Jews, and against National Socialist church politics.’109 
                                                 
106 Ibid., 241.  
107 Ibid.  
108 Ibid., 237.  
109 Ibid., 329–330. Jasper’s conclusion here is difficult to square with his earlier admission that the 
brutal tactics of National Socialism during the early 1930s—including persecution of communists and social 
democrats, the anti-Jewish boycott, the burning of books, and the murder of Jewish-German economist (and 
Erlangen graduate) Rudolf Benario in Dachau—were public knowledge in Erlangen but passed by without 




 C | AMBIVALENCE 
In recent years, two studies have emerged—Roland Liebenberg’s Der Gott 
der Feldgrauen Männer and André Fischer’s Zwischen Zeugnis und Zeitgeist110—
which do not conform to the suspicion/sympathy dichotomy. Neither piece is much 
interested in making moral judgments about Althaus’ political decisions. Instead, the 
studies are descriptive, with each scholar searching Althaus’ past for clues into his 
eventual affirmation of the National Socialist government. Liebenberg discerns the 
formation of a militaristic völkisch theology during Althaus’ years as a chaplain in 
Poland, roughly 1915–1918, before he made any public comment on the ‘Jewish 
Question.’111 Fischer looks to the turbulent years of the Weimar Republic as the 
period in which Althaus’ political theology began to take shape. 
  Fischer concludes that Althaus’ political thought is characterised above all 
by ‘ambivalence.’112 His attitudes, therefore, are not easily categorised because a 
cautious ‘Yes-But dialectic’ [Ja-aber-Dialektik], with which he could accept some 
elements of Nazi ideology while rejecting others, governs his political and 
theological judgments. Because Althaus’ relationship to National Socialism is 
complicated and fragile, Fischer finds it more appropriate to speak of ‘factors of 
susceptibility to National Socialism’ and ‘factors of resistance to National 
Socialism.’113 Whereas Althaus was initially attracted to the regime for reasons not 
                                                 
110 Roland Liebenberg, Der Gott der Feldgrauen Männer (2008) and André Fischer, Zwischen Zeugnis 
und Zeitgeist: Die politische Theologie von Paul Althaus in der Weimarer Republik, Arbeiten zur Kirchlichen 
Zeitgeschichte B:55 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2012).  
111 Liebenberg employs a sociological method to untangle the ‘relevant factors’ contributing to Althaus’ 
political attitudes apart from his theological commitments, including his ‘biographical background, his 
intellectual disposition, his ideological influences, and his social environment.’ See Der Gott der Feldgrauen 
Männer, 16–17, 504. Liebenberg’s study does not address Althaus’ perspectives on the ‘Jewish Question.’  
112 Fischer, Zwischen Zeugnis und Zeitgeist, 453, passim.  
113 Ibid., 682–92.  
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explicitly theological, Fischer sees the ‘factors of resistance’ as anchored primarily in 
his Christian faith. In particular, says Fischer, Althaus’ theology of the orders of 
creation precluded ethnic autarchy and crass biological antisemitism.114 Ultimately, 
however, with his völkisch impulses in tension with his commitment to the church’s 
proclamation, Althaus was caught tragically between Zeugnis und Zeitgeist, that is, 
between his witness as a Christian theologian and his enthusiasm for the spirit of the 
times.115 
 Likewise, Fischer argues that Althaus’ relationship to Jews and Judaism is 
complicated—exhibiting both positive and negative dimensions—and cannot 
therefore be reduced to straightforward prejudice or hatred.116 Fischer runs up against 
the difficulties posed by Althaus’ ambivalence about the Jews, but nonetheless 
perceives that Jewish existence continues to fulfill a critical purpose in his thought. 
In Althaus’ theology, as Fischer puts it, the Jews retain an ‘indirect eschatological 
significance’ as signs of the coming Kingdom of God who disrupt the ethnic 
homogeneity of human communities.117 Yet Althaus’ posture toward Jews and 
Judaism struggles with an unresolved—and perhaps unresolvable—tension between 
fear of and fascination with Judaism.118 
 Though he no doubt fretted over the social and cultural influence that Jews 
exercised in public life, Althaus, as Fischer rightly notes, thought of the ‘Jewish 
Question’ primarily in theological (and not in racial) terms.119 Fischer stresses that 
                                                 
114 Ibid., 698–99. For reasons that will become clear throughout the thesis, I am not convinced by 
Fischer’s reading of Althaus’ doctrine of the orders of creation.  
115 Ibid., 708.   
116 Ibid., 486–91.  
117 Ibid., 500–02.  
118 Ibid., 534–35. Stephen Haynes has reached a similar conclusion in Reluctant Witnesses, 87–89. 
Compare also Christopher Probst, Demonizing the Jews: Luther and the Protestant Church in Nazi Germany 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2012), 32–37.  
119 Fischer, Zwischen Zeugnis und Zeitgeist, 512.  
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Althaus refused to characterise Jews as a biologically inferior race and never 
envisioned a Germany without Jews.120 At the same time, he shows that Althaus’ 
publications regarding the ‘Jewish Question’ beginning in the late 1920s do indicate 
a susceptibility to ‘antisemitic ideology of the primitive type.’121 These texts are rife 
with deep-seated prejudices that border on the racial stereotyping. Fischer’s study 
succeeds in connecting Althaus’ perspectives on the ‘Jewish Question’ to his wider 
theology of the Volk and in fleshing out the nuances of Althaus’ theology of Judaism.  
 In the end, though, Fischer credits Althaus with an antisemitism that is 
‘spiritual-cultural-moral’ [geistig-kulturell-sittlichen] in character, which Fischer 
judges as a moral improvement over the crass racial antisemitism of the era. 
However, it not clear exactly why spiritual antisemitism is morally superior to racial 
antisemitism—if the two can be separated at all. Indeed, whatever the basis of their 
exclusion—cultural or racial—Althaus identified the Jews as dangerous elements on 
the fringes of society. In particular, Fischer’s claim that Althaus did not hold a 
‘dualistic worldview’ in which Jews are associated with evil in an unsophisticated 
way needs to be further qualified.122 Though I argue below that Fischer’s analysis 
does not exhaust all of the dimensions of Althaus’ relationship to the ‘Jewish 





                                                 
120 Ibid., 517, 532.  
121 Ibid., 494–95.  
122 See ibid., 532–33.  
123 Fischer notes at various places that Althaus’ views on the ‘Jewish Question’ are an ‘original 
approach [eigenständigen Ansatz].’ See ibid., 521, 536.  
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METHOD, SCOPE, AND STRUCTURE 
 
 A | A DIALECTICAL APPROACH  
 
 As we have seen, scholarly judgments about Althaus’ relationship to Jews 
and Judaism typically conform to the larger narratives within which they are 
embedded. Almost all his interpreters, critics and apologists alike, agree that Althaus 
is no philosemite, but they disagree about the character and substance of his 
antisemitism—if it is appropriate to speak of his ‘antisemitism’ at all. Questions also 
remain as to whether this antisemitism is rooted deeply in his theology or an 
accidental by-product of his socio-cultural inheritance. Indeed, because of the 
peculiarity of Althaus’ posture toward the ‘Jewish Question,’ this study encounters 
the same obstacle raised by Fischer: it is difficult to categorise Althaus’ antisemitism.  
 I offer here a brief word of explanation about my use of the term 
‘antisemitism’ in the thesis. Although I find the theoretical distinction between 
theological anti-Judaism and racial or ethnic antisemitism to be dubious, Althaus 
does (more or less) attempt to establish an ostensible distinction between the 
theological and the socio-political dimensions of the ‘Jewish Question.’ However, as 
he comments on the issue more extensively across his career, it becomes more and 
more difficult for him to maintain this distinction. As a result, in many cases the line 
between anti-Judaism and antisemitism (if there is such a line) is blurred. So, in the 
end, I doubt whether it is possible to dissociate ideology from theology, though this 
is a common approach in dissecting the rhetoric of the age. For instance, in her study 
of Protestant attitudes toward the ‘Jewish Question’ at the end of the Weimar 
Republic, Marikje Smid differentiates between Antijudaismus (polemic motivated 
solely by religious concerns), Judenfeindschaft (an ancient and nondescript social 
animosity toward Jews), and Antisemitismus (a distinctly modern expression of Jew-
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hatred resting on a racial-biological worldview).124 While such a schema is perhaps 
hypothetically viable, the difficulty is that, at least in Althaus, there is no clear 
separation of the three categories: socio-cultural prejudices are tangled up with racial 
stereotypes, both of which Althaus interprets theologically.  
 In order to diagnose the problematic elements of Althaus’ views on Jews and 
Judaism, then, I am making use of Gavin Langmuir’s paradigm, which catagorises 
antisemitism as rhetoric resting on ‘chimerical assertions’ against Jews that have no 
basis in reality and are not empirically verifiable.125 Langmuir’s approach, to my 
mind, is most useful because it can be expanded also to include ideological or 
theological misrepresentations of Jews or Jewish practice. In this regard, Christian 
caricatures of Jews also qualify as chimerical when they perpetuate an image of 
Judaism that does not conform to Jewish self-understanding, does not draw on 
Jewish texts or traditions, and does not correspond to the reality of Judaism as a 
living religion.126 
 As will become evident throughout the study, Althaus—even when making a 
self-conscious effort to engage Judaism on theological terms—often lapses into 
‘chimerical’ discourse. For example, in his expositions of ‘Judaism’ he virtually 
never consults Jewish sources for his analysis. It is not always immediately clear, 
moreover, whether he is making reference to living Jewish persons when he speaks 
of ‘Jews.’ ‘The Jew’ is often objectified or instrumentalised to function as a device 
with a wide range of rhetorical purposes. The matter is further complicated by 
                                                 
124 See Part I of Smid, Deutscher Protestantismus, summarised at 199–200.  
125 See Gavin Langmuir, Toward a Definition of Antisemitism (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 1990), 330–34.  
126 Charlotte Klein has illustrated how, time and again, Christian theologians reject a Judaism that is 
merely a product of their own devising. See Anti-Judaism in Christian Theology, trans. Edward Quinn 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1978).  
 
 39 
Althaus’ tendency to use terms like ‘Jew’ or ‘Israel’ somewhat indiscriminately, 
though it is generally true that he considers ‘Israel’ to have become ‘the Jews’ at the 
crucifixion. As is still the case in much Protestant theology after the Holocaust, 
Althaus sometimes conflates ‘Jews’ and ‘Israel’ without nuance or regard for 
historical context.127  
 Do Althaus’ comments about Jews and Judaism have an explicit theological 
content or do they derive from an ideological source? Does Althaus prescribe the 
inclusion or the exclusion of Jewish persons with respect to German society? Posed 
in false binary, these questions obscure more than they reveal. The logic driving 
Althaus’ attitudes toward the Jews is, in my view, synthetic. That is to say, it 
incorporates Althaus’ socio-cultural (i.e., ideological) fear of the Jews within his 
unique permutation of the doctrine of the orders of creation. But his theology of the 
‘Jewish Question’ is above all dialectical: Althaus thus forms a system in which Jews 
are necessary enemies—simultaneously a danger to the German Volk and an 
indispensable factor in a healthy theology of the German Volk. For this reason, 
scholarly approaches that divorce ideology and theology, as if the two could be 
separated cleanly, invite misinterpretation of Althaus’ theology of the ‘Jewish 
Question.’128  
 As I have shown here, the state of research could benefit from additional 
investigation into this question. As Joo-Hoon Choi has observed, and as my survey 
has confirmed, the scholarly discussion surrounding Althaus has often crystalised 
                                                 
127 According to K. Hannah Holtschneider, this tendency characterises much speech about the Jewish 
people in the Christian tradition. See German Protestants Remember the Holocaust: Theology and the 
Construction of Collective Memory, Religion-Geschichte-Gesellschaft Fundamentaltheologische Studien 24 
(Münster: Lit Verlag, 2001), 38.  
128 See, for instance, Martin Luther, where Stayer suggests that ‘When Althaus wrote about the “Jewish 
question” in 1929, it was a theologian, not as a nationalist’ (91). However, I see no reason to separate the two: 
Althaus incorporated his nationalist loyalties within his theology of the Volk.  
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into narratives that either ‘generalise, simplify, or glorify.’129 For all of the valuable 
insight it has provided, then, the hitherto-existing literature has only begun to reckon 
with the theological imagination behind Althaus’ answer to the ‘Jewish Question.’ 
The narratives of suspicion run the risk of overstating his commitment to racial 
ideology and too often fail to recognise the constructive and performative functions 
of the Jews in Althaus’ theology. The narratives of sympathy, by explaining Althaus’ 
antisemitism as an ideological reflex or a cultural artefact, divest his opinions on the 
‘Jewish Question’ of the theological content with which Althaus himself 
intentionally infused them. In so doing, these narratives also overlook the integral 
role the Jews play in his doctrine of the orders of creation. In a sense, both narratives 
are correct, but Althaus’ dialectical approach actually occupies the space between 
them. As I argue through the thesis, Althaus’ vision of inclusive quarantine 
represents a unique iteration of Christian antisemitism: the simultaneous attempt to 
include Jewish persons within and exclude them from the Völker around them.   
B | A CHRONOLOGICAL APPROACH  
 This thesis is intended neither as another history of the Kirchenkampf nor as a 
work of Christian Holocaust Theology; there is a vast supply of literature on those 
subjects to which I can make little contribution.130 For this reason, the study is not 
                                                 
129 Choi, Das Konzept der Ur-Offenbarung, 18–19.  
130 The standard treatment of the Kirchenkampf and its prehistory remains Klaus Scholder, The 
Churches and the Third Reich, Volume 1: Preliminary History and the Time of Illusions, 1918–1934 
(Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1988). Important introductions in English also include: Victoria Barnett, For 
the Soul of the People: Protestant Protest Against Hitler (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1992); John 
Conway, The Nazi Persecution of the Churches, 1933–1945 (Vancouver: Regent College Publishing, 1968); and 
Peter Matheson, The Third Reich and the Christian Churches (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1981). See also 105–09 on 
the Kirchenkampf below. For notable works in Christian Holocaust theology, see Alice Eckardt and A. Roy 
Eckardt, Long Night’s Journey into Day: A Revised Retrospective on the Holocaust, revised edition (Detroit, MI: 
Wayne State University Press, 1988); Stephen Haynes, Prospects for Post-Holocaust Theology: ‘Israel’ in the 
Theologies of Karl Barth, Jürgen Moltmann, and Paul Van Buren, American Academy of Religion Series 77 
(Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1991); Franklin Little, The Crucifixion of the Jews: The Failure of Christians to 
Understand the Jewish Experience (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1986); Rosemary Radford Ruether, 
Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots of Anti-Semitism (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 1995); and Paul Van 
Buren, A Theology of Jewish Christian Reality (San Francisco, CA: Harper & Row, 1987). 
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organised thematically. Instead, what I offer here is a systematic chronological 
exegesis of Althaus’ theology of Jews and Judaism as it came to expression across 
his public lectures, works of academic theology, biblical studies, and ethics, as well 
as essays of social commentary, sermons, and archival material. My reading of 
Althaus is canonical, so to speak—that is to say, I use documents from a similar 
timeframe to inform and interpret others. In this way, for example, the thesis 
illuminates the complex strand of Christian antisemitism behind the Erlangen 
Opinion on the Aryan Paragraph by drawing on Althaus’ comments on the ‘Jewish 
Question’ found elsewhere in his corpus.   
 The thesis is structured according to chronology: I trace the development of 
the discursive categories Althaus used to interpret the meaning of Jewish existence 
over three periods: the Weimar Republic (1918 to early 1933), the National Socialist 
regime (1933–1945), and denazification and the Federal Republic of Germany (1945 
to Althaus’ death in 1966). Although Althaus only addressed the ‘Jewish Question’ 
as such in four texts before the Nazi Machtergreifung, the Jews would continue to 
function as important symbols in his theology of the Volk through to the end of his 
life. This chronological approach will elucidate whether and how the ways in which 
he interpreted Jewish existence changed over the course of his professional career, 
particularly in light of the increasing disenfranchisement of Jewish persons, which 
began in the early 1930s and culminated in their catastrophic genocide in the Shoah. 
I sketch the trajectory of the dissertation below.  
 The argument of the thesis proceeds along four movements. In the first 
movement, I uncover the rudiments of Althaus’ theology of the ‘Jewish Question,’ 
which he formulates for the first time toward the end of the Weimar Republic. 
Chapter two surveys two key publications from the era—Kirche und Volkstum 
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(1927) and Leitsätze zur Ethik (1929)—to establish the pathological pole of the 
dialectic. Here, Althaus targets Jews as pathogens who bear a spiritual sickness that 
threatens to infect German Volkstum. At the same time, however, he begins to lay out 
the (quasi-)inclusive social model that would come to structure his thinking about the 
place of Jews in civil and ecclesial communities. Chapter three turns to works 
composed just before the Nazi revolution: Gott und Volk (1932) and Der Brief an die 
Römer (1932). In these pieces, Althaus builds on his earlier work toward a more 
robust vision of Jewish performance—i.e., the mysterious theological function of 
Jewish existence. These chapters, taken together, establish the contours of Althaus’ 
proposed solution to the ‘Jewish Question’ as it developed within his doctrine of the 
orders of creation during the Weimar era: inclusive quarantine. It is during this 
period, moreover, that Althaus first hints at a paradoxical link between the Jewish 
and German destinies. This link, by which he can sometimes make an explicit 
identification of German and Jewish experience, would play a central role in his 
understanding of the ongoing significance of Judaism, especially in the postwar 
period.  
 The second movement uses the interpretive grid of inclusive quarantine to 
draw out critical nuances of two theological declarations co-authored by Althaus in 
the early years of National Socialism’s administration: the Theologisches Gutachten 
über die Zulassung von Christen jüdischer Herkunft zu den Ämtern der deutschen 
evangelischen Kirche (25 September 1933) and the Ansbacher Ratschlag zu der 
Barmer theologischen Erklärung (11 June 1934). These nuances are difficult to 
discern without a broader knowledge of Althaus’ dialectical approach to the ‘Jewish 
Question.’ In particular, chapter four argues that both documents reflect a 
formulation of the doctrine of the orders of creation in which the church (and the 
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organisation of civil society) is subordinated to the Volk to produce a xenophobic, 
and therefore deficient, political theology and ecclesiology. In chapter five, I then 
suggest that the Erlangen Opinion represents Althaus’ broader theological vision for 
Jewish existence in microcosm: Christians of Jewish descent (as well as Jewish 
scripture), though vital for both Christian and German self-understanding, must be 
quarantined even within the church.  
 The third movement examines the evolution of Althaus’ posture toward Jews 
and Judaism in the years following the Shoah. In this section, I conclude that, even in 
light of the inhuman crimes against the Jews, Althaus came to relinquish the dialectic 
of pathology and performance only gradually and partially. Thus Althaus’ mature 
theology of the ‘Jewish Question’ is characterised by both continuity and 
discontinuity. On the one hand, as I argue in chapter six, ‘Jews’ continue to perform 
vital pastoral functions for the ruined German Volk—that is, Althaus uses the story of 
Israel (but perhaps not living Jewish persons themselves) to interpret the experience 
of German suffering and guilt. In his academic works of biblical exegesis and 
theological ethics, on the other hand, Althaus appears to make a conscious effort to 
reform his prior views on the Volk and the state following the genocide of Europe’s 
Jews. However, as I suggest in chapter seven, this attempt is abortive because he had 
always connected pathology and performance so closely. In short, if Althaus cannot 
speak of Jews as pathological he cannot really speak of Jews at all.  
 The project’s fourth movement approaches Althaus as a case study in the 
viability of Lutheran social ethics. His singular adaptation of the Lutheran 
Schöpfungsordnungslehre, with which he classified the world’s peoples according to 
an ethnic taxonomy, had produced both an ecclesiology and a social ethics unable to 
cope with the moral pressures of the Third Reich. As a result, some critics, chiefly 
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Karl Barth, have pointed to the doctrine—and Althaus’ particularly xenophobic 
version—as proof of a fatal flaw in Lutheran ethics.  
 Chapters eight and nine, therefore, address broader questions of Lutheran 
dogmatics. In chapter eight, I suggest that Althaus constructed his paradigm of 
inclusive quarantine, along with its problematic implications for ecclesiology, against 
his better judgment. In chapter nine, I show that there are resources for repair within 
Althaus’ own Lutheran tradition, looking to his contemporaries Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 
Rudolf Bultmann, and Hermann Sasse for materials with which to build a more 
genuinely inclusive socio-ecclesial theology. These chapters are critical if we are to 
apply this study of Althaus to larger issues in Christian theology. Indeed, for Althaus 
the ‘Jewish Question’ was always an ecclesial question to be approached in view of 
its explicit contemporary significance for the church.131 The Erlangen Opinion on the 
Aryan Paragraph (which lies at the heart of the thesis) was, after all, the product of 
deliberation about what the church is and who belongs in it. If there are lessons to be 
learned from Althaus’ story going forward, we must start here: at the intersection of 
creation and church, both of which were connected closely with the meaning of the 
Jews in his theological imagination.  
 
                                                 
131 See Smid, Deutscher Protestantismus, 282–83.  
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MOVEMENT I: THE VOLK WHO BELONG EVERYWHERE AND NOWHERE: ALTHAUS’ 
SOCIETAL VISION FOR THE JEWS DURING THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC (1919–1933) 
 
SECTION I INTRODUCTION | INCLUSIVE QUARANTINE AND THE DIALECTIC OF 
PATHOLOGY AND PERFORMANCE 
 
In Althaus’ writings of the Weimar era, the Jews play a critical yet precarious 
role. Appearing as the simultaneously elect and cursed people of God, the Jews are 
condemned to wander on the margins of all human societies as living signs of God’s 
judgment and as irritants that prevent the achievement of the total ethnic 
homogeneity of other peoples. They are portrayed, moreover, as powerful and 
dangerous foils against which Germans struggle to fulfill their own destiny and to 
protect their society against spiritual sickness. In each case, Althaus confronts the 
‘Jewish Question’ within the context of his singularly aggressive strain of the 
Lutheran doctrine of the orders of creation, which Karl Barth once vilified as ‘the 
most evil of all theological doctrines.’1   
In the section to follow we examine Althaus’ attitudes toward Jews and 
Judaism as they developed toward the final years of the Weimar Republic, the first 
point at which he addressed himself explicitly to the ‘Jewish Question.’ In chapter 
two we uncover Althaus’ paradoxical paradigm for approaching the issue of Jewish 
communities in Germany, with specific reference to a pair of publications from the 
late 1920s: Kirche und Volkstum (1927) and Leitsätze zur Ethik (1929). There is no 
doubt that during this period Althaus, not unlike many of his contemporaries, 
perceived the Jews as a danger to German Volkstum. However, he rejected both the 
Enlightenment project of emancipation–assimilation and the demand for the 
                                                 
1 Karl Barth, ‘Basic Problems of Christian Social Ethics: A Discussion with Paul Althaus,’ in The 
Beginnings of Dialectic Theology, vol. 2, ed. James Robinson, trans. Keith Crim (Richmond, VA: John Knox 
Press, 1968), 48.  
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expulsion of Jews from Germany motivated by crude racial antisemitism. Instead, 
Althaus envisions Germans and Jews as occupying the same societal space, though 
clearly (and visibly) delineated from one another. Chapter three aims to investigate 
the mysterious theological purpose of Jewish existence as imagined by Althaus on 
the eve of the ‘great turning point’ of the National Socialist rise to power. In two 
publications from the final year of the Weimar Republic, Gott und Volk (1932) and 
Der Brief an die Römer (1932), Althaus suggests that Jews, despite the dangers they 
pose, perform vital theological functions and thus are a critical component to a 
correct theological understanding of the German identity. To anticipate: during this 
period Althaus begins to develop his controlling vision of inclusive quarantine, 

















CHAPTER II | INVISIBLE OTHERS: THE ‘JEWISH QUESTION’ IN THE ALTHAUSIAN 
IMAGINATION 
 
We sense the Volk’s enemies in its midst, people who speak its language and  
eat its bread but are nevertheless its corruptors. 
 
Paul Althaus, ‘Das Vaterland’ (1929) 
 
INTRODUCTION   
 
 Althaus regarded the Weimar Republic with a thoroughgoing mistrust. Not 
only did the democracy represent a style of government he considered incompatible 
with the German spirit, Weimar also symbolised secularism and moral degeneration. 
In 1927’s Kirche und Volkstum, Althaus targeted the Jews as the prime 
representatives of this secular ideology so corrosive to the German soul. ‘The Jews’ 
serve as a rhetorical construct by which Althaus expresses his anxiety over 
modernity. His fear and suspicion of an emancipated and assimilated Jewry is also 
evident in his Leitsätze zur Ethik of 1929, wherein he called for a strict and visible 
demarcation between Germans and Jews within a shared societal space. What 
emerges from these two treatises is a proposal for the place of Jews in civic life that 
conforms to neither the Enlightenment project of emancipation–assimilation nor to 
the radical demand for the expulsion of Germany’s Jews. Here we discern the 
beginnings of the dialectic of pathology and performance, an interpretive matrix that 
would govern Althaus’ theology of the ‘Jewish Question’ until the end of his career 
and would ultimately yield a socio-theological prescription for inclusive quarantine. 
ONE | ALTHAUS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC  
 
Like many men of his generation, Althaus felt his life-course altered 
drastically by the outbreak of the First World War. Raptured with what Tanja Hetzer 
has called ‘war-euphoria,’ he was eager to join in the war effort, to which he ascribed 
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a religious significance.2 However, he was disqualified from conventional military 
service for health reasons. Not yet an ordained minister—and thus not eligible for a 
position as a military chaplain out in the field—Althaus instead served as a chaplain 
in a military hospital [Lazarettpfarrer]. He held this post in Łódź, Poland beginning 
January 1915; he also worked among expatriated Germans as an administrative 
pastor in Łódź until the end of the war.3  
It was during these years that Althaus began to develop his militant theology 
of völkisch nationalism; in his own words, it was in Poland that he ‘discovered 
Germanness.’4 He was especially moved by the suffering of ethnic Germans living in 
‘diaspora.’5 Several recent studies have isolated Althaus’ experience in Łódź as the 
decisive factor in the development of the nationalistic political theology, which 
would culminate in his public endorsement of the Nazi regime in 1933.6 Althaus said 
as much in an intimate account of his wartime memories to his Erlangen students in 
1930:  
The war brought me, as well as many others who were drawn into it at that 
time, two great, majestic things: first, solidarity [Verbundenheit] with 
German Volkstum beyond the borders of our state, in Poland and in the 
Baltics—it was among our German brothers in the East that we experienced 
for the first time what Volk and solidarity with the Volk really is. Then the 
                                                 
2 Hetzer, ‘Deutsche Stunde,’ 48. Through a survey of Althaus’ diary entries and publications in church 
bulletins and newsletters during the early years of the First World War, Hetzer shows that Althaus considered the 
German military campaign a ‘holy war’ and a ‘service to God.’ Althaus also saw the travail of war as an 
opportunity for religious revival in Germany. He would later argue that every member of the Volk who is fit for 
military service has a responsibility to comply with conscription. See Althaus, ‘Wehrpflicht,’ in Die Religion in 
Geschichte und Gegenwart, Vol. 5., ed. Hermann Gunkel and Leopold Zscharnack (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
1931), 1781–82. Hereafter referenced as RGG. Kurz argues that Althaus ‘sacramentalised death for the 
Vaterland’ (Nationalprotestantisches Denken, 496).  
3 Drawing on diary entries, personal letters, and postcards, Jasper has provided an exhaustive account of 
Althaus’ experiences during the war. See Jasper, Paul Althaus, 57–82.  
4 Paul Althaus, ‘Die Entdeckung des Deutschtums im ehemaligen Mittelpolen,’ in Deutschtum im 
Aufbruch: Von Volkstumskampf der Deutschen im östlichen Wartheland, ed. Adolf Kargel and Eduard Kneifel 
(Leipzig: Hirzel, 1942).  
5 As Althaus described them in sermons collected as Aus der Heimat: Lodzer Kriegspredigten (Leipzig: 
Eger, 1916). 
6 Most notably Liebenberg’s Der Gott der feldgrauen Männer (2008), which cites Althaus’ experiences 
in Poland as the catalyst for his radical theology of experience. See also Kurz’s Nationalprotestantisches Denken 
in der Weimarer Republik (2007) and Hetzer’s ‘Deutsche Stunde’ (2009). For Fischer, ‘[Althaus’] discovery of 
Germanness [Deutschtum] in Poland is consequently a decisive milestone on the way to a centring on Volkstum 
that was both theologically and politically normative’ (Zwischen Zeugnis und Zeitgeist, 90). 
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second thing: the experience of solidarity with German labourers who stood 
shoulder to shoulder with the young war volunteers in the trenches.7 
 
In light of comments like these, Tanja Hetzer has concluded that the later 
development of Althaus’ völkisch theology is only intelligible in view of this specific 
geopolitical experience in Poland.8 
 ‘The events of the winter of 1918–1919,’ writes Karl-Wilhelm Dahm, ‘were 
regarded as a political catastrophe by German Protestants.’9 Althaus was no 
exception. He was deeply disturbed by the terms of the Versailles Treaty, which, on 
top of seemingly interminable reparations and severe sanctions, also demanded that 
the German state assume full culpability for the Great War. Walter Sparn has 
suggested that this ‘trauma’ of the catastrophe of 1918 signifies the most decisive 
‘biographical rupture’ of Althaus’ life. His disgust for this sham-peace, coupled with 
his exposure to the plight of ethnic Germans in the East, triggered a traumatic ‘break’ 
so jarring that it would characterise his political thought for the rest of his life.10 
Althaus could hardly contain his rage as he reflected on the treaty in 1934:  
At Christmas 1918, barely home from Poland, disgusted by the shameless 
voluntary surrender of the Germans, by the impeachment of the leader, by the 
undignified confession of German guilt for the war, I wrote: ‘In the days of 
victory it was the task of the church to shatter all overconfidence, all 
arrogance, and all Phariseeism in our Volk. But today, after our grave defeat 
and in our state of collapse, it falls to the church to call our Volk to the value 
of a good conscience and to the defiance of confident faith’ (The 
Reformation, 26 January 1919). Then came June 28, 1919—that extorted 
confession of German guilt. Did the church at that time fulfill its pastoral 
duty, and has it done so since? Has it chastised the crime of Versailles, not 
only that of our enemies, but also the German crime of signing it?11 
                                                 
7 Paul Althaus, ‘Die soziale Verpflichtung des Studenten: Ansprache an die Erlanger Studentenschaft 
zum Abschluß einer sozialen Vortragsreihe am 9. Mai 1930,’ Zeitwende 6:2 (1930), 289.  
8 Hetzer, ‘Deutsche Stunde,’ 51. 
9 Karl-Wilhelm Dahm, ‘German Protestantism and Politics, 1918–19,’ Journal of Contemporary 
History 3:1 (1968), 29. See Fischer, Zwischen Zeugnis und Zeitgeist, 110–21, for a thorough summary of 
contemporary reactions to Versailles among Protestant theologians and churchmen. 
10 Sparn, ‘Paul Althaus,’ 4.  
11 Paul Althaus, Die deutsche Stunde der Kirche, 18. In a sermon preached on 18 January 1923, Althaus 




Althaus’ interpretation of the German defeat as an undignified surrender, as 
well as his contempt for the signatories of the treaty, is standard fare for the 
nationalistic rhetoric of the age. There are also faint traces of the ‘stab-in-the-back’ 
legend [Dolchstoßlegende] that appeared in conservative German preaching after 
Versailles and was revived in Nazi propaganda: cowards, traitors, and Jews on the 
home front had sabotaged the heroic young men in the trenches.12 After the 
inglorious demise of the Hohenzollern Empire, Althaus regarded the new Weimar 
government with the ‘admixture of fear and contempt’ that characterised the attitudes 
of most of his fellow churchmen.13  
There are a number of reasons that the nascent Weimar democracy was 
poorly received by many Protestant churchmen, though the majority eventually made 
their peace with it. Christian theologians and pastors like Althaus—suffering from 
what Fischer has called ‘crisis syndrome’—feared that the German way of life was 
under double siege: 1) the alien forces of urbanisation, secularism, liberalism, 
pluralism and individualism were rapidly pulling German society apart, and 2) 
corrosive cosmopolitan spirituality threatened to disintegrate Germany’s historic 
bond with the Christian faith.14 In addition to the widespread corruption of German 
                                                 
has now backfired as a punishing curse over our Volk.’ See ‘Losung für den deutschen Kampf,’ in Der 
Lebendige: Rockstocker Predigten, 2nd ed. (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1926), 114.  
12 See Arlie Hoover, The Gospel of Nationalism: German Patriotic Preaching from Napoleon to 
Versailles (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1986), 140–41. For the use of this legend in Nazi rhetoric, see Jeffrey Herf, The 
Jewish Enemy: Nazi Propaganda during World War II and the Holocaust (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2006) and David Welch, The Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda, 2nd ed. (London: Taylor & Francis, 
2007). Fischer notes that Althaus subscribed to a form of this legend in Zwischen Zeugnis und Zeitgeist (141). See 
also Kurz, Nationalprotestantisches Denken, 413.  
13 Fischer, Zwischen Zeugnis und Zeitgeist, 36. Writing in 1926, Otto Dibelius summarised: ‘Since the 
mood of the church is overwhelmingly hostile to the republic, the Church’s attitude toward the new state is one of 
great reserve.’ See Dibelius, Das Jahrhundert der Kirche (Berlin: Furche-Verlag, 1926), 76.  
14 Fischer, Zwischen Zeugnis und Zeitgeist, 24–26. Ericksen has argued that Althaus’ fear of modernity 
is the ‘crucial element’ to understanding his political thought. See Theologians Under Hitler, 119. On the 
cultural, social, and sexual developments which many Christian theologians found disturbing during Weimar, see 
Peter Gay, Weimar Culture: The Outsider as Insider (New York: Norton, 2001) and Eric Weitz, Weimar 
Germany: Promise and Tragedy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).  
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morals, conservative theologians also railed against Weimar’s capitalist economic 
policies and western-style government as foreign to the German spirit.15 Yet Althaus 
in particular also objected to Weimar because, by usurping the authority to determine 
Germany’s national destiny from God and placing it in the hands of the masses, the 
democratic system violated the orders of creation. Weimar distorted Althaus’ ideal 
vision of theonomic government, wherein authority derives only from God and is 
administered only through legitimate hierarchical structures.16  
All the same, Althaus was in the end able to reach an uneasy rapprochement 
with the young Republic, even if it was for pragmatic reasons. The evidence suggests 
that he probably never considered the Weimar Republic a viable form of government 
for the German people; it was always provisional—an ‘emergency state’ [Notbau] 
and a makeshift protection against ‘the very worst—chaos and anarchy.’17 
Nevertheless, after negotiating a settlement in which the Landeskirchen retained their 
autonomy and privileged status, most Protestant leaders could muster some support 
for the new democracy with their heads if not necessarily with their hearts.18 
Fundamentally, though, Althaus continued to think of Weimar as a concrete symbol 
of Germany’s national humiliation at Versailles: 
The government and its constitution at that time were also the expression and 
the means of German debasement and its atrophied state. But those men gave 
their Yes to cooperation, because—in all its debasement, inadequacy, and 
impotence—it was nevertheless at that moment the only possible 
governmental form for the German life.19  
                                                 
15 See Sparn, ‘Paul Althaus,’ 10.  
16 See Paul Althaus, Obrigkeit und Führertum: Wandlungen das evangelischen Staatsethos in 
Deutschland (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1936), 10.  
17 Ibid., 51. Tanja Hetzer has shown convincingly that the entire trajectory of Althaus’ political thinking 
has always been ‘anti-democratic’ and that he took ‘an explicit political position against democracy and the 
Weimar constitution’ (‘Deutsche Stunde,’ 237–38). 
18 The Protestant leadership’s pragmatic settlement with the Weimar Republic is a central premise of 
J.R.C. Wright, ‘Above Parties’: The Political Attitudes of the German Protestant Church Leadership 1918–1933, 
Oxford Historical Monographs (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), especially chapters 1 and 3.  
19 Althaus, Obrigkeit und Führertum, 52. Though he despised the principles of the Weimar state, the 
surrounding passage makes clear that Althaus feels constrained against the notion of revolution by Romans 13 




Near the apex of Weimar’s ill-fated tenure, he lamented from the pulpit: ‘We live 
between the times. Our past has sunk beneath the mighty hand of God; power, 
freedom, and honour have been shattered for us Germans. . .’ Patriots could do 
nothing but ‘wait for a new German day.’20 
 The writings of the Weimar period represent Althaus’ attempt to make sense 
of life ‘between the times.’ During these years he reflected on the nature and limits 
of Volkstum—that is, not only ethnic belonging, but also a Volk’s awareness of being 
a Volk as it enacts its customs and sensibilities in concrete ways.21 Through this 
concentration on Volkstum he also develops theological and völkisch criteria by 
which to determine what—or who—is not German. It is therefore not surprising that 
Althaus’ first public comments on the ‘Jewish Question’ appear during the Weimar 
years, though the public debate about the civil position of Jews had been ongoing 
since the eighteenth century. His writings from the pre-Weimar period, curiously, 
make virtually no mention of the Jews, despite his involvement in the völkisch 
movement in Poland, where he would have undoubtedly encountered Jewish 
communities.22 Instead, Althaus reserved judgment on the ‘Jewish Question’ until 
                                                 
government, he still preferred imperfect order to chaos. As Jasper has shown, Althaus remained skeptical not only 
of democracy generally, but also that the Weimar Republic in particular could achieve the renewal of the German 
spirit. See ‘Die Friedrich-Alexander-Universität,’ 261. 
20 Paul Althaus, ‘Sind wir in dem Deutschland von heute nicht Fremdlinge?’, (November 1924), quoted 
in Fischer, Zwischen Zeugnis und Zeitgeist, 451. On September 14, 1930, the federal election day in which the 
Nazi party claimed 107 seats, Althaus spoke ominously of the coming day of judgment of the ‘leaders of the 
Volk,’ presumably the leaders of the Weimar Republic. See ‘Vom Bau des Hauses Gottes,’ in Der Gegenwärtige: 
Predigten (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1932), 43–44.  
21 I leave Volkstum untranslated throughout the thesis as no one English term captures the meanings 
Althaus encodes into the word. For Althaus, Volkstum expresses every dimension of a Volk’s identity: language, 
material culture, religion, social custom, spiritual and intellectual sensibilities, as well as biological factors. 
Critically, the word also communicates the concrete ways in which the Volk performs its distinct ethnic identity. 
This is what I mean to convey in stating that Volkstum is the Volk’s awareness of being a Volk.  
22 Fischer concludes: ‘During Althaus’ time in Poland neither are the Polish Jews a theme for him, nor 
does antisemitism play a role in his publications—despite the very high proportion of Jews in the local 
population, which, next to the Germans, represented the largest minority in Catholic Poland’ (Zwischen Zeugnis 
und Zeitgeist, 509). This conclusion is supported by the conspicuous absence of comment on Jews or Judaism in 
the material treated in Liebenberg’s study.  
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the late 1920s, by which time public antisemitism had reached a fever pitch. But 
these writings reveal not a fanatic, but a conservative theologian with a contextually 
moderate approach to the ‘Jewish Question.’  
TWO | THE JEWS AS SOCIAL AND SPIRITUAL THREAT: KIRCHE UND VOLKSTUM 
(1927) 
 
 Different theologians posed the ‘Jewish Question’ in different terms. 
Depending on whether one privileged ‘blood’ [Blut] or ‘spirit’ [Geist] as the 
determinative force of Volkstum, the Jews represented either a threat to the racial-
biological purity of the Volk or a moral hazard to its culture.23 One of the most 
striking features of Althaus’ comments about the Jews, however, is that they do not 
conform to the ‘blood/spirit’ dichotomy. Rather, the Jews emerge as a danger in both 
the physical and spiritual dimensions of Volkstum. Althaus does, on balance, weight 
spirit more heavily than blood, but both play a critical role. This is evident in Kirche 
und Volkstum, originally delivered as an address at the second deutscher Kirchentag 
at Königsberg on June 17, 1927. These are Althaus’ first public remarks about the 
‘Jewish Question.’ They are also perhaps the clearest representation of his mediatory 
personality.24  
 Kirche und Volkstum tries to straddle the rapidly-rising völkisch movement 
and what Althaus perceives to be the historic Christian foundations of German 
society. He thus feels a ‘tension’ between church and Volkstum. To resolve this 
                                                 
23 The analysis is Töllner’s. See Eine Frage der Rasse?, 112. Töllner judges that Althaus, as opposed to 
his colleague Elert, stressed the ‘cultural dimension’ of the ‘Jewish Question’ over its ‘biological dimension.’ 
While Töllner’s conclusion is not wrong, it seems to me that Althaus does not separate the two consistently. 
While it is a useful diagnostic tool, the distinction between Blut and Geist (or biology and culture) is often blurred 
in racist rhetoric. As Susannah Heschel has pointed out, the racial theorists of the Althaus’ era considered the 
body ‘the physical incarnation of moral and spiritual qualities.’ That is, a Jew’s warped body mirrored the 
disfigurement of his spirit. See ‘The Slippery Yet Tenacious Nature of Racism: New Developments in Critical 
Race Theory and Their Implications for the Study of Religion and Ethics,’ Journal of the Society of Christian 
Ethics 35:1 (2015), 12.  
24 Ericksen has characterised Althaus as a ‘mediator’ in Theologians Under Hitler, 79f.  
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tension, he fashions the christianised patriotism that would come to define his 
writings of the era.25 Yet the essay also reveals his penchant for alarmism and 
decisionist rhetoric that, at moments, overrides his moderate temperament. Germany, 
says Althaus, now stands in its ‘hour of destiny,’ in a moment of ‘a new 
consciousness of our national type and responsibility, a passionate desire for the 
rebirth of our Volk out of the procreative power of our Volkstum.’26 Kirche und 
Volkstum, then, is a call to arms in defence of the Volk in an hour of apocalyptic trial. 
Although the speech’s immediate concern is the preservation of German cultural 
values in ethnic German expatriate communities situated amongst foreign 
populations, its focus turns quickly toward the alienation of the Volk taking place on 
German soil. It is within this framework that the Jews emerge out of Althaus’ 
imagination as a foil to the German national type and as an impediment to the 
realisation of the German destiny. Althaus’ theology of the ‘Jewish Question’ takes 
shape only when set into relief against his vision for a vibrant society rooted in a 
distinctly Christian Volkstum. 
 Althaus begins with the Volk as an elemental and unalterable order of 
creation: 
We mean by Volkstum the unique spiritual vitality [Seelentum] which 
distinguishes us from others and appears in the collective feelings, values, 
desires, and thoughts of all our ethnic compatriots; the species-specific 
spiritual-psychic nature instilled in the womb; a transcendent reality, original 
for all of us with our given life, before all of our decisions and desires. A 
primordial givenness [Eine ursprünglichen Gegebenheit] . . . a spiritual 
reality, mysteriously born of spiritual primal origination, and . . . carried on 
spiritually in history through the love which enflames it.27 
                                                 
25 Paul Althaus, ‘Kirche und Volkstum,’ in Evangelium und Leben: Gesammelte Vorträge (Gütersloh: 
Bertelsmann, 1927), 138–39.  
26 See ibid., 113–14, 142–43.  
27 Ibid., 114. Althaus had begun to develop this line of thinking as early as 1919, where he argues that 
the Volk is both temporally and ontologically prior to the individual. Here, he speaks of an individual’s 
‘primordial rootedness’ [ursprüngliche Verwurzelung] in the Volk. See ‘Das Erlebnis der Kirche,’ Allgemeine 
evangelisch-lutherische Kirchenzeitung 52:39 (1919), 841–42. Althaus also locates the origins of the Volk beyond 




‘Community of blood’ [Blutsgemeinschaft] is also a necessary condition for the 
origination of the Volk, though it is only one of several vital components. A Volk 
cannot originate without purity of blood, but once the Volk does originate, it can 
sustain itself even in foreign environments by virtue of the critical power of its 
spiritual vitality.28 The perceived danger posed by Jews living in German society is 
only intelligible with the understanding that for Althaus the Volk is a spiritual entity. 
The Volk derives its strength not primarily through its bloodlines, but through its 
Seelentum: ‘However great the importance of blood in spiritual history may be, once 
a nationality has been born, the prevailing factor is still spirit and not blood.’29 
 As a spiritual reality, the Volk is a manifestation of God’s creative will. On 
this account Althaus can indeed speak of the Volk as God’s own self-revelation, 
albeit in a qualified sense. That one is born German is not a matter of coincidence, 
but of providence.30 God has revealed himself to the German Volk in a special way. 
For Althaus, one cannot speak of the German heritage without speaking of 
Christianity. As Liebenberg has observed, Althaus, in line with his predilection for 
martial language beginning during his chaplaincy in Poland, imagines the German 
Volk (and later, the Church) as a Christian soldier entrusted with a mission from God, 
the commanding officer.31 Because of its profound but onerous spiritual genius, the 
Volk bears ‘the burden of German loneliness’:  
                                                 
irrevocable, immutable.’ See ‘Das Vaterland,’ in Der Student vor Gott: Motive zur Neugestaltung des inneren 
Lebens in der deutschen akademischen Jugend, ed. Georg Muntschick (Berlin: Furche-Verlag, 1929), 241.  
28 ‘Of course, a Volk cannot come into being without that condition, e.g. the unity of blood. But once 
the Volk has originated, it can, as a spiritual reality, continue living—indeed continue procreating—through its 
spiritual power. . . . It may, as we have abundantly experienced in our own German folk-history, even appropriate 
itself among foreign blood’ (‘Kirche und Volkstum,’ 115).  
29 Ibid.  
30 Ibid., 123–24, 127. It is important to note at this point that for Althaus the German Volk is not 
intrinsically superior to any other Volk, as we shall see.  
31 Liebenberg, Der Gott der feldgrauen Männer, 394–95.  
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The peoples receive different missions from the Lord of history. Our Volk has 
testified to God throughout our history, in which God has entrusted it with 
something unique. The German Reformation, German idealism, the German 
destiny of crisis and struggle, the struggle for unity and freedom through the 
ages . . . our Volk has had to endure the deepest questions of humanity more 
painfully and more profoundly than any other people, and is thus maintained 
and consecrated as a special priesthood of the knowledge of the last things.32 
 
The Germans are a nation of priests, which, paradoxically, is a designation 
historically reserved for the people of Israel. But unlike the Jews, the German nature 
has essentially been ‘shaped by the Gospel.’ The point is so central to Althaus’ 
theology of the Volk that it can scarcely be overstated: to be German is to be 
Christian.33  
In order to protect the German heritage, Christian theology is charged with 
the purification of the impulses of the völkisch movement, which, though holy and 
good, threaten to devolve into a toxic idolisation of the Volk. On the one hand, the 
churches guard against Übermut (‘arrogance’), through which ‘a Volk can puff itself 
up as a lordly race and with which it can feed its assertiveness so that it makes little 
of and despises the other races.’34 To temper the presumption to racial dominance 
Althaus warns that one must love one’s Volk ‘not because it is more glorious than 
                                                 
32 Althaus, ‘Kirche und Volkstum,’ 125–26. Cf. Althaus, ‘Volk,’ Glaube und Volk I (1931): ‘We thank 
[God] for the bitterly difficult and crisis-filled history of the Germans through which he has forced us into the 
depth of thought and faith’ (5).  
33 ‘The unity of “German=Christian and Christian=German is a clear, bright, and general fact. For thus 
testify the greatest hours, the most glorious men of our history’ (‘Kirche und Volkstum,’ 121–22). Since the 
German soul is unequivocally Christian, Althaus saw the attempt to revive Teutonic prehistory as ‘pointless’ 
(121) and spoke of the ‘unmistakable danger of a Germanic-Christian mixed religion [Mischreligion]’ (132). He 
would remain critical of neo-pagan movements into the Nazi years, targeting in particular the indologist Wilhelm 
Hauer, founder of the German Faith Movement [Deutsche Glaubensbewegung], in a 1935 tract: ‘Hauer will deny 
[Christian doctrine] for himself and for his friends. But he does not have the right to speak in the name of the 
German people.’ See Althaus, ‘Schuld und Verantwortung im Deutschglauben: zur Auseinandersetzung mit 
Wilhelm Hauer,’ in Theologische Aufsätze: Zweiter Band (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1935), 138. Compare also 
Althaus, ‘Das Evangelium Deutsche,’ Glaube und Volk 1:3 (1932), 42–43. Althaus would continue to criticise the 
German Faith Movement well into the 1930s. For him, once a Volk has encountered Jesus Christ, there remain 
only two choices: Christian faith or anti-Christianity [Christusglaube oder Antichristentum]. Put bluntly: there 
simply is no other religious alternative, such as neo-paganism, for the German people. See ‘Volk ohne Christus?,’ 
Zeitwende 14:8 (1937), 450–51. 
34 Althaus, ‘Kirche und Volkstum,’ 125.  
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any other, but simply because it is my Volk!’35 All peoples stand under the judgment 
of the Kingdom of God, which transcends every ethnic bond. On the other hand, 
however, Christian theology must also guard against Kleinmut (‘faintheartedness’), 
which ‘does not venture to accept or seize the special calling of its own Volk [and] its 
God-given place and therefore its endless responsibility also to keep one’s own Volk 
strong, free, and pure.’36 For Althaus, Christian theology guides völkisch zeal 
between blasphemous overconfidence and cowardly underconfidence, in part by 
identifying and appropriating the theological meaning of Jewish existence.   
But the German Volk has squandered its spiritual heritage. ‘Our divine 
vocation [Gottesberuf]—we recognise with great shame—has not been fulfilled. The 
German soul has lost itself.’37 Specifically, the Christian character of the German 
Volk, along with its concomitant destiny in the world, is disintegrating under the 
pressure of the twin dangers of ‘civilisation’ [die Zivilisation] and ‘strangers’ or 
‘foreigners [die Fremde].’ These two forces conspire to corrode German society:  
Our Volk, so we hear, has lost itself. Lost itself to civilisation, lost itself to the 
foreigner. To civilisation: this means rational organisation instead of a 
growing organism; the corruption of the masses instead of membership in the 
people’s body; a ‘society’ of unconnected individuals instead of an organic 
community; rootlessness and homelessness, both inward and outward, instead 
of inward and outward rootedness in our soil; disinheritance instead of life in 
the heritage of our fathers.38 
 
In Althausian idiom, die Zivilisation and die Fremde are actually the same thing: the 
‘foreign infiltration’ whose chief symbol is the Jews. Tanja Hetzer has identified his 
                                                 
35 Ibid. Compare Althaus, ‘Volk’: ‘We love our Volk not because it is so brave and glorious, but 
because it is our Volk according to the ordinances of God’ (5). See also Althaus, ‘Das Vaterland,’ where he 
suggests that Germans should love their Vaterland ‘not because it is of a higher worth than other countries, not 
because its Volk is of a nobler race, of richer gifts, or more majestic virtues. . . . Much of that will indeed be true. 
But we do not love Germany on that account. We love it because it is our Vaterland’ (240–41).  
36 Althaus, ‘Kirche und Volkstum,’ 125.  
37 Althaus, ‘Losung für den deutschen Kampf,’ 118. Cf. Althaus, ‘Der Weg des Glaubens’ (11 
November 1923), in Der Lebendige: Rostocker Predigten (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1926), 199f. 
38 Althaus, ‘Kirche und Volkstum,’ 115.  
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use of the term ‘civilisation’ as a culturally encoded reference to the Jews: ‘Without 
using the word Jew even once, Althaus portrays the corrosive enemy of the people’s 
community in the cultural code of the time, which connected all of these things with 
Jews.’39 Through the use of rhetorical associations—the key words ‘rootless,’ 
‘homeless,’ and ‘big-city’—Althaus targets the abstract Jew as the prime cause of the 
‘fracturing of our Volk and . . . the decay of our national community.’40 In speaking 
of the ‘foreign infiltration’ [Überfremdung] encroaching onto German soil and 
emblemised in her ‘big cities,’ Althaus is aiming at Jews.41  
 Althaus complains of the socio-political dimension of the ‘Jewish Question,’ 
that ‘the stranger is a force even in our homeland,’ exerting dominance through the 
‘foreign infiltration of our literature, theaters, our art, our fashion and festivities, the 
party system and public affairs. . .’42 But he suspects that the moral degeneracy of 
Weimar is only symptomatic of a more serious spiritual sickness. The real danger 
posed by the Jews is spiritual; because Germany is a Christian nation, moral 
alienation actually threatens the very constitution of the Volk. In a sermon delivered 
to the student association at Rostock four years earlier, Althaus had intimated that the 
                                                 
39 Hetzer, ‘Deutsche Stunde,’ 152–53.  
40 Althaus, ‘Kirche und Volkstum,’ 116. The term ‘rootless’ in particular is loaded with antisemitic 
freight. As Yoder has shown, by the nineteenth century völkisch thinkers were contrasting the urban 
Entwurzelung (‘uprootedness’) of Jews with the ‘bucolic rootedness’ of the noble German peasant. See Ordnung 
in Gemeinschaft, 25–27. 
41 Lowell Green has argued that Althaus’ concern in this address is with ‘hardened capitalists, whether 
Jewish or Gentile, who believed had abandoned the moral teaching of religion, possessed remarkable talents in 
the world of business, and had become unscrupulous and ruthless in taking over world industry’ (Lutherans 
Against Hitler, 118). Yoder has made a similar suggestion: Althaus is using the stereotypical ‘Jew’ as a metaphor 
for manifold societal problems: dehumanisation in the economy, the degradation of marriage, and the decline of 
the church’s influence in German life. See Ordnung in Gemeinschaft, 102–03. For reasons I will argue below, 
this reading, while not incorrect, is insufficient; it is clear from the corpus of Althaus’ anti-Jewish writings that he 
is concerned with the influence of the Jewish persons who stand behind the metaphor.  
42 Althaus, ‘Kirche und Volkstum,’ 116. André Fischer has characterised this widespread attitude as the 
‘fear of foreign infiltration [Überfremdungsangst]’ (Zwischen Zeugnis und Zeitgeist, 24–25). Here Althaus 
demonstrates close proximity to the NSDAP party platform of 24 February 1920, particularly points 23 and 24, 
which attacked the influence of the ‘Jewish and materialistic spirit’ in civil and cultural life. Althaus’ fear over 
the ‘spiritual’ influence of Jews shows an awareness of Nazi ideology, according to which Jews are both 
biological and spiritual threats. See Smid, Deutscher Protestantismus, 135–38. By 1934 Althaus would 
congratulate the new Nazi state for its efforts to ‘sweep away the filth of corruption’ and ‘fend off the powers of 
degeneration [Zersetzung] in literature and theater’ (‘Das Ja der Kirche zur deutschen Wende,’ 7). 
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moral degeneracy of foreigners (read: Jews) can infect Germans: ‘We are 
degenerating not only because of foreigners [die Fremde], but also through our own 
demoralisation.’43 Back in 1923 he had suggested that an influx of alien spirituality 
had already made Germans ‘foreigners in our own land.’44  
 Althaus would express his fear of, and hostility toward, Überfremdung most 
stridently in his 1929 tract, ‘Das Vaterland.’ Here again, he uses pathological 
language to describe the diseased state of German self-consciousness. Love of 
Vaterland, he laments, has grown ‘anemic’ [blutleer] under a ‘surge of cosmopolitan 
slogans and ideas.’45 The essay ties together several xenophobic (and antisemitic) 
themes as it builds toward its virulent climax, where the pathological dimension of 
the dialectic comes through clearly:  
Where there is love, there must also be wrath and hate. Whoever loves his 
Volk-type must also hate all degeneracy and anti-type [Unart]. We hate the 
faithlessness and torpor that is squandering our heritage; we hate the 
disgraceful foreign infiltration [Ausländerei], which is making us into apes 
and slaves to vile foreign fashion in theater and dance, in literature and in 
music. We hate the toxin that is spewing out of the big cities into our country 
through decadent literature, press, and stage performances. . . . We sense the 
Volk’s enemies in its midst, people who speak its language and eat its bread 
but are nevertheless its corruptors.46 
 
The subtext of this statement, as Roland Kurz has noted, is a culturally encoded 
attack on Jews.47 In particular, it is a broadside against emancipated and assimilated 
crypto-Jews who are all the more dangerous precisely because they appear 
German—they ‘speak our language and eat our bread’—but are actually enemies and 
agents of societal disintegration. These invisible Jews, streaming out of the ‘big city,’ 
                                                 
43 Althaus, ‘Losung für den deutschen Kampf,’ 120.  
44 Althaus, ‘Der Weg des Glaubens,’ 198.  
45 Althaus, ‘Das Vaterland,’ 240.  
46 Ibid., 243. Purely metaphorical readings of Althaus’ anti-Jewish rhetoric cannot account for a 
passage like this, where he is characterising the enemies of the Volk as persons who perform embodied tasks like 
speaking and eating.  
47 See Kurz, Nationalprotestantisches Denken, 464. 
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represent the most poisonous form of Ausländerei—a theme which will resurface in 
Althaus’ other writings on the ‘Jewish Question.’48 
The threat of ‘Jewish power and the Jewish spirit’ is immanent above all in 
the form of emancipated Jewry, and, as will become clear in his comments during the 
Weimar period, Althaus diagnoses the ‘Jewish Question’ as a spiritual crisis which 
Christian theology alone is competent to treat. ‘Our Volk,’ he insists, ‘expects today a 
clear word of pastoral counsel . . . what has been said up to now is not enough! 
[Therefore] the churches must . . . have an eye and a word for the Jewish threat to our 
Volkstum.’49 Even as he openly acknowledges a Jewish ‘threat,’ Althaus, 
paradoxically, understands himself to be combatting the ‘wild antisemitism, with 
which so many in our Volk today have been carried away.’50 As an antidote to 
frenzied racial hatred, Althaus substitutes what Tanja Hetzer has called his ‘pastoral 
antisemitism.’51 
 Althaus addresses the ‘Jewish Question’ here:  
It is not a matter of Jew-hatred [Judenhaß]—one can even come to an 
agreement with serious Jews on this point—it is not a matter of blood, it is 
not even a matter of the religious faith of Judaism, but rather it is a matter of 
a threat [Bedrohung] posed through a certain demoralised and demoralising 
big-city spirituality [großstädtische Geistigkeit] whose bearer is now 
primarily the Jewish Volk.52  
 
The dominant logic of Althaus’ theology of the ‘Jewish Question’ is encoded within 
this excerpt. When are the Jews dangerous? Not when they marry amongst 
themselves and not when they confine themselves to the synagogue. The Jews 
                                                 
48 See 73–75 below on Jews as ‘invisible others.’ 
49 Althaus, ‘Kirche und Volkstum,’ 130.  
50 Ibid.  
51 See Hetzer, ‘Deutsche Stunde,’ 149–56.  
52 Althaus, ‘Kirche und Volkstum,’ 131. Althaus now connects the brief allusion to the evils of the ‘big 
city’ made earlier in the address directly to the influence of the Jews. In so doing, he stands within a long 
tradition of German Protestant exegesis that blames Jews for the degeneration of the moral order. See Gerdmar, 
Roots of Theological Anti-Semitism, 601–09.  
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become dangerous when they intrude into public life, when they blur the bloodlines 
between Jew and German, but above all when they disappear into German society by 
erasing external identifying markers. And why are Jews dangerous? Not because 
Jews are an inherently inferior race, but because they bear the foreign spirituality of a 
foreign Volkstum. The problem arises when Jews violate the orders of creation—
when they try to overcome the primordial origination of the Volk—that is, when they 
try to become Germans. Strangers—that is, assimilated Jews—are camouflaged 
contagions who infect Germans with a deadly sickness of spirit.  
 Althaus considers the Jews’ moral bankruptcy to be self-evident, and he 
expects any ‘serious Jew’ to recognise why Germans feel threatened by them. After 
all, says Althaus, even the Jews’ own scriptures testify to their ‘ignorance, fallibility, 
and sin’: ‘The Old Testament is a book at war with itself [ein mit sich kämpfendes 
Buch]; semitic and yet at the same time, as someone well said, the most antisemitic 
book in the world—struggling against “Judah,” with a seriousness and depth that no 
völkisch wrath could ever match.’53 The immorality of the Jews has grave 
consequences for Germans. The Jews’ degeneracy, if allowed to infect the German 
spiritual life, threatens to shipwreck the mission with which God has entrusted the 
German nation. ‘The churches must recognise and show where the powers stand that 
                                                 
53 Althaus, ‘Kirche und Volkstum,’ 136. It must be noted that Althaus does believe there is a critical 
place for the Old Testament in German church life and rejects efforts to de-judaize the Scriptures. Though the Old 
Testament is not binding for a Christian, it is ‘full of Christ’ and is thus valuable to a Christian, whose posture 
should be one of ‘freedom over’ and ‘commitment to’ the Old Testament. He recommends that the church ‘lead 
the fight [against legalism] not with the furor teutonicus against the “Jew-book,” but in the name of Christian 
freedom, in the name of the correctly understood authority of the living God’ (136). Elsewhere in the same 
period, Althaus concludes that the Jews do not know how to read their own Scriptures. In particular, the Jews 
have misread the Messianic pronouncements of the prophets. This, for Althaus, is the ‘the Gospel’s question to 
modern Judaism,’ a question to which the Jews cannot give a satisfactory answer. See ‘Die Frage des 
Evangeliums,’ 212–13.  
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again and again hinder of our Volk in its self-determination and purification 
[Selbstbesinnung und Reinigung].’54  
By this point in Althaus’ rhetoric, the Jews have become a ‘power’ that 
threatens to thwart the realisation of the German spiritual destiny. The ‘demoralised 
and demoralising big-city spirituality’ of the Jews is unraveling the fabric of German 
community life by infecting public morality. Because of this, the sword of God’s 
judgment hangs poised over German society.55 What Althaus truly fears is that the 
influence of the Jews will undo Germany’s Christian heritage, thereby sapping it of 
its spiritual vitality and leaving behind only secularised and disconnected individuals 
where there was once a vibrant people’s community born of the German soul’s deep 
connection with the Gospel.  
In the same period, Althaus prescribes extreme measures to combat any 
influence that would jeopardise the integrity of the Volk. ‘Like all genuine love,’ he 
writes, ‘patriotism carries within itself wrath and hate against all threat to the life of 
the Vaterland, from within or from without, against the degeneration, enfeeblement 
and distortion of the state.’56 Once the rhetorical associations are decoded, this 
statement can be read as a call for defence against the alleged socio-political 
dominance of the Jews.57 In Althausian theology, a ‘people’s church’ [Volkskirche] 
                                                 
54Althaus, ‘Kirche und Volkstum,’ 131.  
55 See, for example, Althaus’ sermon for Repentance Sunday, 1928: ‘Das Gericht des Wortes Gottes,’ 
(26 February 1928) in Der Gegenwärtige, 7–8. In this period, Althaus uses the phrase ‘big city’ as a code word to 
trigger rhetorical associations with Jews, who were associated with the rapid urbanisation of German society 
between the 1870s and the 1920s. See Aly, Why the Germans?, 66–68.  
56 Paul Althaus, ‘Vaterlandsliebe (Patriotismus),’ in RGG, vol. 5., 1441.  
57 In his encyclopedia entry on patriotism, Althaus uses the language of Bedrohung (threat) and 
Entartung (degradation/degeneration), words he had used in connection with the Jewish influence on German 
society in ‘Kirche und Volkstum’ (115–16, 119, 130–31). At the very least, it is clear that the Jews epitomise the 
kind of threat that must be confronted with the ‘wrath and hate’ that Althaus prescribes in ‘Vaterlandsliebe.’ 
Jewish participation in the cultural and civil life of German reached its apex during the Weimar Republic. 
Moreover, the rise of Jewish influence corresponded to the development of political liberalism. As a result, the 
feeble democratic state and ‘the Jews’ were bound closely in the conservative Protestant imagination, where Jews 
were seen as ‘bearers of the liberal tradition.’ See Smid, Deutscher Protestantismus, 75–89. See also ‘Christian 
Teaching about Jews,’ where Lindemann notes that the Weimar Republic was commonly referred to as the 
‘Jewish republic’ (42).  
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fulfills a patriotic function in its defense of the Volk against this threat. It will 
‘struggle alongside all who fight for the rejuvenation of an already sick folk-life, 
work courageously for the preservation and renewal of old morals, organic 
connections, and for the overcoming of the big-city decay of the Volk, for a return to 
a healthy folk-life rooted in our soil.’58 By using the language of pathology and 
sickness, Althaus isolates Jews as contagions who contribute toward a ‘sick folk-life’ 
and obstruct German ‘purification.’  
Again, translated out of the Althausian idiom, this essentially amounts to a 
challenge for the churches to fight against the influence of the Jews, who are threats 
to the spiritual vitality of the German Volk from within. That is to say, Althaus’ 
comments on the ‘Jewish Question’ must be understood within the wider framework 
of his call for a re-christianisation of Germany. The sick body of the German Volk 
can only be restored to health through Christian proclamation, which entails 
overcoming the influence of Judaism: ‘The destiny of our disrupted Volk ultimately 
depends on the power of Christ . . . which means, as far as our responsibility goes: 
the future of our Volk depends on the vitality of our German churches.’59  
Within the logic of Althaus’ vision for a christianised völkisch ideology, it 
becomes clear why the Jews pose such a danger. It is not, in the strictest sense, a 
matter of straightforward ‘Jew hatred’ or purity of blood, since spiritual vitality, and 
not blood, is the critical force of Volkstum. It is perhaps more a matter of ‘losing 
one’s national identity,’ as Hans Schwarz has suggested.60 After all, Althaus seems to 
                                                 
58 Althaus, ‘Kirche und Volkstum,’ 139. At 127f. Althaus emphasises that it is one of the church’s 
responsibilities to support patriotism. He had complained of the ‘sickness’ of the Volk already in his 1923 sermon 
‘Losung für den deutschen Kampf’ (116f.).  
59 Althaus, ‘Kirche und Volkstum,’ 126–27. He later summarised: ‘Volkstum must seek the church, but 
the church must also seek Volkstum.’ The way forward clearly lay in a revival of the nation’s Christian past, for 
which both Judaism and Teutonic neo-paganism are obstacles. See also Althaus, ‘Volk ohne Christus?,’ 454–57. 
60 Schwarz, ‘Paul Althaus’ (2013), 143.  
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indicate that if the Jews would just stay in their synagogues and out of the public 
sector, the danger would be partially alleviated. But in the call for a ‘defence against 
the powers of alienation and decay’ within the context of a ‘rebirth of the life of the 
Volk out of its own sources,’61 Althaus is imagining the Jew, in part, as an opponent 
of the German.  
However, it is precisely as a menace that the Jews actually perform a critical 
role in Althaus’s theology as a ‘force’ that hinders German self-determination. 
Across Kirche und Volkstum, Althaus uses this alleged threat of Jewish influence as a 
catalyst for the re-christianisation of Germany. But Althaus’ statements also meet the 
criteria for what Langmuir has called ‘xenophobic assertions’—that is, allegations 
that do not actually refer primarily to actual Jewish persons, but to a ‘felt social 
menace.’62 The Jews function as an abstraction, a symbol of the kind of threat 
Althaus fears—namely, secular ideology. The Jews, as they fill Germany’s big cities 
with their poisonous brand of secularising and demoralising spirituality, serve as a 
necessary foil against which a revitalised Christian Germany must concentrate its 
renewed spiritual vitality in order to fulfill its vocation as a nation of lonely priests.   
THREE | THE JEWS AS THE BEARERS OF A ‘DIFFICULT FATE’: LEITSÄTZE ZUR ETHIK 
(1929) 
 
 Althaus’ clearest interpretation of the ‘Jewish Question’ appears in his 
Leitsätze zur Ethik of 1929, in which he addresses the ‘Jewish Question’ within the 
framework of his larger ethical schema. The enterprise of ethics itself is grounded in 
the Lutheran doctrine of the ‘historical orders.’63 The Volk, but not necessarily the 
                                                 
61 Althaus, ‘Kirche und Volkstum,’ 116.  
62 See Langmuir, Toward a Definition of Antisemitism, 330–31. Althaus’ rhetoric in this section 
probably does not meet the threshold for Langmuir’s narrow definition of antisemitism as ‘chimerical assertions.’  
63 Paul Althaus, Leitsätze zur Ethik (Erlangen: Merkel, 1929), 47. For Althaus, there is a distinction to 
be made between ‘historical orders’ and ‘natural orders [Naturordnungen].’ The ordinances of marriage, 
Volkstum, law, the state, and the economy are ‘historical’ insofar as they are more than bare nature; they require 
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related concept of race, is one such historical order, and is exposited along with the 
ordinances of marriage and family as well as the state and the legal system.64 In this 
treatise, Althaus develops the basic logic of Kirche und Volkstum into a more explicit 
formulation that would dictate his thinking on the ‘Jewish Question’ for the 
remainder of the Weimar years.  
Before offering his own partial solution to the problem of Jewish presence in 
Germany, Althaus begins with an overview of unworkable proposals. In so doing, he 
rejects both the total inclusion and the total exclusion of the Jews as tenable 
solutions. In Leitsätze zur Ethik, Althaus reveals his basic assumptions about the 
nature of Jewish existence and the Enlightenment’s failed attempt to solve the 
‘Jewish Question.’ Despite over a century of debate about the civil reform of the 
Jews, he complains, the ‘Jewish Question’ still ‘belongs among the most difficult 
national questions for us Germans.’65  
 For all of the mystery surrounding the ‘Jewish Question,’ Althaus is 
unequivocal that the methods of the Enlightenment have failed to solve it. The 
urgency of the question ‘cannot be denied with Enlightenment liberalism 
[aufklärerischen Liberalismus]. It is posed, in spite of all the assimilation, through 
the foreignness [Fremdheit] between the Jewish and German ethnic types [Volksart], 
which is now felt more strongly than ever . . .’66 Ironically, all of the efforts of 
emancipation and assimilation throughout the prior centuries—which had always 
                                                 
human participation in history to bring them to completion. See Paul Althaus, Theologie der Ordnungen, 2nd ed. 
(Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1935), 9–10. 
64 Over the course of the thesis I treat the ordinances of Volk and state extensively while mostly leaving 
aside the order of marriage as peripheral to the main argument. However, as Yoder has shown, the institution of 
marriage is central to Althaus’ ethical system as it is the most fundamental form of human relationship, out of 
which all other relationships grow. See Ordnung in Gemeinschaft, 62–66. 
65 Althaus, Leitsätze, 54.  
66 Ibid.  
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been incomplete and partial at any rate67—had not diminished, but only exacerbated 
the differences between Jews and Germans. On these grounds, Althaus dismisses the 
political project of emancipation and assimilation as an acceptable solution.68  
Althaus is willing to entertain the possibility that the essential incongruity of 
the Jewish and German ‘ethnic type’ might be overcome ‘in individuals’ through 
something like acculturation, in which a particular Jew might experience a ‘deep in-
growing’ into the German type.69 The concession to isolated individuals 
notwithstanding, he does not think acculturation will work on a larger scale. By and 
large, Jews will remain Jews and cannot (and should not) become Germans because 
the boundaries of each Volk, pursuant to the orders of creation, are impermeable. 
Althaus’ posture here is representative of his characteristic distrust of Enlightenment 
rationalism; his criticism of assimilation is also an attack on the Enlightenment 
project in general. For Althaus, the fundamental laws of the orders of creation trump 
the logic of Enlightenment discourse, which relies on the concepts of universal 
human dignity and basic human equality to flatten fixed and intrinsic ethnic 
differences.    
Because he situates his account of Jewish existence within the context of the 
doctrine of the orders of creation, Althaus will not grant that all human beings are 
simply entitled to the same liberties and rights. On the contrary, humanity’s historical 
                                                 
67 See David Sorkin, The Transformation of German Jewry 1780–1840 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1987), especially chapter 1, on the ambivalent legacy of the project of emancipation and assimilation.  
68 Althaus, Leitsätze, 55.   
69 Ibid., 54. We see similar language in a 1930 essay in which Althaus interacts with the Jewish 
philosophers Constantin Brunner, Max Brod, Martin Buber, and Franz Rosenzweig. Althaus regards these Jews 
as worthy of being taken seriously in part because they are ‘not ritualistic-orthodox Eastern Jews [Ostjuden], but 
personalities who stand in the midst of the German spiritual world.’ These Jews have embraced the German spirit 
and are ‘a long way off from modern cultural-Jewry [modernes Kulturjudentum].’ See Althaus, ‘Die Frage des 
Evangeliums,’ 13. Sparn adds: ‘[Althaus] did not entirely exclude the genuine ingrowth [Hineinwachsen] of a 
Jew into the German national identity’ (‘Paul Althaus,’ 9).  
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existence is governed in part by the elemental ‘law of conflict [Konfliktgesetz].’70 
Each Volk is created by God to be essentially distinct from every other Volk, both in 
its cultural determination and, more importantly, in its own distinct historical 
vocation. Each Volk is charged to defend its sense of calling, and this involves 
protecting itself against the influence of other peoples. Hence the ‘dual task for each 
Volk [is] to grasp the particularity and the special mission [besondere Sendung] with 
which it has been entrusted and to hold its ground in defence against all foreign 
infiltration [Überfremdung]. . .’71  
This schema inevitably results in conflict—indeed violent conflict—between 
the peoples of the world, as each pursues its unique commission within the same 
historical space. But in Althaus’ christianised alternative to social Darwinism it is 
precisely this struggle that drives history forward through the ‘dreadful’ mandates of 
the ‘law of struggle’ [Kampfgesetz] and the competitive ‘law of displacement’ 
[Verdrängungsgesetz], by which one Volk may overtake and replace another.72 
Althaus exposits this notion of progress-through-conflict in a Good Friday sermon 
from the same period:  
Wherever blood flows the depths of history come to light. Thus the way of 
our humanity is marked with blood! No Volk can ever achieve greatness and 
freedom without spilling blood! Blood flows between clans, blood flows 
between Volk and Volk, between the parties that struggle for the state, blood 
flows indeed even between churches.73  
                                                 
70 Althaus, Leitsätze, 63–64. 
71 Ibid., 53.  
72 Paul Althaus, ‘Kampf,’ in RGG, vol. 3, 595–96. To be clear, Althaus is not glorifying conflict per se. 
Conflict is an expression of the wrath of God in judgment against sinful humanity. Nevertheless,  
 
Conflict is a fact and a demand of all natural life. . . . Thus the struggle of the living against death is 
inescapably a struggle against each other. Despite all of the symbiosis that pervades the natural world, 
there prevails a terrible law of competitive displacement and a law of conflict, in which every living 
person must deal and from which no living person can escape. . . . The law of conflict—that no one 
lives without killing and without being killed—is a result of the wrath of God (595–96).  
 
73 Althaus, ‘Die Stimme des Blutes’ (18 April 1930), in Der Gegenwärtige, 158. He continues: ‘This 
flowing blood speaks gruesomely of the tragedy, of the awfulness of history, of the fact that apparently in our 




The haze of conflict and competition that envelops human life—what Althaus calls 
the ‘spirit of Cain’—is a curse, but it is also the means by which God administers 
creation after the Fall.74 ‘History,’ he writes in 1932, ‘with all of its constraints—its 
conflict, death, and so on—is not God’s final will. It is, however, his original will.’75 
The living nature of history, then, is such that two peoples may be pitted 
against one another in the pursuit of their respective historical destinies. In this 
romanticised ‘competition of peoples,’ it is impossible for both peoples to win; these 
grand questions of historical destiny cannot be decided through the rational 
adjudication of the Enlightenment, but only through the primal struggle of 
competition.76 This is so according to God’s original decree as prescribed in the laws 
of the orders of creation, which structure human life in its postlapsarian state. 
Though the final establishment of the Kingdom of God will do away with violence, 
Althaus does not take this to mean that conflict is a human invention that developed 
outside of God’s original intent for creation. On the contrary, it is a critical 
component in God’s administration of creation. On this point, moreover, Althaus is 
clear that he is not just talking about conventional warfare between nations; rather, 
                                                 
But the same abundantly flowing blood speaks also of the magnitude, the grandeur, indeed the glory of history.’ 
This is so because ‘There is nothing noble in human history that did not cost blood—blood, dedication, sacrifice. 
Volk and Vaterland, homeland and faith, justice and truth—they’ve all cost blood, and cost blood still’ (158–159). 
Althaus likewise romanticises human conflict in his 1932 essay ‘Die Gestalt dieser Welt und die Sünde: Ein 
Beitrag zur Theologie der Geschichte,’ Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie 9 (1932): ‘History is indeed awful 
in the antagonism into which it sets men against one another time and again. But this antagonism is a condition of 
that which makes life in history priceless. . . . History is dreadful wherever it is glorious’ (337). See also Althaus, 
‘Krieg II: Krieg und Christentum,’ in RGG, vol. 3, 1310, where he uses nearly identical language.  
74 See Paul Althaus, ‘Kain und Christus’ (3 April 1931), in Der Gegenwärtige, 54–55.  
75 Althaus, ‘Die Gestalt dieser Welt und die Sünde,’ 335.  
76 Althaus, Leitsätze, 64. Compare also Althaus’ comments in 1929:  
 
The races are wandering, and are crowding one another out. The jumbled living situation of the peoples 
creates difficult ethnic and governmental questions. So the peoples are forced together, on their way to 
constant confrontation with each other. There is at present wide enough space for peaceful demarcation 
from each other. But this space has its limits. Questions will arise in which not balance and equality, 
but only decision is possible. But this decision cannot be sought through the arbitration award of an 
international forum in every case (‘Krieg II: Krieg und Christentum,’ 1307–08).  
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the Konfliktgesetz applies even in spiritual battles between peoples, where their 
‘souls and wills clash.’77  
As Gerhard Lindemann has illustrated, Protestant churchmen of the Weimar 
period were waging a ‘war against the Jewish mind.’78 As a combatant in this war, 
Althaus saw the rise of Bolshevism in Europe as a key battle in the wider clash 
between ‘souls and wills.’ Already in 1930, he warned that civil unrest sparked by 
working-class resentment toward the educated elite was threatening to tear German 
society apart. The metaphor he uses to diagnose this crisis, significantly, is drawn 
from the discourse of pathology: class divides are a ‘grave, festering wound’ [eine 
schwere, eiternde Wunde] on the German body.79 As it happens, Althaus will later 
describe Jewish presence in Germany as a gaping ‘open wound’ [offene Wunde] 
marring the German body politic.80 The subtextual linkage of Germany’s socio-
financial crisis and the Jews could be incidental, but Althaus developed this 
connection more explicitly in the mid-1930s. There, he incites Christians in Germany 
to take up the ‘spiritual fight’ against powers and principalities. In so doing, he 
implicates Jews with Bolshevism, and names both as demonic powers in the same 
breath: ‘That [a reference to Ephesians 6:12] means: in this worldwide struggle 
[Weltkampf] against Bolshevism we are not merely dealing with men, we are not 
merely dealing with the Jews, but with satanic forces.’81  
Theologically, then, Althaus considers any human attempt to transcend the 
laws of the orders of creation (and the violent struggle which these laws demand) 
before God’s eventual ‘abolishment [Aufhebung] of nature and history’ a fool’s 
                                                 
77 Althaus, ‘Das Vaterland,’ 245.  
78 See Lindemann, ‘Christian Teaching about Jews,’ 43–45.  
79 See Althaus, ‘Die soziale Verpflichtung des Studenten,’ 290–92. 
80 See 91–94 below.  
81 Althaus, ‘Volk ohne Christus?,’ 452.  
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errand; peaceful coexistence between peoples lies beyond history.82 Applied to the 
‘Jewish Question,’ these fundamental laws of creation take priority over any human 
legislation. In the face of these ‘ethnic laws of life,’ says Althaus, ‘the Enlightenment 
[aufklärerische] appeal to the concepts of tolerance, equal rights, and universal 
human dignity makes no sense.’83 Within the wider logic of Althaus’ theological 
system, it becomes clear why he rejects the total inclusion of Jews through 
emancipation and assimilation as a viable solution to the ‘Jewish Question.’ The 
subtle bleeding of one people into another violates God’s intended design for the 
Volk as an ordinance of creation. Jews and Germans are in competition, each trying 
to realise its respective potential in history. When Jews disappear into German 
society, they forget their own distinct vocation as a Volk and at the same time 
threaten Germany’s pursuit of its own glorious historical destiny.  
In the end, Althaus rules out the vision of the Enlightenment for its failure to 
reckon with the intrinsic difference between Germans and Jews, but he also excludes 
fanatical ‘racial-antisemitism’ [Rassenantisemitismus] as a productive way 
forward.84 ‘[E]thnic hatred’ against the Jews as a ‘race inferior in themselves’ [an 
sich minderwertige] holds no promise for solving the ‘Jewish Question.’ As many of 
his apologists have suggested, Althaus does not fully subscribe to the pseudo-
scientific racial ideology that would come to define Nazi antisemitism. In fact, within 
                                                 
82 See Althaus, ‘Heilsgeschichte und Eschatologie,’ Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie 2 (1924):  
 
The life-laws of conflict [die Lebensgesetze der Widerstreites], which are at the same time laws of 
death [Todesgesetzen], belong to the essence of nature and history. Whoever hopes that these laws will 
be replaced through the establishment of the Kingdom of God’s community of love on earth is hoping 
not for a day in history, but for the abolishment [Aufhebung] of nature and history in God’s new world. 
The world of peace between the peoples is no historical world. The struggle between peoples belongs 
among the fundamental features of historical life. It is precisely as inseparable from the concept of 
history as birth and death, as the succession of generations (658). 
 
83 Althaus, Leitsätze, 55.  
84 Ibid.  
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three years of the publication of Leitsätze zur Ethik, Althaus would come to flatly 
reject the ‘ideological superstructures’ of National Socialism, including its racial 
theory.85 This is in part because he questions the stability of the term Rasse—which 
was by this time circulating in much racist pseudo-science—as a discursive tool to 
make universal judgments about ethnic groups.86  
After emphasising the precariousness of Rasse as an anthropological concept, 
Althaus objects to its usefulness on theological grounds.87 He does point to 
‘indisputable spiritual differences’ between the races, but argues that this present 
‘racial diversity’ should be regarded as a temporary state that will be abolished at the 
eschaton.88 Because members of different races all have their common origin in 
God’s creative act and will again enjoy fellowship in the coming Kingdom of God, 
Althaus makes room for ‘all races’ in the church (though the extent of this inclusion 
is severely limited, as we shall see in due course), a place where there is the 
‘possibility of self-understanding and community [Gemeinschaft] between alien 
races in Christ.’89 Race is thus not a totally static characteristic. Like the orders of 
                                                 
85 See Althaus, ‘Gegen den nationalsozialistischen Bazillus,’ Allgemeine evangelisch-lutherische 
Kirchenzeitung 65:3 (1932), 63. For scholarly commentary on Althaus’ attitudes toward racial theory, see 
Schwarz, ‘Paul Althaus,’ (2013), 143 and Sparn, ‘Paul Althaus,’ 9.  
86 Althaus, Leitsätze, 67. A church bulletin from 1931 reports that Althaus had instructed a conference 
of pastors to guard against the ‘over-estimation of the significance of the race question [Rassenfrage]’ when 
thinking about the relationship between Christianity, the völkisch movement, and Judaism. See ‘Evangelische 
Kirche und völkische Bewegung,’ Allgemeine evangelisch-lutherische Kirchenzeitung 64:17 (1931), 403.  
87 Althaus, Leitsätze, 67.    
88 Ibid.  
89 Ibid. Althaus elaborated earlier in the work:  
 
Christian thought affirms the ethnic segregation [Besonderung] of humanity and the particularity 
[Eigenart] of each nationality as grounded in the divine creative will and in the abundance of creation. 
But the Christian knows at the same time that ethnic separation signifies not only the abundance of 
history, but also the limits of the organization of the community, as well as its constraints. The eternal 
Kingdom of God will certainly be preserved for and fulfilled in individuality, but at the same time it 
will also abolish the barriers between the communities, which are represented in all particularity on 
earth: the person, the sexual/gendered, the ethnic, and so on (53).  
 
Compare also ‘Vaterlandsliebe,’ in which Althaus states that all ethnic associations are subordinated to the 
Kingdom of God, ‘into which all peoples have been called’ (1442).  
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creation, race is a penultimate condition intended to govern human life in the 
historical sphere. It is not ultimate.  
Although Althaus judges Rasse a dubious concept, he at the same time 
distrusts the Enlightenment claim of the fundamental equality of all peoples. A series 
of statements reveal his firm belief in a hierarchy of races, which are not ranked 
according to blood or biology, but according to their spiritual and cultural dynamism. 
Imperialist undertones come through loudly as Althaus repeatedly speaks of the 
responsibility that more advanced races have toward backward peoples: ‘the cultured 
peoples [die Kulturvölker] have a responsibility to educate and to protect “primitive” 
peoples [die primitive Völker].’90 It is, of course, part of the German national mission 
to educate ignorant peoples. Ironically, it is this same felt responsibility to spread 
German learning and culture that also animates the enterprise of assimilation and 
acculturation.  
Christianisation of primitive peoples, however, is another matter. It almost 
goes without saying that the simplest—albeit still provisional—solution to the 
‘Jewish Question’ would be for the Jews to become Christians. Though Althaus 
recognises that this solution is not feasible in human history, he nevertheless 
endorses the work of Christian missions to Jews. The ‘christianisation of the 
immature races,’ he says, ‘is the cure for ‘social exclusion and opposition.’91 But 
while he holds out hope for the conversion of Jews to Christianity, such an outcome 
remains a religious solution, and an improbable one at that.92 It is at this point that 
                                                 
90 Althaus, Leitsätze, 63. Althaus emphasises again: ‘The present situation of racial diversity calls the 
gifted races [die begabten Rassen] to the raising up of the sunken and to the education of the immature’ (67).  
91 Ibid., 68. See also Ibid., 55.  
92 Althaus contends that the church should not abandon the mission to the Jews [Judenmission] even 
though it has been ‘all but unsuccessful.’ See ‘Mission und Religionsgeschichte,’ Zeitschrift für systematische 
Theologie 5 (1927/28), 561.  
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Althaus proposes his strategy for dealing with the majority of Jews whose ultimate 
‘foreignness’ persists on account of their continued rejection of Jesus.93 
For Althaus the real threat is not so much the contamination of German blood 
(though this is a factor), but the corruption of the German way of life by Jewish 
spirituality. Jews are not to be feared on the basis of their allegedly inferior racial 
status, but because of the philosophy they represent. He warns:  
The danger of Jewry exists above all in the fact that, by virtue of its fate-
compelled elective affinity, it has become the chief bearer [Hauptträger] of 
the rational-critical, individualistic spirit of the Enlightenment, and as such a 
predominate force in the struggle against the historical ties, customs, and 
traditions of our people.94  
 
The Jews, then, are not only aliens, but also agents of alienation. Though Althaus 
does not elaborate on this claim, it is likely that he is targeting proponents of the 
ideology of the Jewish Enlightenment.  
Beginning in the late eighteenth century, a modern constellation of Judaism 
had created a distinct subculture based on the ideals of the Enlightenment.95 
Encouraged by the egalitarian impulse of secular political thought, many Jews 
immersed themselves in German culture—especially in the tradition of Bildung—in 
the hopes of attaining equal standing with ethnic Germans. Despite efforts toward 
total fluency in German language and culture, however, the place of Jews in German 
society always remained ambiguous. Many Jews ultimately found that they could not 
become Germans, but only Jews with a ‘bifurcated soul,’ with a foot in each world 
                                                 
93 ‘The deepest reason for the alleged ‘foreignness’ [Fremdheit] is to be recognised in the form of the 
external fate of the Jews and the formation of their Jewish spirituality through their rejection of Jesus’ (Leitsätze, 
54).  
94 Ibid.  
95 See Sorkin, The Transformation of German Jewry, 41–78. See also Jonathan Hess, Germans, Jews 
and the Claims of Modernity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002) for a helpful discussion on the ways in 
which Jews themselves participated in the discourse of modernity and shaped its development.  
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but belonging totally to neither. 96 Nevertheless as more Jews embraced the 
progressive social and civil vision of the Haskalah, the visible distinction between 
Jews and Germans started to blur. Consequently, emancipation and antisemitism 
shared a symbiotic relationship—a byproduct of what Shulamit Volkov has called 
the ‘paradoxes of becoming alike.’97  
Althaus believed that Jews and Germans had become too much alike. The 
provisional solution to this paradox, he argues, lies in ‘Jewry’s intensified awareness 
[verstärkter Bewußtheit] of its own unique Volkstum, its own special destiny 
[Schicksal], and its own particular situation.’98 Since the Enlightenment project had 
foundered, Jews now ought to give up on the illusion of assimilation. Instead, 
Althaus challenges the Jews to ‘openly profess’ [sich offen bekennt] their Jewishness 
by embracing their distinct historical calling.99 Ironically, however, his challenge 
implies the fear that, despite his attestation to the contrary, assimilation had 
worked—at least partially. By 1929, Jews could live wherever they wanted, marry 
whom they pleased, and pursue any career, including public office. They had 
effectively become invisible others, and it grew difficult to determine who was a Jew 
and who was not.  
It is not coincidental that elsewhere in the work Althaus argues that respectful 
human societies should be defined by ‘honesty’ [Aufrichtigkeit] and ‘genuineness 
[Unverstelltheit].’100 In particular, he exhibits a special preoccupation with openness 
                                                 
96 See Paul Mendes-Flohr, German Jews: A Dual Identity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 
89–94. 
97 See Shulamit Volkov, Germans, Jews, and Antisemites: Trials in Emancipation (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 202–23. Smid has likewise suggested that antisemitism, as a distinctly 
modern minting of hostility toward Jews, ‘always requires Jewish emancipation as its precondition’ (Deutscher 
Protestantismus, 199).  
98 Althaus, Leitsätze, 55.   
99 Ibid.  
100 Ibid., 36.  
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of physical self-representation in societal relationships. Althaus’ choice of the word 
Unverstelltheit is instructive. In its most literal translation, it can carry the sense of 
representing oneself ‘without disguise’ or ‘without pretense.’ In addition to the 
baseline level of honesty without which no society can thrive, Althaus is likely also 
calling for Jews to give up the sham of assimilation and openly embrace their 
Jewishness in visibly perceptible ways.  
Althaus’ call for Jews to ‘come out’101 and identify themselves hints at his 
fear and suspicion of assimilated Jews who were now impossible to distinguish from 
Germans. Only when the Jews openly confess their Jewishness can the appropriate 
‘boundaries’ between Jews and Germans be established. With these boundaries in 
place, Althaus envisions a ‘worthy community’ characterised by mutual respect.102 It 
is critical to recognise, however, that Althaus does not envision two separate 
societies for Germans and Jews, but rather clearer demarcation between Germans 
and Jews in one shared societal space. In other words, the vision is quarantine, not 
expulsion. The health of German society depends on the ability to determine who is 
sick and who is not—and then to keep the two separate.  
Though contextually moderate, Althaus’ prescription—that the Jews embrace 
their Jewishness and renew their focus on their own particular calling as a people—
has dramatic implications because of the undesirable nature of the Jewish vocation. 
Though, says Althaus, the orders of creation dictate that the world’s peoples ought to 
have remained distinct from each other, they have become jumbled in the unfolding 
                                                 
101 The verb construction sich bekennen, which I have rendered ‘to profess to,’ can also carry the 
meaning of ‘to come out of the closet.’ As Jon Stratton has shown, this language, translated from the discourse of 
sexual identity, can also be used to capture the difficulties of identifying oneself as Jewish in the midst of a non-
Jewish majority culture. See his Coming Out Jewish, Constructing Ambivalent Identities (London: Routledge, 
2000). Though it is perhaps anachronistic to assign this meaning to the phrase as Althaus uses it, it does evoke the 
sense of fear and suspicion that Althaus harboured toward assimilated Jews as invisible others.  
102 Althaus, Leitsätze, 55. 
 
 76 
of history. In the midst of this ‘muddle of peoples,’ he judges that ‘not every Volk 
finds the possibility of the formation of its own national state.’ While some peoples 
are privileged to realise the destiny of nationhood, others must bear the ‘difficult 
fate’ [schweres Schicksal] of living as exiles in a foreign state in order to testify to 
‘the limits of the national state’s authority.’103 Althaus describes the Jews’ alleged 
divine commission in nearly identical terms: 
. . . the mystery of the Jewish destiny among and for the peoples has, in the 
judgment of faith, a serious purpose. The question of this scattered, homeless 
Jewry [zerstreuten, heimatlosen Judentums] exhibits the open question of 
history in general, reminds us of the limits of ethnic segregation and ethnic 
national-community [völkische Geschlossenheit], and directs our gaze to the 
coming Kingdom of God.104 
 
The Jews’ socio-political purpose and their theological purpose are virtually 
synonymous.   
It is precisely as the ‘scattered, homeless Jewry’ that the Jews fulfill their 
unenviable national mission as signs of the unresolvability of human history, as free-
floating alien bodies that prevent total ethnic homogeneity, and as mysterious 
portends of the coming of the Kingdom. The resonance with the ancient anti-Jewish 
libel of the eternally wandering Jew is obvious, especially because Althaus links the 
Jews’ current disinherited state with their rejection of Jesus.105 But it is striking to 
note how Althaus reframes what many Christian theologians have considered as the 
Jewish ‘curse’ (i.e. their exilic existence among the nations) as the Jewish ‘destiny 
[Schicksal].’ More accurately, perhaps, Althaus conflates the concepts of curse and 
vocation; the curse of the Jews is, paradoxically, also their divine calling. In an ironic 
and tragic twist, the Jews’ Schicksal is both their ‘destiny’ and their ‘fate.’ This 
                                                 
103 Ibid., 61.  
104 Ibid., 55.  
105 Ibid.  
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scattered and parasitic existence is the Jewish ‘special destiny’ that Althaus expects 
Germany’s Jews to embrace with an ‘intensified awareness.’  
 The last word on the ‘Jewish Question’ must still remain one of uncertainty. 
The mystery of Jewish existence, like the nature of history itself, necessarily abides 
in a state of ‘unresolvability.’106 With the understanding that any proposed solution is 
only provisional, Althaus recommends that Jews simply identify themselves as Jews, 
embrace their onerous national mission, and remain self-contained in their 
synagogues within established societal boundaries. This proposal reveals Althaus’ 
unease with the more radical rhetoric circulating at the time. He rejects the 
inclusion/exclusion binary represented by the ideologies of 
emancipation/assimilation and racial exclusion. Instead, Althaus casts a vision of 
inclusive quarantine in which Jews and Germans exist in dialectical relationship 
within the same societal space: 
The solution to the Jewish Question can be expected neither through the 
completion of emancipation and assimilation nor through the external or legal 
expulsion [of the Jews] from the life association [Lebensverband] of our 
state.107 
 
Althaus opts for a more-or-less medieval solution to the ‘Jewish Question’ in which 
Jews dwell on the fringe of all human societies as a perpetually dispossessed and 
disinherited sign of judgment and as a warning to other peoples with more glorious 
destinies to fulfill.  
CONCLUSION | INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION  
As our exposition of these two Weimar treatises has shown, Althaus projects 
what at first blush appears to be an ambiguous posture toward the ‘Jewish Question.’ 
                                                 
106 Ibid. 
107 Ibid., 55.  
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However, close examination reveals a dialectical societal vision for the place of Jews 
not only in Germany, but among all the peoples the world. Althaus characterises 
Jewish existence as inherently pathological: Jews—especially assimilated, secular 
Jews—are contagions who threaten to infect the German spirit and endanger the 
German destiny. Despite the risk of infection, however, Althaus will not entertain the 
expulsion of Jews from Germany—or, critically, from any other society—because of 
the indispensable theological functions that Jews perform. Instead, he suggests that 
Jews embrace an inclusive quarantine wherein Germans and Jews can share a 
common society, provided that each Volk respects the visibly-identifiable boundaries 
that divide them. This means that, in the end, the place of Jewish persons is both 
inside and outside of human communities—both everywhere and nowhere. Althaus 
develops these themes with greater theological focus in two publications from 1932, 
to which we now turn.  
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CHAPTER III | ‘OPEN WOUNDS’: THE MYSTERIOUS PURPOSE OF JEWISH EXISTENCE 
 
However we Germans solve [the ‘Jewish Question’], one thing will not 
change: the Jews will remain seated in our country, just as they are among the 
other peoples of the world. 
 




 Althaus’ attitude toward the ‘Jewish Question’—in both its socio-political 
and theological dimensions—was beginning to take its distinct shape by the eve of 
the great turning point of January 1933. In a pair of publications issued just months 
before Hitler’s rise to power, Althaus picks up and builds upon the themes he had 
developed in his earlier Weimar writings. The pathological element of Jewish 
existence remains in force: he continues to depict Jews as dangerous bearers of a 
diseased spirituality. What becomes clearer here, though, is the mysterious 
performative significance of Jewish presence not only in Germany, but in all 
societies. In Gott und Volk, Althaus recruits the Jews as a constructive resource for 
Christian nationalism. The stubborn resilience of this peculiar people, in a 
paradoxical way, actually prevents the idolisation of the German ethnic identity. He 
then seeks to exposit the profound theological meaning of the people of Israel in his 
commentary Der Brief an die Römer, where, since the crucifixion, the Jews wander 
the earth to plague the nations as an ‘open wound.’ In so doing, they serve as an 
ominous yet vital portend of the coming Kingdom of God.  
ONE | THE JEWS AS EXPLODERS OF ‘ETHNIC NATIONAL COMMUNITY’: GOTT UND 
VOLK (1932) 
 
 We again encounter the mediatory character of Althaus’ theology in his 1932 
essay Gott und Volk, wherein he searches for a middle way between two extremes in 
the relationship between nationalism and Christian faith. By 1932, nationalistic 
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fervour was reaching its boiling point, and Althaus perceived a danger in two 
opposite poles of the public debate about the surging völkisch movement. On the one 
hand, the rise of non-Christian völkisch ideology, whether in the form of secular 
nationalism or neo-paganism, threatened to drown out Christian proclamation 
regarding the relationship between God and the German nation. On the other, 
Althaus distrusted ‘a truncated concept of theology, indeed of revelation,’ such as 
that of Karl Barth, which altogether precludes the possibility of divine self-revelation 
in political and historical events.1  
In the first place, Althaus always thought of the church as the ‘conscience of 
the nation’: the organ by which love of Volk is tested and purified.2 Accordingly, 
against the radical elements of the völkisch movement, he offers an alternative 
nationalism that anchors love of nation in Germany’s historic Christian heritage. 
Against restrictive theologies of revelation, on the other hand, Althaus points to 
God’s action in the unique historical and political destiny of the Volk. The Althausian 
brand of Christian nationalism emerges here: ‘The position toward nationality 
[Volkstum] becomes pagan not only when one sounds a call to a ‘German faith’ 
[deutscher Glauben] instead of to Christianity, [but also when one] plays with the 
idea of resurrecting either of a real or a supposed brave ancient-German piety.’3 For 
Althaus, the path to German renewal lies not in the revival of Teutonic legend or 
pagan rites, but in a Christian spirituality that can interpret political events 
theologically in order to venerate the Volk without idolising it.  
                                                 
1 Paul Althaus, ‘Gott und Volk,’ in Die deutsche Stunde der Kirche, 34.  
2 Kurz, Nationalprotestantisches Denken, 455–56. Kurz argues that Althaus’ christianised nationalism 
is one of the defining characteristics of his innovations within the ‘nationalist Protestant’ tradition. 
3 Althaus, ‘Gott und Volk,’ 46.  
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 We have established that, for Althaus, the Volk as a God-ordained structure of 
creation is simply a datum: a static category that must be preserved in human life 
until its ultimate fulfillment at the eschaton. It is within this imaginative framework 
that he addresses the question of how the various peoples of the world, not least the 
Jews, ought to relate to one another in the historical sphere. But Althaus fears that the 
pressures of modernity are slowly eroding the foundations of the Volk: 
The reality of the Volk and the consciousness of Volk and Volkstum will 
remain, as it has previously. Indeed, even consciousness of the Volk has its 
tides. There are tides of forgetfulness and tides of new discovery, tides of 
healthy unconsciousness [of] the Volk and Volkstum—and tides where it is 
necessary to become conscious of the Volk’s danger of death [Todesgefahr 
des Volkes]. We stand today in such a situation of new consciousness of the 
Volk. We are thereby not better, not more German than our fathers, who 
spoke less about Volk and Volkstum and who indeed never uttered the 
buzzword ‘völkisch’—we are not better, but more threatened.4 
 
But what is this threat that confronts Althaus’ Germany with ‘danger of death’ unlike 
any other hour in history?  
Althaus once again targets Überfremdung, the steady encroachment of 
otherness into German life.5 He is concerned here with the alienation of the German 
‘type,’ both on German soil and amongst ‘German culture abroad 
[Auslanddeutschtum].’ As he had in other writings of the Weimar era, he affirms the 
unique ‘common spiritual type’ of the German people, which transcends geography 
and arbitrary national boundaries and manifests in language, culture, poetry, 
philosophy, art and architecture, law and constitution, and perhaps above all in 
church life.6 The Volk originates as a basic spiritual entity in Althaus’ mysterious 
                                                 
4 Althaus, ‘Gott und Volk,’ 35.  
5 Ibid.  
6 Ibid., 35–36. See also Leitsätze, 53f.  
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concept of ‘primal generation’ [Ur-Zeugung], and is formed through the confluence 
of factors, of which blood is one:  
How does a Volk come into being? Natural and historical themes work 
together: commonness of soil, of blood, of destiny. Living together, blood 
relationship, the experience of a common destiny in a state work towards the 
formation of a Volk. Here one already sees that blood relationship—what one 
means today by the concept of ‘race’ [Rasse]—is only one of many 
elements.7  
 
The Volk, simply put, is partially determined by racial relationships, but is primarily 
defined in terms of a people’s history, culture, and destiny—all connoted in Althaus’ 
concept of Seelentum, or ‘spiritual vitality.’  
 At this point, however, Althaus begins to stress that the Volk, which God has 
created and intends to sustain, is a penultimate, and not an ultimate, reality. He 
basically affirms the völkisch impulse, but fears that it has become untethered from 
Germany’s Christian heritage and, as a result, has elevated the Volk over its creator.8 
Because any ideology that refuses to recognise God as the creator and master of the 
orders of creation (of which the Volk is but one) will inevitably degenerate into 
idolatry, Althaus reminds his readers that ‘all earthly bonds have been “called into 
question before God.”’9 It is therefore impossible to speak of an ‘eternal nationality’ 
because ‘[t]he Volk is a creation and just a creation, God-given, but truly not 
immortal and not divine; it is instead mortal and transient, limited and sinful.’10  
                                                 
7 Ibid., 36.  
8 ‘Völkisch thought has it right in that it knows the experienced bond [between Germans] as “holy.” But 
it deteriorates into lies and becomes paganism when it only sees the bond and no longer sees the one who binds, 
who is Lord even over the bond’ (Ibid., 45).   
9 Ibid., 47. Althaus had spoken of God’s judgment over the Volk also in ‘Kirche und Volkstum,’ where 
he warned that love of Volk is especially susceptible to demonic distortion: ‘the völkisch desire is the will to 
live—it participates in the savageness and boundlessness of all natural wills to live. It is not exempt from the hex 
which hangs over all natural desires—the danger of a lapse into the demonic. The noble glow of Volk can become 
a wild, impure fire’ (120).  
10 Althaus, ‘Gott und Volk,’ 47.  
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Althaus senses a danger in the nationalistic zeal of both secular and neo-
pagan völkisch movements, which, decoupled from Christian teachings about the 
meaning and destiny of the nations, could only result in the idolisation of the Volk. 
Only through a christianisation of the völkisch movement could Germany expect 
spiritual and moral renewal:  
As [the church] testifies to God the Lord, the Creator, it makes the bond 
between Volk and fatherland more serious and more strong than any völkisch 
mythology, any racial fanaticism can. The church has forfeited its 
responsibility to defend the dignity of the völkisch imperative against all 
falsification.11 
 
Althaus puts it succinctly elsewhere in 1932:  
 
The passionate rallying-cry resounds through our ranks: ‘German Volk,’ 
‘Nation,’ ‘Freedom,’ ‘New Reich,’ and elsewhere we hear ‘New Society,’ 
‘New Humanity.’ We do not want to drown out any of these rallying-cries. 
The rallying-cry ‘Church!’ is not in competition with any of the others—but 
it must be the very first among them.12 
 
It is within the context of the Christian revival of Germany that Althaus hints 
at the symbolic role that the Jews play in his theological imagination. As we have 
seen, Althaus’ apologists take pains to stress that he did not subscribe to racial 
antisemitism. The comments in Gott und Volk support that claim. Although he does 
believe that blood relationship is an important factor in the formation of a Volk, it is 
not the determining factor. Althaus does not indicate explicitly that there is a 
hierarchy of peoples in which one Volk has greater intrinsic value than another. For 
instance, following Wilhelm Stapel’s Antisemitismus und Antigermanismus of 1928, 
                                                 
11 Ibid., 48. The argument is nearly identical to that of ‘Kirche und Volkstum.’ Compare also Althaus’ 
comments in ‘Vaterlandsliebe (Patriotismus)’: ‘But before the sight of God, natural patriotism is not only 
affirmed, but also purified’ (1442).  
12 Paul Althaus, ‘Luthers Wort an die Gegenwart,’ Zeitwende 8 (1932), 325–26.  
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Althaus discredits the Nazi ideal of a pure racial type.13 When Althaus does use the 
language of national type, he is not thinking primarily in racial terms.14  
While Althaus appears to reject the concept of the racial superiority of the 
Aryan type, he again demands that the peoples—defined not primarily by blood but 
by spiritual essence—remain segregated from each other according to divine decree. 
‘In the ethnic classification of humanity [die völkische Gliederung der Menschheit],’ 
in fact, ‘we recognise God’s creative will.’15 What is more, the nations are to remain 
distinct because they are destined to struggle against one another. Pursuant to the 
‘dark, terrible law of Volk against Volk,’ the comingling of peoples is for Althaus 
forbidden by God: ‘We also do not forget that the origination of a Volk comes about 
through nothing other than conflict and wrathful outward demarcation [zornige 
Abgrenzung nach außen]’ between peoples.16  
Within this imaginative matrix, Althaus’ fear of Jewish ‘foreign invasion’ 
comes into focus. Jewish assimilation is thus an unworkable solution to the ‘Jewish 
Question’ because of Althaus’ fundamental conviction that peoples should remain 
‘outwardly’ demarcated from each other. As we have seen, for Althaus a 
cosmopolitan culture in which one cannot tell who is a Jew and who is not represents 
a distortion of the orders of creation. Though he may not explicitly fear the 
contamination of the German type with Jewish blood, he nevertheless fears the 
spread of the Jewish spirit. This demand for more stringent and more visible 
                                                 
13 Althaus quotes Stapel as follows: ‘Like in all structures of life, so also are peoples not separated 
neatly from each other. One can never say with absolute precision: this one belongs to one, that one to another 
nature [Wesen]. There are individuals “between the peoples”” (‘Gott und Volk,’ 48).  
14  See ibid., 35–36.  
15  Ibid., 40. 
16 Ibid. Compare also Althaus’ handling of the elemental ‘law of conflict’ [Konfliktgesetz] in Leitsätze, 
63–64 and nearly identical language in ‘Volk,’ 5.  
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delineation between Germans and Jews is consonant with the social vision Althaus 
already had outlined in 1929’s Leitsätze zur Ethik.  
 It is crucial to note, however, that for Althaus segregation between peoples 
does not translate straightforwardly to expulsion of peoples from a shared societal 
space. Applied to the ‘Jewish Question,’ this means that ‘[h]owever we Germans 
solve it, one thing will not change: the Jews will remain seated in our country, just as 
they are among the other peoples of the world.’17 Even though Jewish existence 
represents a danger, it is nevertheless a permanent fixture in every human society. As 
André Fischer has rightly observed, ‘Jewish life in Germany is for Althaus an 
indisputable fact.’18  
It is at this point that the ‘Jewish Question’ actually provides a constructive 
resource for the christianisation of nationalism. For Althaus the Jews have a special 
significance for Germans as proof of the limits of ethnic solidarity. In other words, 
he recruits the Jews as a tool to combat or, to use Althaus’ more forceful language, 
‘blow up/explode’ the collectivism which undergirds idolatrous nationalisms: ‘It 
seems to me that their destiny, beyond all of the difficult tasks and hardships that it 
brings with it, has a clear purpose from God. . .’19 The purpose of Jewish existence is 
threefold: 
1) to ‘explode [sprengen] the ethnic national community’ [völkische 
Geschlossenheit] in human societies everywhere, but ‘with particular 
acuteness’ in Germany,  
                                                 
17 Althaus, ‘Gott und Volk,’ 48.  
18 Fischer, Zwischen Zeugnis und Zeitgeist, 517.  
19 Althaus, ‘Gott und Volk,’ 48.  
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2) to ‘point to the limits and relativity of ethnic segregation’ [völkische 
Sonderung], and  
3) to ‘direct our gaze to the coming Kingdom of God.’20 
 The themes expressed in this passage—the mysterious eschatological function of 
Jews as signs of God’s judgment over the orders of creation—capture the complexity 
of Althaus’ theology of the ‘Jewish Question’ during the Weimar period. The Jews, 
though dangerous, are actually indispensable for his theology of the Volk.  
Within his christianised völkisch nationalism, Althaus thus puts the Jews to 
work as a ‘thorn, which painfully disturbs gentile self-segregation in national 
identity.’21 The Jews, according to God’s design, must remain an unsolvable 
problem. The expulsion of German Jews, according to the logic of Gott und Volk, is 
a theological impossibility. Jews are indispensable not because they are intrinsically 
valuable, but because they have been charged with a strange and difficult vocation: 
to testify to the limits of national achievement in the fallen state of creation. These 
stubborn Jewish communities, which do not and indeed cannot assimilate into the 
societies around them, are evidence of the provisional nature of ethnic segregation 
and of the limitations of the ideal of ethnic national-community. In a paradoxical 
way, Althaus uses the Jews as a rhetorical device to expose a fatal flaw in secular and 
pagan ethnic nationalisms: the idolatrous exaltation of the Volk above its creator. 
Within the imaginative framework of Gott und Volk, Althaus proposes not that Jews 
be expelled or assimilated, but quarantined within German communities as an exhibit 
to prove that no Volk stands above its creator.     
                                                 
20 Ibid. The language is nearly identical to Leitsätze, 55.  
21 Jörg Baur, ‘Vermittlung in unversöhnten Zeiten: Zum Gedenken an Paul Althaus 1888–1966,’ 
Kerygma und Dogma 34 (1988): 189.  
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TWO | THE JEWS AS RIDDLE OF THE COMING KINGDOM: DER BRIEF AN DIE RÖMER 
(1932) 
 
 As Stephen Haynes has shown, the predominance of Christian discourse has 
traditionally interpreted the meaning of Jewish existence within a matrix of the 
simultaneous reprobation and salvation of Israel. Within this imaginative structure, a 
negative value is assigned to Jews on account of their rejection of Jesus Christ and a 
positive value is assigned to Jews because they remain the mysterious people of God 
who must be preserved.22 One difficulty with this ‘witness-people’ mythology is that 
it objectifies Jews as an enigma to be solved. Althaus struggles with this difficulty in 
his Der Brief an die Römer of 1932 as he puzzles over the ‘dark, depressing riddle’ 
posed by Israel’s existence: ‘The people of salvation history [Heilsgeschichte] has 
become the salvation-less people.’23  
Althaus’ interpretation of Paul’s exposition of the destiny of the Jews in 
Romans 9–11 is characterised by his dialectical approach to the nature of Jewish 
existence. It is true, for instance, that he does emphasise the critical salvation-
historical relationship between Israel and the church, Israel’s continuing election by 
God, and the Jewishness of Jesus, as Fischer has noted.24 However, as well shall see 
below, Althaus’ positive assessment of the value of Jewish existence, which is still 
critical of Judaism but more or less consistent with classical Christian exegesis, is in 
the end overshadowed by a lapse into chimerical antisemitic diatribes only 
tangentially related to his comments on the biblical text. Ultimately, Althaus returns 
to his familiar dialectic of pathology and performance in both his positive and 
negative judgments about the character of Israel’s existence.  
                                                 
22 Haynes, Reluctant Witnesses, 8–10.  
23 Paul Althaus, Der Brief an die Römer. Übersetzt und erklärt (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
1932), 79.  
24 See Fischer, Zwischen Zeugnis und Zeitgeist, 486–91.  
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 Althaus’ ambivalence toward the meaning of Israel is evident in his 
comments on Romans 9–11. However, one element that remains consistent 
throughout his analysis is the continuing, though qualified, election [Erwählung] of 
Israel as the people of God. Yet, as we shall see, the concept of ‘Israel’ has been 
reconfigured radically into the church. Nonetheless, Althaus praises the religious 
pedigree of Israel, understood as the people whose history is narrated in the Hebrew 
Scriptures:  
With the patriarchs and with Moses God confirmed and renewed the 
covenant; the Torah, the Law was given to the Volk from God through 
Moses; likewise, their cultic system, not established by men but instead 
ordered by God, is exalted over the pagan cultic system; from the patriarchs 
the Volk has received a mark above all others in the promise of the Messiah; 
at the beginning of Israel’s history stand the fathers, who have spoken with 
God directly, in whose history God has prevailed marvelously—where else is 
there a history like this?25 
 
In contrast to the extremist elements of the völkisch movement, which aimed to 
discount completely Israel’s salvation-historical importance, Althaus is unequivocal 
that God has elected Israel and that a remnant of Israel will figure prominently in the 
eschatological climax of salvation-history. What is more, he affirms that the people 
of Israel, in terms of historical origins, had also yielded God’s Messiah: ‘Thus has 
God loved Israel, that his entire glory dwells in a son of Israel!’26 This open 
acknowledgment of the Jewishness of Jesus is significant in a time when Christian 
theologians would soon search for ways to aryanize him.27 
 Even though the religious history of the people of Israel is critical, says 
Althaus, the church is now the true ‘Israel of God.’28 Althaus reconfigures Israel as a 
theological category so that ‘bodily descent from the people of Israel does not 
                                                 
25 Althaus, Römer, 81.  
26 Ibid.  
27 See Heschel, The Aryan Jesus and Gerdmar, Roots of Theological Antisemitism, 531–76.  
28 Althaus, Römer, 80.  
 
 89 
necessarily mean belonging to the true Israel as the community of the children of 
God, that is, the church of God.’29 Here the concept of Israel has been spiritualised in 
a form of classical supersessionism to which Althaus generally subscribes. In the 
negative dimension of the dialectic, then, the people of Israel were once the bearers 
of salvation-history, but have squandered that original vocation. Israel was offered 
every opportunity for salvation, but instead stubbornly chose their dead religion of 
works righteousness: ‘Israel imagined wrongly that it could perform righteously 
before God on the path of the works of the law—which is still impossible—instead 
of going on the way of faith which has been ordained by God.’ As a result of Israel’s 
obstinacy, ‘God’s way of salvation has become for Israel a doom [Verhängnis] and a 
curse [Fluch] through their unbelief.’30  
Such an interpretation of Israel’s salvation-history, however, pins Althaus up 
against the dilemma of Israel’s simultaneous election and reprobation. He resolves 
this problem by hinting that God can bring his final purposes to fruition without the 
ethnic people of Israel by means of a ‘remnant,’ thereby fulfilling Israel’s election 
through a small remainder comprised of Christians of Jewish descent. Despite the 
reality that most of the people of Israel have fallen away from their original divine 
calling, explains Althaus, ‘[t]here is a “remnant,” a Jewish-Christian community, a 
survival of the fleshly Israel in the midst of the New Testament people of God.’31 It 
                                                 
29 Ibid., 82, 87.  
30 Ibid., 87. Althaus’ discourse conforms to what Charlotte Klein has identified as a preoccupation with 
an ‘artificial dichotomy between Law and Grace’ common to much German Protestant theology of the age (see 
Anti-Judaism in Christian Theology, 146). Klein had earlier made the argument that Judaism was never a 
‘religion of works’ and never understood itself to be such. For Klein, the works/grace dichotomy is a Christian 
invention, and yet another example of how Christian theologians have failed to allow Jews to speak for 
themselves: ‘In Judaism—oppressive burdens, in the gospel—liberating grace. None of these theologians can get 
rid of this wrong conception of Judaism’s understanding of the law; the contrast is based on a preconceived 
judgment which merely needs to be proved. Behind this biased judgment lie ignorance of Judaism as it really is 
and arbitrary interpretation of texts’ (53). 
31 Althaus, Römer, 93.  
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is Jewish Christians, in addition to Gentiles, who now constitute the true Israel. 
Israel’s lapse is, ironically, the fulfillment of its original salvation-historical function: 
to bring salvation to the Gentiles.32 Meanwhile, the remnant of Israel lives on in the 
form of Jewish Christians who have joined Gentiles in the church and serve of 
evidence of God’s faithfulness to his promises. As we shall see, this conclusion 
would prove significant as Althaus wrestled with the question of the place of 
Christians of Jewish descent in German churches in 1933.  
Althaus’ exegesis in Die Briefe an die Römer leaves this point unclear, and 
that ambiguity is further complicated by his earlier comments about the on-going 
salvation-historical significance of the people of Israel in his work Die letzten Dinge 
of 1922. Here Althaus, like he does in his Romans commentary, stresses Israel’s 
‘special and unique place in God’s plan of salvation,’ which is to serve as the 
foundation upon which the church, the ‘Israel of God,’ is built. In Althaus’ 
interpretation, once Israel’s salvation-historical objective—i.e., the inclusion of 
Gentiles in the people of God—has been achieved in the ministry of Jesus Christ, it 
appears that the Jews no longer hold any direct salvation-historical significance: 
‘Israel as the historical people [das geschichtliche Volk] is, since Christ, who fulfilled 
Israel’s salvation-historical calling in himself, no longer a theological, “salvation-
historical” [heilsgeschichtliche] factor.’33  
In this eschatological system, Althaus does not consider the restoration of the 
nation of Israel, as a historical entity, necessary in order for secular history to reach 
its conclusion. To be sure, he muses over whether and how God intends to achieve 
the final salvation of Israel, but he refuses to dogmatise Israel’s ultimate future: ‘. . . 
                                                 
32 Ibid., 94. 
33 Paul Althaus, Die letzten Dinge: Lehrbuch der Eschatologie (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1922), 313. 
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we cannot say whether God will lift the curse from his people yet in our history, as 
Paul expected, or beyond our history, where not only the last generation of Israel, but 
all Israel will encounter Christ.’34 Though his analysis of the continued historical and 
salvation-historical significance of the historical entity of Israel is characteristically 
ambivalent, Althaus rejects any form of chiliasm which requires the restoration of 
Israel for the inauguration of Christ’s millennial reign.35 
 In the end, Althaus does not solve the ‘dark, depressing riddle’ of Jewish 
existence in his comments on the text of Romans, instead reserving the question of 
Jewish salvation for eschatological resolution. But his textual commentary, though 
often antagonistic toward Judaism, does generally exhibit the same tension between 
Jewish reprobation and preservation evident in classical Christian exegesis.36 
Althaus’ statements about Judaism are certainly often negative, but they are mostly 
tethered to the biblical text.  
However, in a concluding excursus Althaus seeks to connect his 
interpretation of Romans 9–11 to the contemporary socio-political discourse about 
the status of Jewish communities in Germany. As we have seen, he does not expect a 
solution to the ‘Jewish Question’ through political measures like the emancipation 
                                                 
34 Ibid., 314. In his Romans commentary, Althaus writes that ‘Israel’s conversion will be the end of 
salvation-history. For that reason Israel’s salvation-historical position remains effective for the rest of humanity, 
with all of the twists and turns of its divine-historical destiny’ (Römer, 95). On balance, it appears that Althaus 
leaves open the possibility that the salvation of Israel is reserved for the far side of earthly history, leaving the 
question essentially unresolved. Henning Theißen has argued that by the early 1930s, Althaus had already firmly 
established an eschatology that is ‘anti-apocalyptic’ in nature, in part as a reaction against Jewish eschatology, 
which he believed connected secular history and eschatology too closely. For Theißen, Althaus’ eschatology 
maintained an ‘eternity beyond history’ [Ewigkeit als Jenseits der Geschichte] rather than a Jewish eschatology 
of ‘final history.’ See Die evangelische Eschatologie und das Judentum: Strukturproblem der Konzeptionen seit 
Schleiermacher (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2004), 208–14. Cf. Althaus, ‘Heilsgeschichte und 
Eschatologie,’ especially 616–635, and Althaus ‘Eschatologie IV: Christliche, dogmengeschichtlich,’ in RGG, 
vol. 2., 345–53.  
35 ‘The historical-theological postulates that Israel’s earthly history must find its “worthy outcome,” or 
its “logical conclusion” through an hour of conversion at the end of history have no theological authorisation’ 
(Die letzten Dinge, 314). See also Althaus, ‘Eschatologie V: Religionsphilosphisch und dogmatisch,’ in RGG, 
vol. 2, 353–62 for additional criticisms of chiliasm.  
36 See Haynes, Reluctant Witnesses, 25–63.  
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and assimilation of German Jews. Rather, only Christian theology could interpret the 
meaning of the continued existence of the Jews. At the conclusion of his Romans 
commentary, Althaus complains that the church has ceded discussion about the 
‘Jewish Question’ to the secular world of policy-makers when the question is in its 
essence a theological question. ‘Christianity itself for a long time has lapsed into the 
secularisation of the Jewish Question on account of an awareness of the times.’37 But 
with his interpretation of Romans 9–11 in Der Brief an die Römer, he sees the 
opportunity to offer a ‘word about Israel’s destiny in our present wrestling with the 
question of Jewry.’38 But in the transition from biblical text to social commentary, 
Althaus reverts to chimerical discourse in the form of antisemitic libels and anti-
Judaic clichés.  
In the first place, Althaus suggests that Israel’s destiny has been forever 
altered by its confrontation with Jesus Christ. ‘In Israel’s history with God,’ he 
writes, ‘its encounter with Christ was the decisive hour. Israel’s fate [Schicksal], both 
inward and outward, is sealed decisively through its rejection of Jesus.’39 Though 
there are echoes of the charge, Althaus does not quite accuse the Jews of deicide. 
However, already in his 1930 Good Friday sermon, ‘Die Stimme des Blutes,’ 
Althaus had linked the plight of the Jews to their role in the crucifixion:  
The blood of Christ now speaks; even now it cries out. Against whom does it 
testify? Certainly it testifies first against the people out of whom Christ came 
and whom he served; certainly it testifies first against the stony hardness and 
wicked indecisiveness of the people to whom God had turned unlike he had 
to any other.40  
 
                                                 
37 Althaus, Römer, 100.  
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., 100–01.  
40 Althaus, ‘Die Stimme des Blutes,’ 162–63. It must be made absolutely clear that Althaus does not 
hold the Jews solely responsible for the crucifixion of Jesus. He is unequivocal that all of humanity stands guilty 
for the murder of Jesus, asking rhetorically ‘And yet, who among us would have the right to point the finger [at 
the Jews]: “You were there!” Who could listen to the voice of the blood of Christ as an innocent bystander?’ 
(163). In his Good Friday sermon from 1932, Althaus warns, ‘We cannot simply wash our hands in innocence as 
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As a result of their rejection of Jesus, the Jews are under a curse: ‘Until the end of 
history, the terrible words of an unknowing premonition hang over Israel like a 
thunderstorm: “His blood be on us and on our children!”’41              
Significantly, it is on Christ, but not by Christ, that Israel is ruined: ‘Israel is 
shipwrecked [gescheitert] on Christ.’42 Althaus’ radical re-orientation of the purpose 
of Jewish existence now comes into view. The crucifixion is the pivotal moment in 
which Israel—conceived as the salvation-historical entity with a critical history with 
God—becomes the Jews—the present-day ethnic population with no direct salvation-
historical significance. The failure to recognise Jesus as God’s Messiah signals the 
end of Israel’s direct role in the drama of salvation history. Since the crucifixion, one 
can now speak of ‘the eternal Jew’ [der ewige Jude], who ‘originated when Israel 
made up its mind against Christ’ and is now destined to roam the earth disrupting the 
peace of others because he himself can find no peace.43  
                                                 
if the Jews were alone. Alas not. The same spirit that brought Jesus to the cross is living even in us. Not just 
Jewish blood, but the blood of all humanity revolts against him’ (Althaus, ‘Kain und Christus,’ 57). In his 
academic writings, he considers the cross as a moment of God’s wrath over all human persons, as the ‘holy “No” 
to all of humanity.’ See Althaus, ‘Das Kreuz Christi als Maßstab aller Religion,’ in Evangelium und Leben, 74. 
Althaus almost completely passes over the unique culpability of the Jews in his most concerted academic 
treatment of the theology of the cross, apart from a brief reference to God’s wrath against those who were 
‘mistaken about his Son.’ This wrath is revealed against ‘not just the crowd, the fickle mass of people, but against 
the man in charge of it—the Pharisee, the theologian, the priest, the scribe of the Law of God and the holy 
traditions.’ However, this brief reference is set within the wider context of God’s wrath against the sinfulness of 
all of humanity as revealed at the crucifixion. See Das Kreuz Christi (Berlin: Furche Verlag, 1922), 18. While 
Althaus does recognise the universal guilt of humankind for the crucifixion of Jesus, he nevertheless argues that 
the guilt of the Jews is given priority because they were the objects of God’s special efforts. Thus in ‘Die Stimme 
des Blutes,’ the spilt blood of Christ testifies against the Jews ‘first.’  
41 Althaus, ‘Die Stimme des Blutes,’ 163.  
42 Althaus, Römer, 101. Cf. Althaus’ sermon, ‘Die Herrlichkeit in der Passion’ (25 February 1923), in 
Der Lebendige, where he states that, as a result of the Jews’ ‘No,’ Jesus ‘shuts the door that he had opened to 
them.’ Following this failed encounter, the Jews are now ‘shipwrecked’ or ‘sundered in two’ [zerscheitern] on 
Christ (146).  
43 Althaus, Römer, 101. Smid has noted that the crucifixion is the ‘birth-hour of the “eternal Jew”’ in 
Althaus’ thought (see Deutscher Protestantismus, 285). In this passage, Althaus is relying directly on several 
antisemitic texts as evidence for his claims, including Hans Blüher’s Die Erhebung Israels gegen die christlichen 
Güter (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1931), Max Wundt’s Der ewige Jude (1926) and Deutsche 
Weltanschauung. Grundzüge völkischen Denkens (1926), and Franz Werfel’s Paulus unter den Juden (Berlin: 
Zsolnay, 1926).  
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This rhetoric implies that Jewish existence is not only destructive but also 
parasitic, sapping the spiritual vitality of the societies to which it is attached like a 
wound that will not mend: 
This scattered, homeless people that everywhere explodes [sprengt] the 
ethnic national-community [völkische Geschlossenheit] of their host-peoples 
[Wirtvölker], and which in many cases represents an open wound [offene 
Wunde], embodies the open question of history in general, reminds the 
peoples of the limits of their ethnic national-community and of the 
provisional nature of their segregation [Sonderung] and directs their gaze to 
the coming Kingdom of God.44 
 
Althaus’ framing of Jewish existence in the language of pathology is not, however, 
merely a lapse into some kind of cultural antisemitism, but the expression of a 
deliberate theological grammar. Althaus here conceives of the Jews as an 
eschatological sign, as a living symbol to remind Germans that their ethnic national 
community—the echoes of the growing national concern with the purity of blood are 
clear—can only be provisional this side of the Kingdom of God. The continued 
existence of the Jews, in other words, is in part a sign of God’s judgment on the Volk 
as a penultimate, and not an ultimate, reality. By plaguing the national body as an 
‘open wound’ that will not heal, the Jews warn the nations of the consequences of 
‘self-assertion’ against God.45  
Though the Jews are no longer the bearers of salvation history, they 
nevertheless retain an important theological purpose. Still, in a doctrinal formulation 
original to Althaus, the Jewish Volk assumes a critical divine mission: ‘[t]o transcend 
the hegemony of peoples in view of the Kingdom of God.’46 In the end, although 
they have been replaced by the church as the prime vehicles of God’s salvific action, 
                                                 
44 Althaus, Römer, 101. 
45 Ibid. Fischer suggests that this grotesque image is a hapax legomenon in Althaus’ thought (Zwischen 
Zeugnis und Zeitgeist, 494–95), but I will show that this is not the last time Althaus will speak of Jews in 
pathological language.  
46 Fischer, Zwischen Zeugnis und Zeitgeist, 502.  
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Jewish persons retain a critical, if indirect, theological vocation—even while they, 
like an open wound, threaten to infect an otherwise healthy body.  
The dialectical logic of pathology and performance, as it manifests in his 
Romans commentary, leaves Althaus without the resources affirm the salvation-
historical importance of Israel without problematising the continued existence of 
Jewish communities as a riddle. His comments about Israel and the Jews (who 
appear as two distinct entities: one theological and one ethnic) meander between 
critiques of Judaism that derive from classical Christian exegesis and antisemitic 
libels to such an extent that any rhetorical distinction between theological anti-
Judaism and antisemitism ultimately collapses. Althaus would continue to puzzle 
over the mystery of Jewish existence for years, but one thing remains constant 
throughout his rhetoric: Jews are not simply Jews, but ominous signs.  
CONCLUSION | PATHOLOGY AND PERFORMANCE  
 
 The four treatises in which Althaus addresses the ‘Jewish Question’ explicitly 
provide us with a useful framework for evaluating his assumptions about the 
character and purpose of Jewish existence during the Weimar years. Across these 
four pieces, Althaus offers a depiction of Jews and Judaism that appears merely 
ambiguous, or even contradictory, on the surface but is in fact animated by a 
dialectical theological logic. The Jews occupy a precarious but critical space in 
Althaus’ broader theological system, fulfilling both socio-political and theological 
functions. Before we examine how these ideas developed alongside the increasing 
disenfranchisement of actual Jewish persons under National Socialism, we will 
summarise the dialectic of pathology and performance as expressed in the Weimar 
writings. The basic logic of Althaus’ theology of the Jews can be outlined as follows:   
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1) Jewish existence is pathological. Jewish persons are a danger to their 
surrounding communities, especially the German Volk. Althaus’ confronts 
the ‘Jewish Question’ within his particularly militant permutation of the 
Lutheran doctrine of the orders of creation. The Volk is an order of 
creation founded and sustained by God’s will. Accordingly, God’s 
intention for the relationship between peoples is expressed in the 
elemental ‘laws of life.’47 These laws of life demand the ‘ethnic 
classification of humanity,’ dictating that the peoples of the earth are to be 
outwardly segregated from each other.48 They are to compete with each 
other for the realisation of their unique national destiny. Althaus therefore 
rejects the total inclusion of Jews as represented by the Enlightenment 
ideology of emancipation and assimilation. Jews violate the elemental 
orders of creation when they hide their Jewishness and pose as Germans. 
One Volk cannot become another. By framing them as a corrosive and 
disintegrating threat to the world’s order and structure, Althaus portrays 
the Jews as agents of anti-creation.  
 Moreover, the Jews appear as a force that threatens to thwart German 
self-determination and, as such, as a necessary foil against which 
Germans must concentrate their spiritual vitality to actualise their own 
destiny. Althaus further abstracts the Jews into a polemical trope to 
symbolise secular rationalism, individualism, and urbanism. Their ‘big 
city spirituality’ threatens to unravel the Christian morality of Germany 
and prevent the realisation of the German destiny by sapping its spiritual 
                                                 
47 See Althaus, Leitsätze, 63–64.  
48 See Althaus, ‘Vaterlandsliebe,’ 1442.  
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strength. Moreover, the threat posed by German Jewry is intelligible only 
when we grasp Althaus’ vision for a re-christianised Germany, populated 
by a community of priests. Jewish persons are a danger because they bear 
a foreign spirituality that is lethal to the German type.  
2) Jewish existence is performative. Despite of the curse that characterises 
their existence, the Jews nevertheless still have a critical mission to fulfill 
in all communities. The Jewish destiny has been sealed and re-oriented in 
the Jews’ decisive encounter with Jesus of Nazareth, whom they failed to 
recognise as God’s Messiah. The people of Israel have become the Jews 
at the crucifixion, and now exist within the dialectic of election and curse. 
The historical people of Israel has been replaced by the church—‘the true 
Israel of God’—which also contains a remnant of Jewish Christians.  
Having failed their original salvation-historical vocation, the people of 
Israel—whom Althaus had once described as ‘the pinball [Spielball] 
among the great peoples of the world’49—have now been re-
commissioned wander the earth as disrupters of the peace of socio-
political communities and omens of theological judgment. As necessary 
signs of divine truths, the Jews must not be totally excluded from 
surrounding communities.  
3) Jewish persons fulfill constructive symbolic functions in the socio-
political sphere. The Jews’ ‘peculiar self-assertion’ [einzigartige 
Behauptung] as a Volk in public life serves as painful evidence of the 
limits of ethnic national-community.50 Confined as visible symbols on the 
                                                 
49 Althaus, ‘Die schwerer Zeit im Lichte der Ewigkeit’ (28 June 1931), in Der Gegenwärtige, 64.  
50 Althaus, Römer, 101. Compare also Althaus, Die letzten Dinge, 314.  
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margin of society, the Jews actually stand as a reminder that the Volk, 
however healthy and powerful it may be, will never achieve full ethnic 
solidarity, purity of blood, or total authority. In the same way, the Jews 
testify to the limits of the state’s secular authority and represent the 
unresolvability of human history. Because Jews and Germans share a 
dialectical relationship, Althaus considers this performative dimension of 
Jewish existence particularly important for German self-understanding.  
4) The Jews also enact an indispensable symbolic function in the theological 
sphere. Contrary to the conclusions of scholars who assert that Althaus’ 
anti-Judaism is incidental to his theology,51 these writings indicate that 
Jews perform an integral role in his theology of the orders of creation. 
Althaus shares the predominate assumptions of the ‘witness people’ 
mythology, which interprets the Jews as ‘important signs’ of God’s 
judgment and the promise of the culmination of salvation history.52 
However, he modifies this mythology to exclude the necessity of ethnic 
Jews to induce the climax of salvation history while also expanding it to 
include what André Fischer has called the ‘indirect eschatological 
significance’ of the Jewish Volk.53  
By living out their precarious existence in the midst of all human 
societies, the Jews testify that the Volk, though it is a gift given by God to 
govern life in the historical sphere, will ultimately be transcended in the 
Kingdom of God. By preventing total ethnic homogeneity, Jews remind 
                                                 
51 See, for instance, Knitter’s thesis in ‘Die Uroffenbarungslehre.’ Compare also Green, Lutherans 
against Hitler, 118f.   
52 See Haynes, Reluctant Witnesses, 12–13.  
53 Fischer, Zwischen Zeugnis und Zeitgeist, 500.  
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Christians that their ultimate allegiance should be not to the orders of 
creation themselves, but to the God who stands over the orders. Though 
divested of their original vocation, Jews still exercise a critical prophetic 
function by confronting their host societies as a living safeguard against 
the idolisation of the Volk. In both the socio-political and the theological 
spheres, the Jews must remain visible to fulfill their symbolic 
performative function.  
 To summarise: in both the socio-political and the theological spheres, the 
Jews must remain both inside and outside, a part of and apart from surrounding 
human communities to fulfill their purpose as a Volk. On a societal scale, the 
relationship between Jews and Germans is dialectical, and thus can be characterised 
neither by total exclusion nor total inclusion. Instead, Althaus projects an inclusive 
quarantine model in which Jewish danger is to be contained within but not 
eliminated from surrounding human societies. Though Althaus fears the Jews, they 
must nevertheless be preserved—and, critically, preserved as outwardly identifiable 
communities physically distinguishable from German communities—not because of 
the expectation of their role in the consummation of salvation history, but because of 
the ominous truths they signify. For Althaus, then, the Jews are a necessary danger: 
his system needs the Jews, diseased though they are.  
 As an aside, here it is perhaps illustrative to note how Althaus elsewhere 
handles other forms of ‘broken life’ [das gebrochene Leben]: incompetent, 
pathological lives that are a drain on, rather than a benefit to, society. For Althaus, 
these ‘unproductive’ persons—invalids, the mentally or physically incapacitated, or 
the hereditarily diseased—are nevertheless crucial members of society because their 
mere existence reveals the limits of cultural achievement and thereby holds national 
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arrogance in check.54 This example of the parallel application of the dialectic of 
pathology and performance in a different context is instructive for our understanding 
of how Althaus understands Jewish existence (also pathological and parasitic) to 
function. 
In spanning this dialectic between pathology and performance, the Weimar 
writings also witness to ‘the blurred lines between religiously and theologically 
motivated anti-Judaism and ideologically motivated völkisch antisemitism.’55 
Althaus’ Weimar rhetoric, if not always antisemitic, is usually xenophobic. 
‘Xenophobes,’ explains Gavin Langmuir, ‘are not talking about real people but about 
something much more intangible, their sense of danger, of chaos.’56 In each treatise, 
Althaus abstracts the Jews into symbols of a larger spiritual and societal threat—
agents of chaos who subvert the orders of creation. But because of the dialectical 
relationship between Jews and Germans, the Jews cannot be conceived absolutely as 
an enemy of the German Volk.  
As I have shown, Althaus ultimately rejects as proposed solutions both the 
total emancipation and assimilation of the Jews and the forced expulsion of Jews 
from German territories. Instead, the Jews must openly identify themselves and 
embrace a quarantined existence on the margins of German life. Althaus’ remedy for 
                                                 
54 See Paul Althaus, Eugenik im Lichte christlichen Glaubens (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1933), 17–18. 
Aly has argued persuasively that more attention should be paid to the connection between the Nazi state’s 
euthanasia and forced sterilisation programmes and the extermination of Europe’s Jews. Euthanasia, suggests 
Aly, functioned as ‘an act of self-conditioning’ designed to acclimate Germans to the idea of destroying ‘dead 
weight’ before attempting the wholesale destruction of the Jews (see Why the Germans?, 211–18). The fact that 
Althaus insists on the vital theological importance of ‘unproductive’ groups—including both the incapacitated 
and the Jews—shows a great deal of distance from the Nazi worldview, even if Althaus agreed with other 
elements of the Party’s platform.  
55 Fischer, Zwischen Zeugnis und Zeitgeist, 495.  
56 See Langmuir, Toward a Definition of Antisemitism, 331. Wolfgang Gerlach has argued that terms 
such as Überfremdung ‘were not so much descriptions as a form of incitement.’ Gerlach identifies here the 
common use of Jews as rhetorical devices in nationalistic literature of which Althaus’ Weimar writings are 
representative. See And the Witnesses Were Silent: The Confessing Church and the Persecution of the Jews, trans. 
and ed. Victoria Barnett (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 3.  
 
 101 
chaos is order: the ability to identify and contain Jews and therefore curtail the 
danger they pose.57 In both in the socio-political and theological spheres, the Jews 
must remain visible yet quarantined to fulfill their symbolic function. If the Jews 
disappear, whether by assimilation or by expulsion, they lose their critical 
performative power and fail to fulfill their divine destiny as a Volk
                                                 
57 Langmuir has argued that a prime feature of xenophobic rhetoric is the felt need of members of the 






MOVEMENT II: AT THE CHURCH’S ‘GERMAN HOUR’: GERMANS, JEWS, AND 
ECCLESIAL SPACE UNDER NATIONAL SOCIALISM (1933–1945) 
 
SECTION II INTRODUCTION | PATHOLOGY AND PERFORMANCE IN MICROCOSM  
In the years prior to the National Socialist Machtergreifung, Althaus had 
addressed the ‘Jewish Question’ in the terms of what I have called the dialectic of 
pathology and performance. According to this framework, Jewish persons threaten to 
infect their surrounding communities with a moral and spiritual sickness while at the 
same time performing vital theological functions for those same communities. In the 
Weimar period, Althaus lamented that Überfremdung had made the Germany body 
diseased. In November of 1932, he was still searching for a cure:  
The Reich of the Germans, toward which we are pushing, should certainly be 
a political reality, but at the same time it should be much more than that: a 
rebirth of the German Volk, of the German man out of the sources of his own 
Volkstum, a new time of ‘salvation,’ of renewed health for the whole body of 
the Volk [neue Gesundheit des ganzen Volksleibes], the overcoming of the 
social crisis brought on by capitalism, a new unity of the Volk—a new 
culture, a new worldview, and most of all, a church for all Germans.1 
 
Althaus saw potential for a remedy in the events of January 1933. The new National 
Socialist government, he hoped, would provide a path toward ‘convalescence’ out of 
the deadly ‘sickness’ [Erkrankung] ailing the German spirit.2  
As a result, Althaus was prepared to accept the beginning stages of Nazism’s 
Judenpolitik, even if only tacitly. As the regime began to enact concrete measures to 
disenfranchise the Jews, Althaus would translate his dialectical societal vision into 
the ecclesial sphere. In so doing, he would continue to reject the inclusion/exclusion 
binary—this time represented by the conflicting theologies of the Bekennende Kirche 
and Deutsche Christen—throughout the National Socialist years. Instead, Althaus 
                                                 
1 Paul Althaus, ‘Das Reich,’ Glaube und Volk 1:11 (1932), 163.  
2 Althaus, ‘Das Ja der Kirche zur deutschen Wende,’ 6. 
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offers a narrative of Jewish existence in which the Jews, through both their very 
existence and their scriptures, simultaneously endanger and empower German self-
understanding. Against the backdrop of his Weimar writings, the dialectic of 
pathology and performance comes to acute expression in the Erlangen Opinion on 
the Aryan Paragraph, to which we turn now.  
There are nuances of the Opinion that are difficult to detect without a careful 
analysis within the context of Althaus’ broader theology of the ‘Jewish Question.’ To 
accommodate the breadth and detail of the argument, the second section traces 
Althaus’ response to the ‘Jewish Question’ during the National Socialist years across 
two chapters, which are meant to be read together as a single unit. In chapter four I 
set both Althaus and his controversial pronouncements—the Erlangen Opinion and 
the Ansbach Memorandum—into the wider context of the Kirchenkampf. After 
expositing the documents’ fundamental assumptions about the relationship between 
church and Volk, I move in chapter five to a detailed argument regarding the precise 
nature Althaus’ interpretation of Jewish existence as expressed in the Erlangen 
Opinion (and as supported by the suppositions of the Ansbach Memorandum). As I 
suggest below, the document projects in microcosm the same dialectical vision of the 















CHAPTER IV | VOLK BEFORE CHURCH: THE ERLANGEN OPINION ON THE ARYAN 
PARAGRAPH AND THE ANSBACH MEMORANDUM 
 
For us Lutherans, the ordinance of the church is always partially determined 
by the ordinance of the Volk, into which the church enters, as well as by 
political realities (to which political convictions may also belong). 
 
Paul Althaus, ‘Bedenken zur “Theologischen Erklärung” der Barmer 
Bekenntnissynode’ (1934) 
 
INTRODUCTION   
 
 In many ways, Althaus seems out of place in the turbulent years of the late 
Weimar Republic. His mediatory personality proved ill-suited to cope with an era of 
sharp distinctions and intractable oppositions.3 Accordingly, it is difficult to situate 
Althaus (or his writings) into the polarising matrix of the Kirchenkampf. But it is 
precisely this point that makes the study of Althaus so critical. Althaus’ brand of 
confessional Lutheranism emerges as a third voice between the Deutsche Christen 
(‘German Christian Movement’) and the Bekennende Kirche (‘Confessing 
Church’)—both of whom drew his criticism, though on drastically different grounds. 
Likewise, the two theological pronouncements for which Althaus’ contributions were 
instrumental—the Erlangen Opinion on the Aryan Paragraph and the Ansbach 
Memorandum—highlight critical questions of Christian ethics under the Third Reich. 
Below, I uncover what I argue is the decisive characteristic of the ethical framework 
out of which Althaus’ recommendation for the place of Jews in the DEK would 




                                                 
3 An insight noted by several Althaus interpreters, including Paul Hinlicky (Before Auschwitz, 177f.) 
and Jack Forstman (Christian Faith, 198–99).  
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ONE | ALTHAUS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE KIRCHENKAMPF  
 
Althaus was by no means the only Protestant theologian to receive its news 
with optimism, but the National Socialist seizure of power did radically alter the 
landscape of German church life. As a result, discourse regarding Protestant 
reactions to National Socialism has traditionally been organised around the 
Kirchenkampf—the polarity between the Deutsche Christen and the Bekennende 
Kirche—as a struggle for control of the Deutsche Evangelische Kirche.4 However, 
the last generation of scholarship has exposed the blurred lines between the two 
groups by demonstrating how muddled Christian attitudes toward National 
Socialism, and National Socialist attitudes toward Christianity, often were.5  
Althaus himself serves as a prime illustration of this ambiguity, as his 
political attitudes drew suspicion, or sometimes outright condemnation, from 
Christian spectators abroad. Reformed thinkers in Switzerland, for example, 
classified Althaus and Göttingen theologian Emanuel Hirsch (1888–1972) among the 
‘droves of theologians in Protestant Germany’ who had been infected with the 
‘bacillus of National Socialist radicalism.’6 When the Swiss press invited Althaus to 
                                                 
4 For further discussion of the politics of the Kirchenkampf, see Scholder, The Churches and the Third 
Reich and Barnett, For the Soul of the People, especially chapters 3 and 4.  
5 For the better part of a generation after the Second World War, the narrative crafted by surviving 
members of the Confessing Church, in which the church was seen as a valiant opponent of National Socialism, 
predominated in discourse on the Kirchenkampf. That the German churches were in genuine peril of being 
eliminated by the Nazi regime became the standard position, expressed most prominently in John Conway’s The 
Nazi Persecution of the Churches, 1933–1945: ‘there is evidence to show that the often-proclaimed determination 
to wipe out Christianity altogether would have been extended beyond the Warthegau to the other areas of 
German-held territory, and would have ended in the persecution of Christians by the same methods as had so 
effectively “dealt with” the Jews’ (331). This view has been challenged forcefully by Richard Steigmann-Gall in 
The Holy Reich: Nazi Conceptions of Christianity, 1919–1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 
wherein Steigmann-Gall argues that many of the Nazi leadership considered Nazism a Christian movement and 
had no designs on eradicating the church. Moreover, following a reprinting of Friedrich Baumgärtel’s Wider die 
Kirchenkampf-Legenden (Neuendettelsau: Freimund Verlag) in 1958, subsequent generations of scholarship have 
challenged the prevailing assumption that the churches resisted National Socialism and indeed has identified 
many places where the churches were actually complicit with the regime. For a thorough survey of recent 
historiography of the Kirchenkampf, see Ericksen and Heschel, ‘The German Churches and the Holocaust.’ 
6 The Reformierte Schweizer Zeitung had criticised Althaus and Hirsch for a controversial declaration 
they published at the end of 1931. Althaus and Hirsch discouraged German churches from cooperating in post-
war rapprochement with the victorious powers of World War I, whose ‘murderous politics,’ they thought, was 
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respond to these accusations, he took the opportunity to clarify his position to the 
burgeoning Nazi movement. While he understood the party’s appeal, applauded its 
rediscovery of German pride and patriotism, and certainly preferred it to liberal 
alternatives, he was not prepared to offer his uncritical endorsement:  
First of all, I can divulge to the Press Service that neither Hirsch nor I belong 
to the National Sociality Party. As far as it concerns me, what keeps me from 
joining the party is, one the one hand, objections of a practical-political sort 
and, on the other (and this is the main thing), the naturalist racial ideology in 
the ‘worldview’ of this party.7  
 
The Deutsche Christen, however, had no qualms with the party’s racial 
theory; by the end of 1941, they had called for the total exclusion of Christians of 
Jewish descent from German churches.8 Under the leadership of pastors Siegfried 
Leffler and Julius Leutheuser—both Nazi party members who studied at Erlangen9— 
the movement eventually gained a stronghold in Thuringia. The Deutsche Christen 
embraced Nazi ‘integration’ [Gleichschaltung]—complete with an effort to dejudaize 
the Christian faith and create a dogma-less church defined by antisemitism, jingoism, 
and chauvinism.10 By contrast, the Bekennende Kirche, headlined by Swiss 
theologian Karl Barth, protested to governmental interference in ecclesial affairs. 
                                                 
threatening the German destiny. See ‘Evangelische Kirche und Völkerverstandigung: Eine Erklärung,’ 
Allgemeine evangelisch-lutherische Kirchenzeitung 64:23 (1931).  
7 See Althaus, ‘Gegen den Nationalsozialistischen Bazillus,’ 63.  
8 The leadership of the Deutsche Christen issued a manifesto, ‘Bekanntmachung über die kirchliche 
Stellung evangelischer Juden,’ on 17 December 1941, which read in part:  
 
A German Protestant church must cultivate and nurture the religious life of its German comrades. 
Christians who are racially Jewish [Rassejüdische Christen] have no place and no right in this church. 
The undersigned German Protestant churches and church leaders have therefore abolished fellowship 
[Gemeinschaft] of any kind with Jewish Christians. The undersigned are determined to tolerate not even 
the slightest influence of the Jewish spirit on German religious and church life.  
 
Quoted in Gerhard Lindemann, ‘Antijudaismus und Antisemitismus in den evangelischen Landeskirchen 
während der NS-Zeit,’ Geschichte und Gesellschaft 29:4 (2003), 584.  
9 So reports Green in Lutherans Against Hitler, at 45. Despite this connection, Oberdheid writes in 
1936: ‘Leffler and Leutheuser buy into the National Socialist struggle. They are National Socialists in heart and 
soul. Althaus is not.’ Heinrich Oberdheid, Unpolitisches deutsches Christentum: Ein Wort über das ‘Politisches 
Christentum’ des Professors Paul Althaus (Bonn, 1936), 29. Quoted in Fischer, Zwischen Zeugnis und Zeitgeist, 
698. 
10 On the Deutsche Christen, see Doris Bergen, Twisted Cross: The German Christian Movement in the 
Third Reich (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1996).  
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When the new state introduced legislation designed to control the appointment of 
Protestant pastors, the Bekennende Kirche responded with the Barmen Declaration, 
whose objective was to protect the ecclesiastical sphere from Nazi infringement.11 
While this intra-ecclesial debate raged, the Deutsche Glaubensbewegung (German 
Faith Movement) gained traction in German political life with its emphasis on the 
recovery of German mysticism, Teutonic legend, and neo-paganism.12 
Because of the mediatory character of his theology, Althaus does not fit 
easily within the Deutsche Christen/Bekennende Kirche binary matrix. He was 
connected briefly to the conservative Christliche-Deutsche Bewegung (Christian 
German Movement), which had no particular party affiliation and collapsed in the 
summer of 1933, but he never belonged to the Deutsche Christen.13 Although he 
shared their nationalistic and völkisch sympathies, Althaus rejected the total 
dejudaizing of the Christian faith advocated by the movement and attacked its 
theological underpinnings in a 1935 article.14 According to Fischer, Althaus believed 
the Deutsche Christen represented a ‘pseudo-Christianity’ just as dangerous to the 
Christian faith as the neo-paganism of the Deutsche Glaubensbewegung espoused by 
some Nazi ideologues.15 Not only that, he saw the Deutsche Christen as little better 
than thugs brandishing what he called SA-Christentum: an ‘offensive’ distortion of 
the Christian faith in which ‘the conduct of the SA-Man [is placed] right next to 
Christian conduct . . . and indeed virtually equated with it.’16 
                                                 
11 For the context of the Barmen Declaration, see Arthur Cochrane, The Church’s Confession under 
Hitler, 2nd ed. (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 1976).  
12 See George Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: The Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich (New 
York: Howard Fertig, 1998).  
13 Klaus Scholder, no ally of Althaus’, reports: ‘Elert and Althaus were no German Christians.’ Quoted 
in Green, The Erlangen School, 277. 
14 Paul Althaus, ‘Politisches Christentum: Ein Wort über die Thüringer ‘Deutsche Christen,’ Theologia 
Militans 5:5 (1935), 4–32.  
15 Fischer, Zwischen Zeugnis und Zeitgeist, 604–05. Cf. Althaus, ‘Politisches Christentum.’  
16 Paul Althaus, ‘Volks-Erlebnis und Offenbarung,’ in Die deutsche Stunde der Kirche, 8–9.  
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Even though he supported some of the aims of both the early National 
Socialist state and the Deutsche Christen, then, Althaus always stressed a moderate 
vision of German renewal rooted squarely in an uncompromising Lutheran 
orthodoxy. In fact, one prominent commentator reads Althaus’ controversial tract, 
Die Deutsche Stunde der Kirche (1934), as an effort to persuade moderate members 
of the Deutsche Christen away from the radical leadership of Joachim Hossenfelder 
to his own alternative national-ecclesial vision.17 Indeed, in 1936 Althaus co-
authored a theological statement to distance himself publically from the Deutsche 
Christen movement and to correct its many errors.18 In the political sphere, Althaus 
also resisted vehemently the National Socialist government’s efforts to subsume the 
Lutheran churches into a Reichskirche under the leadership of Reichsbishof Ludwig 
Müller.19  
Althaus shared this opposition to Nazi Gleichschaltung with the Bekennende 
Kirche; however, he quarreled with the movement on doctrinal grounds. Because of 
his signature doctrine of Uroffenbarung, Althaus’ theology has been characterised as 
fundamentally anti-Barthian.20 His 1921 work Religiöser Sozialismus targeted the 
religious socialism of the new dialectical theologians. This drew a response from 
Barth, who questioned whether Althaus’ ethical system had the capacity to criticise 
                                                 
17 See Jasper, Paul Althaus, 233–38.  
18 ‘Theologisches Gutachten über die Thüringer Richtung der Deutschen Christen,’ Junge Kirche 4:14 
(1936): 674–75. Althaus’ co-authors include Friedrich Brunstäd, Rudolf Bultmann, Werner Elert, Friedrich 
Gogarten, and Friedrich Karl Schumann.  
19 See ‘Erklärung aus der lutherischen Kirche Deutschlands zur Berliner Synod der DEK am 9. August 
1934,’ Lutherische Kirche 16:11 (1934), 187–88. See also ‘Erklärung von Mitgliedern der theologischen Fakultät 
Erlangen zur Gesamtlage der lutherischen Kirche in Deutschland,’ Allgemeine evangelisch-lutherische 
Kirchenzeitung 67:38 (1934), 897–98. For more on Althaus’ attacks on the Deutsche Christen, see Tafilowski, 
‘Exploring the Legacy,’ 71–74. 
20 For a summary of Althaus’ dispute with Barth, as well as a useful discussion of Althaus’ place in the 
theological milieu of the twentieth century, see Forstman, Christian Faith, especially 121–30.  
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an unjust government.21 Althaus answered in turn with ‘Theologie und Geschichte’ 
(1923), in which he decried Barth’s ‘debasement of history’—that is, his refusal to 
recognise God’s self-revelation in the historical sphere.22 Throughout the debate, 
Althaus puzzled over Barth’s narrow view of revelation. More than that, he blamed 
Barth’s theological method for the immense popular appeal of the pseudo-Christian 
theology of the Deutsche Christen:  
Our Protestant fathers had a doctrine of the vocatio generalis, of a universal 
call that God issues to humanity through their own reality and the reality of 
the world. In recent theology, with its purely christological doctrine of 
revelation, one no longer knows anything about that. . . . No wonder, then, 
that this truth [i.e. of primal revelation] is now emerging in theologically 
impossible, indeed anti-theological form.23 
 
With the rise of National Socialism, these speculative theological disputes were to 
assume dramatic political significance, especially as the regime began to implement 
concrete legislative measures against the Jews. Perhaps neither theologian could have 
anticipated the catastrophe that was to come, yet it was Barth who would be 
vindicated as Althaus’ doctrines of the orders of creation and primal revelation 




                                                 
21 See Althaus, Religiöser Sozialismus: Grundfragen der christlichen Sozialethik (Gütersloh: 
Bertelsmann, 1921) and Barth, ‘Basic Problems,’ 47. This criticism of Althaus has been repeated by his critics. 
See especially Forstman, Christian Faith, 250–51.  
22 Paul Althaus, ‘Theologie und Geschichte: Zur Auseinandersetzung mit der dialektischen Theologie,’ 
Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie 1:2 (1923), 742–52. The debate continued into the 1940s. See also Paul 
Althaus, ‘Die Inflation des Begriffs der Offenbarung in der gegenwärtigen Theologie,’ Zeitschrift für 
systematische Theologie 18 (1941), esp. 141–42.  
23 Althaus, ‘Volks-Erlebnis und Offenbarung,’ 9–10. In 1934, Althaus complains that ‘The mood of 
theology in the last decade has not been helpful for the proclamation of the active, present God in the history of a 
Volk. God is present in history—so they told us—only in the negative: in the questionableness, voidness, and 
purposelessness of all historical events’ (‘Volks=Geschichte und Heils=Geschichte,’ in Die Deutsche Stunde der 
Kirche, 16). Althaus repeats this criticism in his rejoinder to the Barmen Declaration: ‘It seems to me that one 
actually combats the misuse of the concept of “general” revelation not by surrendering the whole concept, but 
instead by defining it more sharply and more clearly.’ See ‘Bedenken zur “Theologischen Erklärung” der Barmer 
Bekenntnissynode,’ Lutherische Kirche 16:7 (1934), 118.  
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TWO | THE THEOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE ERLANGEN OPINION ON THE ARYAN 
PARAGRAPH AND THE ANSBACH MEMORANDUM 
 
Though he never chose a side in the struggle, Althaus contributed to the 
discourse of the Kirchenkampf with two formal declarations of Lutheran doctrine. 
These two pronouncements—the Erlangen Opinion on the Aryan Paragraph and the 
Ansbach Memorandum—were released within nine months of each other, and under 
similar circumstances of crisis.24 In each case, recent political events had triggered 
the fragmentation of the Deutsche Evangelische Kirche (DEK). 
Althaus and Elert composed the Erlangen Opinion in response to a petition 
from the Prussian General Synod regarding the application of the Aryan Paragraph in 
the German churches. In light of its own deliberations, the Synod had appealed to the 
theology faculties in Marburg and Erlangen for ‘solemn and responsible special 
instruction’ about the new legislation. The legislation in question is of course the 
Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service of April 7, 1933, the third 
paragraph of which dismissed citizens of ‘non-Aryan descent’ from civil office.25 
Specifically, the Synod asked whether this so-called Aryan Paragraph contradicts the 
historic teachings of the Lutheran church or violates its essence.26 The Marburg 
Opinion would flatly reject the Prussian General Synod’s recommendations that non-
                                                 
24 The ‘Theologisches Gutachten über die Zulassung von Christen jüdischer Herkunft zu den Ämtern 
der Deutschen Evangelischen Kirche (Erlanger Gutachten),’ co-authored by Paul Althaus and Werner Elert, 
appears in Theologische Blätter 12:11 (1933): 321–24. I abbreviate the title as ‘the Erlangen Opinion’ or as ‘the 
Opinion.’ The ‘Ansbacher Ratschlag zu der Barmer theologischer Erklärung,’ co-authored by Paul Althaus, first 
appeared in Allgemeine evangelisch-lutherische Kirchenzeitung 67:25 (1934): 584–86. It has been reproduced in 
Hetzer, ‘Deutsche Stunde,’ 257–59. In the body of the text, I cite the version reproduced in Hetzer and I 
abbreviate the title as ‘the Ansbach Memorandum’ or as ‘the Memorandum.’ All translations from the German are 
my own; I have provided English translations of these documents as appendices.  
25 The text of the legislation, along with its subsequent addendums, is reproduced in Bernard Dov 
Weinryb, Jewish Emancipation Under Attack (New York: American Jewish Committee, 1942), 40–42.  
26 Erlangen Opinion, 321–22.  
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Aryan pastors be relieved from office.27 The legacy of the Erlangen Opinion, as we 
shall see below, is somewhat more ambiguous.  
Likewise, the Ansbach Memorandum, a product the ‘Ansbach Circle’ to 
which Althaus and Elert belonged, aimed to adjudicate the ‘divisions which have 
arisen within the Deutsche Evangelische Kirche since its formation in 1933’—i.e. the 
rupture between the Deutsche Christen and the Bekennende Kirche regarding the 
state’s intent to form a Reichskirche—as well as to provide pastoral counsel ‘to 
respond to those members of our church who are questioning or have fallen into 
error.’28 As the documents originate from a similar provenance, each illuminates the 
other. Beyond this, however, the Erlangen Opinion and the Ansbach Memorandum 
share a common theological logic, and can thus be interpreted synthetically. Each 
seeks to formulate the Lutheran doctrine of the orders of creation in such a way as to 
respond to the demands of a momentous historical hour of dire threat to the life of 
the Volk. When taken together, they reveal important implications for Althaus’ rich 
and complex theology of the ‘Jewish Question’ as set within the wider context of his 
militant doctrine of the orders of creation. The Opinion and the Memorandum are 
now infamous; in retrospect, we can see that they yielded a theology that denigrated 
and marginalised the Jews and sanctioned a genocidal regime. At the very least, as 
one scholar has argued, the Erlangen Opinion represents a capitulation to ‘the hyper-
German, völkisch zeitgeist.’29 
                                                 
27 ‘Gutachten der theologischen Fakultät der Universität Marburg zum Kirchengesetz über die 
Rechtsverhältnisse der Geistlichen und Kirchenbeamten,’ Theologische Blätter 12:10 (1933): 290–94. I 
abbreviate this document as ‘Marburg Opinion.’ 
28 Ansbach Memorandum, 257.  
29 See Gerlach, And the Witnesses were Silent, 39–41. The statement proved controversial in its own 
time as well. Responses to the Memorandum were mixed: the Deutsche Christen received it enthusiastically, but 
it drew criticism in other circles. On the reception of the Ansbacher Memorandum, see Töllner, Eine Frage der 
Rasse?, 106–12.  
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Indeed, the Erlangen Opinion has not aged well, especially in comparison to 
its Marburg counterpart, authored primarily by Rudolf Bultmann. The Marburg 
faculty concluded decisively that the provisions presented by the Prussian General 
Synod are totally incompatible with the essence of the church. In particular, the 
Marburg Opinion cites the solidarity of all confessing Christians symbolised in the 
efficacy of baptism: ‘That the message of Jesus Christ as the saviour of the world is 
directed to all peoples and all races, and that, accordingly, all who believe this 
message and are baptised in its name belong to the church is indisputable. The 
members of the church are brothers with one another.’30 Further, the Marburg 
Opinion recognises only a theological, rather than a racial-biological, understanding 
of Jewishness:  
The Jew who acknowledges the prophecy about Christ in the law and the 
prophets of his Volk and is converted and baptised is for the church no longer 
a Jew, and from the perspective of the church, citizenship limitations for 
baptised Jews are never to be accepted.31 
 
For his part, Bultmann left little room for doubt in a follow-up commentary 
on the Aryan Paragraph. In his view, the legislation necessarily and unavoidably 
disenfranchises Jewish Christians:  
In fact, it is my conviction that the Aryan Paragraph makes non-Aryan church 
members into church members of lesser rights and of lesser worth, as our 
faculty opinion has stated. All assurances that the fully-valid Christianness 
[Christsein] of non-Aryan Christians is not affected by the Aryan Paragraph 
and that the Christian Jew should also thus be my Christian brother appear to 
me as self-delusion [Selbsttäuschung].32 
 
                                                 
30 Marburg Opinion, 291–92.  
31 Ibid. The statement does grant that the state may find such citizenship restrictions necessary in the 
civil sphere, but the church cannot allow the state to enforce such restrictions in the ecclesial sphere.  




For Bultmann and the Marburg faculty, the protection of the full rights of Christians 
of Jewish descent is a matter of the essence of Christian confession and 
proclamation:  
Whoever does not want to acknowledge the total unity between Jewish and 
non-Jewish Christians in the church—as it developed to its fullest expression 
in the New Testament in the Letter to the Ephesians and in line with the 
Apostles and the Reformers—and whoever does not want to put this unity 
into practice in the constitution of the church as a matter of principle deceives 
himself if he confesses that the Holy Scriptures are the Word of God and that 
Jesus is the Son of God and the lord of all people.33 
 
Fellow Lutheran Dietrich Bonhoeffer likewise identified the application of the Aryan 
Paragraph in the church as a status confessionis: for him, the legislation represented a 
threat ‘by the very substance of which the Church is endangered.’34  
When contrasted with Bultmann and Bonhoeffer, the Erlangen theologians 
represent an especially militant strain of the doctrine of the orders of creation within 
the Lutheran tradition. Still, Bultmann had hoped that the Erlangen and Marburg 
faculties might find common ground on the place of Jewish Christians in the DEK. In 
a September 18, 1933 letter to Althaus, Bultmann worried over a looming schism:  
With this note I include the Marburg New Testament scholars’ plea for you to 
sign the theses about the New Testament and the race-question 
[Rassenfrage]; you of course teach New Testament, too. I don’t need to tell 
you how important it would be for me if you could lend your signature. 
Likewise our faculty appeals for your Yes on a Gutachten on the ‘Aryan-
Paragraph’; I hope there will prove to be a consensus between Erlangen and 
Marburg here. That would be a sign that one might yet hope for the future of 
the Deutsche Evangelische Kirche; for I must admit that I am close to 
doubting this future.35  
 
                                                 
33 Marburg Opinion, 293.  
34 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, ‘The Jewish-Question as Status Confessionis,’ in Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works: 
Berlin 1932–1933, vol. 12 of Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works, ed. Larry Rasmussen, trans. Isabel Best and David 
Higgins (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2009), 372. Hereafter referenced as DBWE 12. We shall return to 
Bonhoeffer’s criticisms of the Aryan Paragraph below.  
35 Rudolf Bultmann to Paul Althaus, 18 September 1933, NA 10. 
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The first document to which Bultmann refers is the ‘Neues Testament und 
Rassenfrage,’ an opinion issued by members of theological faculties across Germany 
to discredit any racialised opposition between Jews and non-Jews on the basis of the 
New Testament’s teachings.36 But despite Bultmann’s urging, there would be no 
accord between Erlangen and Marburg. The Marburg Opinion and ‘Neues Testament 
und Rassenfrage’ were published in October 1933—both without Althaus’ signature. 
The Erlangen Opinion, with its acutely völkisch expression of Lutheran theology, 
followed one month later.  
But at the same time the Opinion and the Memorandum are just ambiguous 
enough to allow for competing interpretations of their provenance and spirit. 
Subsequently, efforts have been made to salvage Althaus from their controversial 
legacy—not least by Althaus himself. In a 1947 deposition, he testifies: ‘I did not 
write the Ansbacher Ratschlag. In the first and last meeting of the “Ansbach Circle,” 
in which I participated at the request of D. Elert, the text was already essentially in 
its later, published form.’37 Helmut Thielicke likewise acquits Althaus from 
complicity in ‘a disgraceful and pitiful pseudo-Lutheran work’ (i.e. the Ansbach 
Memorandum) by attributing it to ‘the evil spirit (and dean!) of the theology faculty 
at Erlangen,’ Werner Elert.38 The provenance of the document is not totally clear, 
                                                 
36 ‘Neues Testament und Rassenfrage,’ Theologische Blätter 12:10 (1933): 290–94. The signatories of 
the document find that the sacraments invalidate any ethnic distinction between Jews and Gentiles in the church: 
‘It is God who, through the audible word of proclamation and the visible sign of baptism, calls peoples of all 
races and peoples into one common church, wherein the believers are the visible body of the invisible head, 
Christ, and are therefore bound to each other in this visible community as its members’ (294).  
37 Deposition of Paul Althaus, 1947, NA 12.5. Töllner reports the following: ‘Looking back after 1945, 
Althaus stated that he signed the document only at the urging of Elert and only after several revisions’ (Eine 
Frage der Rasse?, 103). Still, even if the body of the text developed out of Elert’s draft, Althaus reviewed the 
document, recommended changes, and signed it.  
38 Helmut Thielicke, Notes from a Wayfarer: The Autobiography of Helmut Thielicke, trans. David R. 
Law (New York: Pentagon House, 1995), 74–75. In a similar strategy, Lowell Green suggests that the document 
was authored by Hans Sommerer, who ‘seems to have couched it in language similar to [Althaus’ and Elert’s]’ 
(Lutherans Against Hitler, 239). Stayer, too, suggests that Elert, and not Althaus, is primarily behind the 
statement. See Martin Luther, 132–33. See also Beyschlag, Die Erlanger Theologie, 167–69. Even as the 
question of authorship remains open, the Ansbach Memorandum expresses a political theology entirely and 
consistently congruent with Althaus’ other writings of the same period.  
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and Althaus and Elert may not have been the principal authors. However, close 
exegesis of the Memorandum uncovers all the identifying characteristics of Althaus’ 
theological personality and method; its theses clearly derive from the larger corpus of 
Althaus’ thought, even if he did not author the entire document himself. 
Regarding the Erlangen Opinion, although Karlmann Beyschlag concedes 
that the document ‘demands that Jewish Christians (voluntarily) refrain from 
ministerial office,’ he is quick to add that this recommendation is ‘paralysed 
immediately by wide-ranging “exceptions” to be made for their admission. . .’39 
Likewise, Gotthard Jasper has suggested that what makes the Opinion problematic is 
not its theology, but its lack of clarity. Before we conclude that Althaus and Elert 
target the Jews for persecution, argues Jasper, we must listen for the statement’s 
‘nuances’ [Zwischentöne], which make theoretical space for pastors of Jewish 
descent in the DEK. On this account, the Opinion stands in opposition to the 
universal application of the Aryan Paragraph in the church.40 
However, careful attention to the Opinion’s nuances actually reveals that its 
entire trajectory conforms to Althaus’ theology of inclusive quarantine as developed 
during the Weimar period. This means that the Erlangen Opinion is best read within 
the structure of the same dialectical theology of Jewish existence established in 
Althaus’ early interpretive categories. The Jews remain a spiritual threat to the orders 
of creation and Jewish pastors are seen as a hindrance to German self-determination. 
At the same time, the Jews remain an utterly unique Volk who are to be preserved 
                                                 
39 Beyschlag, Die Erlanger Theologie, 164. Emphasis in the original.  
40 Jasper, Paul Althaus, 235–38. Jasper elsewhere argues that the Erlangen Opinion has been received 
so negatively because of its ‘cautious’ and therefore ‘ambiguous’ nature. Because of this ambiguity, alternative 
readings of the document are possible: some scholars interpret it as a vital episode of the pre-history of the Final 




because of their various performative functions. Despite their performative value, 
Christians of Jewish descent are nevertheless to be confined to the margins of the 
church and away from its centre, removed from positions of influence. The Erlangen 
Opinion thus stands as an excellent specimen of the remarkable continuity of 
Althaus’ dialectic of pathology and performance.  
 Within the shared paradigm of the Erlangen Opinion and the Ansbach 
Memorandum, the Jews continue to exist in a dialectical relationship with Germans, 
and once again appear as a necessary danger—a threat that must be contained but 
not eliminated, preserved but marginalised. Below, I argue that the Opinion’s 
recommendation for the Jews in the church mirrors Althaus’ larger design for the 
role of the Jews in German society. Because many of his accusations against ‘the 
Jew’ in the Weimar writings are chimerical, it had not always been clear whether 
Althaus was referring to actual Jews or to rhetorical, abstracted ‘Jews.’ With the 
Erlangen Opinion, however, the rhetorical turns concrete: Althaus’ comments now 
impact the employment and wellbeing of living, breathing Jewish persons.41  
 Before we turn to a full exposition of the Opinion’s final recommendation 
regarding the place of Jews in German churches, we must first uncover the ways in 
which it subordinates ecclesiology to völkisch ideology to create a model of the 
church that is dialectical—that is, exhibiting both inclusive and xenophobic 






                                                 
41 There were very few Jewish pastors in the DEK in 1933. By Gerlach’s calculations, with the clause’s 
various exemptions, the Aryan Paragraph applied to less than two percent of pastors in Germany. See And the 
Witnesses were Silent, 30–31.  
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THREE | ETHNICITY AND ECCLESIOLOGY WITHIN THE ORDERS OF CREATION  
 
The Opinion builds on the initial findings of the Prussian General Synod, 
namely: that persons of non-Aryan descent, or those married to persons of non-Aryan 
descent, are to be prohibited from ordination. Moreover, the Synod suggested that 
those pastors of non-Aryan descent already serving should be forced into retirement, 
with the exception of those pastors who can produce evidence of extraordinary 
service of the church in the German spirit.42 Though it does offer important 
qualifications, the Erlangen Opinion legitimates the findings of the General Synod: 
‘With these stipulations, the Prussian General Synod is formally following the 
custom of Christian churches in all times by making admission to her offices 
dependent upon the fulfillment of certain personal requirements on the part of the 
candidate.’43 In the reasoning of the Opinion, ‘the requirement of Aryan ancestry’ is 
a legitimate criterion for evaluating a ministerial candidate. In fact, say Althaus and 
Elert, the church has always discriminated on the basis of ‘age, gender, and physical 
suitability.’44 In this ruling, the Opinion accepts uncritically the antisemitic 
discursive vocabulary of the Aryan Paragraph.45  
From the start, the Opinion anticipates the theological objection that the 
difference between Jew and German is overcome in the unity of the church.46 
Althaus and Elert grant that ‘no person, let alone an entire Volk, is to be excluded 
                                                 
42 Erlangen Opinion, 321. The findings of the Prussian General Synod cohere with the provisions of the 
Aryan Paragraph itself, which makes exceptions for civil servants in office since before 1 August 1914 or who 
had fought for Germany in the Great War.  
43 Ibid.  
44 Ibid.  
45 The Erlangen Opinion employs the dubious racial language of ‘non-Aryan’ [nichtarischer] as 
defined in the First Racial Definition of April 11, 1933. In this addendum to the Law for the Restoration of the 
Professional Civil Service, the National Socialist government identified a non-Aryan person as one ‘who is 
descended from non-Aryans, especially Jewish parents or grandparents.’ The document directed all cases of 
disputed ancestry to the ‘expert on racial research commissioned by the Reich Minister of the Interior.’ See Dov 
Weinryb, Jewish Emancipation Under Attack, 41–42.  
46 An objection raised, for example, both by the Marburg Opinion and by Wilhelm Vischer and 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer in the August 1933 draft of the Bethel Confession, §VI.6. See DBWE 12:416–21. 
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from the universal application of the Gospel.’ Indeed, Jews and Germans are equals 
before God under the Gospel, for ‘in communion with Christ there is no distinction 
between Jew and non-Jew before God.’47 But, as qualified by the Ansbach 
Memorandum, the church must proclaim God’s self-revelation not only as Gospel, 
but also as Law: ‘The Law, “namely the unchangeable will of God,” confronts us in 
the shared reality of our life as it is brought to light through the revelation of God.’48 
Under the Law, then, ‘the status that all Christians share as children of God does not 
abolish [nicht aufhebt] biological and societal differences.’49 Because the Law, as 
Althaus and Elert put it in the Ansbach Memorandum, ‘obligates us to the natural 
orders to which we are subject, such as family, Volk, and race (that is, blood 
relationship),’ spiritual communion and ethnic solidarity are two separate 
questions.50 The Law of God is immutable. Though their particular historical 
manifestation changes depending on context, the ordinances of creation are fixed 
realities decided in the inscrutable counsel of God.  
In this regard, Althaus’ high theology of the Law is somewhat unusual for a 
Lutheran theologian. Elert’s view of the Law, for instance, is more consistent with 
the traditional Lutheran expression: the Law exists in an opposition to the Gospel 
which is resolved only when the Law is abrogated in the death of Christ. In the 
meantime, the Law offers only despair. Althaus’ conception of the relationship 
                                                 
47 Erlangen Opinion, §1, 322.  
48 Ansbach Memorandum, §A:3, 258. Cf. §B:6, 258. For Althaus, God reveals himself only in the living 
‘tension’ between Law and Gospel. Christian faith derives from this ‘two-fold experience of God 
[Doppel=Erfahrung Gottes].’ See Paul Althaus, Grundriß der Dogmatik, vol. 2 (Erlangen: Merkel, 1932), 24–28, 
reproduced in Paul Althaus, Grundriß der christlichen Lehre (Erlangen: Merkel, 1933). 
49 Erlangen Opinion, §1, 322. This clause shows Elert’s influence. In 1924, he had argued that an 
individual is ‘permanently bound’ with her blood relations, family, clan, tribe, nation, and race. For Elert, ‘the 
liberating work of the Reconciler [der Versöhner] cannot in itself abolish [kann . . . nicht aufheben] the blood 
relationship willed by the Creator.’ See Die Lehre des Luthertums im Abriss, 2nd ed. (München: C.H. Beck’sche 
Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1924), 82–83. The ‘compulsory status’ Elert awarded to racial identity as a Seinesgefüge 
(‘structure of being’) is characteristic of Elert’s formulation of the orders of creation doctrine, which Yoder has 
described as broadly ‘nomological.’ See Ordnung in Gemeinschaft, chapter 3.   
50 Ansbach Memorandum, §A:3, 258. Cf. nearly identical language in the Erlangen Opinion, §1, 322.  
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between Law and Gospel, by contrast, is more dynamic. In particular, Althaus sees 
Law and Gospel as standing in both ‘unity and conflict’ [Einheit und Widerstreit]; 
even though the Gospel completes the Law, by virtue of Uroffenbarung Law and 
Gospel are communicating the same fundamental truth—the Divine Command—and 
are therefore not opposed in essence. The Law of course does this imperfectly, but it 
is nonetheless possible to use the Law constructively to inform ethical behavior.51  
This fundamental continuity between Law and Gospel is reflected in the 
Erlangen Opinion’s handling of the ‘Jewish Question’: namely, not even shared 
fellowship in the Gospel can overcome the intrinsic foreignness of the Jewish type 
that has been determined by the Law of God, which remains binding. Just as he had 
in his Weimar writings, Althaus again envisions the Volk as a mysterious primordial 
givenness: ‘The biological bond to a particular Volk, which is a destiny that cannot 
be escaped, is to be respected by Christians both in disposition and deed.’52 Thus the 
ordinances of creation—family, Volk, and race—are determined by God’s 
unchangeable decree. The spiritual communion of the church does not invalidate the 
primordial fact of one’s Volk, ‘but instead binds each one to the station into which he 
has been called.’53  
                                                 
51 As a rule, Althaus’ view of the Law is higher than Elert’s, an insight which is significant for our 
interpretation of both the Erlangen Opinion and the Ansbach Memorandum. For instance, for Elert God reveals 
only his wrath, and not his grace, through the Law. For Elert Law and Gospel are mutually exclusive categories, 
but the same is not true for Althaus. Moreover, whereas for Elert Christ has abrogated and invalidated the Law, 
Althaus considers the death of Jesus as the ‘sanctification’ of the Law. See Wolf Krötke, Das Problem ‘Gesetz 
und Evangelium’ bei W. Elert und P. Althaus, Theologische Studien 83 (Zürich: EVZ-Verlag, 1965), especially 
28–30. Choi has likewise noted that for Althaus Law and Gospel exist in an ‘oppositional and unified’ 
relationship, see Das Konzept der Ur-Offenbarung, 106–08. 
52 Erlangen Opinion, §3, 322. Töllner and Hamm have both noted that Elert emphasises the racial-
biological dimension of ethnic identity, and thus of the ‘Jewish Question’ as well, more strongly than Althaus. 
See Töllner, Eine Frage der Rasse?, 58, 112–13, and Hamm, ‘Werner Elert als Kriegstheologe,’ 219–20. That is 
correct insofar as Althaus considers Seelentum, not blood, as the chief trait of Volkstum. However, Althaus can 
nevertheless speak in very similar terms to Elert. See Völker vor und nach Christus: Theologische Lehre vom 
Volke, Theologia Militans 14 (Leipzig: Deichert, 1937): ‘We cannot choose our place or our type. God has 
decreed that. Our freedom is determined through the holy limits of this bond. We may desert our Volk neither in 
body nor in spirit, neither can we separate ourselves form its type nor from its destiny’ (7).  
53 Erlangen Opinion, §3, 322. The identical language appears in Ansbach Memorandum, §A:3 (258). 
Althaus and Elert’s ethnic essentialism is challenged by the signatories of ‘Neues Testament und Rassenfrage,’ 
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That one belongs to a particular family within a particular Volk in one’s 
earthly existence is a matter of providence. Germanness, therefore, is rooted in the 
mysterious will of the Creator.54 The dissent from the Marburg Opinion is especially 
sharp on this point. Bultmann and his colleagues had put the matter bluntly: ‘The Jew 
who . . . is converted and baptised is, for the church, no longer a Jew.’55 For Althaus 
and Elert, by contrast, a Jewish person who confesses faith in Christ is indeed a 
Christian, but she is still a Jew—and not a German. 
This view is consistent across Althaus’ writings of the era. As he had in the 
Weimar period, Althaus continues to acknowledge that the church, understood as an 
eschatological reality, will transcend ethnic bonds. However, in its historical 
manifestation the church must continue to respect the radical alterity of each Volk 
and to maintain the ethnic segregation dictated by the orders of creation. In a 1937 
paper delivered for the DEK delegation at the World Conference on Church, 
Community, and State in Oxford, Althaus comments on the application of Galatians 
3:28 to contemporary church policy:  
Thus the Christian recognition of the unity of all those who believe in Christ 
should not be understood and applied [to questions of races and peoples]. . . 
As little as unity in Christ nullifies the difference between man and woman, 
just as little does it nullify the difference between races and peoples. Unity in 
                                                 
who argue that the distinction between ‘Jew and Greek’ is not a matter of ‘natural createdness’ or the ‘experience 
of primal-biological [erbiologische] factors,’ but is instead used to indicate a spiritual condition before God. 
Further, Bultmann concedes that the Erlangen Opinion is correct to assert that God has called individual 
Christians into different vocations, but argues that Althaus and Elert have fundamentally misunderstood Paul’s 
writings on the subject. For Bultmann, societal and ethnic distinctions maintain their validity in the ‘world,’ but 
hold no significance in the sphere of the church. See ‘Der Arier-Paragraph,’ 363.  
54 Althaus, Völker vor und nach Christus:  
 
The Volk is a creation of God. From where do I know that? ‘I believe that God created me.’ [. . .] The 
belief that God created me includes my Volk along with it. For whatever I am and whatever I have God 
has given me out the source of my Volk: the inheritance of blood, of bodily appearance [Leiblichkeit], 
of soul, of spirit. God has determined my life both outwardly and down to my innermost self through 
the life of my Volk, through its blood, through its spiritual type—which shapes me above all in my 
language—and through history. My Volk is my outward and inward destiny [Schicksal]. This womb of 
my being is God’s means, his ordinance, by which he creates and begets me (5). 
  
55 Marburg Opinion, 292. Bultmann elsewhere argues that to restrict the rights of non-Aryan Christians 
in the church is to show ‘contempt’ for baptism. See ‘Der Arier-Paragraph,’ 362.  
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Christ means community in the midst of otherness [Anderssein] and among 
counterparts, but it does not nullify all of the delimitations and differences 
that are necessary in our history full of sin and death.56 
 
The Konfliktgesetz, Althaus’ competitive philosophy of history, emerges here again. 
In a world marred by sin and driven by violent competition between peoples, the 
church cannot resolve the inherent antagonism between ethnic groups. It can only 
encourage ecumenical co-existence: 
The one church of Christ, to which all peoples have been called, can in this 
aeon never become a political reality in which the differences between races, 
peoples and states are nullified within itself. . . . To point to ecumenical 
community in word and deed—that is the actual gift of the churches to the 
political world. . .57 
 
For Althaus, total ethnic harmony remains an eschatological hope beyond history. 
Yet even though God will resolve ethnic antagonism in the future, Althaus does not 
take this to mean that ethnic segregation is a curse. Rather, as it predates humanity’s 
dispersion and linguistic confusion at Babel, ethnic segregation is understood as 
God’s intended design for creation.58 
In the years after the Opinion, Althaus develops this völkisch ecclesiology 
more fully. ‘The church of Jesus Christ,’ he writes, ‘is a trans-ethnic reality [eine 
übervölkische Wirklichkeit].’59 However, this means only that the church universal is 
a trans-ethnic community, inasmuch as it exists in ecumenical relationship:  
The church is in every Volk, but it emerges in none. . . . In its support of the 
ecumenical community of faith across political, racial, and ethnic boundaries 
. . . the church of a Volk testifies that ethnic boundaries [Volksgrenzen] and 
church boundaries do not coincide, that the service of its own Volk does not 
                                                 
56 Paul Althaus, ‘Kirche, Volk und Staat,’ in Kirche, Volk, und Staat: Stimmen aus der Deutschen 
Evangelischen Kirche zur Oxforder Weltkirchenkonferenz, ed. Eugen Gerstenmaier (Berlin: Furche-Verlag, 
1937), 22. Cf. Althaus, Völker vor und nach Christus, 9.  
57 Paul Althaus, ‘Christentum, Krieg und Frieden,’ in Kirche, Volk und Staat, 181–82.  
58 See Althaus, Theologie der Ordnungen, 2nd ed., 56–57.  
59 Althaus, ‘Kirche, Volk und Staat,’ 26.  
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exhaust its obligations.60  
 
Nevertheless, the ecclesiology reflected in the Erlangen Opinion appears so 
parochial that Victoria Barnett has suggested that ‘the Erlangen faculty proposed the 
establishment of a separate church for Jewish Christians—an idea that would be 
raised periodically in other parts of the church.’61 In fact, the Opinion never makes 
that recommendation explicitly. It is plausible that Althaus would have endorsed the 
establishment of separate churches of Jewish Christians. And yet there is good reason 
to conclude that such a recommendation is inconsistent with his broader theological 
scheme, which does manifest a vision for the church as a trans-ethnic community, 
but only in a qualified sense.  
 For Althaus, the church is a trans-ethnic community to the extent that it 
recognises that the boundaries between the Völker and the boundaries between 
separate folk-churches are not coterminous. But it is through ecumenical 
relationship, and not in the everyday practice of individual churches in their concrete 
ethnic particularity, that the church transcends ethnic boundaries. The Erlangen 
Opinion, while it does not prescribe a separate church for Jewish Christians 
straightforwardly, nevertheless advances this same ecclesiastical vision in which 
Christians, generally speaking, congregate in self-contained churches specific to their 
ethnic type and relate to the churches of other ethnic types only in ecumenical 
association. Still, the Opinion cannot fully resolve the tension between exclusion and 
                                                 
60 Ibid., 27. Ecumenical involvement prevents the church from falling into idolatrous nationalism. See 
Althaus, ‘Kirche und Volk: Thesen für die Ökumenische Studienkonferenz in Sigtuna, 6. bis 12. Oktober 1935,’ 
Wort und Tat 11:12 (1935), 358.  
61 Barnett, For the Soul of the People, 129. Barnett does qualify her conclusion by alluding to the 
equivocal nature of the document, adding that the Althaus and Elert ‘avoided the issue.’ In reality, the regional 
Landeskirchen enforced the ‘Aryan Paragraph’ to varying degrees. In Mecklenburg and Thuringia, for instance, 
Christians of Jewish descent (lay people as well as pastors) were excluded from the church, whereas the 
Landeskirche in Hannover transferred its Jewish pastors into a state of interim retirement incrementally. See 
Lindemann, ‘Antijudaismus und Antisemitismus,’ 606–07. 
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inclusion because there remains a place for Jewish Christians in German churches, as 
will become clear below.  
 The Opinion roots its ecclesiology in a specific interpretation of the church’s 
history. Althaus and Elert point to ‘evidence that, in the early church, the Jewish-
Christians [Judenchristen] followed a different church-order than Gentile 
Christians.’62 Accordingly, the churches of the Reformation adopted this custom to 
produce a distinct form of ecclesiastical ordinance that conforms to ‘the classification 
[Gliederung] of Christian people corresponding to history and ethnicity.’63 In 
addressing the Prussian General Synod’s concern that the implementation of the 
Aryan Paragraph might undermine the practice of the historic Reformation faith, 
Althaus and Elert conclude precisely the opposite. In requiring its pastors to 
demonstrate Aryan descent, they argue, the German church actually expresses 
fidelity to its own tradition of upholding ethnic demarcation: 
The national churches [Kirchentümer] which emerged from the Wittenberg 
Reformation, according to these fundamental principles, have adapted 
themselves to the boundaries between different peoples, and have not only 
protected those boundaries in the vernacular language, the worship, and the 
makeup of each national particularity [Eigentümlichkeiten], but they have 
also contributed essentially to the cultivation and maintenance of those 
boundaries.64 
 
                                                 
62 Erlangen Opinion, §2, 322. The Marburg Opinion disputes this interpretation of the early church’s 
history: ‘It indeed may also be noted here that Christians of Jewish ancestry [judenstämmige Christen] have been 
called to consecrated service in the Christian community since earliest times, just like they have been in every age 
and among every people, even in our Vaterland’ (293).  
63 Erlangen Opinion, §2, 322. 
64 Ibid. I have rendered Kirchentümer as ‘national churches,’ but this word also connotes the concept of 
churches that conform to each ethnic group’s historical and spiritual particularity, such as vernacular language 
and social custom. The Marburg Opinion also admits that ethnic groups do tend to develop their own church 
communities based around a shared language and culture, but, in contrast to the Erlangen Opinion, adds that this 
phenomenon by no means suggests that members of different ethnic groups cannot or should not share 
communion in a common church body (291–92). For Althaus, the multiplicity of churches and denominations, 
like all historical phenomena, testifies to both the bounty and the curse of created existence. In 1927, he had 
argued that denominational separation is simultaneously an example of the ‘creative richness of God’ 
[Schöpferreichtum Gottes] and the ‘historical law of segregation . . . guilt, error, one-sidedness, and distortion of 
the truth’ See ‘Das Reich Gottes und die Kirche,’ Theologische Blätter 6:5 (1927), 140.  
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The Gospel is universal in scope insofar as it accommodates each particular ethnic 
situation, say Althaus and Elert, but it does prescribe a universal external ecclesial 
structure, nor does it nullify God’s self-revelation as Law. The DEK is therefore 
authorised to restrict the admission of Jewish Christians to pastoral office without 
violating the nature of the church because ‘being one in Christ [Eins-Sein in 
Christus] is for the Lutheran confessions not a question of external organisation, but 
of faith.’65 
 Ultimately, this means that Althaus and Elert subordinate ecclesiology to the 
Volk within the doctrine of the orders of creation. The Opinion presupposes that the 
Volk is a fixed ordinance of creation to which the church must accommodate itself, 
rather than vice versa. It is not the Volk that is relativised by the church, but the 
church that is relativised by the Volk. Althaus puts it most poignantly in his 1934 
rebuttal to the Barmen Declaration: ‘For us Lutherans, the ordinance of the church is 
always partially determined by the ordinance of the Volk, into which the church 
enters, as well as by political realities (to which political convictions may also 
belong).’66 Hence the external organisation of the church conforms to the 
particularity of the Volk, which is ontologically prior to the concrete shape of the 
church in any given historical context. In other words, the Volk is the reality ‘into 
which the church enters,’ rather than the other way around.  
With specific reference to the ‘Jewish Question,’ Althaus and Elert take this 
to mean that ‘The ethnic plurality of external church ordinance is a necessary result 
of ethnic classification [völkische Gliederung] in general, which is to be affirmed as 
                                                 
65 Erlangen Opinion, §2, 322. 
66 Althaus, ‘Bedenken,’ 120.  
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both a matter of destiny [schicksalhaften] and as a matter of ethics. . .’67 By this 
logic, a pastor must be connected organically to his congregation in order to meet the 
community’s spiritual needs: ‘The bearer of the spiritual office should be so closely 
bound to his community in its earthly existence that the ties that bind his community 
are also his.’68 That is to say, a pastor must belong to the same Volk as the members 
of his congregation, with whom he shares blood, language, and destiny.  
Anchored in this partially-xenophobic ecclesial model, the Opinion’s 
objection is thus not to Jewish pastors per se, but to Jewish pastors for ‘German’ 
congregations. Practically speaking, Althaus and Elert express profound doubt that a 
Jewish pastor will be able to gain credibility with a German community. Should 
Jewish pastors remain in their posts, the Opinion anticipates ‘cases in which 
insurmountable difficulties arise between the pastor and the community on account 
of the Jewish ancestry of the pastor’ due to the ‘breakdown of the relationship of 
trust between the pastor and the congregation.’69 This conclusion signals a 
continuation of the notion of incompatible, primordial spiritual types that Althaus 
developed in the Weimar period.70 There remains the subtle danger of the Jewish 
spirit for German life, just as before the National Socialist seizure of power.  
 
 
                                                 
67 Erlangen Opinion, §3, 322. An alternative Lutheran vision is offered by Bonhoeffer, who opts for the 
language of ‘orders of preservation’ [Erhaltungsordnungen] instead of ‘orders of creation’ to avoid absolutising 
the orders. By doing so, Bonhoeffer can then subordinate the Volk to the church, reversing the Althausian 
paradigm, as I will argue below. Bultmann raises a similar objection: ‘One may not say that this unity [between 
Jew and Greek] applies only to the invisible church while in the visible church the barriers which divide people 
must otherwise be respected and allowed. . . . Further, one may not argue that race and Volkstum, as ordinances of 
creation, are not to be ignored, but rather respected by the church’ (Marburg Opinion, 292–93).  
68 Erlangen Opinion, §3, 322–23. Cf. ‘Kirche und Volkstum,’ 131–34.  
69 Erlangen Opinion, §7, 324.  
70 See ‘Gott und Volk,’ 35–36 and ‘Kirche und Volkstum,’ 114 on the concept of Seelentum. On the 
explicit incompatibility of the German and Jewish types, see Leitsätze, 54.  
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CONCLUSION | AMBIVALENCE AND AMBIGUITY 
 Althaus’ personality is reflected in his mediatory posture during the 
Kirchenkampf. Neither a German Christian nor a proponent of the Bekennende 
Kirche, he straddled the ecclesial divide. In the same way, the Ansbach 
Memorandum and the Erlangen Opinion on the Aryan Paragraph exhibit a similar 
ambivalence—an ambivalence that emerges all the more clearly when compared to 
the more precisely-articulated positions of Althaus’ Lutheran contemporaries. But 
ambivalence is not the same thing as ambiguity. On the contrary, both documents 
reflect a dialectical yet clear theology of revelation, and, as a result, share a common 
framework for doing Christian ethics. The particular insight gained here—namely, 
that Althaus subordinates the church to the Volk, which is ontologically and 
spiritually prior—is critical for our understanding of the Erlangen Opinion’s 
concrete recommendations for the place of Jewish persons in the German churches, 








CHAPTER V | INCLUSIVE QUARANTINE IN MICROCOSM: JEWISH PATHOLOGY AND 
PERFORMANCE IN THE GERMAN CHURCHES 
 
In the present situation, to have men of Jewish stock occupy the church’s 
offices would mean a severe strain on and inhibition of the church’s position 
in the life of the Volk and for the fulfillment of its tasks. Therefore the church 
must require that its Jewish Christians be restrained from taking pastoral 
office. Their full membership in the Deutsche Evangelische Kirche, however, 
is not thereby denied or otherwise restricted, just as little as it is denied or 
restricted for those other members of our church who fail to meet the criteria 
for admission to the offices of the church in some other respect. 
 
Erlangen Opinion on the Aryan Paragraph, §5 
 
INTRODUCTION  
Within the Erlangen Opinion’s völkisch ecclesiology, Althaus and Elert 
identify Jewish pastors as a strain on and a pollutant of German spiritual life. 
Althaus’ militant doctrine of the orders of creation then authorises the state to take 
drastic measures to uphold order against the forces of anti-creation—in this case: 
emancipated and assimilated Jewry. But at the same time, Jewish Christians are to be 
maintained in the church—though with a degree of apprehension and suspicion. 
More than that, the Jews—and their scriptures—remain a critical component for 
German self-understanding. For Althaus, Germans interpret their own history 
through the narrative of Israel; therefore, the story of the Jews is a story that must 
continue. In light of these factors, the Erlangen Opinion rejects both the total 
inclusion and the total exclusion of Jewish persons and instead prescribes an 
inclusive quarantine of Jewish Christians within German churches.  
This outcome, I suggest, represents Althaus’ broader theological vision for 
Jewish existence in microcosm. Below, we illuminate the Opinion’s recommendation 
for pastors of Jewish descent by setting into the broader context of Althaus’ theology 
of the ‘Jewish Question’ during the National Socialist years. In so doing, we discover 
that Althaus’ thought in this period is governed by the same dialectic of pathology 
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and performance. Jewish existence is seen as pathological insofar as it is a cursed 
existence that poses both a political and spiritual threat to surrounding communities. 
Accordingly, Jews are targeted as a political danger to the life of the German Volk 
and Jewish pastors are identified as pathogens. At the same time, Jewish existence is 
performative as the Jews and their scriptures function as didactic tools and 
hermeneutical keys for German and Christian self-understanding. A detailed 
exposition of this dialectical theology of the ‘Jewish Question’ uncovers nuances in 
the Erlangen Opinion that would otherwise be difficult to detect. Our analysis 
concludes with striking evidence that Althaus continued to interpret Jewish existence 
according to the dialectic of pathology and performance into the early 1940s, by 
which time the death camps were in operation.  
ONE | BETWEEN ELECTION AND CURSE: JEWISH PERSONS AND JEWISH SCRIPTURE 
AS KEYS TO GERMAN SELF-UNDERSTANDING   
 
 After subordinating ecclesiology to the Volk, the Opinion addresses the crux 
of the Aryan Paragraph: the peculiar dialectical relationship between Jews and 
Germans. On the face of it, Althaus and Elert rely on the Lutheran doctrine of the 
two kingdoms by leaving the civil status of Jews to the discretion of the state: ‘The 
first question is whether the Jews residing in Germany are members of the German 
Volk in a full sense or whether they are their own Volkstum living as a guest-people 
[Gastvolk]. The church as such cannot decide that.’1 The Opinion is reticent to issue 
an explicit pronouncement on the Germanness of Jews—and any consequent legal 
ramification—partly because of the unique theological character of Jewish existence. 
The church cannot advise on the legal standing of the Jews because the Jews are not 
simply another civil constituency among others:  
                                                 
1 Erlangen Opinion, §4, 323.  
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For the church, the Jewish Volk is certainly not, even today, a Volk just like 
any other: it remains the salvation-historical Volk in its election and curse 
[Erwählung und Fluch], the Volk of Jesus and of the apostles (according to 
the flesh), and the Volk being preserved [aufbewahrt] for its final history with 
Jesus Christ.2  
 
Althaus expresses this dialectic of election and curse acutely in his sermons 
of the National Socialist years. The ‘eternal Jew,’ with whom we first became 
acquainted in Althaus’ exegetical work of the Weimar era, makes another appearance 
in a sermon delivered in late 1936. Here, the Jews continue to bear the consequences 
of the crucifixion, still splattered, as it were, with the blood of Jesus: ‘The eternal 
Jew [der ewige Jude] wanders restless through history, the people of the curse [das 
Volk des Fluches].’3 Althaus again invokes the Jew as a rhetorical device to illustrate 
the terrible immanence of God’s wrath over humanity’s historical life. ‘Who could 
look at the Jewish Volk,’ he asks, ‘and not quake before the dreadfulness of the 
vengeance of God?’4 
But the suffering of the Jews is not purposeless; their demise functions as a 
caution to all other peoples, especially Germans. Specifically, the Jews are the 
answer to the open question of theodicy: ‘Is God silent?’ God is not. The Jews are 
living proof that human sin and presumption will not go unpunished.5 Echoing his 
remarks during the Weimar period, Althaus elsewhere portrays the Jews as 
                                                 
2 Ibid. The language of ‘preservation’ or ‘being held in safe-keeping’ is nearly identical to Althaus’ 
Weimar commentary on Romans 11: ‘[Romans 9–11 asks:] perhaps the unique self-assertion [Behauptung] of 
Israel as a Volk is not the mystery of divine preservation [Aufbewahrung] for a new and final history with Jesus 
Christ?’ (Römer, 101).  
3 Paul Althaus, ‘Schweigt Gott?’ (15 November 1936) in Der Herr der Kirche: Predigten (Gütersloh: 
Bertelsmann, 1937). Here, Althaus again connects the Jewish curse to the Jews’ oath at the crucifixion as 
recorded in Matthew’s Gospel: ‘His blood be on us and on our children!’ (376). 
4 Ibid.  
5 The Jews serve as exemplary objects of God’s wrath, but are no means the only people who are 
subject to divine judgment. The Jews testify to God’s vengeance against universal human sinfulness. See ibid., 
377–79. However, the Jews pose a special warning to Germans, who stand in the critical hour of decision before 
God: ‘In the hour when the Jewish peoples cried: ‘Crucify, crucify him!’, the entire history of the Volk was 
decided there, even until this day. The applies for each Volk in the hour in which it stands before Christ and 
consciously decides for or against him; it applies, too, for our German Volk’ (379–80).  
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antagonists to the truth of God in the drama of salvation history. The crucifixion is 
the climax of the Jews’ long history of opposing the Kingdom of God:  
The sorrow of the prophets, the tears of Jesus, the Jews’ demand for his 
death—loud and harsh accusations against the Jewish Volk, plain signs of 
judgment. Israel has become the people of the curse [das Volk des Fluches] 
because it has struggled against the truth of God in the prophets and in Jesus. 
Between God and the Jewish Volk stand the pained cries of God’s messengers 
and the lament of Jesus.6 
 
Their fate sealed at the crucifixion, the Jews continue to wander and toil as the 
people accused by God.  
Yet even in the face of the wrath that looms over Jewish existence, the Jews 
still fulfill a vital performative function in the Erlangen Opinion precisely by 
suffering under the curse—the identical theological vocation as they fulfill in 
Althaus’ wider system. Just as before, the Jews enact their critical symbolic function 
precisely as the people destined to be perpetually scattered:  
In its landless dispersion [landlosen Zerstreuung] throughout the peoples, 
[Jewry] reminds us of the limits of all ethnic national solidarity [völkische 
Geschlossenheit], the provisional nature of ethnic segregation [die Sonderung 
der Völker], and of the Kingdom of God, which will come through the Christ 
who has been promised to Israel.7  
 
The language—and the undergirding theological logic—is taken virtually verbatim 
from his interpretation of the ‘Jewish Question’ during the Weimar period.8 Through 
                                                 
6 Paul Althaus, ‘Kraft deiner Angst und Pein,’ (3 April 1942) in Der Trost Gottes: Predigten in 
schwerer Zeit (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1946), 43. In his 1936 Good Friday sermon, Althaus reflects that, in its 
Good Friday liturgy, the church dramatises afresh ‘God’s jarring grievance [erschütternde Klage] against his 
Volk,’ that is, against Israel. Though the cross of Christ accuses ‘each Volk, each person, indeed all of humanity’ 
because all human existence stands under the curse of sin and death, it is the Jews who first ‘made the heart of the 
prophets to bleed’ by rejecting the suffering love of God. See Althaus, ‘Die verlorene Liebe,’ (10 April 1936) in 
Der Herr der Kirche, 338–39. In his dogmatic work of the era, Althaus emphasises that Israel’s rejection of Jesus 
is representative of humanity’s rebellion against God in general terms. See Grundriß der Dogmatik, vol. 2, 125f.  
7 Erlangen Opinion, §4, 323. Althaus again characterises Jewish existence as intrinsically ‘landless’ 
because the Jews are destined to roam among other peoples of the earth.  
8 See Althaus, Leitsätze, 55, Althaus, ‘Gott und Volk,’ 48, and Althaus, Römer, 101. In all three 
passages, as in the Erlangen Opinion, the Jews are commissioned to disrupt ‘ethnic national community’ 
[völkische Geschlossenheit] and to limit ‘ethnic segregation [völkische Sonderung].’  
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this brief excerpt we glimpse Althaus’ broader theological vision in which the Jews 
fulfill essential constructive functions not in spite of the curse, but through it.  
In the National Socialist period, though, Althaus develops this logic more 
fully by expanding the symbolic function of Jewish persons to include the Jewish 
scriptures as well. In particular, he cites the Hebrew Scriptures as essential for the 
theological interpretation of the German identity. He had always advocated the 
retention of the Old Testament in Christian worship, a fact which, according to Paul 
Knitter, proves that ‘Althaus had not fallen into the commonly accepted antisemitism 
of the time.’9 In the same way, Fischer points to ‘strong apologetic traits’ in Althaus’ 
posture toward the Hebrew Scriptures to distinguish his thought from cruder forms of 
antisemitism.10 However, upon closer examination, the evidence suggests that 
Althaus actually recruits—or commandeers—the Old Testament into the service of a 
profoundly anti-Judaic völkisch supersessionism.  
It is true that Althaus holds a high view of the Old Testament, which he 
considers the ‘primal revelation of the will of God’ [Ur=Offenbarung des Willens 
Gottes] that stands in judgment over all folk-laws.11 More than that, the Old 
Testament actually forms the presupposition for Christian dogmatics. Without it, 
argues Althaus, it is impossible read the New Testament. On account of its function 
as ‘indispensable preparation for the correct understanding of Christ,’ the place of the 
                                                 
9 Knitter, ‘Die Uroffenbarungslehre,’ 150.  
10 See Fischer, Zwischen Zeugnis und Zeitgeist, 503, 507–08.  
11 See Althaus, Theologie der Ordnungen, 2nd ed., 37–38. In an answer to Wilhelm Stapel, who 
characterised the Mosaic Law as a Jewish-specific folk-law with no claim on Germans, Althaus affirms a ‘two-
fold character’ of the Mosaic Law. In its first capacity, it is indeed a folk-law that applies only to Jews. In its 
second capacity, however, it expresses the will of God and is therefore essential for Christian self-understanding. 
See Althaus, ‘Nomos und Evangelium,’ in Die Deutsche Stunde der Kirche, 50–53. Cf. Althaus, ‘Nomos und 
Erlösung,’ Deutsches Volkstum 15:2 (1933), 49–53. Stapel answered with ‘Juden, Heiden und Christen: Eine 
Antwort an Herrn Prof. D. Paul Althaus und Herrn Prof. Dr. Karl Eschweiler,’ Deutsches Volkstum 15:2 (1933), 
59–65. For more on Althaus’ dispute with Stapel over the place of the Old Testament, see Smid, Deutscher 
Protestantismus, 287–88. Althaus enters into a similar debate with Friedrich Gogarten in Theologie der Ordnung, 
2nd ed., 34–39. 
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Old Testament as Christian scripture cannot be disputed.12 At the same time, Althaus 
reasons dialectically about the place of the Old Testament for Christian theology. 
The Hebrew Scriptures are authoritative for Christians, but only in a qualified sense. 
The question of their authority is complicated, however, because in Althaus’ view 
the text offers a progressive account of religious expression in which some forms of 
faith and practice (e.g. the prophets) represent a more highly developed form than 
others (such as ritual laws). To summarise:  
In truth, the book of the Old Covenant exhibits several layers of knowledge 
of God and piety. Prophetic piety and cultic piety are two separate kinds of 
piety. The Old Testament is an expression also of a struggle [Kampf] of 
different kinds of faith with each other, and, to that extent, it is an expression 
of a word at struggle in itself and with itself. Yet it exhibits simultaneously 
not only layers, but also movement, an inward progress of faith to a new 
stage; thus it represents not only layers, but also a history of faith.13 
 
The Hebrew Scriptures thus recount the Jewish peoples’ narrative of moral conflict, 
failure, and development. In this sense, Jewish persons and Jewish scriptures share 
the same function: to serve as (often negative) examples in the history of faith.  
Althaus does, on balance, stress the constructive function of the Law in 
addition to the destructive function traditionally assigned to it in Lutheran 
theology—that is, to make its adherents ‘ripe for despair.’14 Though it demonstrates 
examples of primitive forms of religious expression, the Old Testament under no 
                                                 
12 See Paul Althaus, Grundriß der Dogmatik, vol. 1, 4th ed. (Erlangen: Merkel, 1933), reproduced in 
Paul Althaus, Grundriß der christlichen Lehre (Erlangen: Merkel, 1933), 35.  
13 Paul Althaus, ‘Das Alte Testament in der “Naturgeschichte des Glaubens,”’ in Werke und Tage: 
Festschrift für Rudolf Alexander Schröder zum 60. Geburtstage am 26. Januar 1938, ed. Ernst Hauswedell and 
Kurt Ihlenfeld (Berlin: Eckart Verlag, 1938), 14. Emphasis in the original. In 1927, Althaus had characterised the 
Old Testament as ‘a book at war with itself’ in ‘Kirche und Volkstum’ (136).  
14 Althaus, ‘Das Alte Testament,’ 13–14. Though the Law of the Old Testament does make a valid 
claim on Christians (in the qualified sense I have explained here), Althaus ultimately finds the concept of the 
tertius usus legis, by which the Law is used for moral instruction, unworkable without significant revision. For 
Althaus, the Law is a flawed expression of the Divine Command, i.e. God’s directive for human behavior, which 
is restored by the Gospel. He would exposit this position most fully in The Divine Command: A New Perspective 
on Law and Gospel, trans. Franklin Sherman (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1966). The German original, 
Gebot und Gesetz: Zum Thema ‘Gesetz und Evangelium,’ appeared in 1952. This point represents a notable 
divergence between Althaus and Elert. Elert rejected the tertius usus legis completely, while Althaus was willing 




circumstances can be interpreted as a stage in a generic ‘natural history’ of 
humanity’s spiritual development. Rather, it stands alone as the history of the true 
God’s dealings with a particular Volk.15 As such, the Old Testament is a positive 
resource for Christian self-understanding:  
As a monument to and evidence of [Zeugnis] such a history, the book of the 
Old Covenant remains for Christianity an always-current book. For history is 
not a one-time occurrence, it is not the past, per se. Our faith, too, transverses 
its stages, undergoes its inner movement. . . . In the Old Testament we find 
fellow-travelers and signposts for our way [Weggenossen und Wegzeichen].16 
 
Althaus further expands the function of the Hebrew Scriptures to form constructive 
materials with which to interpret German history theologically by linking not only 
the German and Jewish pasts, but also the German and Jewish destinies.  
The Jews—and critically, their scriptures—are necessary, then, for German 
church life because they are indispensable not only for Christian self-understanding, 
but also for German self-understanding more narrowly. Specifically, Althaus wants 
to interpret the political events of 1933 theologically without equating the history of 
the German Volk with salvation history [Heilsgeschichte] in an unsophisticated way, 
as for instance, the Deutsche Christen would later do.17 Paradoxically, he does this 
by appealing to the story of the Jews, which ‘helps our Volk to understand its own 
history through immersion in the history of Israel.’18  
                                                 
15 Althaus, ‘Das Alte Testament,’ 14–17.  
16 Ibid., 17.  
17 See Althaus, ‘Volks=Geschichte und Heils=Geschichte,’ 15–16. Althaus rejects a Deutsche Christen 
hermeneutic in which the German Volk simply replaces the Jews as the elect people of God. See ‘Politisches 
Christentum,’ 1–7 and ‘Theologisches Gutachten über die thüringer Richtung der Deutschen Christen,’ 674–75. 
On the Deutsche Christen Movement’s relationship to Jews and Judaism, see Bergen, Twisted Cross, 21–43.  
18 Althaus, ‘Volks=Geschichte und Heils=Geschichte,’ 15. Later in the National Socialist period, 
Althaus remarks:  
 
For this purpose immersion in the Old Testament has great significance. For in the Old Testament the 
basic concepts and awareness of the history of a Volk ‘before God’ are pronounced: the gifts and calls 
of God, the Law of the Volk that he has given, the demand of and renewal through a God-sent leader 
[gottgesandte Führer], faith and commitment to the calling as a condition for the ‘subsistence’ of a 
Volk, and so on (‘Kirche, Volk und Staat,’ 25).  
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Still, it is manifestly not the case that German history is salvation history in 
the same way that Israel’s history is. ‘Admittedly,’ Althaus concedes, ‘Israel and its 
history is a uniquely singular event [einmalig]. The election, mission, and promise of 
Israel is not merely a particular example of something in which each Volk will 
participate, but is a salvation-historical anomaly and singularity.’19 Therefore a full-
scale and comprehensive supersessionism is out of the question; Germans cannot 
simply claim the unique promises made to Israel as their own and can thus never 
fully replace Israel.20 The crude supersessionism of the Deutsche Christen for this 
reason ‘represents an intolerable religious, that is to say, messianic inflation of 
political events as well as an intolerable secularisation, that is to say, nationalisation 
of the reality of the Kingdom of God.’21 Even though the Jews have failed as the 
people of God, there is no authority for Germans to substitute themselves into the 
story of salvation. Critically, Christians of Jewish descent (and not Germans) are the 
visible evidence of God’s ongoing election of Israel: 
The attempt to appoint the German Volk as God’s people of the new covenant 
is a downright theological heresy. When Israel, as a whole, made up its mind 
against God—misconceiving its vocation and later throwing it away—it still 
remained the people of God, but its calling is now preserved only in a holy 
remnant. That remnant was the ‘Israel of God.’ The holy remnant no longer 
lives within any one Volk, but in the community of Jesus Christ among all 
peoples.22 
 
However, while it is true that ‘German history is not some kind of messianic 
salvation history,’ it is nevertheless ‘certainly full of divine works.’23 Already in the 
                                                 
19 Althaus, ‘Volks=Geschichte und Heils=Geschichte,’ 16. Cf. Althaus, ‘Kirche, Volk und Staat’: ‘The 
Volk of the Old Testament has experienced in its midst a quite unique, incomparable, and unrepeatable history as 
the Volk from whom Christ should come. Its election and promise in this sense can be applied to no other Volk’ 
(25). Cf. nearly identical language in Völker vor und nach Christus, 13 and ‘Kirche und Volk,’ 355.  
20 Althaus, ‘Volks=Geschichte und Heils=Geschichte,’ 16.  
21 Althaus, ‘Politisches Christentum,’ 7. Althaus characterises the hermeneutical method of the 
Deutsche Christen as ‘chiliastic fanaticism’ [chiliastiches Schwärmertum] in ‘Kirche und Staat nach lutherischer 
Lehre,’ Allgemeine evangelisch-lutherische Kirchenzeitung 68:32 (1935), 752.  
22 Althaus, ‘Politisches Christentum,’ 13.  
23 Ibid., 10.  
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Weimar years Althaus had conceived of German history as ‘divine-history.’ As a 
result, Germany’s story, not unlike Israel’s, has the ‘capacity to function as a 
parable’ for the Kingdom of God.24 
 The Old Testament is given to Germans, reasons Althaus, as ‘evidence’ 
[Zeugnis] of God’s direct intervention into the historical life of an individual Volk. In 
this framework, the Jewish scriptures mirror the purpose of Jewish persons in 
Althaus’ theology. Just as Jews continue to exist as signs of judgment over all human 
societies, the Jewish scriptures likewise testify simultaneously to the failure of Israel 
as the chosen people and to the new possibility of a Volk’s dynamic relationship with 
the Lord of history. In this capacity, the history of Israel has a didactic function for 
all peoples.25 But here Althaus uses Jewish history as a means of interpreting 
German history in particular: ‘God enters into a Volk’s history concretely, deals with 
it, calls it and gifts it, brings it to account, judges it, shatters ethnic presumption 
[völkische Anmaßung], forgives it, and raises it to new life.’26 Here again, Israel’s 
chief failure—‘ethnic presumption’—is the very pitfall into which fanatical German 
supersessionists, tempted by ‘embarassing religious hubris,’ are in danger of 
falling.27  
In this way, the story of the Jews’ self-assertion before God and among other 
peoples—and their subsequent judgment—illustrates one of the fundamental 
purposes of Jewish existence: to prevent the idolisation of the Volk. Thus, ‘as a 
narrative record of God’s history with a Volk, the Old Testament is plainly 
                                                 
24 See Kurz, Nationalprotestantisches Denken, 472–73.  
25 Althaus, ‘Kirche und Volk,’ 355.  
26 Althaus, ‘Volks=Geschichte und Heils=Geschichte,’ 16. See nearly identical language in Völker vor 
und nach Christus (1937), 13 and ‘Kirche und Volk,’ 355.  
27 Althaus, ‘Politisches Christentum,’ 11.  
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indispensable for proclamation to our Volk in its time of historical change.’28 That is 
to say, Israel’s gross misinterpretation of its own history and vocation serves as a 
warning to Germans: ‘The Old Testament also reminds us that, as a matter of fact, 
the interpretation of our own history can err.’29 Because the German and Jewish 
destinies are linked, the Old Testament is the tool by which Germans can understand 
their own historical calling in a time when the danger of nationalistic hubris lurks in 
the shadows of national renewal.30 
Though the election of Israel can never be exactly duplicated, the Old 
Testament serves as proof that God can enter into a special relationship with a Volk. 
In the Althausian system, Israel functions as what Yoder has called the Ur-Erlebnis 
(‘archetypal experience’) of God’s revelation among the Völker.31 To put it another 
way, Althaus considers God’s covenant with Israel, singular as it is, to be 
paradigmatic for ‘what [God] is doing, in different forms and stages, among all 
peoples.’32 This means, then, that Althaus can transfer Israel’s role in salvation 
history, albeit in a qualified sense, to other Völker, a move which is critical especially 
for German self-understanding. So, despite his strident criticism of simplistic 
supersessionism, Althaus places the Patriarchs of Israel in parallel with the ‘fathers’ 
of the German Volk: ‘[The God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob] is our God. But our 
God is also the God of our fathers, the God of German history with all its adversity 
and its miracles. . .’33 Germans, like Abraham, had endured uncertain years of 
                                                 
28 Althaus, ‘Volks=Geschichte und Heils=Geschichte,’ 16. See also ‘Kirche und Volk,’ where Althaus 
refers to the Old Testament as ‘an example-book [Exempelbuch] of God’s living action’ (355).  
29 Althaus, ‘Kirche und Volk,’ 355.  
30 See Althaus, Völker vor und nach Christus, 11.  
31 Yoder, Ordnung in Gemeinschaft, 79. 
32 Knitter, Towards a Protestant Theology of Religions, 93.  
33 Althaus, ‘Volks=Geschichte und Heils=Geschichte,’ 20. Kurz illustrates how, after identifying the 
God of the Hebrew Scriptures with the God of the German Volk, Althaus makes direct use of the Old Testament 
for German self-understanding: ‘This “God of the Germans” is identical with the God of the Bible; without the 
latter the German Volk would not have been able to interpret God’s action in their history. Thus the German Volk 
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‘wandering’ as they follow God’s call to their own Promised Land in the aftermath 
of the Great War.34 Because they share an analogous (but not identical) divine 
election, Germans can learn what it means to live as a people commissioned by God 
by observing the success—and more critically, the failure—of Israel. It follows, then, 
that the church must not be dejudaized completely. German Christians need the Jews, 
and the ‘evidence’ of the Jews’ history narrated in the Hebrew Scriptures, as a guide 
to interpret their own history theologically and thereby to realise their own spiritual 
destiny. Hence ‘this book, when we come to it with the question of God’s purpose in 
German history, is incredibly near and living!’35  
In this form of ethnic supersessionism, Germans, like the Jews, claim an 
exclusive relationship to the God of Israel. Germans join—but not quite supplant—
the Jews as the people called by God ‘from ancient times’ whose way has been 
‘difficult and wearisome.’36 This statement appears even more striking in light of 
Kirche und Volkstum (1927), in which Althaus had anointed Germans as a Volk 
‘consecrated as a special priesthood’ who ‘has had to endure the deepest questions of 
                                                 
can apply many Psalms directly to itself, such as Psalm 124 for example’ (Nationalprotestantisches Denken, 
472).  
34 Paul Althaus, ‘Geh aus deinem Vaterlande!’ (14 November 1920), in Der Heilige: Rostocker 
Predigten (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1922), 14–15, 17–18.  
35 Althaus, ‘Volks=Geschichte und Heils=Geschichte,’ 20. In 1937, Althaus remarks that ‘[The Old 
Testament] is the place where any Volk that wants to live awake before God must go to school’ (Völker vor und 
nach Christus, 13). Elsewhere, Althaus comments that ‘In its unmediated relationship with God, in its blessing 
and its gifts in this earthly life and its goods, the people of the Old Testament learned to spell the abc’s of life 
with God’ (‘Das Alte Testament,’ 16–17). Compare Althaus’ comments during the Weimar era: ‘How we need, 
precisely from our own völkisch point of view, the Old Testament as evidence [Zeugnis] of God’s history with a 
people, how we need the prophets of the Bible! It is here that a Volk finds its mission.’ Althaus explicitly 
identifies it as the German mission ‘to testify to the coming Kingdom of God in a special form,’ which, 
paradoxically, closely parallels one of the prime performative functions of Jewish existence. See Althaus, ‘Kirche 
und Volkstum,’ 124–25.  
36 Althaus narrates the history of the Germans in the same register as the history of the Israelites:  
 
The birth of the people of Israel remains for us, as for all peoples, a memorable hour, for it is the Volk 
of the prophets and to which Jesus Christ was born. But when we, as Germans, hear: ‘I am the Lord 
your God,’ the God of the Old and New Testaments, it means something more for us: The God who 
mysteriously called you as a Volk from ancient times, who has gifted you richly, who has sent you the 
message of the Gospel and has built his church in you; who has made your way difficult and wearisome 
[schwer und mühsam]; who inspired Martin Luther in your midst and revealed himself powerfully in 
his faith; who calls you back out of estrangement from yourself [Selbstentfremdung] through prophets 
and heroes. . . . I am the Lord your God! (‘Volks=Geschichte und Heils=Geschichte,’ 20).  
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humanity more painfully and more profoundly than any other people.’37 Because, 
ironically, Jews and Germans fulfill a similar priestly office among the peoples of the 
world, Althaus predicts that the dreadful fate of the Jews awaits Germans as well, 
should they succumb to the mounting pressures of neo-paganism and secularism. As 
we shall see, the mysterious link between Jews and Germans would later form a vital 
element of Althaus’ postwar preaching. For the time being, however, this 
premonition is critical for our understanding of Althaus’ theology of the ‘Jewish 
Question’ vis-à-vis German identity: ‘And should we throw away the Gospel,’ he 
warns, ‘we would never be able to rid ourselves of the sting. Our Volk would then be 
right there next to the “eternal Jew,” a second figure wandering restless and without 
blessing [ruhelos und segenlos] through history.’38  
TWO | ENEMIES OF THE STATE: THE ‘GERMANNESS’ OF JEWS AND THE PURPOSE OF 
CIVIL AUTHORITY 
 
As we have just seen, Althaus considers the Jews and their scriptures to be of 
great theological meaning. Yet neither the indirect salvation-historical import of the 
Jews’ existence nor their dialectical spiritual relationship to Germans can determine 
their status as citizens of a secular state: 
But the church’s knowledge of the salvation-historical uniqueness and the 
mystery of the Jewish Volk does not yield the possibility of deciding the 
question of whether the Jews living among us belong to the German Volk in 
the fullest sense, or whether it is a foreign guest-people.39  
 
Because that question is ultimately ‘biological and historical in nature,’ the church 
cannot resolve it, not even through the sacramental rite of baptism.40 Instead, the 
civil dimension of the ‘Jewish Question’ will ultimately need to be decided by the 
                                                 
37 Althaus, ‘Kirche und Volkstum,’ 125–26.  
38 Paul Althaus, Christus und die Deutsche Seele (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1934), 32.  
39 Erlangen Opinion, §4, 323.  
40 Ibid. The contrast with the Marburg Opinion and ‘Neues Testament und Rassenfrage’ is strong.  
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state. Ostensibly, Althaus and Elert seem to assume an a-political posture with 
respect to the fate of Jewish persons. However, by concluding that ‘the question of 
the ethnic relationship between Germanness and Jewishness . . . can only be 
answered by our Volk as it relates to another Volk in view of its particular biological-
historical situation,’41 the Opinion awards the state theological authority to 
disenfranchise the Jews, as will become clear below.  
Not only in the theological sphere, but also in the political sphere, 
emancipated Jews cannot simply be considered a people just like any other:  
Today more than ever the German Volk perceives the Jews in its midst as an 
alien Volkstum. It has recognised the threat [Bedrohung] to its own life posed 
by emancipated Jewry and has defended itself against this danger [Gefahr] 
with legal exclusion clauses [barring Jews from civil service].42  
 
Here again Althaus rehashes the theology of Judaism he had constructed during the 
Weimar period. Just as before, the Jews appear as a unique threat and an obstacle to 
the realisation of the German destiny.43 In particular, the rise of secularism—
symbolised by the Jews in Althaus’ theology—endangers German existence itself. 
The moment Germans cease to be Christians, through, for example, the influence of 
Jewish spirituality, they will cease to be Germans.44 Because the felt menace of 
emancipated Jewry is so acute in the present historical crisis, Althaus and Elert 
authorise the state to take extreme action to neutralise the threat: ‘In the struggle for 
the renewal of our Volk the new state is excluding men of Jewish or half-Jewish 
                                                 
41 Ibid.  
42 Erlangen Opinion, §5, 323.  
43 Althaus spoke of the ‘threat’ [Bedrohung] and ‘danger’ [Gefahr] of the Jewish spirit in ‘Kirche und 
Volkstum,’ (119, 130–31, and 134–35), ‘Gott und Volk’ (35), and Leitsätze zur Ethik, where he had expressed 
particular concern over the threat posed by an emancipated and invisible Jewry (54–55). Significantly, Bultmann 
warns that it is actually measures against Jewish persons in the church—and, critically, not Jewish persons 
themselves—that ‘threaten’ [bedrohen] and ‘endanger’ [in Gefahr bringen] the existence of the church. See 
Marburg Opinion, 291. 
44 See Althaus, Christus und die Deutsche Seele, 17. 
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descent from offices of leadership. The church must respect the fundamental right of 
the state to take such legislative measures.’45 
Althaus’ political writings during this period illuminate the full import of the 
church’s endorsement of the state’s autonomy by connecting it to the doctrine of the 
orders of creation. These orders uphold creation: ‘The natural orders, however, do 
not merely make known to us the demanding will of God. While they are grounded 
in their relationship to our common natural existence, they are at the same time the 
means by which God creates and maintains our earthly life.’46 As a Volk (or a family 
or a race) fulfills its vocation, it collaborates with God in the administration of the 
world. In fact, argues Althaus, in the pursuit of its mission a Volk comes into genuine 
encounter with Jesus Christ.47 However, in the complicated world of historical 
existence, the Christian must interpret God’s will for the orders anew in each given 
context. For even though the Wesen behind each ordinance of creation is unchanging 
and unchangeable, the particular historical manifestation, i.e., the Gestalt, of the 
ordinance is dynamic. Thus the specific form that an ordinance takes is characterised 
by ‘activity’ [Tätigkeit]—fluid movement as opposed to a ‘fixed condition 
[Gegebenheit].’48 The demands of a particular historical situation therefore dictate 
the concrete actualisation of an ordinance of creation.  
As God acts in the unfolding of history, the orders of creation continually 
command obedience even in their shifting constellations. This same historical 
determinism underpins Althaus’ political ethics as expressed in the Ansbach 
Memorandum: ‘As the will of God meets us always in our here and now, it binds us 
                                                 
45 Erlangen Opinion, §5, 323.  
46 Ansbach Memorandum, §A:4, 258.  
47 Ibid.  
48 Paul Althaus, Theologie der Ordnungen (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1934), 13. For the relationship 
between Wesen and Gestalt in Althaus’ theology, see Yoder, Ordnung in Gemeinschaft, 61–62. 
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also to the particular historical moment of our family, our Volk, and our race—that is, 
to a particular point in time in their history.’49 The will of God encounters each Volk 
anew, continually laying claim to each of its members in each context, demanding a 
decision. In an hour of grave threat, therefore, the state may be required to violate 
natural law or historical precedent to ensure the Volk’s survival. In these instances, 
according to Althaus’ counsel, ‘I should honour the particular law of my own Volk 
[bestimmtes Recht meines Volkes], not natural law [Naturrecht].’50 The state, as the 
guardian of the historical life of the German Volk and the steward of its own 
particular Volk-law, bears not only the authority but also the responsibility to restrict 
the rights of Jewish persons, regardless of whether the international community 
approves or of what natural law might dictate. By speaking of the ‘threat posed by 
emancipated Jewry,’ Althaus and Elert identify the Jews as a problem to which the 
Aryan Paragraph promises an appropriate—and ostensibly legal—solution. 
In this framework, the state is ‘the form in which a Volk lives its historical 
life,’ and its purpose is to ‘protect the unique life of its Volk in order to preserve and 
to unfold its own life among the peoples.’51 In other words, the fundamental function 
of the state is to provide its Volk with the security and the space to fulfill its destiny: 
‘[The state] secures for the Volk the freedom to unfold its own life. . . . The state thus 
stands in service to the highest task of the Volk: to fulfill its historical vocation 
[seiner geschichtlicher Beruf].’52 This function is the criterion by which a state’s 
                                                 
49 Ansbach Memorandum, §A:3, 258.  
50 Althaus, Theologie der Ordnungen, 14. Cf. Obrigkeit und Führertum: ‘Thus an authority has no 
abstract right to govern “in itself” [an sich], such as a natural law [ein Naturrecht], but instead has a determined, 
indeed an ethnically-determined [völkisch-bestimmtes] right.’ For Althaus, the state must accommodate itself to 
the ‘historical life of the Volk,’ which is the ‘Ur-Norm of the relationship between people’ (43).  
51 Paul Althaus, ‘Zum gegenwärtigen lutherischen Staatsverständnis,’ in Die Kirche und das 
Staatsproblem in der Gegenwart, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Furche Verlag, 1935), 6. Cf. Althaus, Obrigkeit und Führertum, 
42–43. 
52 Althaus, ‘Christentum, Krieg und Frieden,’ 169–70.  
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legitimacy is measured.53 Hence, at this critical hour, the National Socialist 
government has jurisdiction to take drastic steps to curtail a force that endangers the 
Volk’s destiny: 
Wherever the state does not truly belong to the people, its responsibility for 
the particular life of this Volk will come to expression in that it will limit 
itself to ensuring legal order and peace, as well to maintaining the economic 
life-conditions of the Volk. But where the state is truly a state of its own 
people, on the other hand, it can and—above all in hours of historical threat 
to its Volk and its national ethos [in Stunden geschichtlicher Bedrohung 
seines Volkes und Volkstums]—must transgress these limits.54 
 
In situations of extreme danger, such as the mounting influence of a 
secularised and secularising Jewry, Althaus is prepared even to submit to the 
absolute demands of a totalitarian state. Though he does recognise the risks, he 
nonetheless affirms the government’s right to lay claim to every sphere of corporate 
and individual life—provided that the state is taking such measures to ensure the 
survival of the Volk.55 With specific reference to his contemporary political situation, 
Althaus insists that the ‘ostensible totality’ of the state, even when it restricts the 
liberty of its constituents, is not a reflection of National Socialism’s ‘nature,’ but 
rather ‘exists only out of the crisis posed to our state.’56 This crisis includes the 
chronic disconnectedness and moral bankruptcy of ‘the liberal government,’ for 
which he blames the Enlightenment and, by association, the Jews.57 
                                                 
53 ‘A Volk that is awakened to its historical life demands a government that is bound to and committed 
to serving its particular life. The Volk has the right and the duty to measure its government by this standard’ 
(Althaus, ‘Zum gegenwärtigen lutherischen Staatsverständnis,’ 6–7). Theodor Dieter has gone so far as to 
conclude that for Althaus ‘Volkstum is the norm of the state.’ See ‘Das Volk as Schöpfungsordnung bei Paul 
Althaus,’ in Nation im Widerspruch: Aspekte und Perspektiven aus lutherischer Sicht heute, ed. Helmut 
Edelmann and Niels Hasselmann (Gütersloh: Christian Kaiser/Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1999), 187–94. 
54 Althaus, ‘Kirche, Volk und Staat,’ 28.  
55 See ibid., 29–30. Cf. Althaus, ‘Zum gegenwärtigen lutherischen Staatsverständnis,’ 7–8.  
56 Paul Althaus, ‘Totaler Staat?’, Luthertum 45 (1934), 134. Cf. a similar line of argumentation in 
Althaus, ‘Kirche und Staat,’ 749. 
57 Althaus, ‘Totaler Staat?’, 133–34. Cf. Althaus, ‘Kirche, Volk und Staat,’ 29–30. Althaus had 
complained about the disintegrating spirit the Enlightenment, of which Jews are the chief bearer, in Leitsätze (54–
55). See also Althaus, ‘Toleranz und Intoleranz des Glaubens,’ in Theologische Aufsätze, Band II (Gütersloh: 
Bertelsmann, 1935), in which he criticises the modern concept of religious tolerance rooted in the ‘zeitgeist of the 
Enlightenment [Zeitgeist der Aufklärung].’ This form of religious tolerance has ‘corroded [zersetzt] religious 
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Althaus is of course aware that a totalitarian government is susceptible to 
terrible distortion—‘There is a total autonomy of politics that is not from God, but 
from the devil’—but, even as late as 1937, he gives no indication that the National 
Socialist government had been disfigured by the demonic.58 In the spring of 1934, 
the Ansbach Memorandum states that ‘we as Christians honour each ordinance, as 
well as each authority—even in their distortion—as the instrument of divine 
unfolding,’ but is then quick to qualify: ‘but we also distinguish as Christians 
between benevolent and strange rulers, between healthy and sick [gesunde und 
entstellte] ordinances.’59 However, neither the Memorandum itself nor the Althausian 
political theology behind it provides any clear criteria by which such a diagnosis is to 
be made, save, perhaps, the preservation of order. By this standard, the National 
Socialist regime is a healthy ordinance indeed. Hence the Ansbach Circle’s now 
infamous declaration: ‘In this knowledge we thank the Lord God as believing 
Christians that he has gifted our Volk, in its time of crisis, with a Führer as a “pious 
and faithful ruler,” and, in the National Socialist system of government, God wishes 
to give a “good regiment,” a regiment with “discipline and honour.”’60 
                                                 
seriousness’ in Germany (111). In ‘Kirche und Volkstum,’ (1927) Althaus had warned of the ‘corrosive and 
corroding [zersetzte und zersetzende] big-city spirituality’ of the Jews (131).  
58 Althaus, ‘Christentum, Krieg, und Frieden,’ 174. That Althaus was willing to bear with the regime 
until 1937 is puzzling, given that he had drawn a distinction between ‘chauvinism’ and ‘patriotism’ a decade 
earlier. In a 1927 article he defined chauvinism as ‘a distortion of patriotism’ characterised by ‘a vain and 
uncalled for estimation of one’s own nation, blindness to the right to life and the worth of other nations, and a 
pathological excitability of the national sense of honour.’ Chauvinism manifests itself especially in ‘hateful, 
inflammatory war propaganda.’ See Paul Althaus, ‘Chauvinismus,’ in RGG 2 (1927), 1496. It is striking that 
Althaus did not initially recognise these chauvinistic elements in the ideology and propaganda of the Third Reich.  
59 Ansbach Memorandum, §A:4, 258. Althaus criticises the Barmen Declaration for its conspicuous 
silence on the orders of creation. See ‘Bedenken,’ 119.  
60 Ansbach Memorandum, §A:5, 258. Althaus apparently equivocated on this point in the draft. Elert 
wanted to render the text ‘[in National Socialism], God has given a regiment with “discipline and honour,”’ but 
Althaus insisted a change to ‘[in National Socialism], God wishes to give a regiment with “discipline and 
honour.”’ See Jörg Haustein, ‘Der “Ansbacher Ratschlag,”’ in Nation im Widerspruch, 223. The language of 
‘regiment’ further links Althaus to the composition of the document; he preferred to speak of the doctrine of the 
‘two regiments of God’ [zwei Regimenten Gottes] instead of the ‘doctrine of the two kingdoms’ [die Zwei-Reiche-
Lehre] especially during the Weimar and National Socialist periods. See Gotthard Jasper, ‘Die Zwei-Reiche-
Lehre bei Paul Althaus. Ein Schlüssel zu seiner politischen Ethik?,’ Luther 85:1 (2014), 41.  
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In the end, each person’s duty to the Volk, insofar as she has been allocated to 
her particular Volk at a ‘destined’ [bestimmt] point in its history, receives its 
‘concrete content through the peoples’ present national system of government [die 
gegenwärtige völkische Staatsordnung].’61 In other words, the particular obedience 
that God demands from the members of the Volk takes shape at the specific direction 
of the prevailing secular authorities. This political theology helps to explain the 
Erlangen Opinion’s remarkable confidence in the National Socialist state to decide 
the appropriate course of action with respect to the ‘Jewish Question.’ This uncritical 
confidence—fides implicita, as Althaus puts it elsewhere62—stems not only from the 
Erlangen theologians’ commitment to the Lutheran doctrine of the two kingdoms, 
however, but also from their belief that the National Socialist government is taking 
legal and orderly measures against a force that actively hinders the unfolding of the 
Volk’s historical life.  
The Opinion trusts that by combatting anti-German spirituality and restricting 
foreign influence, the state is upholding the orders of creation, the chief criterion by 
which the health of political power is judged.63 This recommendation is rooted in 
Althausian political theology, according to which, so long as the state protects 
Germany’s Christian heritage, the church may be subsumed under the state’s 
jurisdiction. But the church-state relationship is at the same time reciprocal: where 
the state grants the church the freedom to fulfill its particular vocation, the church 
                                                 
61 Ansbach Memorandum, §B:6, 258–59. In Obrigkeit und Führertum (1936), Althaus argues that a 
legitimate government is defined by its ability to preserve order and prevent the ‘disrespect and rupture of the 
orders’ (39). 
62 Althaus, Obrigkeit und Führertum, 49. Althaus argues that, pursuant to fides implicita, a Volk must 
obey its leader even when he issues ‘unpopular policies’ that are difficult to understand. Cf. Althaus, Völker vor 
und nach Christus, where he argues that the nation’s leadership is entitled to this ‘political faith’ in virtually all 
circumstances (12).  
63 See Althaus, Obrigkeit und Führertum, 39.  
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has a duty to support the state in its civic administration of the life of the Volk.64 The 
church and the state likewise share a joint-responsibility to cultivate the spiritual 
vitality of the Volk by preserving its explicitly Christian character—something 
Althaus evidently believed the National Socialist state intended to do.65  
If the church is to fulfill its function as a Volkskirche, then, it must 
collaborate with the state’s drastic measures in this particular historical hour. Yet 
Althaus knows that to read the contemporary political events of the Volk 
theologically is of course precarious, because each historical moment is ‘ambiguous.’ 
Nevertheless, the church’s ‘proclamation must take this risk upon itself at certain 
critical turning points.’66 Therefore, writing just months after the introduction of the 
Aryan Paragraph, Althaus risks identifying the Führer’s demands on the Volk with 
the unmediated address of God: ‘If the stipulations recently enacted into law through 
the Führer’s claim on the people are for the purpose of a truthful and worthy life in 
an age of illusions and forgetfulness, then the people truly have heard more than the 
voice of a man.’67  
                                                 
64 See Althaus, ‘Kirche, Volk und Staat,’ 31 and Althaus, ‘Zum gegenwärtigen lutherischen 
Staatsverständnis,’ 8. Elsewhere, Althaus targets Barth’s dialectical theology for its failure to recognise this 
reciprocal relationship between the church and state in joint service of the Volk. See ‘Bedenken,’ 120–21.  
65 He writes in 1935:  
 
State and church are directed to a close relatedness and to an alliance of work for the Volk, provided 
that and as long as the state acknowledges Christianity as a historical foundation of the Volk’s national 
values and wishes to maintain the life of the Volk through the influence of Christian thought and vigor; 
and provided that as long as the church can be completely a Volkskirche . . . embracing the entire Volk 
as an association and an ordinance in service of its final task: the effective proclamation of the Gospel 
to all (‘Zum gegenwärtigen lutherischen Staatsverständnis,’ 8–9).  
 
Althaus’ views are hardly surprising, as Hitler’s early rhetoric in particular can be read as ‘an aggressive political 
propaganda aimed at the Protestant vote.’ Many churchmen continued to hold out hope that the Führer would 
keep his promise to preserve Christian institutions, both Protestant and Catholic. See Wright, ‘Above Parties,’ 
78–88, 112–13.  
66 Althaus, ‘Volks=Geschichte und Heils=Geschichte,’ 17.  
67 Althaus, ‘Volks-Erlebnis und Offenbarung,’ 11–12. Though Althaus always interpreted the rise of 
National Socialism as an act of God, he never identified it directly with the Kingdom of God: ‘No “Third Reich” 
is the advent of the Kingdom of God’ (Althaus, ‘Drittes Reich und Reich Gottes,’ in Die deutsche Stunde der 
Kirche, 31).  
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In fact, the task of the church, as Althaus sees it in 1934, is to interpret this 
new völkisch passion for Führer and Vaterland through the lens of Christian 
theology in order to show that this ‘anonymous, nameless’ feeling is in fact none 
other than the call of the God of Christian scripture; to attribute it to anything else is 
to devolve into paganism.68 Small wonder, then, that a circle of Lutheran churchmen 
headlined by Althaus and Elert pledged ‘to assist in the work of the Führer in our 
vocation and station.’69 With specific reference to the ‘Jewish Question,’ the two 
Erlangen theologians assisted the work of the Führer by identifying Jewish existence 
as pathological. In the Erlangen Opinion, Jewish pastors are depicted as a drain on 
Germany’s spiritual vitality who inhibit the fulfillment of the German vocation in 
history. 
The fulfillment of its unique mission for the Volk, as Althaus and Elert 
conclude in the Ansbach Memorandum, is the ‘unconditionally valid standard’ by 
which the ordinance of the church is measured; as such, this mission shapes both the 
‘implementation and the content of the church’s proclamation.’70 Within the context 
of this martial understanding of the church, Althaus’ image of the parasitic Jew who 
saps the strength of all human communities emerges again. But this time the Jew 
threatens not only society in general, but also jeopardises the mission of the church in 
particular:  
In the present situation, to have men of Jewish stock [Judenstämmigen] 
occupy the church’s offices would mean a severe strain on and inhibition of 
                                                 
68 Althaus, ‘Volks-Erlebnis und Offenbarung,’ 12. Elsewhere, Althaus is careful to qualify, however, 
that the experience of national renewal comes from God as creator, but it is something other than the experience 
of salvation or of the Kingdom of God. See ‘Politisches Christentum,’ 15–16. Cf. also ‘Kirche und Volk,’ 353–
54.  
69 Ansbach Memorandum, §A:5, 258.  
70 Ansbach Memorandum, §B:7, 259. Althaus had indicated in 1932 that the church’s purpose is 
dictated by the historical conditions of the Volk. This, as I have said, contributes toward a martial understanding 
of the church, which must, according to Althaus, ‘stand with its violated [vergewaltigt] Volk’ and aid it in the 
struggle for freedom against ‘the foreign national will [gegen dem fremden nationalen Willen]’ (see ‘Gegen den 
nationalsozialistischen Bazillus,’ 65).  
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[eine schwerer Belastung und Hemmung] the church’s position in the life of 
the Volk and for the fulfillment of its tasks. Therefore the church must require 
that its Jewish Christians be restrained from taking pastoral office.71  
 
The Opinion reasons under the assumption not only that the Jewish and German 
spiritual types are incompatible, but also that the Jewish type is especially dangerous. 
A Jewish person, even a baptised clergyman, cannot fully understand, let alone meet, 
the spiritual needs of a German congregation. Thus a Jewish pastor will only 
‘pollute’72 the life of the Volkskirche and inhibit the realisation of its destiny.  
The language of Belastung—which connotes both ‘strain’ and ‘pollution’—
appears especially sinister in light of Althaus’ comments of 1937: 
We are to esteem and to fulfill the particular life which God has given to us 
and with which he has entrusted us—we are to pass it on faithfully, both 
bodily and spiritually. We are responsible for the inheritance [of our Volk], 
for the inheritance of blood and the inheritance of spirit [das Bluterbe und das 
Geisterbe], for its Bios and Nomos, which we must maintain within our type 
and authenticity.73 
 
This language, which is strongly evocative of the Law for the Protection of the 
German Blood and the German Honour enacted in September 1935, is symptomatic 
                                                 
71 Erlangen Opinion, §5, 323.  
72 I render the word Belastung, with which Althaus describes Jewish pastors, as ‘strain,’ but it also 
carries the meaning of ‘pollution.’ The image of the Jewish pastor as a pollutant is evocative of the National 
Socialist obsession with ethnic and spiritual purity.  
73 Althaus, Völker vor und nach Christus, 7. It is worth noting, however, that Althaus does equivocate 
on the importance of purity of blood during the National Socialist years. He does not accept the Nazi racial 
program completely. Generally, Althaus acknowledges the perceptible differences between races, but affirms the 
spiritual unity of humanity before God:  
 
Today we are stressing the difference between blood. That has, along with each recognition and 
acknowledgment of the diversity of the divine creation, its own proper right. . . . But the Holy 
Scriptures—Paul before the Aeropagus in Athens (Acts 17:26)—remind us that all people originate 
‘from one blood’; that is Adam’s blood, the blood which was disobedient to God. In this regard, there is 
no distinction between races (Christus und die Deutsche Seele, 26).  
 
Moreover, it bears mentioning that while he was uncomfortable with what he calls ‘negative’ eugenic measures—
forced sterilisation, abortion of fetuses with hereditary disease, and assisted suicide—Althaus does basically 
support ‘positive’ forms of racial hygiene, including something close to selective breeding. See Eugenik im Lichte 
christlichen Glaubens, especially 10–14.    
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of a deeply anti-Judaic element within Althaus’ völkisch theology.74 Yet the 
statement is by no means a hapax legomenon. Althaus in 1931:  
This love for my Volk directed to God must again and again become wrath 
against the bastardisation and distortion of [Entartung und Entstellung], 
against the squandering of our true inheritance and the surrendering of the 
future which God demands of us, against the forgetting or falsification of our 
true task.75  
 
Even before National Socialist propaganda targeted the Jews as pathogens, Althaus 
feared that foreign agents had made the German body sick.76 
THREE | INCLUSIVE QUARANTINE IN MICROCOSM 
 
In the end, the Erlangen Opinion is still governed by the Althausian dialectic 
of pathology and performance. While Jews should be excluded from pastoral office 
as a rule, the Opinion does allow for exceptions. Critically, however, these 
exceptions are to be made for individual Jews, not the Jewish Volk as a whole: ‘By 
this it is granted that the boundary between the Jews and the German Volk, in 
individual situations, is not rigid, but fluid.’77 In his writings of the Weimar period, 
Althaus had entertained that a particular Jewish person may ‘grow into’ the German 
type through acculturation.78 Similarly, Althaus and Elert hold out the tenuous 
possibility for Germanisation through conversion to Christianity: ‘The church itself 
also knows that a genuine conversion to Jesus Christ can lead a Jew directly out of 
foreignness [Fremdheit] from the German people to membership in the German 
                                                 
74 There is no indication of a shift in Althaus’ theology of the ‘Jewish Question’ in the National 
Socialist period, even after the implementation of the Nuremburg Laws beginning in September 1935. The Law 
for the Protection of the German Blood and the German Honour targeted Jews explicitly. The contemporaneous 
Reich Citizenship Law divested Jewish persons of full political rights. It should be mentioned that this kind of 
language also appears in the work of Werner Elert, whose influence on the wording of the Erlangen Opinion is 
obvious on this point. For an overview of Elert’s völkisch socio-theological system, see Hamm, ‘Werner Elert als 
Kriegstheologe,’ 218–22.  
75 Althaus, ‘Volk,’ 5.  
76 ‘We know ourselves to be responsible before God for the whole life of [our Volk]—not only for the 
soul of our Volkstum, but also for its “body”—for we sense with fright the ways in which its soul is growing sick 
on account of its bodily weakness, i.e. the constriction of its life and its hopelessness’ (ibid.). 
77 Erlangen Opinion, §6, 324.  
78 See Sparn, ‘Paul Althaus,’ 9. 
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people through his being rooted into the church.’79 As we noted earlier, for Althaus 
the defining characteristic of Germanness is Christian Seelentum.80 By this rubric, 
Jasper is partially right to conclude that ‘Althaus always recognised that national 
character [Volkscharakter] is a product of history and not determined only through 
race and blood. Therefore good Germans could be made even out of Jews.’81  
Jasper’s conclusion is misleading, however, and is ultimately overruled by 
the prevailing logic of Althaus’ thought. The Erlangen Opinion, and the Althausian 
theology of the Volk in which it is rooted, is ultimately defined by its skepticism that 
Jewish pastors can connect to German congregations on an organic level. While it is 
true that Althaus anchors his ideal of Germanness in Christian faith, he is actually 
appealing to a type of spirituality found exclusively in German blood: ‘We behold 
the German essence most clearly in Christian-German blood.’82  
The point is clearest in Völker vor und nach Christus (1937), where Althaus 
speaks of ‘the specific we-consciousness’ [das eigentümliche Wir-Bewußtsein] of the 
German Volk, which arises out of ‘commonality of soil [Gemeinsamkeit des Bodens], 
i.e., of living space [Lebensraum], commonality of blood or race [and] a common 
historical destiny.’ Therefore, ‘the origination of a Volk is a mystery of God’ and a 
                                                 
79 Erlangen Opinion, §6, 324.  
80 Althaus in a speech from 1934:  
 
It is, for us, inwardly self-evident that we are Christian and German in an unbreakable unity; that our 
Germanness is called into question through Christ only insofar as all natural human types are judged as 
sinful through him; but our German humanness [deutsches Menschentum] is degraded and negated 
precisely as little as is manhood or womanhood. We are unquestionably certain that the German soul 
and faith in Christ are totally compatible, nay, even more so: that the German soul, just as with each 
human spirituality [Seelentum], only becomes what it should be by faith in Jesus Christ (Christus und 
die Deutsche Seele, 5).  
 
In this address, Althaus outlines the unique German Seelengeshcichte in which ‘it was the destiny of faith of the 
German people [das Glaubenschicksal der Germanen] to accept the message of Jesus Christ’ (6); consequently, 
‘[w]e know no other German type than the Christian-German type’ (17).  
81 Jasper, Paul Althaus, 237.  
82 Althaus, Christus und die Deutsche Seele, 17.  
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‘non-deducible, plainly inexplicable primordial origination [Urzeugung].’83 Since 
membership in the German Volk is primordial and suprahistorical, the German ‘we-
consciousness’ is fundamentally inaccessible to a Jew; Germanness, so to speak, is 
non-transferable.84 But here the Althausian theology of Volkstum is riddled with the 
kind of inconsistencies endemic to all racist patterns of thought. If Germanness is 
‘primordial’—that is, if it is immutable—why is Althaus so worried that Jews will 
alter it? Or, to come at the problem another way, if spiritual qualities are intrinsic to 
particular Völker, the pollution of one Volk by the qualities of another should not 
even be possible.85 
The dominant logic of the Opinion, especially when interpreted in the wider 
matrix of Althaus’ theology of the ‘Jewish Question,’ suggests that pastors of Jewish 
descent could never truly be German in the deepest, spiritual sense—even if they do 
convert to Christianity. By extension, the document implies that Jews must remain 
outsiders even within their own community of worship. Nevertheless, the Erlangen 
Opinion does make final recommendations that controvert the more aggressive 
policy proposed by the Prussian General Synod. Despite the xenophobic dimension 
of the document’s ecclesiology—and its suspicion of the pathological spirituality of 
Jews—its authors maintain that to dismiss currently serving pastors from office 
                                                 
83 Althaus, Völker vor und nach Christus, 5–6. The resonance with National Socialist propaganda—
commonality of blood and soil, Lebensraum—is clear. In 1931, Althaus had intimated that German spirituality 
originates in the ‘womb’ [Mutterschloß] and comes to birth only through physical ‘procreation’ from two German 
parents. See ‘Volk,’ 4–5. See also ‘Kirche und Volk,’ 352.  
84 Gotthard Jasper, a political scientist by training, has theorised that the kind of German nationalism 
Althaus and Elert are representing here is plagued by its ‘lack of content [Inhaltslosigkeit].’ American and French 
nationalisms, argues Jasper, are rooted in ideals that are universal in scope: American nationalism legitimates 
itself by ‘making the world safe by democracy’ and French nationalism seeks to spread the principles of 
‘freedom, equality and fraternity.’ German nationalism, by contrast, ‘defines itself—even now—ethnically, 
biologically, and in terms of blood.’ Since it is defined by ethnicity, Germanness has no universal content and 
thus cannot be shared in the same way that national identities defined by ideals (Americanness, Frenchness) can. 
See ‘Die Friedrich-Alexander-Universität,’ 263.  
85 Internal contradictions like these have led Susannah Heschel to conclude that it is really the 
instability of race, and not its immutability, that lies at the heart of racist worldviews. See ‘The Slippery Yet 
Tenacious Nature of Racism,’ 6–7. 
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solely on the basis of ancestry would violate the essence of the pastoral office.86 
Instead, ‘Statement of extraordinary grounds should be required on a case-by-case 
basis not for their retention in office—as in Clause 3 of the Prussian church bylaw—
but for their dismissal.’87 For this reason, Althaus and Elert conclude that ‘here the 
church cannot simply adopt the regulations of the state’s legislation in every respect, 
but rather it must act according to the rules which arise out of its nature as the 
church.’88  
However, even in the event that a Jew does convert to Christianity, his 
appointment to pastoral office in the DEK remains mostly a theoretical possibility—
and a remote one at that.89 Still, the Opinion is more ambivalent about the place of 
the Jews than its critics have often imagined. It is indeed true that the Erlangen 
Opinion rejects a universal application of the Aryan Paragraph in the German 
churches. It is also true that the Opinion recommends that, though Christians of 
Jewish ancestry are to be disqualified from leadership as a general rule, their 
membership in the DEK should not be denied or otherwise restricted.90  
But it is precisely in this recommendation that we discern that, at the deeper 
levels of its structural logic, the Opinion’s prescription for Jews in German church 
life parallels closely Althaus’ broader vision for the place of the Jews in German 
society. In spite of the church’s eschatological character as a community defined by a 
                                                 
86 Erlangen Opinion, §7, 324.  
87 Ibid.  
88 Ibid. 
89 Erlangen Opinion §6, 324:  
 
It follows from all of this that the church, in its ordinance, explicitly leaves room for exceptions in 
which Christians of Jewish or half-Jewish descent may be admitted to its offices. The administration of 
the ecclesiastical office by a person of Jewish stock has always been rare in our church and it should 
continue to maintain the character of an exception also in the future, but as such it must remain a 
possibility according to special direction.  
 
Althaus and Elert ultimately leave the adjudication of individual cases to the church’s bishops.  
90 Erlangen Opinion, §5, 323.   
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Gospel that transcends every ethnic division, the Jews are nevertheless quarantined 
off from their fellow Christians, even, paradoxically, within the church’s walls. Yet 
as the concrete evidence of the continuing election of the Jews, Christians of Jewish 
descent perform a crucial salvation-historical role and therefore must exist in the 
church, but not in positions of influence.91 In the same way, the Jews—and crucially, 
Jewish scriptures—fulfill a critical symbolic function in German society as living 
cautionary tales who warn of the dangers of ethnic presumption—but always from 
the margins and never from the centre.  
The Erlangen Opinion is most intelligible, then, when read within the 
interpretive matrix of inclusive quarantine. Althaus fits this paradoxical societal 
vision—the foreigner as a-part-of-but-apart-from the national community—to an 
ecclesial scale. Despite the xenophobic elements of the Althausian ecclesiology 
reflected in the Erlangen Opinion (i.e., the pathological pole of the dialectic), it also 
manifests a theological logic with a genuinely trans-ethnic outlook by defending the 
membership of Christians of Jewish descent in the DEK. Simply put, Althaus does 
not contemplate a church, not least a ‘German’ church, without Jews. I have argued 
here that Jewish persons and Jewish scripture therefore must remain in the church as 
they fulfill a parallel function: to stand as living signs that mitigate against the false 
worship of the idol of ethnic jingoism.   
Because their history is a cryptic key to German self-understanding, 
moreover, the Jews remain indispensable in Althaus’ theological system, dangerous 
though they are. In both contexts—within the church and in secular society—the 
Jews exist in dialectical relationship to Germans as a problem that must be contained 
                                                 
91 Althaus had argued earlier that the continuing election of Israel is maintained in Christians of Jewish 
descent. See Römer, 93.  
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but not expelled, a threat that must be neutralised but not eliminated. In each case, 
the Jews are held in an inclusive quarantine—pushed to the edge of the community 
to serve as voiceless exhibits to be seen but not heard. On this point, Bultmann truly 
had discerned the spirit of the Erlangen Opinion, and his criticism cuts to the quick: 
‘Were I a non-Aryan or not-purely-Aryan Christian, I would be ashamed to belong to 
a church in which I am indeed allowed to listen, but must remain silent.’92 
FOUR | PATHOLOGY AND PERFORMANCE BEYOND THE ERLANGEN OPINION 
The entire trajectory of the Opinion—that the Jews, conceived as a force that 
destabilises the orders of creation and pollutes German spirituality, are to be confined 
along with their scriptures as pieces of evidence on the margins of the church 
community—conforms exactly to the theology of the ‘Jewish Question’ that Althaus 
had developed during the Weimar period. This dialectical approach represents a 
challenge for the binary model established by the literature. On the one hand, 
Beyschlag, commenting within the narratives of sympathy, suggests:  
If one looks at it more closely, the Erlangen Opinion reveals itself as an 
extremely skillful and tactical attempt to safeguard not only the regulation of 
the Aryan-question [Arierfrage], but along with it ecclesial autonomy with 
respect to the state (a traditional Erlangen desideratum) in the face of a 
supremely dangerous precedent.93 
 
Contrast the judgment of Berndt Hamm, which is representative of the narratives of 
suspicion:  
The Erlangen Opinion on the Aryan Paragraph was no isolated and 
incomprehensible lapse on the part of the Erlangen theologians, but instead 
corresponded completely with their already previously known and . . . 
theologically rooted affinity for a ‘cultivated’ [gepflegten] nationalism, Volk-
ideology, and antisemitism; and it corresponded with a widespread concern 
with the fiction of a closed ethno-biological organism in the territorial 
                                                 
92 Bultmann, ‘Der Arier-Paragraph,’ 362.  





This interpretive divide is due in part to the inherent difficulty in classifying Althaus’ 
theology of the ‘Jewish Question.’ As I have argued here, the model that Althaus 
himself projects is not binary, but dialectical; Jews are neither included nor excluded, 
but suspended in between.  
At any rate, some scholars have concluded that ‘possible special-treatment 
[Sonderbehandlung] or special-legislation [Sondergesetzgebung] for the Jewish 
minority, which would later become a gruesome reality under the “Third Reich,” is 
for [Althaus] unthinkable.’95 Yet this claim appears to overstate the case. Special 
legislation was thinkable for Althaus—he thought it. He then recommended its 
application in the church, albeit in a qualified way. By early 1933, he had already 
established a view of the Jewish problem in Germany that stood in close proximity to 
the ‘tendencies and goals of National Socialist Judenpolitik.’ From there, argues 
Marikje Smid, it was only a short step to the approval of discriminatory legislation 
regarding the place of Jews in the church.96 
 Perhaps for Althaus the annihilation of the Jews was beyond the realm of 
imagination, but a candid sermon sketch from 1942 indicates that his theology of 
Judaism nevertheless took a very violent shape even after the first concentration 
camps began operation.97 These notes serve as a neat summary of Althaus’ theology 
of the Jews, as the full range of the dialectic of pathology and performance is on 
display. The Jews appear both as a contagion and as an indispensable didactic sign. 
                                                 
94 Hamm, ‘Schuld und Verstrickung,’ 31.  
95 Fischer, Zwischen Zeugnis und Zeitgeist, 510. Gotthard Jasper has likewise concluded that for 
Althaus the extermination of the Jews would have been an ‘unthinkable’ solution to the ‘Jewish Question.’ See 
Paul Althaus, 495.   
96 Smid, Deutscher Protestantismus, 288–89. 
97 Paul Althaus, ‘Ein Volk, das “nicht gewollt” hat!’ [June 1942], NA 12.5.  
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Through this brief sermon outline, Althaus sums up the total narrative of his theology 
of the ‘Jewish Question’: the Jews, having squandered their original salvation-
historical vocation, now wander the earth bearing the ‘mark of God’ in order to 
testify to divine truths. In so doing, the Jews, even if they do not recognise it, 
perform a critical didactic function as their miserable and dangerous existence 
functions yet again as a key for German self-understanding. Most significantly, the 
German and Jewish destinies are linked, even though Althaus pits the Jews as an 
enemy of Germans: ‘We Germans are aware that we are to lead this war against 
world-Jewry [das Weltjudentum].’98  
 To emphasise the performative capacity of Jewish existence, Althaus begins 
with a locus classicus of the ‘witness-people’ mythology: ‘Frederick the Great once 
challenged a pastor in conversation: “Can you name for me any proof for the 
existence of God?” The pastor answered: “Your majesty, the Jews!”’99 With this 
anecdote, Althaus highlights the unique theological quality of Jewish existence—a 
consistent theme throughout his writings. Now, he says, the ‘Jewish Question has 
arisen prominently once again. Whoever penetrates it deeper will soon realise: the 
Jews are not a political Volk like any other.’100 The peculiar nature of Jewish 
existence means that the ‘Jewish Question’ cannot be addressed solely on racial-
biological terms. Jews are not merely a socio-political ethnic body, but strange signs 
of divine truths shrouded in ‘a sinister mystery [ein unheimliches Geheimnis].’ As 
such, Jewish persons are indispensable evidence for God’s existence:  
This unfortunate Volk bears the mark of God, the mark of his curse. In its 
decisive hour, it offered God only its defiance. Therefore God has cast it 
                                                 
98 Ibid., 1.  
99 Ibid. Emphasis in the original. The anecdote of the conversation between Frederick the Great and a 
pastor is an antisemitic ‘legend’ used by Christian theologians for centuries. See Haynes, Reluctant Witnesses, 
58–59.  
100 Althaus, ‘Ein Volk,’ 1. Emphasis in the original.  
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away and marked it; therefore to this day it is a Volk without blessing. Proof 
[Zeugnis] that the God of the Bible is the Living One; that his Word, spoken 
through the prophets, has come true in Jesus; that God lives and that God is 
not mocked. The fate [Schicksal] of Jewry—evidence of God, evidence for 
the truth of the Bible!101 
 
 Like Jewish persons themselves, the Old Testament also functions as ‘proof’ 
[Zeugnis] of the righteousness of God’s judgment. Indeed, the Jews’ own scriptures 
testify to the ways in which they have distorted their divine vocation: ‘God had 
originally elected this Volk to a special giftedness and mission. . . . In the days of 
yore, God did much for this Volk—the Old Testament in its grandeur is proof of 
that!’102 At this point, Althaus narrates the history of the Jews as to emphasise their 
depravity. At every turn, the Jews have fundamentally misunderstood their purpose 
as a Volk. The majority of the Jews 
again and again misuse the call of God and their gifting in the most horrible 
way. God spoke of his dominion, which will bring salvation to all peoples. 
But Israel misjudged it and got it all backwards. . . . Israel feels itself to be the 
‘chosen people,’ though not in the way that God intended, but instead with 
human arrogance.103 
 
Not only that, the Jews also ‘imprisoned’ the spirit of the Law behind a system of 
‘human statutes.’104 Small wonder, Althaus reasons, that they also killed Jesus. 
Jerusalem has always been a ‘murderer of the prophets.’105 
 With the rejection of Jesus, Jewish history reaches its dreadful climax. 
Althaus now connects the failure of Israel with the contemporary scourge of the 
Jews. The rhetorical move toward the pathological dimension of the dialectic merits 
full citation:  
God had been patient, again and again. But now the measure is full. God 
sums up all that had happened over the centuries and now the bill is due. The 
                                                 
101 Ibid. Emphasis in the original.  
102 Ibid. Emphasis in the original.  
103 Ibid., 1–2. Emphasis in the original.  
104 Ibid.  
105 Ibid., 2.  
 
 157 
year 70 is the response to Golgotha and to all blood that cries out to heaven: 
the destruction of Jerusalem, the burning of the temple, the curse over Israel, 
its outward dispersion [Zerstreuung] in the world, its inward torpor and 
degeneracy [seine innere Erstarrung und Entartung] (it has rejected the spirit 
of the prophets, rejected its better self). Now Islam has come to roost in 
Jerusalem, and the people of Israel wander throughout the earth as the 
‘eternal Jew,’ strange and sinister [fremd und unheimlich] to all other peoples, 
or, when they forget that, a contagion [Anstekung (sic)] and a mortal danger 
[Lebensgefahr]. This is how God judges! Exceedingly gifted—and dreadfully 
afflicted! Who can look at the Jewish Volk without learning to fear God!106 
 
The language of pathology that Althaus had used throughout the Weimar years and 
into the National Socialist era reaches explicit expression here. The Jewish curse 
manifests like a disease with inward and outward symptoms: dispersion, torpor, and 
degeneracy. The ‘eternal Jew’ is a ‘contagion’ [Ansteckung] who carries the plague, 
threatening to infect the peoples around them. If the disease is not quarantined, 
‘mortal danger’ [Lebensgefahr] is sure to follow. Critically, it is when the Jews 
forget that they are supposed to remain a stranger to other peoples—that is to say, 
when Jews assimilate into their host societies and become ‘world Jewry’—that they 
turn lethal.   
 However, sick though he is, the ‘eternal Jew’ does not wander aimlessly. 
Ironically, the Jews still fulfill their vocation—to testify to the existence of the God 
of the Bible—but not in the way they had anticipated. Rather, the affliction of the 
Jews serves a vital performative function, especially for Germans. Althaus now 
swings back to the positive pole of the dialectic by stressing the indispensability of 
Jews and their history. Paradoxically, Jewish existence is necessary because 
                                                 
106 Ibid. In the second edition of Theologie der Ordnungen in 1935, Althaus had identified sickness as a 
consequence of contempt of the orders of creation, which dictate that the peoples are to remain segregated: ‘[The 
orders of creation] remain our destiny, even if we despise them and fail to fulfill their purpose. They punish us. 
They retaliate against us as life—whose essential constitution comes from them—falls ill [erkrankt] and 
degenerates on them’ (18).  
 
 158 
Germans and Jews share an analogous spiritual election and mission. In this capacity, 
Jewish existence is didactic:  
All of this is a warning for us. We cannot point arrogantly to this Volk: look 
there, the rejected ones! How entirely different we are from them! If we 
speak like that, then we ourselves have become Jews—Pharisees whom God 
will judge just like he judges Israel. No, this history of God with Israel comes 
very near to us. For Jesus Christ has also come to us Germans. His word has 
sounded out among us. He has also sent us prophets.107 
 
The German spiritual history parallels that of Israel—a theme Althaus had developed 
earlier in the National Socialist years.108 In particular, those Germans who exhibit 
‘appalling apathy’ toward their Christian heritage are acting just like the Jews who 
rejected their own prophets.109 Germans of all people must learn from Jews or else 
become Jews—and suffer the same fate. Althaus therefore uses the Jews to spark 
religious re-awakening amongst Germans. He is able to do this because, in a strange 
way, the German Volk is the spiritual counterpart of the Jews. The fate of each will 
be determined by its encounter with the Messiah: ‘For us Germans, as for Israel, our 
destiny is Christ.’110 
CONCLUSION | DESTINY AND TRAGEDY 
In Althaus’ complex theology of the ‘Jewish Question’—climaxing to its 
clearest expression in this sermon from June 1942—the German story is actually a 
re-articulation of the Jewish story, with one critical difference: Germans still have the 
hope of fulfilling their vocation without falling under the curse that haunts Israel. 
Nevertheless, the relationship between Jew and German remains dialectical in 
character, oscillating simultaneously between inclusion and exclusion, pathology and 
performance.  
                                                 
107 Althaus, ‘Ein Volk,’ 3.  
108 See especially Althaus, ‘Volks=Geschichte und Heilsgeschichte.’  
109 Althaus, ‘Ein Volk,’ 3. Emphasis in the original.  
110 Ibid.  
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Even in the face of mounting persecution of the Jews at the hands of the 
National Socialist regime, Althaus’ vision remains strikingly consistent: it is still the 
Jewish destiny to cleave to a segregated existence on the periphery of the church, just 
as the Jews are destined to fulfill their precarious mission as perpetual wanderers on 
the fringes of every human society. Not even a common spiritual bond in the Gospel 
could nullify the uncompromising Law of historical existence: 
We cannot abolish segregation and struggle without destroying God’s 
creation. It makes no sense even for Christian conferences to make 
resolutions against the hate between peoples and races or to recommend a 
‘Christian’ politics that has been purified by its resolutions. . . . There is no 
total commitment for my Volk without ardent passion and wild wrath.111 
 
In the end, even baptised Jews remain a danger for Germans. Althaus had insisted in 
1937 that ‘we do not want to master other peoples or intrude into their own self-
understanding’ through völkisch theology,112 but there was an exception to be 
made—as always—for the Jews. The Jews bear a tragic destiny: pushed to the 
margins and deprived of their rights because ‘no Volk can rise to new vitality without 
displacing and raping [verdrängen und vergewaltigen] another.’113 
                                                 
111 Althaus, Theologie der Ordnungen, 2nd ed., 54. Althaus here recalls his concept of the 
Konfliktgesetz, according to which ‘the love of Volkstum and Vaterland . . . is bound up inextricably in antipathy, 
wrath, and hate.’  
112 Althaus, Völker vor und nach Christus, 4.  
113 Althaus, ‘Drittes Reich und Reich Gottes,’ 31. The language of violent subjugation is evocative of 
the concept of the ‘law of displacement’ [Verdrängungsgesetz], which Althaus had developed in ‘Kampf,’ RGG 3 
(1929), 595–96. Cf. Althaus, Völker vor und nach Christus, 9. As he had during the Weimar period, Althaus 
again emphasises that the ‘law of strike and counter-strike, blow and counter-blow’ is a curse and an expression 
of God’s wrath. Through the death of Christ, God has inaugurated a world in which these laws of conflict can be 
overcome by the Gospel in the lives of individual Christians, even though the laws still govern humanity’s 




MOVEMENT III: THE DEATH THROES OF JUDAISM: REFLECTION ON THE ‘JEWISH 
QUESTION’ IN THE POSTWAR YEARS (1945–1966) 
 
SECTION III INTRODUCTION | TAKING BACK AND MAKING GOOD AGAIN 
 With the Third Reich defeated and many German cities lying in ruins, 
Althaus pleaded for clemency first and foremost for the German people. Still, though 
his writings of the postwar years often betray a lack of theological self-awareness, 
Althaus does—to varying extents, depending on the piece—acknowledge Christian 
guilt, though he usually does not specify for what. Although he rarely names the 
Jews as its victims, he charges Christian theology to begin the work of moral 
repentance after the war:  
 The Christian community has the great task of rousing its members to a desire 
for peace: for those who have perpetrated injustice against the other, to rouse 
the desire to recant [zurücknehmen] and to make amends 
[wiedergutzumachen]; for those who have suffered injustice, the will to 
forgive and to restore brotherly community anew.1 
 
With this two-fold formula—taking back [zurücknehmen] and making good again 
[wiedergutmachen]—Althaus himself provides the rubric by which we can follow 
the trajectory of his postwar theology of the ‘Jewish Question.’ First, does Althaus 
recant? Second, does he attempt to make good again? In other words, does his 
thought hold any promise for a constructive Christian theology in a post-Shoah 
world?  
Before we can even address the question of theological repair (Movement 
IV)—that is, of making good again—we must determine whether Althaus 
relinquishes his dialectic of pathology and performance in light of the crimes against 
the Jews. The answer, like Althaus’ theology of the ‘Jewish Question’ itself, is 
                                                 
1 Paul Althaus, ‘Amnestie? Von der Recht-schaffenden Macht der Vergebung,’ Zeitwende 20:12 
(1949): 878.  
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dialectical: yes and no. A clear solution is obscured by the complex nature of his 
reasoning about the Jews; at various points the dialectic remains clearly-articulated 
and pronounced and at others it collapses. Specifically, Althaus maintains and in 
some cases intensifies the dialectic in his postwar preaching, where Jews and their 
history continue to have a pastoral value for Germans that climaxes in the direct 
identification of the German and Jewish destinies. The matter is complicated, 
moreover, by Althaus’ ambivalent personal attitudes toward actual Jews as manifest 
in his concrete actions with respect to Jewish persons and those who assist them. In 
the academic sector, however, Althaus reconsiders the pathological dimension of 
Jewish existence in his works of theological ethics and exegesis—as a result, the 
performative function of Jewish persons more or less disappears from the sphere of 
dogmatics. In Althaus’ postwar theology, Jews truly live only the pages of scripture; 
the ongoing significance of Jewish persons is altogether more uncertain.  
In sum, Althaus rejects some dimensions of the theological system he had 
constructed during the Weimar and National Socialist years (e.g., the deicide libel, 
the Jews as an ‘open wound’), but retains others (such the use of Jews as a 
hermeneutical key to interpret German experience). By tracing these views across his 
postwar pastoral materials and personal testimony and correspondence (chapter six), 
and works of dogmatics and exegesis (chapter seven), we discern the enduring 
tension of continuity and discontinuity in Althaus’ postwar theology of the ‘Jewish 
Question.’ There is development and reform but not rupture, even though ultimately 
his theological categories for understanding Germanness and Jewishness collapse, as 
we shall see. His paradigms simply could not make sense of what had happened: his 
ideal of Germanness had failed and now, in a qualified sense, Germans had become 




CHAPTER VI | CATASTROPHE AND CONSCIENCE: JEWS AND GERMANS AS FELLOW 
TRAVELERS 
 
Are we Germans a people of misfortune among the other peoples—like the 
Jews, their counterpart? A people under God’s curse? Has the Creator, in his 
wrath, made us only for disaster? Does he have only dark plans for us? 
 
Paul Althaus, ‘Gottes Gedanken mit uns’ (1945) 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 In the immediate aftermath of National Socialism’s collapse, Althaus turns 
almost straight away to the narrative of Israel as a means of making sense of 
Germany’s national cataclysm. The Jews—and more specifically their history as 
narrated in the Hebrew Scriptures—once again appear as a hermeneutical key for 
decoding German experience. Hence the performative dimension of Jewish existence 
is intensified in the pastoral sphere even as Althaus gradually downplays the 
pathological dimension. In the end, the dialectic of pathology and performance is 
maintained in Althaus’ postwar preaching, albeit in a muted way.  
 There is a similar ambivalence in Althaus’ personal attitudes toward Jews. As 
his personal correspondence and archival documentary evidence suggests, Althaus 
was capable of suspending his personal distaste for, and theological mistrust of, Jews 
to maintain personal relationships with Jewish students and, on at least one occasion, 
even to intervene on behalf of those arrested for aiding Christians of Jewish descent. 
The combined weight of his pastoral reflection on Jews and Judaism in the abstract 
and his concrete dealings with Jewish persons testify to the abiding tension of his 
dialectical theology of the ‘Jewish Question’—which, it seems to me, was something 
he could resolve neither pastorally nor in his own life. In a paradoxical way, the Jews 
of the Old Testament and contemporary Jewish Christians appear as fellow travelers 
in the German journey of faith.  
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ONE | DOWNFALL AND AFTERMATH: DENAZIFICATION AND REINSTATEMENT  
 Althaus’ visions of a re-dignified and re-christianised Germany had been 
swallowed in the Nazi nightmare. But his personal nightmare was not quite over. 
Soon enough, the Allies began to detain and try Nazi criminals of war. But the 
Spruchkammer came calling for Schreibtischtäter, too, and Althaus, like other 
bureaucrats across the Reich, was not above suspicion.2 Despite clearing the initial 
round of denazification—and having chaired a denazification committee himself—
Althaus was dismissed from his position at Erlangen by the Allied commission in 
early 1947, ostensibly on the grounds of his politics. His case appears to have 
suffered from an uncharitable representation in a memorandum prepared for the U.S. 
occupation force by his colleague Hermann Sasse. According to Lowell Green, Sasse 
depicted Althaus as a ‘forerunner of the German-Christians.’3 Althaus himself made 
a pointed reference to the unflattering remarks of Sasse’s memorandum in a 
deposition from 1947.4 In any event, the notice appeared thus in the local newspaper:  
Professor Dr. Paul Althaus, theologian. In his book ‘Die deutsche Stunde der 
für die Kirche’ [sic] he welcomed the events of the year 1933. His book 
‘Obrigkeit und Führertum’ attempted to justify treason against the Weimar 
Republic and to make democracy laughable. As the chairman of the 
denazification at the University of Erlangen he recommended the 
reinstatement of anti-democratic professors.5 
  
During his denazification trial, Althaus acknowledged the perception of his work 
circulating at the time. Doubtless aware of the language of this particular newspaper 
                                                 
2 The Spruchkammerverfahren, or ‘Spruchkammer trials,’ as described by Katharina von Kellenbach, 
were ‘proceedings designed to ascertain varying level [sic] of complicity and impose sanctions appropriate to the 
degree of culpability on the basis of character witnesses, often drawn from camp survivors, clergy, or neighbors.’ 
See The Mark of Cain: Guilt and Denial in the Post-War Lives of Nazi Perpetrators (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), 36–39. As von Kellenbach notes, these trials were not reserved only for SS guards and high-ranking 
party functionaries, but also for ordinary citizens, including university professors.  
3 See Green, Lutherans Under Hitler, 346–48.  
4 Deposition of Paul Althaus, 1947, NA 12.5, 2. Althaus intimates that Sasse characterised Althaus’ 
political theology self-servingly in order to vindicate himself.  
5 ‘76 Entlassungen an der Erlanger Universität,’ Die neue Zeitung, 3 February 1947. 
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article, he brushed aside any attempt to connect his early völkisch writings to 
National Socialism as ‘laughable.’6  
 Althaus began his personal amnesty campaign after the initial verdict came 
down. As he appealed to colleagues and former students to testify about his 
resistance to National Socialism in the interim between his dismissal and 
reinstatement, some, such as the Oxford missiologist Nathaniel Micklem, demurred.7 
Others, however, were quick to defend him. Tübingen theologian Helmut Thielicke, 
once Althaus’ own doctoral student, admitted that ‘[i]t is doubtless correct that 
Professor Althaus was relatively optimistic about National Socialism in 1933.’ 
However, Thielicke argued that in time Althaus came to recognise the evil of 
Nazism. According to Thielicke, in fact, the most decisive thing is not that Althaus 
came to reject National Socialism, but that National Socialism rejected him: ‘I 
consider these experiences very significant in the question of political judgment, 
because National Socialism itself cultivated the clearest instinct for its opponents.’8 
Likewise Hans Schmidt, formerly the chaplain of university students in Erlangen, 
recalled private conversations in which Althaus ‘castigated the methods of National 
Socialism.’ Schmidt also reported that the regional National Socialist leadership had 
targeted Althaus for arrest, but they dared not lay a hand on him because they feared 
“the voice of the people.”’ In light of these factors, ‘[i]t would be totally 
incomprehensible if today, after the collapse of the National Socialist dictatorship, 
                                                 
6 Deposition of Paul Althaus, 1947, 2.  
7 See Nathaniel Micklem to Paul Althaus, 16 May 1947, NA 12.5. 
8 Helmut Thielicke, ‘Aeusserung über Herrn Professor D. Paul Althaus, Erlangen,’ 28 March 1947, NA 
12.5, 4. As evidence of the party’s suspicion of Althaus, Thielicke notes that Althaus’ writings against the 
sterilisation law were banned and that when Thielicke’s own employment was imperiled because of his political 
commitments, the party told him that Althaus’ advocacy on his behalf only served to make Thielicke’s position 
more precarious.  
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Professor Althaus were to be further hindered in his work at the University of 
Erlangen.’9 
The Spruchkammer eventually agreed, reinstating Althaus after appeal on 
December 30, 1947 on the basis of the following findings:  
In the opinion of the public prosecutors, no legal charge should be raised. 
Professor Althaus cannot be seen as a National Socialist, much less, 
therefore, as a staunch supporter of the tyrannical regime, particularly with 
respect to its racial ideology. Moreover, any legal allegation that Professor 
Althaus aligned himself publically with National Socialism through speeches 
or writings in support of the regime cannot be sustained credibly.10 
 
The vindication does not stop there:  
Moreover, the September 1933 theological Gutachten [i.e., the Erlangen 
Opinion] regarding the admission of Christians of Jewish descent to the 
offices of the Deutsche Evangelische Kirche, which Althaus co-signed, 
cannot be regarded as an ideological statement of support for National 
Socialist racial politics. . . . Indeed, a clearer statement against the demand of 
the National Socialist state was scarcely possible at that point in time.11 
 
Althaus had been exonerated formally, but his legacy remained in dispute. In 
Erlangen, this chapter in Althaus’ history had been shrouded in silence until a new 
generation of scholars emerged in the 1960s. This new generation of Erlangen 
theologians, laments Gotthard Jasper, ‘triggered a nightmarish public controversy’ 
when they subjected the Erlangen Opinion to critical scrutiny at the 1979 Deutscher 
Kirchentag.12 The debate begun in those days is open even now: there are still 
competing interpretations of Althaus’ political attitudes and his views of the ‘Jewish 
Question’ after the fall of the Third Reich. 
                                                 
9 Hans Schmidt, ‘Bestätigung,’ July 22, 1947, NA 12.5, 1–2.  
10 Einstellungsbeschluß, 30 December 1947, NA 12.5, 2. The US Military Government Liaison and 
Security Office confirmed the Spruchkammer’s decision on February 17, 1948. See NA 12.5.  
11 Einstellungsbeschluß, 2.  
12 See Jasper, ‘Die Friedrich-Alexander Universität,’ 249–50. Ericksen also references students’ 
demonstrations of public protest against Althaus when the truth of his entanglement with National Socialism 
came to light. See Complicity in the Holocaust, 188. 
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 It is true, it seems to me, that Althaus was no ideological National Socialist, 
as the Spruchkammer concluded. He had always known that every government, not 
least National Socialism, carries the germ of evil within itself. Already in 1935 
Althaus had wrestled with the moral ambiguity posed by conflicting allegiances to 
ordinances that are at once intact and distorted: ‘I must serve my Volk and its state, 
not in paradise, but in this dire world that is badly out of joint. . . . I must represent 
the cause of my Volk, even though I know and perceive that it is also interwoven 
with the very evil against which I am trying to struggle.’13 Although there is no 
explicit reference, the passage gestures toward Althaus’ growing unease with the 
methods of the National Socialist state. In 1950, he would recollect that the moral 
bankruptcy of the regime had ‘shattered’ any claim to legitimate authority ‘long 
before the rupture of its power.’14 
Though there are hints of Althaus’ growing disenchantment with the 
government, the issue is further complicated by his public silence. Althaus stopped 
his open support for National Socialism by the mid-to-late 1930s.15 Likewise, after 
the war he seldom spoke about the ‘Jewish Question’ in explicit terms, though he did 
continue to exposit the meaning of Jewish existence theologically. But what does this 
silence mean? The polarity that characterises Althaus scholarship in general 
manifests in competing interpretations of his silence. Paul Knitter, for example, 
commends Althaus for his ‘theological opposition against the regime [through] an 
                                                 
13 Althaus, Theologie der Ordnungen, 2nd ed., 67.  
14 Paul Althaus, ‘Christenheit und Staat,’ Allgemeine Rundschau: Unabhängige Tageszeitung für 
Nordbayern 60:24 (1950), 1.  
15 Beginning about this time there is a dramatic drop-off in Althaus’ political and völkisch writings, as 
Paul Knitter has noted. See ‘Die Uroffenbarungslehre,’ 159. The reasons for this sudden drop-off are up for 
debate. In any case, in the postwar period Althaus focused much of his attention on his Luther scholarship. His 
influential Die Theologie Martin Luthers, 2nd ed. (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn, 1963) 
appeared in English translation in 1966, with Die Ethik Martin Luthers (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus Gerd 
Mohn, 1965) following posthumously in 1972.  
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argumentum e silentio.’16 For Jack Forstman, by contrast, Althaus’ recognition of 
error and subsequent silence is a ‘pathetically modest credit.’17 Althaus himself 
pointed to the ‘censorship of the war years, which was growing more aggressive all 
the time.’ He further complained that, as a result of this forced silence, ‘our 
colleagues abroad have sometimes drawn wrong conclusions.’18 
At any rate, by the time of the regime’s collapse Althaus found himself part 
of a church that could supply little explanation for what had happened over the past 
twelve years. The evil of the National Socialist government had been recognised too 
late; in the aftermath, the church stood divided on whether and to what extent its 
theology had been complicit in the crimes of the regime. Often the church portrayed 
itself and the German nation as the victims of impersonal forces beyond human 
control. In the words of Matthew Hockenos,  
From the very outset, conservative clergymen avoided a forthright 
explanation for the rise of Nazism and the subsequent misery Germans were 
enduring in 1945 by raising the discussion above the realm of human agency 
and responsibility to the general European trend of secularization and the 
work of God.19 
  
For his part, Althaus also resorted to the language of demonic possession and 
exorcism to account for the otherwise inexplicable:  
The evil spirit [der schlimme Geist] that has reigned here for the last twelve 
years—whatever was evil in it should now be driven out: out of our entire 
public life, out of the judicial system, out of the press, out of our schools and 
education system. That’s what the victorious powers want. That’s what we 
ourselves want, and we are certain of this: that’s what God wants, too.20 
 
                                                 
16 Knitter, ‘Die Uroffenbarungslehre,’ 159.  
17 Forstman, Christian Faith, 202.  
18 Paul Althaus, Grundriß der Ethik, 2nd ed. (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1953), 5. 
19 Matthew Hockenos, A Church Divided: German Protestants Confront the Nazi Past (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2004), 54. Hockenos’ study illuminates the debates within the EKD (Evangelische 
Kirche in Deutschland) after the war as to whether Lutheran theology should be reappraised critically in light of 
the Third Reich’s rise and atrocities, and what direction such reappraisal should take.  
20 Paul Althaus, ‘Schaffe in mir, Gott, ein reines Herz’ (21 May 1945), in Der Trost Gottes, 246.  
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In depicting the National Socialist years as a demonic episode, Althaus here shows 
symptoms of the ‘syndrome of displacing one’s own guilt’ by divesting himself and 
his listeners of agency—and thereby of culpability as well.21 However, as we shall 
see below, Althaus does confront German guilt, but he does so by using the narrative 
of Israel as a cipher.  
TWO | TOGETHER UNDER THE CURSE: THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE GERMAN AND 
JEWISH DESTINIES IN ALTHAUS’ POSTWAR PREACHING   
 
 ‘Destiny [das Schicksal],’ suggests Marikje Smid, had always been at the 
core of Althaus’ ‘sense of foreignness’ from Jews.22 Destiny is what separated Jew 
and German in the Weimar years, when Althaus yet hoped that Germans would 
fulfill their divine vocation where Israel had failed. Yet his own Volk’s ruinous 
defeat in the Second World War had wrought a great and tragic irony: Germans and 
Jews now shared the same Schicksal. Although the dialectic of pathology and 
performance appears to wane in Althaus’ postwar dogmatic works, to which we will 
turn momentarily, it remains intact in the pastoral sphere, where he uses Israel’s 
narrative of vocation/electionÆfailureÆcurseÆredemption to interpret German 
experience in the aftermath of National Socialism’s collapse. In these materials, the 
pathological character of Jewish existence is still present, but is gradually eclipsed by 
an intensified focus on the performative function of Jews and their history.  
The character of Althaus’ preaching after the fallout of the Nazi collapse is 
hotly contested. Whether and to what extent Althaus acknowledged his own guilt, as 
well as the guilt of the Christian community, is at the centre of the debate. For 
Gotthard Jasper, Althaus’ straightforward admission of German guilt immediately 
                                                 
21 See Hamm, ‘Schuld und Verstrickung,’ 16.  
22 See Smid, Deutscher Protestantismus, 285.  
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after the war actually provided the formula that the council of the EKD would adopt 
for the Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt in October 1945.23 Jasper’s charitable reading 
has been countered by Berndt Hamm, who notes that Althaus’ sermons often deal in 
the language of ‘fate’ [Verhängnis] rather than of ‘guilt [Schuld].’ In so doing, 
Althaus attributes the events of the National Socialist years to some external force, 
thereby absolving himself and others.24  
Here again, though, the binary interpretive model—admission of guilt or self-
exculpation—strains to incorporate the equivocality of Althaus’ statements from the 
pulpit. On the one hand, Althaus owns up to German guilt in a sermon preached in 
Hitler’s final days:  
To be sure, we’re not all guilty in the same measure. Perhaps the Christian 
church in Germany could say: we are the least guilty, we have not been 
complicit [mitgemacht]. But we don’t want to speak like that . . . but now 
we—and I’m speaking above all for my brothers in pastoral office—perceive 
that our Christian powerlessness and boundedness [Ohnmacht und 
Gebundenheit] is weighing upon us not only as fate [Schicksal] but also as 
guilt [Schuld]. We confess that today before God and man.25 
 
Here Althaus explicitly rejects an appeal to Schicksal as an explanation for Christian 
moral failure. Though this passage would seem to vindicate Jasper’s claim over 
                                                 
23 Jasper, Paul Althaus, 319–20.  
24 Hamm, ‘Schuld und Verstrickung,’ 13–15. Jasper disputes Hamm’s conclusion in Paul Althaus at 
320. Later on, he attacks Hamm’s position more stridently:  
 
[Hamm’s] overall argument of guilt and entanglement—both in its tone and as an abstract concept—
implies a deeply moral condemnation of the ‘entanglement’ of the father-generation. In this respect, 
Hamm proves a typical representative of the ’68-ers’ generation . . . [who], without any actual life 
experience in the time of the reign of National Socialism, claim the right and the opportunity to naively 
and critically interrogate their fathers (385–86).  
 
25 Paul Althaus, ‘Die gewaltige Hand Gottes’ (22 April 1945), in Der Trost Gottes, 226. In a sermon 
from 1962, Althaus draws a distinction between ‘collective guilt’ [Kollektivschuld] and ‘collective shame 
[Kollektivscham].’ Germans all feel shame, argues Althaus, for the crimes of National Socialism, but they do not 
all bear guilt: ‘We are not all jointly-responsible for and complicit with all of the atrocities [Grausiges] that the 
German people perpetrated during the Hitler years.’ See Althaus, ‘Karfreitag’ (20 April 1962), in Gott ist 
gegenwärtig: letzte Predigten, ed. Gerhard Althaus (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1968), 80. At the same 
time, he possesses a strong theology of divine judgment by which each person is held accountable for moral 
decisions. See Paul Althaus, ‘Die Schmerzen des Gerichts,’ in Tröstet mein Volk! Grabreden unserer Zeit, ed. 
Wilhelm Horkel (Neuendettelsau: Freimund-Verlag, 1953), 167–70.  
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Hamm’s, it is worth noting that Althaus nowhere elaborates on the specific failure of 
the church. Moreover, regardless of whether this sermon is a precursor to the 
Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt, the documents share a fatal rhetorical structure. Both 
emphasise German suffering before making vague allusions to German wrongdoing. 
More critically, neither names the primary victims of the murderous National 
Socialist regime and its complicit institutions: the Jews.26 Hence a dichotomous 
interpretive model will fail to reckon with the ambiguity of Althaus’ postwar 
attitudes toward guilt, suffering, and the ‘Jewish Question.’ As I suggest below, 
while the dialectical character of his thought does remain intact, Althaus gradually 
downplays the pathological threat of Jewish persons while simultaneously 
intensifying his focus on the performative function of Jewish existence as a means of 
coping with the German catastrophe.  
 Even with more than a decade of distance during which to reflect on his 
views on the ‘Jewish Question’ in light of the Shoah, Althaus still continues to 
interpret Jewish existence through the dialectic of pathology and performance in his 
postwar sermons. Though the more aggressive elements of his rhetoric do begin to 
fade over time, his depiction of the Jews proves remarkably stubborn. In March 
1956, for example, Althaus again picks up the familiar theme of Israel’s guilt for the 
death of Jesus. Here as before, the crucifixion represents God’s ‘terrible indictment 
[Anklage] against Israel,’ who have rejected their true Messiah. As a result, in 
Althaus’ ominous premonition, God is not finished with the Jews.27 Most significant, 
however, is that Althaus again characterises Jewish existence as intrinsically 
                                                 
26 See Hockenos, A Church Divided, 75–100 on the ambivalent legacy of the Stuttgart Declaration of 
Guilt.  
27 Paul Althaus, ‘Die Überschrift am Kreuz’ (30 March 1956), in Die Kraft Christi: Predigten 
(Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1958), 53–54.  
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pathological: ‘Israel has crucified its king. Therefore now even today it wanders 
restless [ruhelos] and largely homeless [heimatlos] through history, sick [krank] on 
Golgotha, sick on Jesus Christ.’28 Even after a war that aimed to eradicate the Jews 
like a virus—the details of which were public knowledge by 1956—Althaus 
nevertheless persists in portraying the Jews as displaced and diseased. This is the last 
time that he will speak so explicitly of the Jewish Krankheit. However, his sermons 
continue to evoke the pathological dimension of Jewish existence even as they 
ostensibly seek to correct Christian antisemitism.  
 Still, beginning in the 1950s Althaus’ sermons generally trend away from the 
more hostile rhetoric of his earlier preaching about the Jews. In particular, he now 
emphasises the universality of human guilt for the crucifixion, a theme that had 
appeared in his earlier work but had been subordinated to the primacy of Jewish 
guilt. Here Althaus partially reverses his earlier statements by pointing to the cross as 
a ‘monument’ to German guilt and an ‘indictment against us [Anklage wider uns].’29 
Yet the Jews continue to appear as the prime antagonists in the drama of salvation 
history. Jerusalem remains the place where prophets are murdered, the Jews remain 
the people who rejected Jesus, and ‘Pharisee’ remains a code word for legalistic and 
hollow religiosity.30 On the other hand, Althaus also begins to reflect critically on the 
nature of Christian antisemitism, but his analysis is tone-deaf. He notes, for instance, 
that the deicide libel proved especially harmful in the Middle Ages and Reformation, 
but does not say much about the events of his own lifetime. Surprisingly, it is under 
                                                 
28 Ibid., 54.  
29 Althaus, ‘Karfreitag,’ 82. In Althaus’ prior sermons, God’s Anklage had been directed primarily at 
Israel. See, for example, ‘Die Stimme des Blutes’ (18 April 1930) and ‘Kraft deiner Angst und Pein’ (3 April 
1942).  
30 See Paul Althaus, ‘Estomihi’ (28 February 1965), in Gott ist gegenwärtig, 150–52. Though still 
problematic, these statements are less aggressive than those of his 1942 sermon on the same biblical text 
(Matthew 23:34–39). See Althaus, ‘Ein Volk, das “nicht gewollt hat!”’ in NA 12.5. Althaus also associates 
vindictiveness with ‘Phariseeism’ in ‘Das Gebot der Stunde’ (13 May 1945), in Der Trost Gottes, 238.  
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the influence of the Second Vatican Council that Althaus acknowledges a needed 
reform in Christian theology: ‘As far as that is concerned, to speak of the people of 
Israel, back then or today, as the murderers of Christ is unbecoming and 
unchristian.’31  
Despite this conscious effort to relinquish this one particular element of 
Christianity’s antisemitic heritage, Althaus cannot in the end divorce himself from 
the form of discourse in which the libel is embedded. Immediately after offering the 
above corrective, he reverts back to the witness people mythology: ‘There lies upon 
Israel a hex which can largely be seen up until the present day.’ Consequently, he 
muses, Israel is still a mystery as ‘dark and grave’ as it was during the Weimar 
Republic.32 So, even while he renounces explicitly a form of Christian antisemitism 
in which he himself had participated, the pathological dimension of his undergirding 
theology of the ‘Jewish Question’ remains largely in place. In this respect, Althaus 
testifies to Stephen Haynes’ foreboding prediction that the witness-people myth is 
too deeply rooted in the Christian imagination to ever be exorcised.33 
Still more striking, however, is how Althaus develops the performative 
function of Jewish existence in the postwar years. As we will explore presently, 
Althaus intensifies his focus on the constructive potential of Jewish failure and 
suffering (the latter of which is usually obscured or ignored) to interpret German 
guilt and suffering. In short, Althaus identifies the German and Jewish destinies by 
casting the events of the National Socialist years in parallel with Israel’s own 
narrative arc of blessing, failed vocation, punishment, and restoration. In so doing, he 
                                                 
31 Althaus, ‘Estomihi,’ 152. The Second Vatican Council’s deliberations on how Christians should 
think and speak about Jews, to which Althaus is alluding here, would be codified in Nostra Aetate on 28 October 
1965.   
32 Ibid.  
33 Haynes, Reluctant Witnesses, 183.  
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resumes a line of thought that had begun in the 1920s and extends it to apply directly 
to the catastrophic humiliation of the German Volk after the demise of National 
Socialism.  
As I have argued throughout, Althaus envisions Germans and Jews as having 
parallel spiritual vocations: each has been chosen by God to fulfill a mission for the 
world, each has its prophets and patriarchs, each has encountered Jesus Christ 
directly, and the two peoples share the same fate should they fail their tasks. In this 
respect, Jewish existence fulfills a didactic function for Germans. At the same time, 
for Althaus Jews should be regarded with suspicion and held in an inclusive 
quarantine on account of the unique spiritual danger they pose. Althaus’ postwar 
sermons indicate that he believes the worst has happened: the quarantine failed. Like 
Israel, Germans have misunderstood their vocation, abused their divine gifting, and 
have now fallen under the curse. In this way, the Jews, who are the perpetually 
diseased and dispossessed Volk, provide a guide for Germans who, in a dramatic 
reversal of fortunes, are now the ones who are war-torn and beleaguered, ‘sick’ 
[krank] and ‘homeless [heimatlos].’34 This interpretive strategy culminates in 
Althaus’ explicit and direct identification of the German and Jewish destinies, as we 
shall see below.  
Althaus narrates the events of the National Socialist calamity as if they are an 
iteration of the story of Israel. By emphasising themes of divine judgment and exilic 
dispersion, he aligns the German and Jewish destinies just as he had done during the 
Weimar and National Socialist periods. This time, however, Germans have joined 
Jews under God’s curse. In a series of sermons delivered between the end of April 
                                                 
34 See Althaus, ‘Die gewaltige Hand Gottes,’ 227, 230.  
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and the beginning of July 1945, Althaus suggests that the catastrophe can only be 
understood theologically:  
This hand that is against us—we can’t be silent about it—is none other than 
the hand of the Judge. As the months wear on, a growing crowd of us have 
recognised this: a downfall like this cannot be understood or explained in 
merely political-military terms. Here one must look deeper. We have felt it 
for a long time: the blessing of God no longer rests on our path.35 
 
What is most significant, however, is that he now applies to Germans the language of 
pathology that he had once reserved for Jews. The events of the spring of 1945, 
suggests Althaus, prove that Germans too have been infected with the disease of 
secularism—a disease borne most fatally by the Jews.36 He laments, in particular, the 
idolatry and blasphemy of a public life ‘that no longer knows anything about the fear 
of God . . . which is the health [Gesundheit] of the life of the peoples.’37  
Through a series of rhetorical associations, Althaus implies that Germans—
now suffering both a literal and a spiritual ‘homesickness’ [Heimweh]38—have 
become a mirror image of Jews. As a result of the punishment of God, ‘[i]n these 
days, many of us here in Erlangen must abandon our homes and become homeless 
[heimatlos].’39 But the physical wreckage of German cities, and the subsequent 
displacement of German persons, is only a symptom of a more serious sickness of 
German spirit. Althaus reasons that the German body was susceptible to National 
Socialist ideology in the first place because of a widespread spiritual infection. 
                                                 
35 Ibid., 224. Emphasis in the original.  
36 Recall Althaus’ 1929 treatise Leitsätze zur Ethik, where he identifies Jewish Volk as ‘the chief-bearer 
of the rational-critical, individualistic spirit of the Enlightenment’ (81). Cf. Althaus, ‘Kirche und Volkstum’ of 
1927, where the Jews threaten Germans with their ‘demoralised and demoralising big-city spirituality’ (131).  
37 Althaus, ‘Die gewaltige Hand Gottes,’ 224–25.   
38 ‘For many of us, this applies in a literal sense . . . but in a deeper sense it is the truth for all of us: 
living in a foreign land! Who among us can feel at home in today’s world, in today’s Germany? The world in 
which we are standing now is not our homeland [Heimat]; we are in a foreign land.’ See Paul Althaus, ‘Heimkehr 
zu Gott’ (15 February 1948), in Die Herrlichkeit Gottes: Predigten zu den Festen und Festzeiten des 
Kirchenjahres (Gütersloh: Rufer-Verlag, 1954), 226–27.  
39 Althaus, ‘Die gewaltige Hand Gottes,’ 224–25.   
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Significantly, he now uses the language of pathology with reference to German 
Volkstum:  
We stand here now before a field of rubble, and it seems to us as if the 
terrible destruction of our beautiful cities, their churches and other noble 
buildings were only the outward expression of what has happened to the 
German soul. The inner degeneration [Zerstörung] began far earlier than just 
the last decade. All the indoctrination of and the ideological influence on our 
Volk would not have been successful had the German soul still been healthy 
[gesund] and clear at the time.40 
 
The remedy for this disease of godlessness is of course a return to Jesus Christ, 
without whom ‘the German soul will never again convalesce [genesen].’41 In the 
aftermath of the Second World War, then, Althaus envisions German existence as 
having taken on an exilic character: it is now the fate of Germans to be sick and 
displaced.42  
Usually, Althaus transposes German political history onto the salvation-
historical narrative of Israel only implicitly: Germany had been chosen by God, 
failed its vocation, and is now subject to judgment. However, in a sermon of July 1, 
1945 Althaus explicitly tethers German self-understanding to Jewish suffering. He 
opens with a narration of German experience that is stunning, given that the horrors 
of the death camps had already begun by the summer of 1942. Nevertheless, Althaus 
claims for Germans an incomparable history of suffering at the hands of foreign 
nations:  
Our German lot is hard. It has never been easy. The path of the German Volk 
through history has been difficult. How much labour and pain it cost us to 
become a Volk! How our Volk has been torn through inner conflict, through 
schisms of faith, through the wars of religion! More than any other Volk, we 
                                                 
40 Althaus, ‘Schaffe in mir, Gott, ein reines Herz,’ 247. Cf. Althaus, ‘Christenheit und Staat’: ‘But 
indeed we do not want to forget that the total state itself in this respect signifies only the acute onset of an already 
long-lingering sickness [lange schleichenden Krankheit]’ (2).  
41 Althaus, ‘Schaffe in mir, Gott, ein reines Herz,’ 249.  
42 In a 1951 sermon, Althaus speaks of the ‘curse’ [Fluch] weighing upon the German nation as God’s 
punishment for following a ‘false path.’ The effect of the curse is that Germans, their ‘health’ [Gesundheit] 
having been sapped, are now ‘driven from their beloved homeland.’ See ‘Durch Gott gedemütigt’ (21 November 
1951), in Die Herrlichkeit Gottes, 242–44.  
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have been the prey and the pinball of foreigners [Beute und Spielball der 
Fremden]. . . . A path rich in suffering! Our Volk bears its scars and wounds 
in body and soul.43 
 
Now it is Germans who are the wandering and hunted Volk rather than Jews, whom 
Althaus had earlier called ‘the pinball [Spielball] among the great peoples of the 
world.’44 Like Israel, Germans now strain under God’s punishment and, also like 
Israel, their reprobation is incomprehensible and ostensibly inexplicable, a ‘mystery’ 
hidden deep in the counsel of God.45 Althaus’ provocative fusing of Jew and German 
climaxes in a cry of despair:  
Are we Germans a people of misfortune among the other peoples—like the 
Jews, their counterpart [Gegenbild]? A people under God’s curse [Ein Volk 
des Fluches Gottes]? Has the Creator, in his wrath, made us only for disaster? 
Does he have only dark plans for us?46  
 
Years before, Althaus had warned that, should Germans contract the diseased 
spirituality of the Jews, they would consequently share the Jewish fate of perpetual 
dispersion.47 His premonition had come true: Germans had become the mirror image 
of the Jews—Germans had become Jews—a second people wandering under the 
curse.  
 Yet as dire as the German situation is, the final word is still one of hope. For 
Althaus, Jews and Germans share an analogous election—and thus they suffer an 
analogous reprobation. But they also share a future redemption that God intends to 
fulfill, regardless of how hopeless present circumstances may seem. Althaus succors 
                                                 
43 Paul Althaus, ‘Gottes Gedanken mit uns’ (1 July 1945), in Der Trost Gottes, 251.  
44 See Althaus, ‘Die schwere Zeit im Lichte der Ewigkeit’ (28 June 1931), 64.  
45 Althaus, ‘Gottes Gedanken mit uns,’ 252.  
46 Ibid., 252–53. Althaus elsewhere intimates that the German nation has fallen under the ‘curse’ 
[Fluch] of God on account of the many ‘abominable sins’ of the Volk, but that God overcomes this curse with the 
‘victorious power of love’ (see ‘Das Gebot der Stunde,’ 235).  
47 ‘And should we throw away the Gospel, we would never be able to rid ourselves of the sting. Our 
Volk would then be right there next to the “eternal Jew,” a second figure wandering restless and cursed through 
history’ (Althaus, Christus und die deutsche Seele, 32). In 1942 Althaus had warned that if Germans sit in 
judgment over Jews, ‘the rejected ones,’ then ‘we ourselves have become Jews’ (see ‘Ein Volk das “nicht 
gewollt” hat!,’ 3). 
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the sick German soul by way of a direct and unsophisticated appeal to a word of 
Hebrew prophecy (Jeremiah 29:11).48 He does pause briefly to consider whether 
such a hermeneutical technique is appropriate or whether it is ‘pure arbitrariness . . . 
an all too cheap means of numbing our pain that still does nothing to alleviate our 
suffering in the least.’ Finally, however, he concludes that ‘this was not said to us 
first, but to the Volk of the Old Covenant, [but nevertheless] this word applies to each 
person and in each time since Jesus.’49 In this move, Althaus claims for Germans the 
unique promise made to the people of Israel. Jewish existence, therefore, continues to 
fulfill a performative and constructive function even in spite of the fact that it has 
infected German existence. The narrative of Israel holds out hope that the German 
story can too be healed.  
 In the meantime, however, it is an abiding shame that binds Jew and German 
together. The fact that God continues to preserve Israel for a future encounter with 
Jesus Christ, argues Althaus, proves that there is no human guilt beyond the scope of 
divine forgiveness. In a departure from his prior Good Friday preaching, he now 
emphasises the solidarity of Jews and Germans in their entanglement with atrocity 
and the terrible miscarriage of justice. At the end of his life Althaus absolves Jews of 
guilt for the crucifixion, and, I suspect, not coincidentally:  
What the spiritual leaders of the Volk did back then does not signify any kind 
of collective guilt [Kollektivschuld] for the whole Volk, just as little as the 
horrible crimes of Auschwitz signify that for us—we are all ashamed 
[beschämen uns alle] of those crimes, but we don’t all bear guilt for them.50 
 
                                                 
48 ‘For surely I know the plans I have for you, says the LORD, plans for your welfare and not for harm, 
to give you a future with hope’ (NRSV).  
49 Althaus, ‘Gottes Gedanken mit uns,’ 253. He had also applied this passage to interpret Germany’s 
military fortunes during the war. See his ‘Meditation über Jeremiah 29,11,’ NA 13:4. 
50 Althaus, ‘Estomihi,’ 152.  
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The question of guilt, then, is never straightforward. Immediately after the war, 
Althaus introduces the concept of ‘historical guilt’ [geschichtliche Schuld]: a failure 
of nerve or lapse into ‘error and powerlessness.’ This kind of moral breakdown—into 
which Althaus seems to place both Golgotha and Auschwitz—is indeed cause for 
regret, but it is not a source of guilt ‘in the strictest sense.’51 Just as ordinary Jews did 
not crucify Jesus, says Althaus, ordinary Germans did not murder the Jews. So, in 
this bizarre calculus, Germans and Jews, while not exactly guilty, do bear a shared 
weight of historical shame.   
It must be said that Althaus does signal his awareness of the attempted 
destruction of the Jews, but usually attributes those atrocities to the National Socialist 
leadership.52 Nevertheless, by 1952 Althaus reverses the Good Friday rhetoric he had 
used for so many years by naming the Jews, for so long the victimisers in the passion 
narrative, as the victims of Germans: 
‘The voice of your brother’s blood cries out to me from the earth,’ cries out 
for atonement, for retribution, for God’s vengeance for innocent life that has 
been murdered. The blood cries out. There’s no use in throwing dirt on it, 
covering it with sand, burying it. They’ve planted birch trees on the mass 
graves at Katyn—it’s just like us people to do that!—but the blood of Katyn 
still cries out and will not fall silent. The blood of the Jews, Poles, Czechs 
murdered [hingemordet] by German hands still cries out, whether we want to 
hear it or not.53 
 
                                                 
51 ‘We can mourn deeply our error and powerlessness [Irren und Ohnmacht] in an hour of decision 
which demanded powerful political action, but we cannot indict ourselves [sich anklagen] on that account. . . . 
Error and powerlessness can exist without guilt. They can bring historical shame on us, but they do not bring 
personal shame before God in every case. They are weakness, but they are not evil [Sie sind Schwachheit, aber 
nicht Bosheit].’ See Paul Althaus, ‘Schuld,’ Prisma 1:2 (1946), 6.  
52 See also Althaus, ‘Gottes Gedanken mit uns,’ 251–52 and Althaus, ‘Amnestie?,’ 879–80.  
53 Paul Althaus, ‘Abels Blut und Christi Blut’ (11 April 1952), in Die Herrlichkeit Gottes, 101. It is 
worth noting that Althaus does distance himself from Nazi parlance by using the word hingemordet (‘murdered’) 
instead of the Party’s more sterile term, vernichtet (‘exterminated’), which is also the word used for the 
destruction of animals or inanimate objects. At the same time, even while Althaus acknowledges the genocidal 
crimes of the National Socialist regime, he couches them among the atrocities of other nations. He seems to 
catagorise the murder of the Jews as an act of war comparable to the Russian government’s mass murder of 
Polish nationals at Katyn or the British and American bombing of Dresden in February 1945. Again he stresses 
that it is the ‘superiors and leadership [who] gave the murderous orders’ who will have to reckon with the guilt of 
these crimes in particular, even though all humanity has participated in the ‘spirit of Cain.’    
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Significantly, however, he appears to see no substantial connection between toxic 
anti-Judaic theologies and the murder of Jewish persons. Even in the face of 
unequivocally evil treatment of Jewish persons by Germans—a people he believed to 
be Christian in their very essence—he can muster only ‘collective shame.’ In other 
words, Althaus does not consider Auschwitz ultimately to demand a total overhaul of 
his theology of the ‘Jewish Question.’  
The problem with Althaus’ post-Shoah preaching is not that he consults the 
Hebrew Scriptures as sources for Christian reflection and self-understanding; 
Christians, as has been acknowledged in a recent exchange between Christian and 
Jewish authors, do have a legitimate claim to the so-called Old Testament.54 Rather, 
difficulties ensue when Althaus continues to offer a distorted and chimerical account 
of Jewish performance. And, as this survey of his pastoral writings has shown, while 
he appears to surrender the more aggressive elements of his völkisch theology in the 
aftermath of the Shoah, he has not fully rehabilitated with the undergirding structural 
logic: that is, the dialectic of pathology and performance. On the contrary, though he 
relinquishes his most obviously antisemitic vocabulary, the very form of the 
discourse he continues to use does an equally serious violence to Jewish persons. 
Namely, Althaus has minimised Jewish suffering by using it to interpret German 
suffering. Berndt Hamm stresses the problems posed as Althaus overlooks the 
‘millions of murdered Jews’ with an exclusive focus on German pain: 
The problem with the Althausian way of preaching, which has so much to say 
about the suffering of the German people and its Christians and so little to say 
                                                 
54 Ann Conway-Jones, an Anglican practitioner, has rightly observed that Christianity is a movement 
which took the Hebrew Bible with it as it developed out of Second Temple Judaism. As a result, Christians are 
‘equally entitled’ to make use of Hebrew scripture. In a response to Conway-Jones, Jewish scholar Sebastian 
Selvén not only agrees with this premise, but proposes the retrieval of interpretatio christiana as a promising 
resource for ‘eas[ing] some of the tensions in the relationship between Jews and Christians.’ See Conway-Jones, 
‘Contempt or Respect? Jews and Judaism in Christian Preaching,’ The Expository Times 127:2 (2015), 64–65 and 




about its perpetration [Täterschaft], lies not in that Althaus does not have an 
idea of the culpable entanglement that both his Erlangen hearers and he 
himself had . . . but rather how he speaks of it . . . how he characterises the 
guilt as passive omission . . . how he unconsciously trivialises it . . . how he 
as a theologian allowed guilt to disappear again and again behind an imposed 
fate. . .55 
 
These motifs—chiefly Althaus’ use of Jews as a key to German self-understanding—
are consistent with his attitudes toward the ‘Jewish Question’ beginning in the 1920s, 
as I have argued throughout. But Althaus’ failure is not merely a sin of omission. Not 
only has he obscured the gross atrocities against the Jews, he has taken the ‘comfort 
of God’ [der Trost Gottes] promised to Israel and given it to Germans.  
THREE | THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE PARADOX: ALTHAUS’ PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP TO 
JEWS   
 
 Althaus had maintained his dialectical theology of the ‘Jewish Question’ in 
his pastoral exposition of the relationship between Jews and Germans, though he 
came to emphasise the performance of Jewish existence over its pathology. These 
public comments may reflect the same unresolved tension in his own personal 
attitudes toward Jews. Robert Ericksen reports a striking instance of Althaus’ 
‘personal aversion towards Jews and Jewish culture’ as remembered by Althaus’ son, 
Gerhard. When Gerhard questioned his father on the subject in the mid-1950s, 
Althaus simply replied, ‘You have not experienced the Jews.’56 This account is, on 
the surface, difficult to reconcile with Lowell Green’s personal testimony on the 
same subject: ‘Althaus’s [sic] son, Gerhard, told me in July 1998 that his father had 
expected him to disregard the rules against fraternization with non-Aryans and to be 
friendly with the Jewish children at school.’57 These narratives, though anecdotal, are 
                                                 
55 Hamm, ‘Schuld und Verstrickung,’ 15, 17.  
56 Gerhard Althaus conveyed this account directly to Ericksen. See Ericksen, Theologians Under Hitler, 
109 and Ericksen, ‘Assessing the Heritage,’ 25–26.  
57 Green, Lutherans Against Hitler, 150.  
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indicative of a phenomenon that goes beyond Althaus’ own particular case: the 
public/private paradox.58 Althaus had made strident comments about the danger of 
Jews and Judaism in his capacity as a public servant, though there is evidence that he 
could—and did—set aside his personal prejudice against Jews to participate in acts 
of basic human decency.  
 It is telling that much of Althaus’ defence before the Spruchkammer—and his 
vindication within sympathetic scholarly narratives—rests on his personal gravitas. 
In the immediate aftermath of Althaus’ dismissal, Helmut Thielicke, who by that 
time had established a reputation as a valiant opponent of National Socialism, 
explained Althaus’ initial positive reception of the government as an ironic flaw of 
personality. He writes,  
Subjectively speaking, my explanation for his trivialising interpretation of 
National Socialism is that Paul Althaus by nature possesses a generally 
optimistic attitude toward life, which makes him inclined to see the positive 
both in people and in things. It was precisely this quality for which we felt so 
grateful as his students. This optimism, however, which is a gift not to be 
underestimated for an educator, threatened to become his downfall in the 
interpretation of National Socialism; for a man of the inviolable personal 
integrity of a Paul Althaus, furthermore, it must have been almost impossible 
to imagine the potential evil of National Socialism.59 
 
Four decades later, Thielicke would remember Althaus as a well-meaning man who 
tragically fell victim to his own ‘innocent naiveté [unschuldsvoller Naivität].’60 
Likewise Wolfgang Trillhaas, another of Althaus’ former students, offers a benign 
perspective on his mentor’s political attitudes, arguing that his uncritical theological 
method failed him in the ‘testing of the spirits’—that is to say, Althaus’ indecisive 
                                                 
58 Von Kellenbach has observed how perpetrators constructed amnesty campaigns based on ‘personal 
decency’ that aimed to dissociate public acts of duty from private morality. See The Mark of Cain, 167–77.  
59 Thielicke, ‘Aeusserung’ 2.  
60 Thielicke, Zu Gast, 85. In the end, Thielicke judges that Althaus’ personal integrity is unassailable; 
he was a good man with a ‘pious heart . . . whose character was beyond reproach, at least as far as his motives 
were concerned’ (see Notes from a Wayfarer, 73–75).  
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nature ‘played a prank on him.’61 These verdicts are echoed by Walther von 
Loewenich, a colleague of Althaus on the Erlangen theology faculty who cites his 
personal encounters with Althaus in order vindicate him: ‘From 1938, Althaus, as far 
as I can see, no longer expressed anything positive about the Third Reich in public. 
He was privately [innerlich] finished with it long before the military catastrophe, 
which I know from many conversations.’62 
 Loewenich’s comments exemplify the difficulty in reconciling Althaus’ 
public and private personas. As we have seen, Karlmann Beyschlag has gone so far 
as to conclude that one must have ‘personally experienced’ Althaus’ ‘spiritual 
charisma’ in order not to totally misunderstand him.63 But how are we to fit together 
Althaus’ public comments of strident nationalism and xenophobic anti-Judaism with 
his private reservations about National Socialism and its crude Jew-hatred? The 
dilemma is compounded by the scarcity of documentary evidence; the private-
Althaus remains, with the exception of the personal testimony of sympathetic 
colleagues and friends, largely inaccessible. It is challenging, for instance, to verify 
the claims made by an anonymous deposition from 1947: ‘Professor Althaus, both in 
Erlangen, where he has worked since 1925, and in every place where he has given 
speeches—in the biggest cities in Germany—is known as a not-National Socialist 
[Nicht-Nationalsozialist].’64 The anonymous author testifies that Althaus routinely 
criticised the regime in private conversations and academic lectures as he ‘led the 
                                                 
61 Trillhaas, Aufgehobene Vergangenheit, 85. Trillhaas credits Althaus with helping to launch his own 
academic career.  
62 Walther von Loewenich, Erlebte Theologie, 169. Loewenich remarks that criticism of the Erlangen 
theological faculty has been partially fair and partially not in the years since the war. Regarding Althaus in 
particular, he concludes, ‘despite his occasional sympathetic statements, he had been no National Socialist.’  
63 Beyschlag, Die Erlanger Theologie, 184.  
64 Anonymous Deposition, 1947, NA 12.5, 1. Emphasis in the original.  
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struggle against the totalitarian concept of National Socialism.’65 The deposition 
stresses Althaus’ private opposition to the regime:  
In particular, at the ‘open evenings’ that Professor Althaus regularly held at 
his home for his students, much open criticism of the ‘Third Reich’ was 
discussed, according to the statements of the students involved. Specifically 
this on July 20: Professor Althaus, according to the report of a certain student 
Düfel, on that occasion voiced ‘that Hitler’s survival signifies judgment over 
the German people.’ This Düfel, who stills studies in Erlangen now, added 
this: it is only on account of the ability of the students to keep a secret that 
Professor Althaus did not share the same fate as the Munich Professor Kurt 
Huber—namely, being executed by firing squad.66 
 
 Most significant for my purposes, however, is the deposition’s description of 
Althaus’ personal relationship to Jewish persons. The likelihood that Althaus had 
consistent personal contact with the Jewish community is low. Historically, as Jasper 
has noted, substantially fewer Jews studied in Erlangen compared to other parts of 
the country, despite the presence of a large Jewish population in the nearby village of 
Fürth.67 Still, there is testimony that Althaus advocated for Jewish theology students 
at the university: 
Althaus was regarded as the special confidant [besonderer Vertrauensmann] 
of non-Aryan theology students and of those theologians who were judged 
politically suspicious and were persecuted on account of their attitude toward 
the church-politics of the Third Reich. So testifies the non-Aryan theologian 
Fritz Fraenkel, now a student in Göttingen (Stumpfebiel 2). So too the 
politically persecuted young theology candidate Karl Heine (Erlangen, 
Henkestraße) and Horst Kerstan (Erlangen, Frankestraße 4). In May 1942, as 
the lawyer Dr. Mensing (Wuppertal) can attest . . . Althaus wrote an expert 
report [Gutachten] in favor of several female schoolteachers from Bremen 
who had taken in members of the Jewish community who were designated to 
be deported to the East. . . . Althaus has exposed himself to accusation on 
account of this report.68 
                                                 
65 Ibid. These claims are difficult to verify, as Althaus’ lecture notes are not extant.  
66 Ibid., 2. Emphasis in the original. The author is here referring to Kurt Huber, professor of psychology 
in Munich and member of the White Rose group, who circulated tracts in opposition to National Socialism. 
Huber was, in fact, sentenced to death by guillotine, not executed by firing squad. See Inge Scholl, The White 
Rose: Munich 1942–1943, 2nd ed., ed. and trans. Arthur R. Schultz (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 
1983).  
67 See Jasper, ‘Die Friedrich-Alexander-Universität,’ 256. This state of affairs is due, he speculates, in 
part to a ‘clearly perceptible antisemitism’ in Erlangen. 
68 Anonymous Deposition, 3. Töllner also recounts Althaus’ efforts to assist a theology student with a 




The particularity with which the deposition names Althaus’ non-Aryan contacts 
lends the account a credibility not to be overlooked. Moreover, there is documentary 
evidence to suggest that Althaus did use his influence as a university professor to 
intervene on the behalf of the schoolteachers to which the deposition alludes. On this 
occasion, as we shall see below, Althaus was able to dissociate his open mistrust of 
Jews from the demands of Christian conscience. In so doing, he illustrates the 
ambiguity that characterises much Christian antisemitism, according to which 
Christians could maintain a dissonance between their public attitudes toward ‘the 
Jews’ and their personal dealings with, or on the behalf of, Jewish persons.  
 In May 1942, pastor Heinrich Kloppenburg, a leader of the Bekennende 
Kirche in Oldenburg, issued an urgent appeal to Althaus to intervene on the behalf of 
four Bremen schoolteachers who had been under arrest since November 1941 for 
providing Jewish families with clothing and supplies. With the teachers—who, it 
must be noted, were not themselves Jewish—now facing trial to determine whether 
they violated their civil servant loyalty oaths, Kloppenburg contacted Althaus with 
the defense counsel’s request for a theological expert opinion [Gutachten] in 
response to the legal indictment. Given the substantial geographical distance between 
Bremen and Erlangen, it is significant that Kloppenburg contacted Althaus; this 
suggests, perhaps, that Althaus had a tacit reputation for resisting the racial laws of 
the regime. At the same time, however, Kloppenburg also assures Althaus that the 
teachers acted only out of Christian conscience, not out of personal affinity for Jews: 
‘The defense counsel emphasises that it is important to establish that this contact 
                                                 
sit his ecclesial exams for the Bavarian Landeskirche and to have helped the student secure a vicarship in Alsace. 
See Töllner, Eine Frage der Rasse?, 65.  
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with Jewish families was not a matter of personal friendship (one of the 
schoolteachers explained that, at the beginning, she found the Jewish woman she met 
very unpleasant, personally speaking), but simply a matter of Christian obligation.’ 
The teachers, he adds, ‘have not caused a public scandal as no one noticed that they 
were with these families.’69 
 Althaus’ response to Kloppenburg is revealing on a number of levels: though 
he equivocated, ultimately he agreed to advocate for the teachers while leaving the 
prejudicial framework of the legal proceeding intact. On the face of it, he appears to 
offer his unreserved support for the teachers, and by extension, for the Jewish 
families they assisted:  
I was moved as I read your letter and its attachment. It goes without saying 
that I see the matter exactly as you do and I have no doubt that the 
schoolteachers . . . acted christianly, that is, they acted in accordance with the 
Word and Spirit of Jesus. The allegation that has been issued by the Court 
only serves to reflect once again the entirely dire situation of the church.70 
 
However, the logic of Althaus’ interpretation of the schoolteachers’ actions rests not 
in protecting the dignity of these Jews as Jews, but on defending the legal rights of 
Christians who are Jewish:  
According to my judgment, the civil-service oath of loyalty to the Führer has 
not been affected by their actions; for it is a matter neither of criticism nor of 
a thwarting of the stipulations mandated by the Führer, but only that one 
allows the involved parties, even in this difficult situation, to feel that they 
belong to the Christian church. Because the Führer has expressly recognised 
the Christian churches as such in the message he delivered on 21 March 
1933, his political struggle against Jewry’s danger to the Volk [Volksgefahr 
des Judentums] cannot be interpreted in such a way as to deny membership of 
baptised Jews to the Christian church. It is out of this public, indisputable 
membership that the conduct of the teachers resulted—out of this and nothing 
else.71 
                                                 
69 Heinrich Kloppenburg to Paul Althaus, 12 May 1942, NA 12.5, 1–2.  
70 Althaus to Kloppenburg, 16 May 1942, NA 12.5, 1.  
71 Ibid. The speech to which Althaus alludes was delivered by Hitler on the ‘Day of Potsdam’ (21 
March 1933); two days later the ‘Enabling Act’ was passed. In his speech before the Reichstag on 23 March 
1933, Hitler acknowledged both the Roman Catholic and Protestant churches as vital factors for the preservation 




Strikingly, Althaus does not challenge the Führer’s ‘political struggle against 
Jewry’s danger to the Volk.’ As we have seen, this political struggle is something of 
which he seems to have approved in concept, even while he demonstrated a degree of 
unease with the government’s methods. Secular Jewry, manifest as the continuing 
menace of Weltjudentum, remains a live threat, but that, he argues, is not the issue at 
hand here, since the Jews in question belong to a Christian community.72  
Moreover, says Althaus, the teachers should be exonerated because they 
assisted these families not because of, but rather in spite of their Jewishness—that is, 
the teachers intervened on the behalf of fellow Christians who are Jewish. ‘In the 
first place,’ he reasons,  
it is a matter of a legal determination that the Führer’s Yes to the church of 
March 1933 has not been withdrawn . . . [and] that there has never been a 
requirement that the church may only have Aryan members; that each Jewish 
family belonged to the Stephanigemeinde accordingly; and that the action of 
the teachers has its ground and authority from this fact.73 
 
Though Althaus had argued that Jewish pastors should be disqualified from 
leadership, he always maintained that Jewish Christians must have a place within the 
Germans churches.74 Here again we see Althaus’ implicit trust of the state and its 
alleged promise to respect the autonomy of the German churches, although he hints 
that this trust may be misplaced. This being the case, he suspects that the defense will 
stand a better chance of success on the basis of strictly juridical arguments because 
                                                 
72 In the 1968 edition of his Romans commentary, which was published posthumously, Althaus would 
state that ‘the Jews must been seen with different eyes than all other peoples, not only as “world Jewry” 
[Weltjudentum], but as “Israel.”’ See Althaus, Der Brief an die Römer, Das Neue Testament Deutsch 3, ed. 
Gerhard Friedrich (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1968), 121–22. Significantly, Althaus affirms that there 
is such a thing as Weltjudentum—a libel that had been a staple of National Socialist propaganda—but that this is 
not the only way that Jews should be conceived.  
73 Althaus to Kloppenburg, 1. Emphasis in the original.  
74 See 148–53 above. 
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‘[i]f I were to argue before the court on purely on the grounds of Christian ethics, it 
would be like speaking into a void.’75  
Although Althaus ends the correspondence on a note of equivocation, he did 
eventually issue a Gutachten that was presented by the defense counsel at the 
schoolteachers’ trial, as reported by the chief defense attorney, Karl Mensing.76 
Mensing later testified that Althaus’ Gutachten defended the actions of the teachers 
by pointing to the state’s legal recognition of the DEK: 
Just like members of all other peoples and races, so too Jews who have 
confessed faith in Jesus Christ and been baptised are members of the 
Christian church. In Germany, Jewish Christians have been, up till now, 
members of the Landeskirchen incorporated into the DEK. As of today, the 
state has not contested that. It has never been made compulsory for the DEK, 
and its associated national churches, to exclude baptised Jews from its 
ranks.77 
 
Althaus did support the teachers’ actions on theological grounds—‘It is essential to 
the Gospel message that the church of God founded by Jesus gathers together people 
of all Völker in the unity of faith and love’—but he ultimately chose to privilege the 
legal argument.78 In the end, the Reich Administrative Court 
[Reichsverwaltungsgericht] reinstated the teachers to their positions, albeit with a 
twenty percent reduction in salary for three years. The teachers, according to 
Mensing, had Althaus to thank for this positive outcome.79 
                                                 
75 Althaus to Kloppenburg, 2. Emphasis in the original.  
76 See Karl Mensing, ‘Bescheinigung,’ August 19, 1947, NA 12.5. 
77 Ibid., 2. Althaus had recommended this defence strategy in his 1942 correspondence to Kloppenburg:  
 
Most likely—I repeat—the juristic argument would have the greatest chance of success: the Jews 
concerned, in accordance with the laws which have long been in effect in Germany, belong to the 
Stephaniegemeinde—and everything else results from this. Then indeed the court can still . . . explain: 
it is a scandal that this law should still apply; Jews may not belong to the churches of the DEK!—but 
nevertheless, the teachers have protection in a legal status that has not yet been repealed (Althaus to 
Kloppenburg, 2. Emphasis in the original).  
 
78 Mensing, ‘Bescheinigung,’ 1.  
79 Ibid., 2.  
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 That Althaus is willing to act on behalf of Jewish Christians, albeit indirectly, 
does not prove, as Lowell Green has intimated, that he is a philosemite.80 What it 
does prove, however, is that Christian attitudes toward Jews are often ambivalent and 
that it was possible for Christian theologians to hold their public denigration of Jews 
and Judaism in tension with their felt Christian obligation to human decency. André 
Fischer has articulated the intrinsic dissonance of Althaus’ theoretical views on the 
‘Jewish Question’ as a tension between ‘fascination with Judaism’ and ‘disgust with 
Judaism.’81 In terms of his practical dealings with Jews, Althaus exhibits a similar 
ability to hold together incongruous theological tendencies: he remains suspicious of 
‘Jews’ as an abstraction but this theological antipathy does not always translate to a 
concrete ethic. In this respect, Althaus is not unlike Karl Barth, who took tangible 
measures to assist Jews despite a personal distaste for them, which he once described 
as an ‘allergic reaction.’82  
More broadly, this dissonance is consistent with what we know about 
rescuers in general. It is difficult to demonstrate a direct causal relationship between 
a rescuer’s worldview and a decision to assist Jews. The common link between 
                                                 
80 See Green, Lutherans Against Hitler, 144–50. 
81 Fischer, Zwischen Zeugnis und Zeitgeist, 534–35.  
82 Barth described it as follows in a letter to Friedrich-Wilhelm Marquardt dated 5 September 1967 [in 
Karl Barth, Letters 1961–1968, ed. and trans. Geoffrey Bromily (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1981), 261–63]:  
 
I am decidedly not a philosemite, in that in personal encounters with living Jews (even Jewish 
Christians) I have always, so long as I can remember, had to suppress a totally irrational aversion, 
naturally suppressing it at once on the basis of all my presuppositions, and concealing it totally in my 
statements, yet still having to suppress and conceal it. Pfui! is all that I can say to this in some sense 
allergic reaction of mine. But this is how it was and is. A good thing that this reprehensible instinct is 
totally alien to my sons and other better people better than myself (including you). But it could have 
had a retrogressive effect on my doctrine of Israel.  
 
Comments such as these certainly complicate Barth’s legacy with respect to his relationship to Jewish persons. 
However, Mark Lindsay has shown that, despite his remarks to Marquardt (and similar remarks to Eberhard 
Bethge), Barth had consistent and sustained contact with Jewish colleagues, was conversant with contemporary 
trends in Jewish philosophy and theology, and took concrete measures to protect Jewish persons fleeing from 
National Socialist persecution, including opening his home to Jewish refugees. See Mark Lindsay, Barth, Israel, 
and Jesus: Karl Barth’s Theology of Israel (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 21–35.  
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rescuers is not necessarily a special concern for Jews, but rather, as Oliner and Oliner 
have shown, ‘their capacity for extensive relationships’—that is, a heightened 
awareness of their personal responsibility to others.83 In Althaus’ case, however, 
there is little evidence that he defended Jews as Jews. In every instance—whether for 
non-Aryan students of theology or for Jewish-Christian families—Althaus intervened 
on the behalf of Christians who happened to be Jewish. In this regard, this episode 
actually serves to illustrate the consistency of Althaus’ theology of the ‘Jewish 
Question.’ His support for Jews as Jews had always been limited, but he had also 
always been open to the possibility of a Jew’s genuine conversion to Christianity.  
CONCLUSION | A TENSION UNRESOLVED  
 Within more sympathetic circles of interpretation, there has been an 
inclination to depict Althaus as a well-meaning but misguided man. Hetzer captures 
this phenomenon succinctly: ‘[Although] Althaus clearly positioned himself 
theologically and politically, there still remains a tendency in the historiography of 
theology after 1945 to see Althaus not as a player in history, but as a victim [Opfer] 
of his own ideas.’84 However, throughout his career he constructed a dialectical—yet 
conscious, sophisticated, and coherent—theology of the ‘Jewish Question’ in which 
Jews perform critical theological functions precisely because of the pathological 
nature of their existence. In many respects, Althaus maintained this dialectical 
                                                 
83 To summarise:  
 
The help [rescuers] extended to Jews was rarely the result of a perception of Jews as particularly 
worthy, but was rather a reflection of their characteristic ways of determining moral values and actions. 
For some rescuers, helping Jews was a matter of heightened empathy for people in pain. For others, it 
was due to internalized norms of social groups to whom they were strongly attached. And for a small 
minority, it was a question of loyalty to overriding autonomous principles rooted in justice or caring.  
 
See Samuel Oliner and Pearl Oliner, The Altruistic Personality: Rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe (New York: 
The Free Press, 1988), 249. 
84 Hetzer, ‘Deutsche Stunde,’ 241.  
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theology even after the Shoah. Indeed, even while he begins to downplay the 
pathology of Jewish existence, Althaus actually intensifies the performative 
dimension of Jews and their scriptures in the pastoral sphere, where Jews continue to 
function as hermeneutical keys for German self-understanding. This performative 
function climaxes in his direct identification of the German and Jewish destinies. 
From the pulpit, Althaus casts Jews (especially as depicted in biblical narratives) as 
fellow travelers of Germans.  
 That Althaus could suspend his abstract theological suspicion of Jews in his 
personal life does not nullify the dialectic of pathology and performance. Moral 
decisions are complex, and it is likely that Althaus, when confronted with the 
demands of his Christian conscience, set aside his public denigration of and personal 
antipathy toward the Jews. Perhaps the most we can say here is that Althaus did not 
resolve this tension in his personal life. There is little evidence of his interaction with 
Jews as Jews, yet it remains the case that he considered baptised Jews as genuine 
neighbors entitled to Christian charity. For our wider purposes, however, this episode 
may indicate that Althaus’ theology of the ‘Jewish Question’ does not always have 
living, breathing Jews as its referent. As both his post-Shoah pastoral works and his 
dogmatic and exegetical writings imply, the idea of Jews and their histories is 
sufficient to fulfill the performative function of Jewish existence without dependence 
on actual Jewish persons. As I now argue below, when Althaus sought to reform his 
dogmatic and exegetical thought in light of the cataclysmic genocide of Europe’s 
Jews by de-emphasising their pathological nature, his theology (perhaps 





CHAPTER VII | THE COLLAPSE OF THE DIALECTIC: DOGMATIC AND EXEGETICAL 
WORKS 
 
In light of this closeness and commonality [between Jews and Christians] it 
is, for Christianity, endlessly puzzling and depressing that Israel, in general, 
has closed itself off from Jesus Christ. With all of its ‘zeal for God’ (Rom. 
10:2), Israel has missed the very thing to which God’s whole history with it 
has been pointing. 
 
Paul Althaus, Der Brief an die Römer (1968) 
 
INTRODUCTION  
After a prolonged encounter with ‘the demons of barbarity,’ immediately 
after the war Althaus called Germans to ‘national penance [deutsche Volksbuße].’1 
Only rarely, however, does he name the victims of his nation’s sins. Still, although 
he has difficulty expressing guilt or responsibility for theological error with 
particularity and in concrete terms, he does seem to have recognised that the 
enterprise of Christian theology and ethics could not simply carry on as it had before. 
Through to the end of his career, Althaus recalled the ‘appalling misuse of all 
patriotic words and ideals’ and the ‘madness’ of the Nazi years.2  
With the dust of the collapse still settling, Althaus acknowledged too that the 
rise and fall of the National Socialist movement necessitated a critical reassessment 
of the state of Christian ethics: ‘Under the impact of the German catastrophe we must 
reappraise our previously represented concepts of state and politics from the ground 
up.’3 Here Althaus seems to gesture toward a radical overhaul of—or at least a sober 
re-examination of—his theological and ethical programme. Yet, as we explore 
below, the extent to which Althaus’ dogmatic formulations of his dialectical theology 
                                                 
1 Althaus, ‘Das Gebot der Stunde,’ 233–36.  
2 See Paul Althaus, ‘Klopfet an. . .’ (18 June 1956), in Die Kraft Christi, 229.  
3 Althaus, Grundriß der Ethik, 2nd ed., 5. Cf. Althaus, ‘Christenheit und Staat,’ 1.  
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of the ‘Jewish Question’ changed after the ‘German catastrophe’—and, with that, 
what continuing purpose contemporary Jews might have—remains unclear.  
ONE | THEOLOGICAL ETHICS AND DOGMATICS 
 
As we have noted above, Althaus sees that Christian ethics, dogmatics, and 
exegesis have been called into question by the events of the National Socialist years. 
The demonic nationalism of the age, compounded by the genocide of Europe’s Jews, 
is, he concedes, cause for self-conscious reflection on the assumptions, aims, and 
methods of Christian theology. Significantly, however, his summons to theological 
reconstruction is not meant as a retraction. Explaining his revisions to the 1953 
edition of Grundriß der Ethik, he is almost defiant on this point:  
Of course, many sections [from earlier editions] do not recur here or have 
been shaped into an entirely new form. This should not be misunderstood as a 
theological confession of guilt [ein theologisches Schuldbekenntnis] in view 
of earlier editions. That which has been omitted from this edition, for 
example, on the doctrine of the Volk, the state, and politics, remains, on the 
whole, something of which I am not ashamed even today—even though it 
may have been somewhat unsatisfactory and one-sided in isolated places.4 
 
In October of that same year, Althaus made a similar comment to Karl Barth in 
response to Barth’s uncharitable appraisal of Althaus’ theology of Volkstum in the 
Church Dogmatics. ‘Perhaps now,’ he writes, ‘I will write a short essay in which I 
show, autobiographically, how I came to accept the concept of the “Volk.” Alas, even 
today I don’t feel any embarrassment about that.’5 
These excerpts are pregnant with implications for Althaus’ ethical enterprise 
after the Shoah. In the first place, we must note that Althaus does acknowledge 
                                                 
4 Althaus, Grundriß der Ethik, 2nd ed., 6. Paul Knitter cites these ‘retractions’ as proof that Althaus 
gradually came to ‘criticise and correct’ his political theology: ‘One cannot emphasise strongly enough that 
Althaus corrected the ideological application of his Uroffenbarungslehre and theology of orders’ (‘Die 
Uroffenbarungslehre,’ 157–59). This claim, I think, overstates the case for reasons that I will argue below.  
5 Paul Althaus to Karl Barth, 25 October 1953, in Paul Althaus, Karl Barth, Emil Brunner: 
Briefwechsel 1922–1966, ed. Gotthard Jasper (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2015), 102–03. Emphasis in 
the original. Hereafter referenced as Briefwechsel.  
 
 193 
(reluctantly) the inadequacy of his prior theological commitments, and there are 
discernible shifts in his ethical thought after 1945.6 In light of this, it is all the more 
significant that, with respect to the ‘Jewish Question,’ he does not quite recant, nor 
does he attempt to offer a more constructive theology of the Volk or of Jews and 
Judaism. Rather, the ‘Jewish Question’—as a clearly defined ethical issue—more or 
less disappears from Althaus’ dogmatic works from this period; explicit theological 
reflection on the meaning of contemporary Jewish existence is scarce in his postwar 
writings. The reason for this, I suggest, is that since Althaus knows he can no longer 
characterise Jewish persons as strains or contagions in a post-Shoah context, he is 
unable to uphold the performative function of Jewish existence because it had always 
been tied to the pathological dimension of Jewish existence. When pathology and 
performance are no longer linked, in other words, the dialectic collapses.  
 In any event, Althaus resumes the task of ethics just where he had during the 
Weimar Republic: within the orders of creation.7 In most respects, his ethical system 
remains unchanged, albeit there is perhaps a more pronounced awareness, with the 
National Socialist years still fresh in his mind, of the orders’ susceptibility to idolatry 
and tyranny.8 In light of his admission to the occasional ‘one-sidedness and 
inadequacy’ of his ethical positions, it is not surprising that Althaus omits any 
explicit reference to the ‘Jewish Question,’ though I argue that he still has the Jews 
partially in view. However, even though he eliminates his earlier theology of the 
Jews from his section on the Volk—which, it seems, is a tacit retraction of his more 
                                                 
6 For instance, Gotthard Jasper has argued that Althaus returned to more orthodox expression of 
Lutheran political ethics after ‘his processing of the experience of the National Socialist catastrophe.’ In 
particular, Althaus no longer speaks as of the state as the guarantor of the Volk’s historical destiny and he 
radically modifies his theology of war toward a more classically Lutheran theory of just war. See ‘Die Zwei-
Reiche-Lehre,’ 49.  
7 See 64–77 above on Althaus’ Leitsätze zur Ethik (1929).  
8 Althaus, Grundriß der Ethik, 2nd ed., 110–12. 
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virulent rhetoric—the ethical framework within which Althaus first constructed his 
theology of the ‘Jewish Question’ remains virtually untouched. In short, the 
problematic theology of the Volk through which Althaus had approached the 
meaning of Jewish existence and the Aryan Paragraph in the first place is still intact. 
The only thing missing is the Jews.  
 As I have argued above, Althaus’ theology of Volkstum proved problematic 
as he coped with the question of the implementation of the Aryan Paragraph in the 
DEK. By rooting one’s national belonging in the ‘primal origination’ [Urzeugung] of 
the Volk, Althaus had alienated pastors of Jewish descent by definition. Even as he 
writes in fascism’s destructive wake, however, Althaus continues to locate Volkstum 
in ‘commonality of soil [Gemeinsamkeit des Bodens], that is, of living-space 
[Lebensraum], and of blood,’ despite the ways in which these concepts had been 
toxified by Nazi ideology. The result is once again the exclusive ‘we-consciousness’ 
[Wir-Bewußtsein] of the Volk, a concept he had developed in the 1930s.9 Althaus 
here approaches the question of belonging and loyalty within the same theological 
matrix of ‘ethnic classification’ [die Gliederung der Menschheit in Völker] he had 
always used, as if nothing had changed.   
 The Konfliktgesetz is also implied here again, though the concept seems to 
have been sapped of some of its pathos: in a shift in emphasis from his earlier work, 
he stresses the tragedy of ethnic segregation over its grandeur.10 What is especially 
striking, though, is that Althaus can persist in assuming a homogenous and static 
concept of the German Volk—indeed of any Volk!—given the massive migration 
                                                 
9 Ibid., 124. Compare identical language in Völker vor und nach Christus (1937), 5–6.  
10 Ibid., 124–25. Cf. Althaus, Grundriß der Dogmatik, 4th ed. (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1958), where 
Althaus stresses that the Kampfes-, Verdrängungs-, and Todesgesetzes are consequences of sin, though they are 
also a means of God’s grace (177–80). See also Die christliche Wahrheit: Lehrbuch der Dogmatik, vol. 2 
(Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1948), where Althaus connects conflict with the tragedy of human transience (187–88).  
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within Europe that had begun before his lifetime and had intensified during and after 
the Second World War. This tendency, perhaps, most clearly reveals the extent to 
which Althaus’ Germany was an ‘imagined community’ all along.11 Yet on the 
whole he continues to situate the Volk within an essentialising racial taxonomy that 
remains unmodified after the Shoah.12  
This unmodified ethical framework yields the same theology of the church 
with which Althaus had addressed the Aryan Paragraph in 1933. He had 
recommended that Jews be restrained from pastoral office on the basis of a 
segregationist ecclesial model that is still in place twenty years later. The logic of the 
Erlangen Opinion remains discernible:  
. . . in its proclamation and embodiment the church seeks to enter into the 
type [Art] and organic life-form of the Volk. For the sake of this task of the 
church, it makes sense and is correct for the church to structure itself in 
alignment with the classification of humanity into peoples and states in the 
form of folk-churches. . . . The dangers of such an arrangement do not mean 
that it is not correct.13 
 
The danger to which Althaus alludes is the total insulation of folk-churches. As a 
safeguard against this danger he invokes ecumenical association, just as he had 
during the National Socialist years.14 Although ‘classification and segregation’ 
[Gliederung und Sonderung] are the natural rules according to which individual 
church communities develop, Althaus emphasises the catholicity of the church 
                                                 
11 The concept is Benedict Anderson’s. See Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and 
Spread of Nationalism, revised edition (London: Verso, 2006).  
12 See Althaus, Grundriß der Ethik, 2nd ed., 127–29. It must be noted that, later in the text, Althaus 
recognises that all human beings share a common origin ‘in Adam.’ That is to say, there is a unity of humanity 
that transcends ‘the limits of biological type’ rooted in humanity’s relationship to, and estrangement from, God 
(156–67). Cf. Althaus, Die christliche Wahrheit, vol. 2, where he affirms the fundamental unity of the human 
race, but also points to the ‘fact’ that the peoples are, spiritually speaking, ‘foreign from one another and far from 
one another’ (86–87).   
13 Althaus, Grundriß der Ethik, 2nd ed., 169. Cf. Althaus, Grundriß der Dogmatik, 4th ed., 237–40. Just 
as the human race has a fundamental unity but is nevertheless divided into peoples, so the church shares a 
spiritual catholicity but is divided into individual churches and confessions. See Die christliche Wahrheit, vol. 2, 
305–07.  
14 See 120–22 above.  
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universal—yet not through ethnically-integrated churches but through ‘brotherly 
community’ between self-contained folk-churches.15 This ecclesial model—wherein 
the church is still implicitly subordinated to the Volk and which left no room for 
pastors of Jewish descent in pulpits of the DEK—is supported also by Althaus’ 
exegetical work of the postwar era.16 
 But here the ‘Jewish Question’ is most conspicuous by its absence; Althaus 
makes no direct reference to the unique problems posed by Jewish existence in the 
1953 edition. However, I suggest that Althaus still has the Jews in view as he 
comments on the ‘imperative of loyalty to the Volk’:  
We are to cultivate and pass on [the life of the Volk that God has entrusted to 
us]. We bear responsibility for the physical and spiritual inheritance of our 
Volk. We are obligated, as much as we can, to preserve its biological health 
[Gesundheit] and to struggle against the danger [Gefahr] of its biological 
degeneration . . . [we bear the responsibility] to cultivate its language, type, 
and customs, so long as they are healthy, as well as to fend off licentious 
foreign infiltration [willkürliche Überfremdung].17 
 
Althaus here joins the concept of Überfremdung—which he had associated explicitly 
with Jews during the Weimar era—to pathological language (Gesundheit) to trigger 
rhetorical associations with Jews. In so doing, he continues to share an antisemitic 
vocabulary used by National Socialist propagandists to justify ethnic cleansing.18 
Thus in his clearest articulation of the task of Christian ethics after the German 
                                                 
15 Althaus, Grundriß der Ethik, 2nd ed., 173.  
16 Compare Hermann Wolfgang Beyer, Der Brief an die Galater, ed. Paul Althaus, Das Neue 
Testament Deutsch 3, ed. Paul Althaus and Gerhard Friedrich (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1962): ‘To 
the extent that the church itself is an ordinance, naturally it must respect the differences between people’ (31–32). 
Here Beyer and Althaus reproduce Althaus’ earlier arguments that spiritual unity in Christ does not abolish 
biological or societal differences between persons outside the walls of the church.  
17 Althaus, Grundriß der Ethik, 2nd ed., 125. On the threat of Jewish Überfremdung, See Althaus 
‘Kirche und Volkstum,’ 116 and Althaus, ‘Gott und Volk,’ 100. In Leitsätze zur Ethik, Althaus had depicted the 
Jews as ‘the predominate force in the struggle against the historical ties, customs, and traditions of our people’ 
(54). At the conclusion of §36 (‘Das Volk’) of the second edition of Grundriß der Ethik, Althaus recommends 
‘Kirche und Volkstum,’ ‘Gott und Volk,’ and Völker vor und nach Christus for further reading.  
18 The word fremd and its cognates, including Überfremdung, had figured predominately in Nazi 
propaganda. See Robert Michael and Karin Doerr, eds., Nazi-Deutsch/Nazi German: An English Lexicon of the 
Language of the Third Reich (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002), 403.  
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catastrophe, Althaus hints at the lingering danger posed by the Jews, but he no longer 
mentions the constructive promise that he had formerly linked with that danger.  
TWO | EXEGETICAL WORKS 
The predominance of Althaus’ most strident statements on the ‘Jewish 
Question’ had always appeared in the context of situational works: sermons, 
speeches, and essays of social commentary. During the Weimar and National 
Socialist eras, Althaus connected his views of contemporary Judaism to biblical 
exegesis and dogmatic formulation only in isolated instances, but his dialectical 
approach to the question in his situational writings was always animated by scriptural 
exegesis. In the section below we investigate whether and how his views on the 
nature and purpose of Jewish existence change in his postwar works of exegesis. We 
can discern in the textual evidence traces of Althaus’ dialectic of pathology and 
performance after the Shoah, yet those traces grow faint by the end of his career. In 
these materials, Althaus reconsiders exegetical tropes that are openly denigrating of 
Jewish persons while leaving untouched the problematic assumptions about Jewish 
existence behind those tropes. Yet whereas the performative function of Jews and 
their scriptures remains clear in Althaus’ pastoral context, as we have seen, the 
dialectic of pathology and performance collapses in his exegetical writings.  
 Althaus published the first edition of Der Brief an die Römer in 1932. As we 
have seen, in this commentary he depicts Israel’s spiritual history in ways that are at 
once consistent with classical Christian exegesis and yet deeply antisemitic. It is in 
an excursus to his commentary on Romans 9–11 that der ewige Jude first appears to 
disrupt the peace and interrupt the ethnic solidarity of his host societies.19 A great 
                                                 
19 See 93–94 above. 
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deal had transpired between the first edition of the commentary and a revised version 
released in 1962—not least the genocide of Jews in Europe. Althaus is of course 
aware of this, but at this point he does not appear to consider the Shoah as an impetus 
for a re-evaluation of his exegetical approach to the ‘Jewish Question.’ The excursus 
on Romans 9–11 is retained almost verbatim in the 1962 edition. Althaus considers 
the ‘Jewish Question’ an unresolved issue even after the war, and he still 
problematises what is left of the Jewish presence in Germany as a riddle.20 Likewise, 
the ‘eternal Jew’ continues to wander the earth, plaguing the nations as an ‘open 
wound.’21 Althaus’ views are especially alarming in context as he characterises 
Jewish existence as pathological and viscerally repulsive nearly twenty years after 
the Shoah.  
 However, Althaus revised the commentary heavily between the 1962 and the 
1968 editions, as Martin Meiser has noted.22 In the 1968 edition, which was 
published posthumously, the excursus has been redacted dramatically. This revised 
exegetical work reflects his growing awareness of the problematic nature of some of 
his prior comments on the ‘Jewish Question.’ The most striking feature of this 
edition is therefore its omissions, as Althaus has removed explicitly pathological 
language. The Jews are no longer maligned as parasitic. Moreover, he now shows 
consciousness of Christianity’s troubled relationship to Judaism:  
Paul’s pain over Israel is at the same time the sorrow of Christianity as a 
whole. With shame Christianity will confess that it, as the witness to Jesus 
                                                 
20 Paul Althaus, Der Brief an die Römer, Das Neue Testament Deutsch 3, ed. Paul Althaus and Gerhard 
Friedrich (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1962), 88, 111.  
21 Ibid., 111. The language also appears in the 1959 edition. See Paul Althaus, Der Brief an die Römer, 
Das Neue Testament Deutsch 6, ed. Paul Althaus and Gerhard Friedrich (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
1959), 111.  
22 See Martin Meiser, Paul Althaus als Neutestamentler: Eine Untersuchung der Werke, Briefe, 
Unveröffentlichten Manuskripte und Randbemerkungen, Calwer Theologische Monographien A:15 (Stuttgart: 
Calwer Verlag, 1993), 239–40.  
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Christ, is complicit [Mitschuld trägt] in Israel’s closedness [to Christ] on 
account of its conduct toward the Jewish Volk.23 
 
Christian attitudes are judged problematic insofar as they prevent Jews from 
becoming Christians, but Althaus stops short of a full recognition of the harmful 
effects of Christian anti-Judaism. As Meiser observes, ‘Christian complicity for the 
unbelief of Israel is admitted, but he does not admit that Christian anti-Judaism 
prepared the way for the Holocaust.’24 At the same time, Althaus’ anguish over the 
puzzling reprobation of Israel signals an intensified focus of the mysterious 
relationship between Jews and Christians.  
 In the 1968 edition of Der Brief an die Römer Althaus exposits the 
connection between Israel and the church more extensively than elsewhere in his 
writings. Here again, though, he continues to identify the Jews as a riddle to be 
solved. As before, he argues that all secular attempts to deal with the ‘Jewish 
Question’ will fail because Judaism can only be understood in light of its fulfillment 
in Christianity:  
It has been forgotten for a long time that the Jews must be seen with different 
eyes than all other peoples, not only as ‘world-Jewry’ [Weltjudentum] but as 
‘Israel,’ the Volk which God has called to and gifted with a distinctive history 
with Jesus Christ, with the Gospel, and with the church.25 
 
But who is Israel? Althaus here distinguishes between Weltjudentum—the secular 
Jewry that is a threat to other peoples—and Israel, the people whose history is critical 
for Christians. Here, it seems to me, Althaus takes care not to conflate what he sees 
as dangerous secular Jews with the salvation-historical entity of Israel, with whom 
the church is bound. But it is precisely the spiritual kinship between Jews and 
                                                 
23 Althaus, Römer (1968), 122.  
24 Meiser, Paul Althaus als Neutestamentler, 240.  
25 Althaus, Römer (1968), 121.  
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Christians that makes the ‘Jewish Question’ so bedeviling. Even in the face of 
obvious theological disagreements, Christianity and Judaism are blood-relatives: 
Jesus and the apostles were Jews, Christianity began as a Jewish movement, and 
Jews and Christians share common scriptures and pray to the same God. ‘We are 
insolubly bound together with Israel,’26 he claims—and yet Jews and Christians 
remain estranged. At any rate, for the first time Althaus stresses solidarity between 
Jews and Christians.  
 But despite Althaus’ efforts to repair the antisemitic elements of his 
exegetical writings, he lapses reflexively into the anti-Judaic discourse he had used 
for nearly four decades. For example, he persists in depicting Jews as antagonists in 
the story of salvation-history: 
In light of this closeness and commonality [between Jews and Christians] it is 
for Christianity endlessly puzzling and depressing [unendlich rätselvoll und 
bedrückend] that Israel, in general, has closed itself off from Jesus Christ. 
With all of its ‘zeal for God’ (Rom. 10:2), Israel has missed the very thing to 
which God’s whole history with it has been pointing.27 
 
These comments cohere with his hermeneutical approach to Jewish religious practice 
in general. As Meiser has shown, Althaus’ attitudes toward Jewish law are 
consistently negative. With reference to Hermann Wolfgang Beyer’s commentary on 
Galatians, which Althaus re-worked after Beyer’s death, Meiser writes that the two 
scholars ‘confuse Pharisaical piety with its caricature’:  
Beyer and Althaus know that Paul was bound to a ministry of Jewish 
conversion out of love for his own Jewish Volk, but they do not draw any 
implications for the theological appraisal of Jewish piety from that fact; 
Jewish piety instead appears essentially as self-assertion against God 
[Selbstbehauptung gegen Gott], as compulsion, and as pure externalism 
[reine Äußerlichkeit].28 
 
                                                 
26 Ibid., 121–22.  
27 Ibid.  
28 See Meiser, Paul Althaus als Neutestamentler, 331–33. The commentary in question is Beyer, Der 
Brief an die Galater, ed. Paul Althaus (1962). See footnote 16 above. 
 
 201 
In their confusion about the nature of true piety, Jews fulfill yet another didactic 
function by testifying (unknowingly) to the futility of misplaced ‘zeal for God.’ The 
Law itself, then, is for Althaus a distortion of the ‘divine command’—that is, of 
God’s original directive to humanity. Through the Fall, the command to love God 
and neighbor has devolved into a convoluted system of prohibitions.29 Though the 
Old Testament does have value for Christians, the legalism of Jewish spirituality 
remains a constant threat to disfigure the Gospel with its pedantic hair-splitting.30 
 This chimerical (mis)characterisation of Jewish piety is part of Althaus’ 
wider hermeneutical strategy within which the Old Testament is retained on account 
of its positive theological significance but is at the same time regarded with a certain 
apprehension.31 In this respect, the Jewish scriptures again parallel the function of 
Jewish persons. As in his earlier writings, Althaus basically affirms the place of the 
Old Testament as Christian scripture, as he always had done, though he does so with 
a degree of ambivalence. Jesus himself, he argues, both accepted and rejected the 
authority of the Old Testament. So too with the New Testament writers Paul and 
John, who simultaneously denounce the legalism of the Old Testament and yet claim 
it as Christian scripture. But this ambiguity surrounding the authority of the Old 
Testament for Christians is due to the book’s conflicting nature: 
It becomes the holy book of Christians and remains the holy book of anti-
Christian Judaism [antichristliches Judentums]. . . . The true understanding of 
the book is disputed by both. Israel stands against Jesus on the ground of the 
Old Testament; Christianity stands by Jesus with the Old Testament and 
stands by the Old Testament with Jesus. This is only possible because, 
                                                 
29 Althaus thus makes a threefold distinction: Command—Law—Gospel. Law is a postlapsarian 
disfiguration of the Divine Command. The Gospel then frees the Divine Command from the entanglements of the 
Law and restores it. See Althaus, The Divine Command, especially 12–21.  
30 See Paul Althaus, Die christliche Wahrheit: Lehrbuch der Dogmatik, vol. 1 (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 
1947), 241–45.  
31 For Althaus the Old Testament’s relationship to Christian faith and practice is threefold: it exercises 




religiously speaking, the Old Testament is no unified book, but actually bears 
conflict within itself and is at war with itself [mit sich selber kämpft].32 
 
Thus for Althaus it is Christians and not Jews who know how to decipher the 
enigmatic prophecies of the Hebrew scriptures.33 This is in part because the Old 
Testament (unlike its Greek counterpart) is a mysterious admixture of divine truth 
and human error. Though the prophets, for instance, testify to the Gospel hidden 
within the Law, ‘there are parts of the canon in which we hear only the voice of a 
man, the speech of Judas.’34 The provocative allusion to Judas is striking but not 
surprising, as Althaus had earlier argued that, at its worst, the Old Testament 
demonstrates ‘an expression of humanity which erected the cross of Christ.’35 
For all its dangers, however, the Old Testament remains indispensable not 
only for Christians, but for Germans as well. Even though, in a historical sense, the 
narratives belong exclusively to the people of Israel, the Hebrew Scriptures reach 
into the present:  
This God of the Old Testament, through the witness of the chroniclers and 
prophets, brings us before himself as our God, the God of primal revelation, 
the one living God of all humanity. Through the account of a bygone folk-
history [vergangene Volksgeschichte], which is not ours, we are seized by the 
reality of the one God, who is present for each person and in every time and 
who deals with us today in our own history.36 
 
Even though ‘non-Jews’ [Nicht-Juden] are free from the parochial laws of Israel, 
they are bound to an existential decision before the God to whom the laws attest. 
                                                 
32 Althaus, Grundriß der Dogmatik, 4th ed., 68. Althaus had spoken of the conflicted nature of the Old 
Testament nearly identical terms in 1927’s ‘Kirche und Volkstum.’ Cf. Althaus, ‘Das Alte Testament,’ 14f.  
33 ‘We Christians, in our faith in Jesus as the Christ, are certain that the Jewish Volk’s “No” to Jesus in 
the name of the Old Testament is also a “No” to the actual truth of the Old Testament’ (Grundriß der Dogmatik, 
4th ed., 68). Althaus had made similar arguments in ‘Die Frage des Evangeliums an das moderne Judentum’ 
(1930).  
34 Althaus, Die christliche Wahrheit, vol. 1, 243. Elsewhere, Althaus remarks that ‘late Judaism had to 
no small extent surrendered the prophetic heritage and had become a religion of law—one which in many ways 
anticipated the features of Roman legalism’ (The Divine Command, 19–20).  
35 Althaus, Die christliche Wahrheit, vol. 1, 233.  
36 Althaus, Grundriß der Dogmatik, 4th ed., 69. Emphasis in the original.  
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Here as before, Althaus alludes to the performative function of Jewish scripture, by 
which Christians in general and Germans in particular can interpret their own 
experience.37 The figures of the Old Testament have pastoral significance as fellow 
travelers on the way of faith who illustrate what life under God’s ‘tutelage’ is like.38 
This performative capacity remains critical for pastoral reasons, but the ongoing 
dogmatic significance of Judaism or Jewish persons is far less certain.  
Indeed, by referencing the ‘bygone’ folk-history of Israel, Althaus hints at the 
inertness of contemporary Jewish practice. In a memorable phrase, he declares that 
‘Christ is the end of the Messiah’ [Christus ist auch des Messias Ende], by which he 
means that Jesus of Nazareth has confounded Israel’s misplaced expectations and 
frustrated its nationalistic aspirations.39 By this logic, the Jews, having fundamentally 
misunderstood their divine vocation, have also missed the climax of their own 
history. Though the Jews will once more reckon with Jesus Christ in an 
undetermined eschatological future, their existence is deprived of purpose in the 
meantime. This kind of exegesis rests on a deeply anti-Judaic assumption: that, since 
its rejection of Jesus, Judaism has been stripped of its telos.  
In a significant shift in emphasis from the earlier editions of his Romans 
commentary, Althaus therefore intimates that it is only in relationship to 
Christianity—that is, as Christianity’s basis—that Judaism performs any constructive 
function. Christians do continue to wait for the miraculous ‘home-coming’ of Israel, 
but meanwhile the church has replaced Israel as the active player in God’s plan of 
salvation.40 Whereas the 1932 edition of the Romans commentary had emphasised 
                                                 
37 See 128–38 above.  
38 Althaus, Die christliche Wahrheit, vol. 1, 229, 240–41.  
39 Althaus, Grundriß der Dogmatik, 4th ed., 72–73. Cf. Althaus, Die christliche Wahrheit,  
vol. 1, 230–32.  
40 Althaus, Römer (1968), 122.  
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the threefold performative function of the Jews—to symbolise the openness of 
history, to disrupt the ethnic solidarity and segregation of their host societies, and to 
witness prophetically to the coming Kingdom of God—Althaus drops that line of 
argumentation from the 1968 edition. The church now fulfills the tasks originally 
intended for Israel in every respect:  
Whatever is finally valid for Israel is fulfilled in Jesus Christ and his church 
both now and in the end [jetzt und am Ende]. After Jesus Christ, Israel no 
longer occupies the place of the one people of God amongst and for the sake 
of the peoples of the world. The people of God is now, as Paul testifies, 
Christianity made up of Jews and non-Jews. Israel’s salvation-historical 
vocation for which it was elected has now been transferred to Christ and his 
church as the true Israel. Israel as a Volk, according to the witness of the 
apostle Paul, has its salvation-future [Heilszukunft], but it no longer has any 
special salvation-historical mission.41 
 
Though his exegesis had always implied that the church has taken over the 
role of Israel, Althaus had previously equivocated on the question of total 
supersessionism: Israel’s history is unique and there are ‘indirect’ functions that 
Israel alone continues to perform in the sphere of salvation-history. Here, however, 
the church is able to fulfill all of Israel’s functions. The effect is that Israel, once 
divested of the admittedly problematic vocations that Althaus had assigned to it in 
earlier iterations of his exegetical work, is essentially deprived of any constructive 
purpose. That is to say, Althaus cannot conceive of Judaism as a living religion with 
any positive value in its own right. Meiser puts it succinctly: ‘Judaism is seen only as 
a historical counterpart to Paul, but not as a present and living counterpart to 
contemporary Christianity.’42  
                                                 
41 Ibid., 123. Althaus had characterised the church as the ‘true Israel of God’ in earlier editions of the 
commentary, but he had always maintained that Israel retains an indirect eschatological function that the church 
does not share.  
42 Meiser, Paul Althaus als Neutestamentler, 333. Compare the comments of Charlotte Klein on this 
Christian hermeneutical tendency: ‘Theologians are scarcely aware of how far their theories, views, and attitudes 
have influenced and continue to influence Christians in their relations with Jews alive today. . . . But in the purely 
theological-exegetical works Jews and Judaism are discussed now as before as if they formed an abstract 
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Specifically, Althaus argues that large sections of the Hebrew Scriptures exist 
only as a backdrop against which the Gospel can shine: ‘[These texts] have no 
positive purpose for Christianity, but only the negative purpose of a foil and a 
counter-play [Folie und Widerspiel] to the Gospel.’43 I have argued above that in 
Althaus’ thought the purpose of Jewish persons mirrors the purpose of Jewish 
scripture. If I am right about that, then it follows that Jews themselves have been 
reduced to inanimate foils that exist only to cast the liberating truth of Christianity 
into sharper relief. In other words, Judaism is in its death throes; it is decaying, but 
has just vitality enough to poison Christians with its fatal legalism. In this way, 
Althaus’ articulation of the religious history of Israel actually doubles as Judaism’s 
eulogy.  
CONCLUSION | JUDAISM TRAPPED BETWEEN LIFE AND DEATH 
 Of course, Althaus is not the first Christian theologian to sentence Judaism to 
a living death. Many had already condemned the Jews to the zombielike existence 
captured vividly in Friedrich Schleiermacher’s unforgettable image of Judaism as an 
‘unverweslichen Mumie,’ an embalmed corpse ‘long since dead’ yet resistant to 
decomposition.44 Over a century later, Martin Niemöller picked up where 
Schleiermacher left off: ‘[The Jewish people] can neither live nor die, because it is 
under a curse that forbids it to do either.’45 So too here: even when Althaus appears 
to redact overtly antisemitic exegesis in light of concrete crimes against Jewish 
persons, he has difficulty articulating what continuing purpose Jews might have. This 
                                                 
something, existing in a vacuum, and not as a living factor in the world today; not as if it were a question of 
millions of human beings living among us’ (Anti-Judaism in Christian Theology, 13). 
43 Althaus, Die christliche Wahrheit, vol. 1, 233.  
44 Friedrich Schleiermacher, Über die Religion: Reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern (1799; 
repr., Berlin: Deutsche Bibliothek, 1900), 209. See also Amy Newman, ‘The Death of Judaism in German 
Protestant Thought from Luther to Hegel,’ Journal of the American Academy of Religion 61:3 (1993). 
45 Niemöller’s sermon excerpt is reproduced in Gutteridge, Open Thy Mouth, 103–4.  
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trend illustrates just how intimately pathology is linked to performance in Althaus’ 
dialectical theology of the ‘Jewish Question.’ Because he no longer speaks of the 
danger of Jewish existence as he had in earlier editions of Der Brief an die Römer, he 
can no longer speak of the constructive theological functions that result from that 
danger.  
 After the Shoah, Althaus realised that it was untenable to continue to 
characterise Jewish persons as perpetually displaced irritants or secularising 
contagions, but he can find no alternative productive purpose for Judaism except as 
to serve passively as the root of the Christian faith and to wait for its ‘final history 
with Jesus Christ.’46 His theology of the ‘Jewish Question’ had once been complex, 
but in its place emerges the bland and unsophisticated anti-Judaism characteristic of 
his era.47 The final product, I suggest, is a theology in which the Jews only truly live 
on the pages of scripture and in the Christian imagination. This exegetical 
development manifests, as we have seen, also in Althaus’ postwar preaching, where 
the story of Israel—but not necessarily Jewish persons themselves—provide a key 
constructive resource for Christian and German self-understanding. In the final 
analysis, despite Althaus’ efforts to decode the meaning of their existence through 
his dialectic, the Jews remain a riddle unsolved: absent pathology, the dialectic 
collapses. Hence contemporary Jewish persons are neither pathological nor 
performative, but only ‘endlessly puzzling and depressing.’ But if he no longer 
roams the earth as der ewige Jude, it is unclear exactly what an actual Jew does.
                                                 
46 Althaus, Römer (1968), 122.  
47 For a representative work, see Martin Noth, ‘The Rejection of Christ,’ in The History of Israel 
(London: A&C Black, 1960). Noth theorises that with the destruction of the Temple in 70 CE, ‘Israel thereby 
ceased to exist and the history of Israel came to an end’ (439).  
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MOVEMENT IV: ALTHAUS AND THE CHALLENGE OF (PSEUDO-)LUTHERAN ETHICS 
 
SECTION IV INTRODUCTION | THE IRONIES OF ALTHAUSIAN THEOLOGY 
The ‘unmastered trauma’ of the Shoah is a reality that has confronted, and 
continues to confront, both Jewish and Christian faith.1 The extent to which the 
genocide of European Jews demands a total reconstruction, or deconstruction, of 
Christian claims about God and his relationship to the Jewish people remains open 
for debate.2 For Althaus, though, the demonic idolisation of the Volk and monstrous 
crimes against the Jews did not prove forceful enough motivation to reinvent his 
theological system. To quote the blunt analysis of Walther Mann: though Althaus 
might have changed minor details by the end of his career, his mature theology of the 
orders of creation is built essentially of ‘the same old stuff.’3  
As for the ‘Jewish Question’ in particular: the results of Althaus’ efforts to 
‘take back’ [zurücknehmen] his harmful theological constructs are mixed. Though he 
does surrender the most obviously antisemitic of his theological tropes, as we have 
seen, the dialectic of pathology and performance remains largely intact in the 
postwar years. Althaus maintains the dialectic more strongly in the pastoral sphere, 
though he de-emphasises the pathological pole while simultaneously intensifying the 
performative promise of the Jewish story for German self-understanding. In his 
works of dogmatics and exegesis, though, he eventually comes to relinquish the 
pathological dimension of Jewish existence almost completely. In so doing, however, 
                                                 
1 The language is Richard Rubenstein’s. See After Auschwitz: History, Theology, and Contemporary 
Judaism, 2nd ed. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 81–122.  
2 For a helpful survey on both Jewish and Christian responses to the Shoah as a theological event, see 
‘Facing the Tremendum (I): The Shoah and Modern Jewish Thought,’ and ‘Facing the Tremendum (II): The 
Shoah in Modern Christian Thought,’ in Mark Lindsay, Reading Auschwitz with Barth: The Holocaust as 
Problem and Promise for Barthian Theology, Princeton Theological Monograph Series (Eugene, OR: Pickwick 
Publications, 2014). 
3 Walther Mann, Ordnungen der Allmacht: Paul Althaus der Jüngere über die Ordnungen, Arbeiten zur 
Geshichte und Theologie des Luthertums 7 (Hannover: Lutherisches Verlagshaus, 1987), 135–36. 
 
 208 
he simultaneously eliminates the telos of contemporary Jewish experience along with 
it.  
 At the same time, there is a certain dissonance by which Althaus could 
suspend his theological mistrust of and personal distaste for Jewish persons when his 
Christian conscience demanded it. Though Althaus, so far as I can tell, seems only to 
advocate for Christian Jews and not for Jews as such, his personal life reflects a 
similar ambivalence to his public remarks regarding the ‘Jewish Question.’ I suspect 
that his personal engagement with living Jewish persons (such as Jewish theology 
students in Erlangen) may be a faint indication of an underlying promise in his 
theology that has been obscured its more explicitly anti-Jewish elements. The very 
fact that Althaus’ approach to Jewish existence is dialectical means that his theology 
could have taken a less xenophobic shape. In other words, it is the very ambivalence 
of his theology of the ‘Jewish Question’ that suggests it could have been performed 
otherwise.  
In chapter eight, I argue not only that the radically ethno-centric theology that 
Althaus ultimately enacted is not a necessary and inevitable outcome of Lutheran 
ethics, but also that it is not a necessary and inevitable outcome of Althausian ethics. 
Namely, I mean that Althaus’ theology itself possesses mechanisms to prevent a 
dangerous over-emphasis on the ordinances of Volk and nation: specifically, a sober 
grasp of the sinfulness and the penultimate nature of the orders. Where Althaus 
overrides these mechanisms, he does so against his better judgment. The crowning 
irony of his dialectical theology of the ‘Jewish Question’ is that Althaus considers 
the Jews themselves as the means to prevent the idolisation of the Volk. Nevertheless, 
it must be said that even while Althaus sometimes does use the theology of the orders 
of creation [Schöpfungsordnungslehre] to envision trans-national ecclesial and civil 
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communities, he just as often deploys the doctrine in support of a segregated societal 
structure, as he does, for instance, in the Erlangen Opinion on the Aryan Paragraph.  
On this account, some critics—chiefly Karl Barth—have seen the doctrine as 
irredeemable, an example of the intrinsic weakness of Lutheran social ethics. This 
claim is debatable. But if we are to gesture toward the repair of the 
Schöpfungsordnungslehre, we will need to look beyond Althaus to do it. The extent 
to which Althausian theology has the capacity to ‘make good again’ 
[wiedergutmachen] is, in the end, severely limited. Yet as I argue below, there are 
resources within the Lutheran tradition—specifically in the thought of Althaus’ 
contemporaries Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Rudolf Bultmann, and Hermann Sasse—to 
configure the doctrine of creation in such a way as to combat the ethnic 

















CHAPTER VIII | SELF-DEFEATING TENDENCIES IN THE ALTHAUSIAN THEOLOGY OF 
VOLK 
 
While Althaus certainly knows otherwise—that is, about what the Lutheran 
concept of vocation really means—he formulates the concept of ethnic-
vocation in such a way that the purest representative of romantic 
individualism could not have expressed it any more pristinely. 
 
Emil Brunner, Das Gebot und die Ordnungen (1932) 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 Any attempt to rehabilitate Althaus’ legacy is to some extent also an attempt 
to rehabilitate Lutheran political and social ethics. As critics have pointed out, the 
widespread failure of the German churches to overcome the jingoism and 
antisemitism of the Third Reich may signal a weakness intrinsic to Lutheran 
theology itself. Yet it was Ernst Troeltsch—writing decades before Hitler, the 
Kirchenkampf, and the Shoah—who impugned Lutheran social teaching most 
poignantly for its ‘patriarchal-agrarian’ ethic that ‘glorifies authority for its own 
sake.’ From the beginning, argues Troeltsch, Lutheranism had been totally dependent 
on the prevailing political power, ‘like some frail sapling.’4 As a result, its theology 
manifests in a social ethics with no critical apparatus—what Troeltsch calls the 
‘social impotence of Lutheranism.’5 The Lutheranism Troeltsch depicts, defined by 
feeble quietism and slavish obedience to authority, is the version most vulnerable to 
criticism. Indeed, it is striking how prescient his critiques can seem in retrospect, as 
the events of the 1930s and 1940s exposed Lutheranism at its most flawed. At first 
blush, Althaus seems to fit Troeltsch’s caricature of Lutheranism almost exactly—
                                                 
4 See Ernst Troeltsch, The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches, vol. 2, trans. Olive Wyon 
(London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1931), 516, 529–30, 542–45. The German edition, Soziallehren der 
christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen, appeared in 1912.  
5 For Troeltsch, this ‘yielding spirit’ is at the very core of Lutheran thought. See ibid., 568.  
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especially in that by glorifying the life of the Volk Althaus appears to have 
‘submit[ted] unconditionally to the external life of [his] political sphere.’6 
ONE | CHALLENGING A TROELTSCHIAN CLICHÉ  
 It is possible, on the other hand, that Althaus (and the tradition to which he 
belongs) may have been the victims of ‘clichéd thinking,’ owing largely to 
Troeltsch’s influence.7 Althaus in particular is something of an easy target for those 
who are already predisposed to suspicion of Lutheran theology, which is why he has 
been subject to so much criticism in Barthian circles. As Karlmann Beyschlag has 
noted astutely, Althaus has often been treated as a ‘symbolic figure for all that is 
theologically objectionable and politically reprehensible.’ This, in turn, means that he 
has been chronically misunderstood.8  
 However, here I argue that the critical breakdown in Althaus’ socio-political 
theology generally—but especially his theology of the Volk as set within his doctrine 
of the orders of creation—poses a real problem for Lutheran ethics, but it does not 
represent a fatal flaw. The shape that his Schöpfungsordnungslehre took is but one 
permutation among several Lutheran (and Reformed) options; nevertheless, it is an 
expression of Lutheran thinking with which the Lutheran theologian must reckon.9 
                                                 
6 Ibid., 516. Friedrich Mildenberger, in his exposition of the Lutheran Confessions, also admits that the 
Augsburg Confession lends itself to ‘a strong affirmation of the world and its actual structures.’ For 
Mildenberger, this is an unfortunate byproduct of the apologetic tone of the document, drafted by Melanchthon to 
distance Lutherans from other Protestant movements, especially the Anabaptists, who were threatening the civil 
order. See Theology of the Lutheran Confessions, ed. Robert C. Schultz, trans. Erwin L. Lueker (Philadelphia, 
PA: Fortress Press, 1986), 126–27. 
7 In his careful study, Uwe Siemon-Netto has sought to overturn clichéd readings of Lutheran theology 
(such as that of Troeltsch), showing historical examples where Lutherans resisted unjust authority not in spite of 
but rather on the basis of their Lutheran convictions. See The Fabricated Luther: The Rise and Fall of the Shirer 
Myth (St. Louis, MO: Concordia Publishing House, 1995).  
8 Beyschlag, Die Erlanger Theologie, 183.  
9 For an account of Althaus’ theology of the orders of creation within the context of its development 
and reception within the wider Lutheran tradition, see Mann’s Ordnungen der Allmacht. Mann’s study shows the 
diverse ways in which Lutheran theologians have interpreted the doctrine, especially since the so-called ‘Luther 
Renaissance’ at the turn of the twentieth century. Mann also wrestles with the doctrine’s entanglement with 
National Socialist ideology, concluding ultimately that the doctrine had developed long before the emergence of 
the party’s race platform. Nevertheless, it is possible, even likely, that the doctrine could have developed ‘into a 
National Socialist theology of the orders, or something like it’ (57).  
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With the benefit of hindsight, we know that Althaus’ theology of the orders could not 
withstand the ethical challenges posed by the Third Reich, but it also drew criticism 
from Althaus’ contemporaries at the time. Some proposals for the doctrine’s 
reconfiguration came from unlikely sources, especially the Swiss Reformed 
theologian Emil Brunner, but Althaus’ fellow Lutherans also offered compelling 
alternatives that do not show the same vulnerability to xenophobic distortion. 
With that said, however, I further argue that Althaus is already aware of the 
ever-present threat of the demonic disfiguration of the orders, and thus already aware 
of the dangers to which his interlocutors point. That is to say, the theology of the 
Volk that reached its climax in the Erlangen Opinion on the Aryan Paragraph is the 
inevitable outcome neither of Lutheran ethics nor of Althausian ethics. I suggest here 
that Althausian ethics actually has mechanisms in place to prevent the totalisation 
and idolisation of the Volk. To anticipate: Althaus himself put checks into place to 
counteract the distortion of Christian theology through wild völkisch fanaticism. 
However, at various points he overrides these checks through self-defeating 
tendencies, which cause him to violate certain principles of his own theology.  
On account of these inconsistencies in applying his own system, it is 
therefore possible to read Althaus against himself. There is evidence, in other words, 
in Althausian theology of a trans-ethnic social vision, albeit a vision that manifests in 
segregation. His thought, therefore, can only be rehabilitated so far. It is on this point 
that his theology ultimately falls short and that we must rely on alternatives offered 
by his Lutheran contemporaries Bonhoeffer, Bultmann, and Sasse. But where 
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Althaus erred in a disproportionate and xenophobic focus on the German Volk, he did 
so against his better judgment.10 
TWO | THE ALTHAUSIAN SCHÖPFUNGSORDNUNGSLEHRE AND ITS CRITICS  
 
 We must begin with a question: How Lutheran is the Althausian theology of 
the ‘Jewish Question’ and the theology of the Volk within which it is embedded? 
Althaus was perhaps the preeminent Luther scholar of his generation, and his 
theology was shaped by Luther in virtually every respect. He wrote two authoritative 
works on Luther: The Theology of Martin Luther (English translation 1966) and The 
Ethics of Martin Luther (English translation 1972), both of which appeared after the 
Second World War. In neither book does Althaus reference Luther’s 
Judenschriften.11 Of course, that is not surprising; the postwar years saw an abrupt 
cessation of scholarly research on Luther’s anti-Jewish texts. Quite apart from the 
obvious professional hazard of handling these themes during denazification, the 
‘evidence of horrors’ had made any constructive engagement with the writings 
untenable.12  
 All the same, Althaus’ relationship to the Jews, like Luther’s, is complicated. 
It is puzzling, then, that even during the 1920s and 1930s, during which time 
Luther’s anti-Jewish writings were circulated widely, Althaus constructed his 
complex theology of the ‘Jewish Question’ without any reference to the 
                                                 
10 This line of argumentation has been used to explain Martin Luther’s antisemitism. See Eric Gritsch, 
Martin Luther’s Anti-Semitism: Against His Better Judgment (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 
2012). By using this phrase, I do not mean to excuse Althaus’ xenophobic and anti-Jewish rhetoric. Rather, I am 
arguing that by making these comments, Althaus is overlooking and violating elements of his own theology.  
11 Kirsi Stjerna and Brooks Schramm have assembled Luther’s writings on the Jews, including 
exegetical works and homilies, in the useful compendium, Martin Luther, The Bible, and the Jewish People: A 
Reader, ed. Kirsi Stjerna and Brooks Schramm (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2012).  
12 See Reiner Anselm, ‘“Luther und die Juden” in der systematischen und ethischen Debatte nach 
1945,’ in Martin Luthers ‘Judenschriften’: Die Rezeption im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, ed. Harry Oelke et al. 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2016), 235–36. On the mixed reception of the Judenschriften from 
Lutheran orthodoxy through the twentieth century, see also Thomas Kaufmann, Luther’s Jews: A Journey into 




Judenschriften. This absence is so conspicuous that Christopher Probst has 
concluded that ‘[d]espite the vast quantity of literature that Althaus penned, he was 
curiously silent on “Luther and the Jews.” Thus, there is really no way to analyze 
directly “Althaus on ‘Luther and the Jews.’”13 The theology of the Volk out of which 
Althaus formed his views on the ‘Jewish Question’ is not strictly Lutheran, if by this 
we mean that he relied directly on Luther’s anti-Jewish writings. Beyond that, 
moreover, Althaus was following an innovative trend within the Lutheran tradition 
when he designated the Volk as an order of creation, taking the 
Schöpfungsordnungslehre in a direction that Luther himself did not envision, as 
James Stayer has noted.14  
Speaking more broadly, the Schöpfungsordnungslehre, in the words of 
Walther Künneth, is an ‘insecure and easily misunderstood’ development in Lutheran 
theology, in part because it is really the product of nineteenth-century neo-
Lutheranism [Neuluthertum] with tenuous authority in Luther himself. This explains, 
to Künneth’s mind, the plurality of interpretations of the doctrine in contemporary 
Lutheran theology.15 Luther had indeed spoken of three estates which structure 
human communities—status economicus (marriage), status politicus (state), and 
status ecclesiasticus (church)—but he never systematised them into an explicit 
doctrine of orders of creation.16 That task fell to the theologians of the Erlangen 
                                                 
13 Probst, Demonizing the Jews, 36.  
14 See Stayer, Martin Luther, 88. Hinlicky adds that Althaus’ interpretation of the doctrine is a 
‘“progressive” adaptation to supposed cutting-edge advances in evolutionary and anthropological science’ 
(Before Auschwitz, 22).  
15 See Walter Künneth, Politik zwischen Dämon und Gott: Eine christliche Ethik des Politischen 
(Berlin: Lutherisches Verlagshaus, 1954), 118–20.  
16 See Martin Luther, Confession Concerning Christ’s Supper (1528), in Luther’s Works, ed. Jaroslav 
Pelikan, Helmut T. Lehmann, and Christopher Boyd Brown (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press; St. Louis, MO: 
Concordia Publishing House, 1955–.), 37:364–65. American Edition of Luther’s works hereafter abbreviated as 
LW. Luther sometimes varies the sequence in which these estates are treated, but in every case he limits the 
divine orders to these three, which are subordinate to the controlling order of Christian love. The estates of 
marriage and civil government exist primarily to preserve common life from falling into disarray. See also 
Commentary on Psalm 111 (1530), in LW 13:368–69; On the Councils and the Church (1539), in LW 41:177; 
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School: Johann Hofmann and especially Gottlieb Harless, in whose work the 
language of Schöpfungsordnungen probably first appears.17 Luther, of course, could 
scarcely have anticipated the modern concept of ethnicity as a structural element of 
human community, and so he would have seen no need to designate Volk as an 
additional ordinance of creation. After all, he once mused, ‘we have more than 
enough to do in living aright and resisting the devil in these three [estates].’18 
Nevertheless, later Lutheran theologians, namely Harless and Hofmann, expanded 
Luther’s estate of marriage to include the family and, by extrapolation, the Volk. 
Thus, by the time Althaus addressed himself to questions of national belonging and 
German identity in the 1920s, Erlangen theologians had been theologising the Volk 
for half a century.19 
Going further still, Althaus and Elert made claims for the sanctity of the Volk 
that Harless and Hofmann did not. We know that Althaus’ innovations on this point 
made some observers uncomfortable in his own context. One pastor Karl-Heinz 
Becker of Ezelheim wrote to Althaus in 1938 to question whether Althaus could find 
any authority for his concept of the Volk’s ‘we-consciousness’ [Wir-Bewußtsein] in 
the theology of the reformers.20 On that score, Althaus himself seems to have known 
that the Volk did not figure prominently in Luther’s own work. In The Ethics of 
                                                 
and Table Talk (1542–43), in LW 54:445–46. In Article XVI of the Augsburg Confession, Melanchthon appeals 
to a broadly Lutheran view of Obrigkeit, by which ‘good order in the world [is] instituted by God.’ In this 
context, ‘orderly government’ covers both temporal authority and the estate of marriage. See The Augsburg 
Confession—German Text (1530), in The Book of Concord: The Confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran 
Church, ed. Robert Kolb and Timothy J. Wengert, trans. Charles Arand et al. (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 
2000), 48.  
17 See Gottlieb Christoph von Harless, Christliche Ethik, 7th ed. (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1875), 491f. 
While Harless does use the vocabulary of Schöpfungsordnung, he often prefers the dynamism of 
Schöpferordnungen (‘orders of the Creator’) or Berufsordnungen (‘orders of vocation’). See also Yoder, Ordnung 
in Gemeinschaft, 9.  
18 Luther, On the Councils and the Church, in LW 41:177.  
19 For a detailed study of the nineteenth-century origins of the Schöpfungsordnungslehre in the 
Erlangen School, see Yoder, Ordnung in Gemeinschaft, 9–54. 
20 Karl-Heinz Becker to Paul Althaus, 4 May 1938, NA 10.  
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Martin Luther he omits any comment on the Volk as an ordinance of creation, 
perhaps a tacit acknowledgment that Luther does not have much to say on the 
matter.21 Althaus’ Erlangen colleague Hermann Sasse put it somewhat more bluntly. 
Whoever searches the Lutheran Confessions for an explicit theology of Volkstum, 
says Sasse, will be disappointed: there simply is none.22 It is a point that Althaus is 
more-or-less willing to concede, but not without an objection. It is true, Althaus 
admits, that classical Lutheran social ethics does not appreciate the state’s 
relationship to the Volk. Still, he argues, Luther had a robust consciousness of his 
own Germanness, even if he did not thematise it theologically. Most significantly, 
historical circumstances have changed for the German nation, and while it was 
perfectly appropriate to have a theology of state without a theology of Volk in 
Luther’s time, such a formulation is no longer sufficient now.23 
 At any rate, Probst is surely correct that a direct analysis of Althaus’ 
relationship to Luther’s theology of the Jews is difficult. Yet Althaus did rely at least 
partially on Luther’s writings to form his theology of the Volk, although not on the 
materials one might have expected. Implicitly in the Weimar years and then 
explicitly in the late 1930s, Althaus constructed a robust theology of the Volk—
within which he builds his thinking on the ‘Jewish Question’—on the basis of a 
single sentence from Luther’s Small Catechism of 1529: ‘I believe that God created 
me together with all that exists.’24 In a pair of 1937 essays, Althaus takes the 
                                                 
21 See Paul Althaus, The Ethics of Martin Luther, trans. Robert C. Schultz (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress 
Press, 1972).  
22 See Hermann Sasse, Das Volk nach der Lehre der evangelischen Kirche (München: Christian Kaiser 
Verlag, 1934), 5–6.  
23 See Althaus, Obrigkeit und Führertum, 15–18. 




elemental character of the Volk, a concept he extrapolates explicitly from the Small 
Catechism, as his starting point: 
. . . the Volk is a creation of God. From where do I know that? ‘I believe that 
God created me.’ The belief that God created me includes my Volk along 
with it. For whatever I am and have, God has given me out of the wellspring 
of my Volk: the inheritance of blood, of body [Leiblichkeit], of soul, of spirit. 
God has determined my life—both outwardly and down to my innermost—
through the life of my Volk, through its blood, through its spiritual type, 
which shapes me above all in my language and through its history.25 
 
This appeal to Luther’s Catechism indicates that even if Althaus understood himself 
to be innovating, he thought he was innovating within the confines of Lutheran 
teaching on creation. 
 The temptation to disassociate Althaus’ personal views on Volkstum and on 
the ‘Jewish Question’ from his theological system, and therefore from Luther’s, is 
understandable. One such attempt has been made, as we have seen, by Paul Knitter, 
who argues that the xenophobic dimension of Althaus’ nationalist outlook is rooted 
not in his theology, but in his ideology.26 In the same vein, Hans Tiefel has 
concluded that the version of Lutheran social ethics espoused by Althaus (and by 
others such as Friedrich Gogarten, Werner Elert, and Emanuel Hirsch) can scarcely 
be called Christian at all. Because Althaus tethered the enterprise of ethics to his 
Uroffenbarungslehre, a theology open to extra-biblical or pre-biblical revelation, 
                                                 
25 Althaus, Völker vor und nach Christus, 5. Compare his comments in ‘Kirche, Volk und Staat’ of 
1937:  
 
‘I believe that God created me.’ In this faith we also recognise our Volk as God’s creation. For God 
creates us within and out of the life of our Volk. He has ordained that I receive my life from Him in the 
determination of the life of my Volk, that is, that the life of my Volk, its inheritance of blood and 
inheritance of spirit [sein Blut- und Geisterbe] determines my life both inwardly and outwardly (19).  
 
Althaus puts forth a similar argument in Theologie der Ordnungen, 2nd ed., 11–12. He had begun to develop these 
themes as early as 1919. See parallel language in ‘Das Erlebnis der Kirche,’ 841–42.  
26 See Knitter, ‘Die Uroffenbarungslehre,’ 147–48. Brunner had made a similar comment in the early 
1930s, arguing that Althaus’ political and völkisch theologies derive not from Luther, but from German 
Romanticism and Idealism. See Emil Brunner, Das Gebot und die Ordnungen: Entwurf einer protestantisch-
theologischen Ethik (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1932), 650–51.  
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there is no distinctly Christian content to prevent capitulation to a racialised zeitgeist: 
‘Once the law is thus cut loose from Christian and biblical considerations, nothing 
stands in the way of defining God’s law along nationalistic and racial lines.’27  
One can perhaps vindicate ‘authentic Lutheranism’ by discrediting Althaus in 
this way. But in my view the better course of action is to confront Althaus’ theology 
of the orders of creation as a genuine—if genuinely problematic—expression of 
Lutheran theology. Paul Hinlicky has isolated the salient point: in the end it will not 
do to make the ‘defensive argument that real Christianity, or the real Luther, or real 
Lutherans are not really to blame.’28 Following Hinlicky, I suggest that Althaus was 
a real Lutheran who formulated a real Lutheran doctrine with real flaws. Whether the 
Schöpfungsordnungslehre can be salvaged is a question to which we shall return in 
due course.   
  In any event, during his denazification trial Althaus faced the challenge of 
accounting for some of his more radical statements that appeared to glorify the Volk. 
The Althaus interpreter is now faced with the same challenge, which is compounded 
by the dialectical nature of his theological system. The fact is that there are 
dimensions of his theology of the Volk that are undeniably xenophobic. These 
elements came to their most acute and problematic expression in his theology of the 
‘Jewish Question,’ culminating in the Erlangen Opinion on the Aryan Paragraph. At 
the same time, there is evidence that Althaus understood himself to be resisting the 
pseudo-religion of völkisch nationalism and ethnic exceptionalism. Helmut Thielicke 
summarises the complex trajectory of Althaus’ thought:  
That which could initially mislead a superficial reader of the writings of Paul 
Althaus to discover National Socialist elements in those writings is, without 
                                                 
27 Tiefel, ‘The German Lutheran Church,’ 332.  
28 Hinlicky, Before Auschwitz, 67.  
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doubt, an extant national pathos. However, whoever has his whole theological 
literary development in view, as I do, perceives a clear and unambiguous line 
from the relatively unbroken theological—yet still not reflective—
nationalism of the young Althaus . . . to an increasingly reformed and strictly 
defined concept of the national. One could compile countless citations from 
his lectures, seminars, and books out of which it emerges clearly how Althaus 
combatted precisely this ‘nationalism’—and indeed all other ‘-isms’—and 
how he had spoken of the demonic possibilities of this and other forms of 
absolutising.29 
 
Thielicke overstates the progressive elements of Althaus’ thought and he is in any 
case too charitable; I am not convinced that there is a ‘clear and unambiguous’ 
development from naïve complicity to principled resistance. But he is right that there 
is substantial textual evidence that Althaus came to recognise the orders’ 
vulnerability to demonic distortion. Althaus himself made the same point during his 
denazification proceedings in 1947 by reading his own writings against themselves.30 
A sophisticated reading of Althaus’ total theology of the Volk—including his 
theology of the ‘Jewish Question’—such as that which I have offered reveals both 
xenophobic and trans-ethnic visions for the organisation of society.  
 As the Kirchenkampf raged on in the 1930s, the Lutheran doctrine of the 
orders of creation in general, and Althaus’ trenchant version in particular, received 
criticism both from within Lutheran circles and from without. Swedish Lutherans 
Gustaf Aulén (1879–1977) and Anders Nygren (1890–1978) questioned whether 
German Lutherans had sufficiently reckoned with the reality of sin in their 
formulation of the doctrine. A pair of Swiss Reformed theologians, Karl Barth 
(1886–1968) and Emil Brunner (1889–1966), echoed these concerns. As I will 
demonstrate below, in each case Althaus not only anticipated these critiques, but had 
                                                 
29 Thielicke, ‘Aeusserung,’ 2–3.  
30 See the 1947 Deposition of Paul Althaus, where Althaus lists a series of proof-texts from his own 
writings to vindicate his theology of Volk and Volkstum (2–3).  
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also made provisions to prevent the misuse of the Schöpfungsordnungslehre to which 
these critics point. More than that, though, there are resources in Althaus’ own 
formulation of the theology of the orders of creation to mitigate against the 
idolisation of the Volk—even if, as was often the case, he did not always heed his 
own warnings. In this respect, I am following the analysis of Althaus’ Erlangen 
colleague, Walter Künneth. As we have seen, in Künneth’s estimation the doctrine of 
the orders of creation is an unstable evolution within Lutheran thought, and in his 
own work he prefers the dynamic language of Erhaltungsordnungen to the static 
Schöpfungsordnungen.31 If confined to the classical model of the doctrine, however, 
he regards the Althausian formulation as more satisfactory than some contemporary 
alternatives precisely because it offers a ‘safeguard’ [Sicherung] against an ever-
threatening tendency to autonomise the orders. That is, through the 
Schöpfungsordnungslehre Althaus manages to affirm ‘the activity of creation without 
losing sight of the existence of the Fall at the same time.’32  
 Althaus can indeed use the doctrine in such a way as to generate a trans-
ethnic social vision. Yet as I have mentioned, the ethical promise of Althaus’ 
permutation of the doctrine certainly has its limits; even though he can to some 
extent imagine a supra-völkisch society, he cannot imagine human communities, 
ecclesial or civil, without segregation. There are, however, resources to make this 
correction within the Lutheran tradition itself. As the next chapter will show, there 
are articulations of a Lutheran theology of creation that avoid the danger of 
essentialising race. In sum, then, the problem lies not with Lutheran social ethics per 
                                                 
31 See Yoder, Ordnung in Gemeinschaft, 180–84 and 209–11. 
32 Künneth prefers Althaus’ account to that of Emil Brunner, which he deems theologically untenable, 
and those of Friedrich Gogarten and Wilhelm Stapel, whose fatal identification of Volksnomos and Gottesgesetz 
has brought the doctrine into ‘disrepute.’ See Politik zwischen Dämon und Gott, 118–20.  
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se, but with Althaus’ self-defeating tendencies, whereby he overrides the 
Sicherungen (to use Künneth’s language) designed to prevent the radicalisation of 
the Schöpfungsordnungslehre.  
A | ALTHAUSIAN ANSWERS TO LUNDENSIAN QUESTIONS  
The Swedish Lutherans of the Lundensian School had been keeping a keen 
eye on the politics of the German churches as the Kirchenkampf unfolded in the early 
1930s. With the benefit of an outside perspective, the theologians in Lund recognised 
the demonic nature of National Socialism more quickly and more clearly than their 
fellow Lutherans to the south. Indeed, as denazification played out in Erlangen some 
twelve years later, Hermann Sasse lamented that his colleagues had not heeded the 
warnings of the Lundensians.33 One such warning came from Gustaf Aulén, who 
wondered whether German Lutherans had not underestimated the power of sin to 
disfigure the orders. He writes that the problem results from a flawed understanding 
of the relationship between sin and creation:  
In certain theological circles the idea of ‘orders of creation’ has caused 
considerable mischief, not least when the state has been identified as one of 
these ‘orders.’ It has even been suggested that these ‘orders’ are sacrosanct, 
even when their appearance and activity militate against the most elementary 
demands of the divine will of love. It seems to have been forgotten both that 
their function is to serve this will of love and that they exist under conditions 
imposed by sin.34 
 
As Aulén sees it, an underdeveloped theology of sin had blunted the doctrine’s 
critical prowess and blurred the distinction between God’s original creation and its 
fallen state. This distortion of the doctrine, moreover, had also lost sight of the 
regulating force of the love-command, a flaw that other critics would also notice. 
                                                 
33 See Green, Lutherans Against Hitler, 347.  
34 Gustaf Aulén, The Faith of the Christian Church, trans. Eric Wahlstrom and Everett Arden (London: 
SCM Press Ltd., 1954), 191–92. This edition is the translation of the fourth Swedish edition which appeared in 
1943. The first Swedish edition appeared in 1923.  
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Tragically, this means that the orders have become enslaved to the very ‘diabolical 
forces’ they are designed to restrain.35 Yet, as I will demonstrate below, Althaus had 
reckoned with the gravity of sin in his theology of the orders and was well aware of 
their entanglement with evil.  
 Aulén’s critique was intensified by his colleague Anders Nygren, whose 
penetrating assessment of the Kirchenkampf has proven remarkably accurate in 
retrospect. In his collection of 1934 essays, translated as The Church Controversy in 
Germany, Nygren voices the theological concerns of ‘the foreign nations [whose 
eyes] are fixed more and more on the scandalous proceedings in the German 
Church.’36 In particular, he expresses surprise and dismay at the Erlangen Opinion 
and its support for ‘a somewhat modified Aryan Paragraph’; he had expected Althaus 
and Elert to reject the clause as forcefully as Bultmann and the Marburg faculty had 
done.37 He considers the theology of the Volk exhibited in the Erlangen Opinion, 
however, as only symptomatic of a much more serious problem: the reality that the 
German churches have exchanged Christianity for an idolatrous religion of race and 
egoism. Though he does not name Althaus, Nygren targets theologies that glorify the 
Volk as the root of the problem:  
What then is [the church struggle] about? The answer is simple: it is about 
Christianity itself, its being or not being. What has happened in Germany in 
these days is nothing more and nothing less than that a new religion has 
appeared on the stage by the side of and in opposition to Christianity—a 
religion founded on blood and soil, or race-idealism. . . . [Germans] have 
adopted the Nation, and they have adopted it as something holy—nay, as the 
Holy of Holies. The holiness of people and race has become the absolute 
value. This race passion has gone all over Germany as a revival, and the 
peculiar thing is that it has in an equal degree fettered Christians and non-
                                                 
35 Ibid.  
36 Anders Nygren, The Church Controversy in Germany: The Position of the Evangelical Church in the 
Third Empire, trans. G.C. Richards (London: Student Christian Movement Press, 1934), 72.  





Nygren does not foresee a solution to this Germanist idolatry by which ‘the 
deification of their own race is taking the place of religion.’39 Yet it is precisely here 
that Althaus’ case proves so challenging: his theology has the resources to satisfy the 
concerns of both Aulén and Nygren. With Aulén, Althaus stresses the fallenness of 
the orders; with Nygren, he seeks to combat the blasphemous religion of secular 
nationalism. Though his works were not a direct response to the issues raised by 
Aulén or Nygren, Althaus does offer answers to these Lundensian questions.  
Although he anchored his ethical system in the Schöpfungsordnungslehre, 
Althaus always had a profound sense of the sinfulness of the orders in their historical 
manifestations. In the second edition of his Theologie der Ordnungen, he emphasises 
that the orders are essentially fallen; that is, their very nature shares in the brokenness 
of postlapsarian creation: ‘[The orders] have fallen into sin not only insofar as the 
wickedness of individuals and of collective humanity distort and abuse them in 
history, but also insofar as the orders have necessarily been intertwined with 
[verflochten] sin in our world that has fallen under sin and the curse of death.’40 
While Creation and Fall can be distinguished theoretically, the distinction becomes 
virtually impossible to maintain in practice. This Verflochtenheit means that all 
human action—in every sphere—is morally ambiguous: ‘[O]ne cannot serve within 
the orders of history without simultaneously participating in the building of the 
kingdom of sin.’41 For this reason he warns against the ‘absolutising’ of the orders. 
                                                 
38 Ibid., 86–87. Emphasis in the original. Nygren’s conclusion that a false religion had infiltrated and 
even replaced Christianity in Germany is consistent with the ethos of the Lundensian School, who ‘strongly 
maintained that they did not do normative or constructive theology. They only provided a rigorously objective 
description of the distinctively and authentically Christian.’ See Arne Rasmusson, ‘A Century of Swedish 
Theology,’ in Lutheran Quarterly 21:2 (2007), 135.  
39 Nygren, The Church Controversy in Germany, 86–87.  
40 Althaus, Theologie der Ordnungen, 2nd ed., 48–49.  
41 Ibid., 61.  
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For Althaus the orders themselves are the mechanism designed to prevent their 
abuse; the various ordinances check and govern one another. Distortion ensues only 
when one of the orders—including the Volk—is elevated over the others.42 
This also means that Althaus is aware that the love of Volk is especially 
subject to idolatrous disfiguration: ‘The völkisch desire is the will to live [but] it is 
not exempt from the hex which hangs over all natural desires—the danger of a lapse 
into the demonic. The noble glow of love of Volk can become a wild, impure fire.’43 
Like Nygren, Althaus saw the blasphemous exaltation of the Volk in both the 
German Christians and the German Faith Movement. And, also like Nygren, he 
judged that völkisch fanaticism represented a rival religion competing with 
Christianity for the devotion of the German soul: 
We recognise the demonic totality of the Volk [dämonische Totalität des 
Volkes] where one, in the name of Volkstum and without respect for and 
obedience to the German soul’s history with Christ, demands a völkisch 
religion that arises out of the living primal-source [Urgrund] of Volkstum 
itself.44 
 
Althaus perceived precisely this ‘demonic totality of the Volk’ within the German 
Christian movement, through whose rhetoric ‘[t]he natural love for oneself, the love 
of one’s mother as well as the love of Volk and fatherland have all deteriorated into 
the demonic—into arrogance, vanity, bondage, intoxication—each one a distortion of 
genuine devotion.’45 
                                                 
42 See ibid., 21–23. Dating back to the Weimar years, Althaus had always emphasised that the orders 
are penultimate realities. See ‘Gott und Volk,’ 39–40. He also showed an awareness of the human propensity to 
disfigure the orders of creation, which exist for humanity’s benefit, into a ‘tyrannical idol’ or a ‘prison of 
scruples,’ just as he judged the Jews had done with the Sabbath commandment. In his own context, Althaus 
warns of the idolisation of work, the state, and the economy. See ‘Ordnungen’ (13 October 1935), in Der Herr 
der Kirche, 238–46. 
43 Althaus, ‘Kirche und Volkstum,’ 120. See also Althaus, ‘Gott und Volk,’ 45–46 and Althaus, ‘Das 
Gebot der Stunde,’ 233–34.   
44 Althaus, ‘Totaler Staat?’, 134–35. Cf. ‘Kirche und Staat,’ 749.  
45 Althaus, ‘Politisches Christentum,’ 17. 
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Althaus also feared that the spread of völkisch fervor would undermine the 
church’s proclamation and witness. Though he supported the impulse behind the 
völkisch movement—i.e., the rediscovery and renewal of German Volkstum—he 
foresaw the increasing danger of radicalism even before the rise of National 
Socialism.46 He articulates the dilemma as he unpacks the distinction between 
Volkskirchentum and völkisches Kirchentum47 in 1935: 
The Volkskirche would become a völkisch church [völkisches Kirchentum] in 
the moment it no longer witnesses to the one God and Lord who calls all 
peoples into his Kingdom, but witnesses instead to a national god 
[Nationalgott]; no longer to biblical salvation-history but to national history 
as salvation- and redemption-history; no longer to the Holy One, who is the 
Lord and measure of all ethnic ideals, desires, and ordinances, but to a pitiful 
little godling [Göttlichen], which would be nothing more than the epitome or 
the guarantor of ethnic ideals, desires, and ordinances.48 
 
Althaus knew that humanity, perhaps especially when pursuing noble ideals, would 
always court idolatry—even within the church. As a renewal of patriotic sentiment 
flooded across Germany, Althaus called the church to purify secular nationalism and 
to name the god of the German soul as the God of Christian scripture. Anything else 
would mean that Germans are worshiping a ‘national god.’ Ironically, Althaus even 
designated the Jews a critical resource for the purification of secular and ethnic 
nationalisms, as we have seen. By the very fact of their stubborn existence, Jews 
testify that no Volk can replace the God who stands above all orders with a pathetic 
‘godling’ of ethnic exceptionalism.49 
 
                                                 
46 See especially Althaus’ 1932 essay ‘Gott und Volk.’  
47 The terms are difficult to render into English, but Volkskirchentum communicates an expression of 
Christianity that conforms to the specific needs and spiritual essence of the Volk, while völkisches Kirchentum is 
pejorative, referring to an ecclesiology that is totally consumed and compromised by jingoistic ethnic 
nationalism. ‘Kirchentum’ is the word Althaus uses to combine the church’s nature as office with the church’s 
nature as community. See ‘Kirche und Staat,’ 747.  
48 Althaus, ‘Kirche und Volk,’ 358. See also ‘Theologisches Gutachten über die Thüringer Richtung der 
Deutschen Christen,’ 675.  




B | ‘THE MOST EVIL OF ALL THEOLOGICAL DOCTRINES’? DIALOGUE WITH 
BARTH AND BRUNNER 
 
If Althaus’ Lutheran colleagues to the north expressed concern over the 
destructive capabilities of the orders, it should not be surprising that the doctrine 
came under attack from the south as well. Theologians within the Swiss Reformed 
tradition, too, criticised the way in which Althaus formulated the concept, with Karl 
Barth ultimately condemning the Schöpfungsordnungslehre as a completely 
catastrophic—and totally hopeless—basis for Christian ethics. Emil Brunner also 
worried about a latent Romanticism lurking behind Althaus’ theology of the Volk, 
but nevertheless proved more optimistic about rehabilitating the theology of the 
orders—albeit with a more sober focus on their function as remedies for sin and 
provisional safeguards against chaos. Here again, though, Althaus shows 
(theoretical) awareness of the sinfulness and penultimate nature of the orders and 
answers Brunner with a robust account of the orders as a manifestation of God’s 
continuing work of creation. 
It was unlikely that Althaus was ever going to find an ally in Karl Barth. 
From the beginning, Althaus and Barth shared a troubled relationship in which 
collegial civility could sometimes devolve into scornful polemics. Nevertheless, the 
two maintained a significant correspondence until their falling-out in the early 
National Socialist years.50 The root of the disagreement—as had been the case in 
Barth’s Abschied from Brunner and Gogarten, which resulted in the dissolution of 
their collaborative enterprise, Zwischen den Zeiten, at the end of 1933—was of 
                                                 
50 Althaus and Barth, nearly exact contemporaries, came of age in the same generation. They exchanged 
letters on a wide range of theological topics for over a decade until about 1934, when the relationship broke down 
totally. Their correspondence resumed, at Althaus’ initiation, in the early 1950s. See Briefwechsel, 12–117.  
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course the question of natural theology, with which these theologians (he names 
Bultmann as well) had made an ‘evil pact.’51  
For Barth, though, it was Althaus’ unique formulation of natural theology in 
the doctrine of Uroffenbarung that rendered Lutheran ethics especially irreparable, 
opening a Pandora’s box of theological problems. If it takes Uroffenbarung as its 
starting point, argues Barth, Lutheran political ethics will inevitably fail:  
I confess that [Althaus’ book Religiöser Sozialismus] has greatly strengthened 
my deep mistrust of the sinister connection between Lutheran inwardness and 
Lutheran worldliness. Whoever can bring the will of God into such dangerous 
proximity to the little bit of experience of the heart and conscience of so-
called Christians and the little bit of ‘common life of the congregation’ will 
also of necessity bring it into the quite fatal proximity to history, nature, and 
fate. The psychological immanence of God of necessity brings the cosmic in 
its train.52 
 
Barth’s anxiety, it seems to me, is justifiable to an extent: it is true that for Althaus 
God’s self-disclosure need not be (exclusively) christologically grounded. However, 
it is not quite fair to categorise Uroffenbarung as a bald ‘natural theology’; it would 
be closer the mark to say, as Yoder has done, that Althaus perceives God’s action in 
historical life, not in nature per se.53 Moreover, if Barth supposes that Althaus 
considers Uroffenbarung sufficient for salvation apart from God’s revelation in 
Christ, he is mistaken on this point.54 Because, however, Althaus conceives of God’s 
revelation before and apart from Christ as the necessary ‘pre-history’ for the 
Incarnation, he found it incomprehensible that one could do Christian theology or 
                                                 
51 Barth to Althaus, 2 January 1933, in Briefwechsel, 96–97.  
52 Barth, ‘Basic Problems,’ 56. In a January 2, 1933 letter to Althaus, Barth characterised the 
Uroffenbarungslehre as an ‘irredeemable bolted lock that bars both the first paragraphs of your Grundriß [The 
second edition of Althaus’ Grundriß der Dogmatik, which appeared in 1932] and everything that follows.’ See 
Briefwechsel, 96–97.  
53 Yoder, Ordnung in Gemeinschaft, 78. 
54 The relationship between Uroffenbarung and Christusoffenbarung in Althaus’ theology is, as Choi 
has argued, ‘dialectical.’ For Althaus, Uroffenbarung does not mean that each religion to makes equally valid 
truth-claims; rather, all human religion will be judged by the final criterion of the Gospel of Jesus Christ. That 
said, according to Althaus, Uroffenbarung is a necessary precondition of God’s self-disclosure in Christ, though 
it is not by itself sufficient for saving knowledge of God. See Choi, Das Konzept der Ur-Offenbarung, 117–18.  
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ethics without a doctrine of general revelation.55 These incongruent theologies of 
revelation came to expression in their irreconcilable political attitudes as reflected the 
Barmen Declaration (which had condemned Althaus’ brand of general revelation as 
no less than a false teaching) and the Ansbach Memorandum, respectively.  
In the end, the two theologians did not even share the vocabulary to resolve 
the impasse over the doctrine of the orders of creation—something Barth seems to 
have recognised quite early on.56 The events of the spring of 1934 proved the last 
straw for a relationship that had been near its breaking point for some time. Althaus 
reached out to Barth again two decades later—partially as a gesture of reconciliation, 
and partially to complain about how Barth had lumped Althaus’ theology of 
Volkstum in with cruder forms of völkisch theology in the Church Dogmatics.57 
Barth’s response cuts to the heart of the dispute: 
My silence toward you persists because of the singular wideness 
[Welträumigkeit] of your theological dialectic, which has always perplexed 
me. . . . I worried about your christology and your ‘Ur-Offenbarung.’ You 
say so much which, to my mind, cancels itself out and which, in any case, 
was never perceptible to me as a unified whole. One day you must explain to 
me in a face-to-face conversation—without fuss or quibble, without any 
both/and—what the unified whole that you want to express actually is. . . . 
Now, as for what you are asking about in particular: From the very beginning 
(indeed I must now touch on a very delicate point), I feared that the tree of 
                                                 
55 Althaus suggests that God’s revelation in natural law, for instance, is a necessary ‘pre-history’ 
[Vorgeschichte] for God’s revelation in Christ; the church’s very kerygma, therefore, is a historically conditioned 
development that is only comprehensible with reference to God’s prior revelation apart from and before Christ. 
That is to say, ‘[i]t did not fall from heaven’ (see Althaus, ‘“Durch das Gesetz,”’ 14). These conclusions, of 
course, brought Althaus into stark disagreement with Barth’s ‘exclusively christological dogmatics,’ which 
Althaus believed violated the New Testament and the common Protestant tradition. Reflecting on the prevailing 
theological attitudes in Germany during his student years and early career, he remarked elsewhere:  
 
Even in those days, I found the narrowness of the predominant doctrine of revelation unbearable. It 
seemed to me unbiblical and cramped. I never could understand how we as theologians and churchmen 
could surrender the whole world of nature and of history to skepticism and secularism, and parrot what 
atheistic philosophy had done to strip our lives of God.  
 
Quoted in Wenzel Lohff, ‘Paul Althaus,’ in Theologians of Our Time: Adam, Althaus, Balthasar, Barth, Brunner, 
Bultmann, Congar, Guardini, Niebuhr, Rahner, Schlier, Tillich, ed. Leonard Reinisch (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1964), 54.  
56 ‘That we mean something so entirely different when we talk about church, revelation, Christ is a 
calamity that cannot be lamented enough’ (Barth to Althaus, 2 January 1933, Briefwechsel, 97).  
57 See Althaus to Barth, 25 October 1953, in Briefwechsel, 102–03. 
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your theology could also bear such fruit one day [here Barth refers to 
theologies which cohered with National Socialist ideology]—and then when I 
read your signature (was it in 1934 or later?) under the ‘Ansbacher 
Ratschlag,’ I felt myself entirely justified—nuances or not—in seeing you 
together with all the other Volk-theologians in the same boat.58  
 
In retrospect, we can see that to some extent Barth’s premonition about the failure of 
Lutheran ethics and his fears about the sinister dimensions of Althaus’ theology 
would come to pass. Althaus would not speak a decisive ‘No’ to God’s revelation in 
history: a decision (or, more accurately perhaps, an indecision) with fateful 
consequences, as Jack Forstman has noted.59 But whether this signifies the total 
vindication of Barthian theology over and against Lutheran confessionalism, as 
Forstman and others have intimated, is a separate question. It is also worth asking 
whether Barth caricatured Althaus, making him into a straw man of a confused 
Lutheran political ethic.60 Most critical for my purposes, however, is that straight 
through to the end of his career, Barth considered the Schöpfungsordnungslehre 
totally unsalvageable—‘the most evil of all theological doctrines,’ as he put it back 
in 1922.61 
                                                 
58 Barth to Althaus, 1 November 1953, in Briefwechsel, 103–04. Emil Brunner, too, felt that Barth’s 
judgment was defensible at the time. He wrote the following to Althaus in the fall of 1934:  
 
When [Barth] speaks so contemptuously about you, I of course disapprove of it completely. But I do 
understand it at least a little bit because of your church-political attitudes. What with that evil 
proclamation with Hirsch [Brunner here refers to ‘Erklärung über “Evangelische Kirche und 
Völkerverständigung”’ of June 1931] together with your wavering attitude toward the German 
Christians.  
 
See Brunner to Althaus, 21 November 1934, in Briefwechsel, 146–47 
59 For the debate between Althaus and Barth, see Forstman, Christian Faith, 121–32. Arthur Cochrane 
has likewise cited Althaus a negative foil in his sympathetic account of Barthian theology and the Barmen 
Declaration. Cochrane further intimates that Althaus and the Erlangen Lutherans were primarily concerned with 
preserving their own confessional identity ‘at a time when the “house was on fire,” when the very existence of the 
evangelical Church was at stake’ (The Church’s Confession, 181–96). 
60 Jasper argues that the ‘two-kingdom’ doctrine, as it exists in the imagination of critics, was Barth’s 
‘polemical invention’ based on a ‘truncated’ reading of Althaus’ theology. Jasper claims Barth seized on the 
political theology of Althaus and others who failed to oppose National Socialism as proof of the inadequacy of 
Lutheran doctrine. So while Jasper agrees that Luther’s political views were problematic, he suggests that they 
were so because Althaus did not use the doctrine of the two kingdoms properly. See ‘Die Zwei-Reiche-Lehre,’ 
41–46.    
61 Barth, ‘Basic Problems,’ 48. 
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Barth’s fellow Swiss Emil Brunner was more optimistic about the ethical 
promise of the Schöpfungsordnungslehre, and, perhaps not by coincidence, was also 
much more congenial toward Althaus. Indeed, Brunner and Althaus had much in 
common, not the least of which was the withering wrath of Barth—something they 
each experienced across their careers. The two shared a close friendship over the 
course of many decades, though their relationship strained under the weight of 
Althaus’ political associations, namely with Emanuel Hirsch, during the early 
1930s.62 They also debated the ethical import of the doctrine of the orders of 
creation, both in their personal correspondence and in their respective publications: 
Brunner’s Das Gebot und die Ordnungen appeared in 1932, and the second edition 
of Althaus’ Theologie der Ordnungen followed in 1934.  
Though he is a Reformed theologian, Brunner’s handling of the doctrine has 
significant implications for Lutheran theology in general, and for how the Lutheran 
theologian might approach the ‘Jewish Question’ in particular. In Das Gebot und die 
Ordnungen Brunner attacks Althaus on two fronts: 1) by exposing a ‘Romantic’ 
philosophy of history that warps the theology of creation and yields a flippant 
doctrine of sin, and 2) by charging that Althaus’ ethics lacks an eschatological vision. 
The combined consequence of these two flaws, argues Brunner, is a failure to 
distinguish between the present, fallen state of creation and the completion of 
creation that God has inaugurated in the work of Jesus Christ and intends to fulfill in 
the eschaton. However, as I suggest below, Althaus’ theology has the resources to 
satisfy Brunner’s concerns; whether he attends sufficiently to these resources in 
practice is far less certain.  
                                                 
62 Brunner made reconciliation contingent upon Althaus’ disassociation from ‘that wicked Hirsch.’ See 
Brunner to Althaus, 21 November 1934, in Briefwechsel, 136–47. 
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 In the first place, Brunner considers Althaus’ thinking too ‘Romantic,’ 
especially as it came to expression in his theologies of the state and the Volk. Yet on 
both topics the two theologians are relatively close because of their common reliance 
on ‘our shared Luther’ (as Brunner put it) in the framing of their respective ethical 
enterprises.63 For instance, there is not much to choose between Brunner’s account of 
the Volk and that of Althaus. Both list common living space, common blood, 
common family stock, common biological makeup, a shared history and destiny, and 
above all a shared language as the ingredients of Volkstum.64 Despite this ostensible 
similarity, though, Brunner sees a critical difference of nuance: his own intensified 
focus on the inherent sinfulness of both the state and the Volk as postlapsarian 
constructs rooted not in creation itself, but in the perversion of creation. The state, for 
example, is for Brunner an ordinance that exists solely on account of human 
sinfulness:  
The compulsory character of the state—that is, of that which we call the 
state—is not to be understood as an expression of the will of the Creator. 
Civil community is on that account only community in a broken, improper 
sense, and this ordinance of community is not an ordinance of creation, but is 
actually an ordinance determined by the fact of sin . . . the state is the product 
of collective sin.65 
 
For this reason he prefers the terms Sündenordnungen (‘ordinances of sin’) or 
Zuchtordnungen (‘ordinances of discipline’) to Schöpfungsordnungen. This shift, as 
Lutheran theologian Paul Hinlicky has suggested, is actually a better formulation of 
                                                 
63 After having read Das Gebot und die Ordnungen, Althaus remarked: ‘In both the individual aspects 
of the overall system, as well as in the greater aspects, you and I agree marvelously, even if never discussed 
exactly these questions.’ Althaus to Brunner, 18 May 1932, in Briefwechsel, 141–42. Emphasis in the original. 
After having read Althaus’ Theologie der Ordnungen, Brunner reciprocated: ‘It is the case for me, as apparently 
it is for you also: I feel myself nearer to you theologically from year to year. The reason: our shared Luther.’ 
Brunner to Althaus, 29 March 1934, in Briefwechsel, 143–44.  
64 See Brunner, Das Gebot, 441–42, Althaus, ‘Kirche und Volkstum,’ 113–14, and Althaus, Völker vor 
und nach Christus, 4–5.  
65 Brunner, Das Gebot, 431–32. 
 
 232 
original intent of the doctrine and is more faithful to the chronology of the biblical 
narrative.66 
In the same way, Brunner also considers the Volk a corrective measure whose 
very existence testifies to the fracturing of humanity at the Fall. The Volk, though it 
is in a qualified sense ordained by God, is an amalgamation of the bounty of creation 
and the barbarousness of postlapsarian existence:  
Völker are not some platonic ideals that at some point took on earthly form, 
but are instead extremely ‘random’ constructs [überaus ‘zufällige’ Gebilde] 
into which both the creative richness of individualisation and the effects of 
the most savage and powerful forces have been woven together into 
indivisible unity. The same applies for a Volk as does for an individual 
person: ‘Behold, I have been born into sin,’ and ‘You, O God, have formed 
me in my mother’s womb.’ There is truly no ground for the romantic 
glorification of one’s own ethnic individuality.67 
 
With his poignant characterisation of the Volk as an ‘extremely “random” construct,’ 
Brunner understands himself to be correcting an error of ‘modern Lutheranism.’ He 
cites in particular the völkisch theologies of Althaus, Brundstäd, and Hirsch, which 
locate the origins and destiny of the Volk in prelapsarian providence. Specifically, he 
wonders how the ‘transience of all nations that have existed to the present does not 
expose the relativity of this concept.’68 Relativity is the key word here, as Brunner 
has his finger on the crux of the issue: Althaus fails to acknowledge that the state and 
Volk are only relative measures. Consequently, he makes the fallen creation ethically 
normative. In other words, Althaus does not err by the mere recognition of the 
historical fact of ethnic pluralism, but he does err by refusing to relativise the Volk, a 
                                                 
66 ‘Political sovereignty was not one of the original Lutheran orders of creation, for its institution arises 
after the fall of the first couple. It exists temporarily, then, as a Notordnung, an “emergency order”’ (Hinlicky, 
Before Auschwitz, 186. Emphasis in the original). Brunner later remarks that, in terms of political theology, 
‘[h]ere we side with Luther against the Romantic historicism [Geschichtsromantik] of Althaus’ (Das Gebot, 651, 
note 10).  
67 Brunner, Das Gebot, 442.  
68 Ibid., 650–51, note 9. 
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construct which itself participates in the problem it is designed to correct, in light of 
the Kingdom of God—a critique to which we shall return momentarily.  
Aside from one objection—‘I believe my doctrine of the state is not as 
Romantic as you suppose’69—Althaus did not think Brunner had misrepresented his 
theology. Yet in the second edition of Theologie der Ordnungen, he is at pains to 
distinguish his positions from Brunner’s, despite their considerable agreement, and to 
explain his rationale. Given the subtlety of their diverging views, as well as the 
implications for the viability of this important Lutheran doctrine, a careful study is 
warranted.  
To begin with, Althaus stresses the fallenness of the orders to such an extent 
that it is ‘theologically impossible to distinguish between the orders as Schöpfungs- 
and Erhaltungsordnungen, or indeed, as Emil Brunner wants to do, to distinguish 
between orders of creation and orders of sin [Sündenordnungen].’ Instead, the 
theologian must see the orders as both an expression of God’s creative will and as 
structures entangled ‘with sin and death.’70 But here again, Brunner had worried that 
the problem with Althaus’ Schöpfungsordnungslehre was precisely this kind of 
conflation of creation and sin wherein the two are considered as essentially the same 
thing. This means that, in turn, Althaus cannot, or rather does not, differentiate 
between creation and fallen creation—something Barth had discerned years earlier.71  
Still, it is difficult to deny that Althaus is keenly aware of the great 
destructive potential of the disfiguration of the orders in their historical 
                                                 
69 Althaus to Brunner, 18 May 1932, in Briefwechsel, 141–42. Even though Althaus’ view of the state, 
even the totalitarian state, was perhaps Romantic—Lowell Green has characterised it charitably as ‘benign’ (The 
Erlangen School, 275)—he always knew that the Third Reich was not the Kingdom of God, and that no earthly 
government ever could be. See Althaus, ‘Drittes Reich und Reich Gottes’ 31.  
70 Althaus, Theologie der Ordnungen, 2nd ed., 15–16.  
71 See Brunner, Das Gebot, 651. Brunner attributes this tendency in Althaus’ theology to the influence 
of Hirsch. Cf. Barth, ‘Basic Problems,’ 54.   
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manifestations, as we have seen. He makes the point decisively in Theologie der 
Ordnungen: ‘Order and sin are inseparably entwined with one another. But we must 
still go one step further. The distortion of the orders through human sin is to a large 
extent rooted in the orders themselves: we violate them precisely by participating in 
them.’72 To anticipate Brunner’s second criticism: here we see that Althaus is 
entirely cognisant that the orders of creation have the capability to degenerate into 
anti-creation and he therefore does not simply equate the present state of the world 
with God’s original (or ultimate) design.  
In my view, the disagreement between Althaus and Brunner is therefore not, 
at base, about sin and its effects. Rather, the deeper issue at play is a fundamental 
difference of understanding regarding the nature and purpose of creation, especially 
as seen in light of the eschatological redemption of the created order. Althaus always 
argued that the orders perform more than a merely negative, preservative function. 
‘The state,’ he insists, ‘is more than just a remedium peccati. But here, of course, you 
see my Romanticism!’73 But the two could not find common ground on this point 
because, for Althaus, ordinances like state and Volk do not arise ‘exclusively in 
reference to the reality of sin.’74 On the contrary, he wants to understand the orders 
as movements within the dynamism of God’s creatio continua:  
If one renounces this concept [i.e. Schöpfungsordnungen], then one also 
renounces Luther’s notion of creation as the continuous and present action of 
God which is occurring today. . . . Why then may we not speak of 
‘Schöpfungsordnungen,’ namely of the orders and means of God’s present 
creative action? ‘Erhaltungsordnungen’—this concept virtually denies God’s 
ongoing creative action. God does not merely maintain the world, but he 
creates continually.75 
 
                                                 
72 Althaus, Theologie der Ordnungen, 2nd ed., 50–51. 
73 Althaus to Brunner, 19 May 1934, in Briefwechsel, 145.  
74 Althaus, Theologie der Ordnungen, 2nd ed., 15–16. 
75 Ibid., 14.  
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Hence, continuing his dispute with Brunner in 1935, Althaus will come to speak of 
the state’s ‘paternal office’ through which God continues to create the world out of 
fatherly love.76 
Brunner’s more searching critique emerges here: Althaus’ view signals a 
failure to think eschatologically about the function of the orders. This criticism, 
which I think Althaus’ theology can address with varying degrees of success, is 
nevertheless helpful in producing a healthier ethic with greater promise to mitigate 
against xenophobic constellations of the doctrine. Brunner’s controlling assumption 
is that there is a distinction to be made between the ‘created order’ [die 
Schöpfungsordnung] and the ‘redeemed order [die Erlösungsordnung].’77 This 
assumption has dramatic ethical implications as the ordinances of the fallen creation 
are regulated and relativised by the ordinances that anticipate God’s eschatological 
completion of creation. Thus the real question that divides Althaus and Brunner is 
the extent to which the fallen orders are ethically normative. In practice, the orders of 
creation—sinful though they are—have much greater ethical purchase for Althaus 
than for Brunner.78  
This is the case because, for Brunner, the present world can only be the 
starting point for ethical reflection: 
Acceptance of the order that is given, because it is given by God, is the first 
word of Christian ethics—but it is never the last. What God wills as the 
Creator is always the first thing; but it is—irrespective of our sin—not the last 
thing. For he wants creation to go beyond itself [er will Schöpfung über sich 
selbst hinausführen] toward the completion [Vollendung] of all things. He 
preserves the world not merely for the sake of preserving it, but in order to 
                                                 
76 See Althaus, ‘Kirche und Staat,’ 749–50. 
77 See Brunner, Das Gebot, 192–202. 
78 Knitter notes that, despite ostensible similarities between Althaus and Brunner on this point, Althaus 
asks the theology of general revelation to do more work than does Brunner: ‘Theoretically, Althaus’ 
“Uroffenbarung” is very similar to Brunner’s “Schöpfungsoffenbarung”; but phenomenologically and practically, 
Althaus attributes much more efficacy and independence to his general revelation that Brunner does’ (Towards a 
Protestant Theology of Religions, 53).  
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bring it to completion. . . . The given [das Gegebene] is not what God 
created, but is actually that which God created fractured by sin. Therefore 
God requires of us not only the first thing—acceptance of the given—but he 
requires a second thing: obedience to his will as we recognise it in the will of 
the perfector the redeemer.79 
 
Thus ‘acceptance’ of the created order is only the first step of ethical action. More 
important, in Brunner’s estimation, is the ‘second thing’: resistance to the orders 
insofar as they represent not only the sinful distortion of God’s original intent for 
creation, but also a poor approximation of the redeemed order. This in turn means 
that the Christian both ‘accepts’ the given world for the sake of what it is (i.e., God’s 
good but broken creation) and at the same time ‘protests against’ the given world for 
the sake of what it will become.  
 The regulatory principle of this eschatologically-grounded ethic is the 
demand of the neighbour, which the church—as a community in which the work 
inaugurated by Jesus Christ has been partially realised—is both authorised and 
obligated to meet.80 Hence for Brunner the Christian not only can oppose her own 
family, state, or Volk, but must do so when love of neighbour [der Nächsten—
literally, ‘the one who is next to me’] requires it. For Althaus, by contrast, the claim 
of the love-command is surpassed by the autonomy of the Volk as it pursues its 
historical destiny. Walther Mann explains:  
This quality of being an ‘end in itself’ [Selbstzwecklichkeit], this autonomy or 
this vocation does not always match up with the love-command 
[Liebesgebot]. Althaus therefore makes obedience to God—rather than 
love—the keyword of Christian ethics and in so doing goes a step beyond 
Luther.  
 
The implications for the handling of the ‘Jewish Question’ are clear.81   
                                                 
79 Brunner, Das Gebot, 198–99. 
80 Ibid., 202.  
81 Mann, Ordnungen der Allmacht, 104. Mann suggests that Althaus’ (qualified) adoption of the Aryan 
Paragraph in the churches stems from his belief that the occupation of the church’s offices is to be determined 
above all by the Beruf of the Volk, usually as articulated by the state (107–08). Mildenberger likewise judges that 
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 What is striking about this impasse, however, is that Althaus’ theology 
actually attends, to varying extents, to Brunner’s concerns—often in very similar 
language. That is to say, Althaus too understands in theory that the orders of creation 
all stand under the eschatological judgment of the Kingdom of God. In Theologie der 
Ordnungen, for example, he emphasises that criticism of the orders is not only 
possible but indeed necessary when an ordinance, including the Volk, elevates itself 
above the other orders and, in the process, self-negates. In a schema that closely 
parallels Brunner’s ‘acceptance’/‘protest’ model, Althaus hints that eschatology must 
inform any ethic of the orders: ‘I must struggle for the ordinance as it should be, but 
I must remain in the ordinance as it is—both belong together.’82  
 Perhaps under the influence of Brunner’s criticism, Althaus would later 
emphasise the fundamental transience and finitude of Volk. More than that, however, 
he would draw the critical implication that, as a fallen creature, the Volk is an 
insufficient basis for a binding theological ethic:  
My Volk is a creation, not itself God or the divine essence; it is not immortal, 
not itself the origin and standard of all norms and worth. The transcendent 
and eternal God, who alone possesses immortality, has decreed mortal life for 
my Volk, just as he has for the life of other peoples.83  
 
There is evidence here, in other words, that Althaus could articulate the doctrine in 
such a way as to address Brunner’s worry. In Althaus’ thought system, as Dieter has 
observed, there are mechanisms which regulate the ordinances of creation in (at 
                                                 
to replace love with any other criterion for action, even in the so-called secular sphere, is a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the doctrine of the two kingdoms. See Theology of the Lutheran Confessions, 222–24.  
82 Althaus, Theologie der Ordnungen, 2nd ed., 67. Emphasis mine.  
83 Althaus, ‘Kirche, Volk und Staat,’ 19–20. Cf. Althaus, ‘Kirche und Volk,’ 353. Kurz has suggested 
that particularly for the early Althaus, the Volk has some sort of eschatological purchase as an eternal reality: ‘For 
Althaus the ordinance of creation “Volk” also had an existence in the Kingdom of God, that is, beyond the world 
bound by time: the individuality of the Völker must have its equivalent in eternity; a “trans-ethnic 
cosmopolitanism” is to be dismissed as a purely human concept’ (Nationalprotestantisches Denken, 432–33, 
440). That is a plausible reading, but I think the evidence shows that Althaus came to stress the penultimate 
nature of the Volk clearly in his mature work.  
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least) three ways: temporally (as they are all subject to the coming Kingdom of God), 
in terms of content (as God can call each ordinance into question), and through their 
mutual balancing of one another.84 Althaus knows that the orders are penultimate, 
broken, and liable to problematic imbalance.  
Yet even after having read Theologie der Ordnungen, Brunner remained 
unconvinced. Moreover, he questioned whether Althaus’ account is actually 
Lutheran at all: 
The one thing that separates us is what I call the residual Romanticism in 
your concept of history, which, it seems to me, comes to expression in your 
political attitudes. . . . You introduce into your doctrine of the state an 
account which I never hear in Luther but which, on the contrary, is in full 
accord with what I have heard—and continue to hear—in the writings of the 
Idealists. For me—and excuse me for saying so—you are simply not sober 
enough theologically when it comes to this issue.85 
 
However, as I have argued, the problem is not that Althaus is ‘not sober enough 
theologically.’ As Mann has shown, Althaus came to emphasise the inherent 
sinfulness of the orders more and more sharply over the early 1930s. Furthermore, 
his theology of the orders is ‘eschatologically structured’ insofar as he acknowledges 
a theoretical distinction between the present state of creation and its intended 
eschatological state.86  
 The larger issue, it seems to me, is that Althaus’ theology has the resources to 
satisfy Brunner’s critique but he does not utilise them in his concrete political and 
ecclesio-political decisions, such his recommendation to prohibit Jewish men from 
pastoral office in the Erlangen Opinion on the Aryan Paragraph. Althaus’ theoretical 
framework for resistance to the distortion of the orders too often failed to translate 
                                                 
84 See Dieter, ‘Das Volk as Schöpfungsordnung,’ 183.  
85 Brunner to Althaus, 29 March 1934, in Briefwechsel, 143–44.  
86 See Mann, Ordnungen der Allmacht, 45–48, 50–51. 
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into the concrete. Put another way, the xenophobic dimensions of his theology 
ultimately overrule the mechanisms designed to prevent this disfiguration of the 
Schöpfungsordnungslehre. 
CONCLUSION | AGAINST HIS BETTER JUDGMENT 
 There is a sense in which Althaus’ critics know him better than he knows 
himself. From their vantage point outside of Althaus’ thought-system, Aulén and 
Nygren could discern the looming threat of distortion that surrounds the doctrine of 
the orders of creation. Barth and Brunner were able to point to some of the internal 
inconsistencies that plague Althaus’ theology with more specificity. In Brunner’s 
judgment, when Althaus developed his hyper-nationalist concept of the Volk, he was 
doing so in violation not only of his own doctrinal tradition, but in violation of 
elements of his own theology: 
Just as with its thinking about the state, modern Lutheranism is strongly 
influenced by romantic Idealism in its thinking about the Volk. This is 
evident, for example, in Althaus with his doctrine of ethnic-vocation 
[Volksberuf]. While Althaus certainly knows otherwise—that is, about what 
the Lutheran concept of vocation really means—he formulates the concept of 
ethnic-vocation in such a way that the purest representative of romantic 
individualism could not have expressed it any more pristinely.87 
 
Brunner’s most penetrating insight is a simple one, and it echoes what I have argued 
here: in order to frame the Volk as an ethically-normative entity, Althaus had to 
violate the principles not only of his Lutheran tradition, but of his own particular 
                                                 
87 Brunner, Das Gebot, 658, note 26. Emphasis mine. Of course, Althaus feels himself justified in 
mapping Luther’s concept of Beruf onto the Volk. Mann has shown, however, that here Althaus is drawing not 
only on Luther, but also on Hegel, Fichte, Schleiermacher, as well as Harless and Hofmann. See Mann, 
Ordnungen der Allmacht, 102–03. As mentioned above, Mann considers Althaus’ development of the Volksberuf 
regulated not by the law of love but only by its own autonomy to be ‘a step beyond Luther’ (104). Jasper likewise 
suggests that in his radical theologies of Volk and war, Althaus is ‘fully conscious’ that he is ‘transgressing the 
Lutheran tradition’ by drawing on extra-Lutheran influences such as Ranke, Herder, the Romantics, the Idealists, 
and the Pietists. Simply put, in Jasper’s view Althaus knows he is constructing a theology that is not strictly 
Lutheran. See ‘Die Zwei-Reiche-Lehre,’ 43–44. The claim, I think, is defensible, but as I have argued above (see 




theological system. Put another way, where Althaus prioritises the autonomy of the 
Volk within his theology of the orders of creation, he is acting against his better 





CHAPTER IX | THE MAKINGS OF A LUTHERAN CORRECTIVE: BONHOEFFER, 
BULTMANN, AND SASSE 
 
The church is not a community of people who are all the same but precisely 
one of people foreign to one another who are called by God’s word. The 
people of God is an order over and above all other orders. 
 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer,  
‘Theses on “The Aryan Paragraph in the Church”’ (1933) 
 
INTRODUCTION | DISEASED IMAGINATION AND ETHNIC TAXONOMY  
If there is a common thread that unites Aulén, Nygren, Barth, and Brunner, it 
is that each recognised that the Schöpfungsordnungslehre is susceptible to 
parochiality. Althaus’ formulation of the doctrine in particular is continually at risk 
of actualising in a deeply problematic socio-theological blueprint for the organisation 
of human communities, but especially for the church community. His theology of the 
Volk is fatally inward-looking, another symptom of what Brunner considers to be a 
serious deficiency in modern Lutheranism: ‘The aversion of modern Lutheran 
theologians toward everything that points toward the supra-national [das 
Übernationale] stems not from their Lutheranness, but from their Romanticism.’ 
Specifically, Brunner suspects that Althaus (as well as Brundstäd and Hirsch) have 
not reckoned sufficiently with ‘the end of all things’ when God will establish an ‘all-
encompassing unified-creation’ that will render all national and ethnic distinctions 
secondary.1  
We turn our focus now to Brunner’s question: can Althaus envision ‘the 
supra-national,’ whether civil or ecclesial? The answer, as I have argued throughout, 
is ambivalent: yes and no. Althaus can, and sometimes does, use the 
Schöpfungsordnungslehre in such a way as to provide glimpses of a semi-inclusive 
                                                 
1 Brunner, Das Gebot, 650–51, note 9.  
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co-existence between ethnic groups. But that is as far as his doctrine of creation can 
take us. This flawed theology of creation is, in my view, further compounded by an 
inadequate ecclesiology. This weak ecclesiology manifests in the inability (or 
unwillingness) to subordinate the claims of the Volk to the claims of the church, 
which exists as a supra-ethnic community elected before the foundation of the world, 
as the Apostle puts it in Ephesians 1:4, and therefore ontologically prior to the Volk. 
Indeed, even when Althaus attempts to conceive of human communities as trans-
ethnic bodies, segregation—both outside the church and within it—proves to be the 
limit of his imagination. The impulse toward racial and ethnic taxonomising is in part 
a reflex that Althaus inherited from a ‘diseased Christian imagination,’ to use Willie 
James Jennings’ memorable language. This reflex distorts the doctrine of creation 
and is usually bound to a profoundly supersessionist theological agenda. This 
diseased imagination also produces a link between supersessionism and dangerous 
nationalisms by extracting the concept of divine election from the concrete 
particularity of Jewish existence; once this is done, election can then be mapped onto 
any national history.2 This supersessionist-segregationist method accounts for much 
of what Althaus is doing in his theology of the ‘Jewish Question.’ 
 And yet in Althaus’ writings there are at the same time traces of an 
alternative theological logic that holds promise to imagine both ecclesial and civil 
communities as supra-ethnic in character. Paradoxically, Althaus flashes perhaps his 
most robust multi-national vision in the midst of one of his most xenophobic tracts:  
There is but one God, and he is above Volk and state. He is concerned also 
with other Völker. He has placed us next to one another and wants us to live 
with one another. Thus we cannot, in our vain presumption, consider other 
Völker as nothing and deny their right to life. Patriotism which has been 
                                                 
2 See Willie James Jennings, The Christian Imagination: Theology and the Origins of Race (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011), especially 209–20 and 250–88. 
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sanctified by Christ is to be sharply distinguished from wild, blind fervour, 
which acknowledges no Lord, and therefore acknowledges no limits to its 
claim or to its power. True patriotism rejoices in the other Völker in their 
particular type and respects the unique design of God which has come to 
expression in each one.3 
 
On the ecclesial front, there is evidence that he understands that the boundaries of the 
church are not coterminous with ‘human demarcations,’ including ethnic 
boundaries.4 On this basis, Althaus can offer an interpretation of the church as a 
mystery that transcends and relativises the ethnic antagonism of the Konfliktgesetz, 
which dominates national relations in the secular sphere: 
In the church, the false absoluteness [die falschen Unbedingtheit] of our 
historical agendas must die off because God’s true absoluteness reminds us of 
the provisionality [die Bedingtheit] of our historical points of view and 
objectives. In the church, therefore, there grows a community which 
transcends all of the antagonism between our goals and paths, transcends 
parties, and transcends all conflicts between peoples [Völkerkämpfe]. . . . 
These antagonisms and conflicts do not simply cease. But they cease to be the 
ultimate concern [das Letzte] and thereby lose their evil, destructive, and 
acrimonious power.5 
 
By the early 1950s, Althaus would come to charge the church with a ‘special task’: 
to provide a ‘home’ [Heimat] for ‘coloured people’ and ‘those of mixed race’ [die 
Rassenmischlinge] who do not have their own sense of ethnic belonging.6 Of course, 
he is still trafficking in the grammar of a racialised taxonomy, but he nonetheless 
shows an (underdeveloped) awareness that the church must militate against the 
ethnic segregation that defines secular existence.  
Although he had the resources to do so, however, Althaus did not bring this 
trans-ethnic theology of the church (limited and fragmentary as it is) to bear on the 
concrete question of the place of Jewish persons in the German churches during the 
                                                 
3 Althaus, ‘Das Vaterland,’ 245.  
4 Althaus, ‘Luthers Wort an die Gegenwart,’ 322–23. 
5 Ibid., 326–27. 
6 See Althaus, Grundriß der Ethik, 2nd ed., 128–29.  
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Kirchenkampf. In sum, his theoretical theology of the church did not translate into 
the practice of communing with Christians of Jewish descent. Instead, Althaus chose 
to privilege the ‘historical agenda’ of the German destiny over the obligation to his 
Jewish neighbours. The reason for this, as I have argued throughout the thesis, is that 
his theology of the Volk—and thus his theology of the ‘Jewish Question’—is 
dialectical, oscillating back and forth between inclusion and exclusion in a tension 
that he could never fully resolve. 
This tension is perhaps most clearly typified in Althaus’ essay ‘Totaler 
Staat?’ from 1934. Here Althaus is advocating a theology of the Volk that does 
exhibit an inclusive dimension. Paradoxically, he imagines the renewal of German 
Volkstum will at the same time provide an environment in which diverse Völker can 
flourish: 
The German Volk will, for the sake of its own historical destiny and for the 
peace of Europe, always think beyond the idea of the Reich and will envision 
its ideal fulfillment as a trans-ethnic [übervölkischen] political ordinance, a 
protectorate under which many people can live according to their type. . . . 
The Reich restrains itself from guarding only the independent existence of its 
own Volk and instead preserves diversity. Fascism cannot conceive of this 
concept of the state. But in the soil of National Socialism it can grow.7 
 
His astonishing misjudgment of the nature of National Socialism notwithstanding, 
Althaus offers a societal vision that is trans-ethnic, but only in a qualified sense. We 
can see his dialectical theology at work again here. The model is inclusive: the state 
must safeguard diversity, thereby making space for the other. But this inclusivity 
takes the form of quarantine: diversity always manifests as segregation—many 
peoples living next to each other ‘according to their type.’ It is precisely this 
theological construct that came to concrete expression in the Erlangen Opinion on 
                                                 
7 Althaus, ‘Totaler Staat?,’ 132–33.  
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the Aryan Paragraph and which, in the end, Althaus cannot escape. This paradoxical 
compound of inclusion and exclusion is the limit of Althaus’ own formulation of the 
doctrine of the orders of creation, and at this point we may also be approaching the 
limit of his theological imagination generally. In this regard, Barth may have been 
right in his judgment that Althausian theology has a tendency to cancel itself out.8  
 Lutheran social ethics has staggered under the combined weight of the 
Barthian critique and the events of the first half of the twentieth century. In light of 
these factors, there have been serious questions about whether the doctrine of the 
orders of creation can be salvaged and put to productive use.9 While I appreciate the 
gravity of these concerns, I am not convinced they amount to a fatal flaw; even while 
theologians like Althaus failed to appropriate the doctrine correctly, there is promise 
for repair within the Lutheran tradition itself. As I have argued here, the chief 
difficulty with the Althausian articulation of the concept is not just the content of the 
doctrine (though of course there are deeply problematic elements here, as we have 
seen), but even more so the way in which he positions the ordinance of the Volk with 
respect to the church. That is to say, the doctrine need not be jettisoned, as Barth 
suggests, but rather put into its proper place. By relying on the work of Althaus’ 
Lutheran contemporaries—Bonhoeffer, Bultmann, and Sasse—we discover 
adjustments to the theology of the orders of creation that avoid the pitfalls of 
xenophobic ethnic segregationism by subordinating the Volk to the church.10 In the 
                                                 
8 See Barth to Althaus, 1 November 1953, in Briefwechsel, 103–04. 
9 Carl Braaten observes that some Lutheran ethicists overcompensated for the doctrine’s perceived 
failure by discarding it and resorting to situation ethics. See ‘God the Creator Orders Public Life,’ in No Other 
Gospel!: Christianity Among the World’s Religions (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1992), 123–24. 
10 I have made an abbreviated iteration of the following argument in ‘A Reappraisal of the Orders of 
Creation,’ Lutheran Quarterly 31:3 (in press, forthcoming 2017). There, I offer a dialogue with Bonhoeffer and 
Sasse as one avenue toward the renewal of the doctrine of the orders of creation. However, this is only one 
proposal among many possibilities. For instance, Nathan Howard Yoder has recently made a compelling case that 
Lutheran ethicists should be looking to the Trinitarian theology of Walther Künneth for the recovery of the orders 
of creation tradition. See Ordnung in Gemeinschaft, chapter 4.  
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brief accounts to follow, we consult three expressions of Lutheran ecclesiology that 
prioritise the trans-ethnic quality of the church over and against the inward-looking 
heresy of what Bonhoeffer calls ‘pseudo-Lutheranism.’  
ONE | THE VOLK IN THE FACE OF THE ONE REALITY: DIETRICH BONHOEFFER 
(1906–1945) 
 
 In the late 1920s, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, nearly twenty years Althaus’ junior, 
joined Althaus in an effort to revive Lutheran ecclesiology by reclaiming a concept 
that had become marginalised in Lutheran orthodoxy: church as communio.11 Their 
interest in ecclesiology eventually found opportunity for concrete expression as the 
debate turned toward how the German churches should handle the ‘Jewish Question’ 
in the early 1930s. Both theologians issued formal declarations about the adoption of 
the Aryan Paragraph in the DEK within months of each other. Although Althaus and 
Bonhoeffer shared some common theological assumptions about the meaning of 
Jews and Judaism, they soon parted ways on an ecclesial ethic—a divide that begins 
to emerge first in Bonhoeffer’s essay ‘The Church and the Jewish Question’ of April 
1933.   
On the face of it, Bonhoeffer approaches the ‘Jewish Question’ on similar 
terms to Althaus: he considers the issue unresolvable specifically because of the 
unique—that is to say, cursed—nature of contemporary Jewish existence. ‘The 
church of Christ,’ he writes, ‘has never lost sight of the thought that the “chosen 
people,” which hung the Redeemer of the world on the cross, must endure the curse 
                                                 
11 Althaus published Communio Sanctorum: Die Gemeinde im lutherischen Kirchengedanken in 1929; 
Bonhoeffer’s Sanctorum Communio: Eine dogmatische Untersuchung zur Soziologie der Kirche followed in 
1930. For an appraisal of these respective projects within the context of the broader development of Lutheran 
ecclesiology, see Rolf Schäfer, ‘Communion in Lutheran Ecclesiology,’ Lutheran World Federation 
Documentation 42 (1997), 133–62. While Schäfer considers both efforts to retrieve communio as an ecclesial 
model to be abortive, he sees greater promise for an outward looking theology of the church in Bonhoeffer’s 
brand of ‘non-confessional’ Lutheranism.  
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of its action in long-drawn-out suffering.’12 Ironically, the very grammar of 
Bonhoeffer’s discourse on the subject is anti-Judaic, even when he is arguing for the 
inclusion of Jewish Christians in the churches of the DEK. Churches that exclude 
Christians of Jewish descent from their communion, he suggests, are submitting 
themselves to the yoke of the Law; they are acting like legalists—that is, they are 
acting like Jews.13 Though his views would famously change over the following 
decade, Bonhoeffer initially authorises the state to take legislative measures against 
Jews.14 Like Althaus, Bonhoeffer cannot escape an anti-Judaic imaginative 
framework, and he likewise engages the ‘Jewish Question’ on prejudicial terms. 
Nevertheless, as is reflected in his ecclesiology, Bonhoeffer is able to overcome the 
völkisch impulse which is evident in his early writings.15   
The theology of Judaism Bonhoeffer puts forth in ‘The Church and the 
Jewish Question,’ then, is not without its problems. However, already in this essay 
we can discern the beginnings of ecclesial ethic that Bonhoeffer would come to state 
with increasing clarity over the course of 1933. Once fully developed, this ethic 
provides Bonhoeffer with the resources to advocate for the full inclusion, without 
qualification, of Jewish persons in the German churches. The challenges posed by 
                                                 
12 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, ‘The Church and the Jewish Question’ (15 April 1933), in DBWE 12. The initial 
drafts of the Bethel Confession of August 1933, in whose composition Bonhoeffer was instrumental, characterise 
Jewish existence as ‘indelible,’ meaning that Jews, marked by God, are therefore able neither to assimilate into 
their surrounding societies nor establish their own nation. See the Bethel Confession, in DBWE 12:418. 
13 Bonhoeffer, ‘The Church and the Jewish Question,’ 369–70. We see a similar line of argumentation 
in Bonhoeffer’s July 1933 essay, ‘The Jewish-Christian Question as Status Confessionis,’ in DBWE 12:372. Like 
other Protestant theologians of his era (including Althaus), Bonhoeffer employs the charge of ‘Jewishness’ or 
‘Phariseeism’ as a rhetorical device to undermine the positions of other Christians with whom he disagrees. See 
Stephen Haynes, ‘Who Needs Enemies? Jews and Judaism in Anti-Nazi Religious Discourse,’ Church History 
71:2 (2002), especially 355–59 and 365–67. 
14 ‘Without doubt one of the historical problems that must be dealt with by our state is the Jewish 
question [sic], and without doubt the state is entitled to strike new paths in doing so’ (Bonhoeffer, ‘The Church 
and the Jewish Question,’ 363). At this stage, Bonhoeffer considers it beyond the church’s jurisdiction to confront 
the state about the morality of its measures; that work, he suggests, should be left to humanitarian organisations 
and individual Christians.  
15 See, for example, the series of lectures he delivered to a German-speaking congregation in Barcelona 
in 1929 in DBWE 10:360–78.  
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the state’s actions against Jews, he argues, ‘can only be answered on the basis of a 
right concept of the church.’16 Despite his ambivalence about the ultimate theological 
significance of the Jewish people, Bonhoeffer is unequivocal that, in its posture 
toward the ‘Jewish Question,’ the very existence of the church is at stake. ‘[T]he 
obligatory exclusion of baptised Jews from our Christian congregations’ signifies a 
status confessionis—a matter of the church’s very essence and integrity.17 
Bonhoeffer fleshes out this concept more fully in his July 1933 memorandum, ‘The 
Jewish-Christian Question as Status Confessionis,’ wherein he warns that if the 
German churches adopt the Aryan Paragraph, the very substance of the church would 
be in peril.18  
With his emphasis on the ‘Jewish-Christian Question’ as a status 
confessionis, Bonhoeffer has been building momentum toward a decisive rejection of 
any attempt to organise the church according to the dictates of National Socialist 
legislation. This line of ecclesial reasoning reaches its climax in his ‘Theses on “The 
Aryan Paragraph in the Church”’ in September 1933, where Bonhoeffer roots his 
objection to the Aryan Paragraph in a critical theological move. Here he makes an 
adjustment to the Schöpfungsordnungslehre by subordinating every earthly order to 
the church: 
In the church, a Jew is still a Jew, a Gentile a Gentile, a man a man, a 
capitalist a capitalist, etc., etc. But God calls and gathers them all together 
into one people, the people of God, the church, and they belong to it in the 
same way, one with another. The church is not a community of people who 
are all the same but precisely one of people foreign to one another who are 
called by God’s word. The people of God is an order over and above all 
other orders. . . . Race and blood are one order among those who enter the 
                                                 
16 Bonhoeffer, ‘The Church and the Jewish Question,’ 362.  
17 Ibid., 366, 368.  
18 Bonhoeffer, ‘The Jewish-Christian Question as Status Confessionis,’ 372. Bonhoeffer considers it 
fundamental that the church’s autonomy be respected both in how its members are treated and in how fitness for 
pastoral office is determined.  
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church, but it must never become a criterion for belonging to the church; the 
only criterion is the Word of God and faith.19 
 
This approach represents an alternative to Althaus’ theological vision. Bonhoeffer on 
the one hand acknowledges the particularity of ethnic identities—he does not pretend 
that ethnic diversity simply does not, or should not, exist within the church—but 
insists on the other hand that every penultimate distinction (Volk, race, gender, or 
political affiliation) is relativised within the collective identity of the one people of 
God. By this logic, the Aryan Paragraph is a ‘false doctrine’ that destroys the church; 
simply put, it is a heresy.20  
 At the same time, Bonhoeffer also knows that many ‘Germans’ will be 
uncomfortable sharing the ecclesial space with ‘Jews,’ given the troubled history 
(real or imagined) between the two peoples. It is a concern that Bonhoeffer 
understands, but rather than conceding to the ‘weaker members of the congregation’ 
who are scandalised by Jews in their midst, he actually recommends conflict within 
the church. These weaker brothers and sisters, he argues, should be forced to tolerate 
a Jewish presence precisely so that they can learn what the church really is: ‘Here, 
where the Jewish Christian whom I dislike is sitting next to me among the faithful, 
this is precisely where the church is.’21 It is on this exact point that the ecclesial 
theologies of Bonhoeffer and Althaus part ways: for Bonhoeffer, the church will self-
negate if it sacrifices its Jewish members; for Althaus, the church will fail its mission 
if it does not.22 
                                                 
19 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, ‘Theses on “The Aryan Paragraph in the Church,”’ in DBWE 12:426–27. 
Emphasis mine. Bonhoeffer is close to the spirit of Luther here. In his Lectures of Genesis (1535–45), Luther 
comments that the church takes priority over all other orders, for it is established prior to the ordinances of 
household and state as a sign that ‘man was created for another purpose than the rest of living beings.’ See LW 
1:103–04. 
20 Bonhoeffer, ‘Theses on “The Aryan Paragraph in the Church,”’ 428. 
21 Ibid. 
22 See David Robinson and Ryan Tafilowski, ‘Conflict and concession: nationality in the pastorate for 
Althaus and Bonhoeffer,’ Scottish Journal of Theology 70:2 (2017): 1–20.  
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These incompatible interpretations of the applicability of the Aryan 
Paragraph in the church are the outcome of the radically divergent ways in which 
Althaus and Bonhoeffer interpret the Schöpfungsordnungslehre as an element of 
Protestant dogmatics. In distinction not only from Althaus, but also from Barth and 
Brunner, Bonhoeffer rejects the concept of ‘orders of creation’ and makes exclusive 
use of ‘ordinances of preservation’ instead.23 Because the effects of sin to are so 
extensive that no earthly ordinance remains wholly intact, says Bonhoeffer, the 
remaining orders exist merely to curb the chaos of postlapsarian creation. As stated 
in Bonhoeffer’s drafts of the Bethel Confession, the mandates of marriage, family, 
Volk, and economy are not autonomous orders of the original creation and are 
‘therefore of no value in themselves, but only in relation to the end which God will 
bring humankind, to the new creation in Christ. . . . They are valid orders of God but 
have no ultimate validity.’24  
These themes come through most clearly in Ethik, where Bonhoeffer judges 
that the misapplication of the Schöpfungsordnungslehre, which mistakes penultimate 
stations of Volk and Rasse for ultimate categories, grows out of a deeper problem 
with Lutheran dogmatics: ‘two-realm thinking [das Denken in zwei Räumen].’25 The 
critical error in this ‘pseudo-Lutheran’ ethical schematic is that it seals off the 
‘secular’ sphere of creation from the ‘sacred’ sphere of God’s dominion. This 
dichotomous thinking manifests in theologies in which ‘the autonomy 
[Eigengesetzlichkeit] of the orders of this world is proclaimed against the law of 
                                                 
23 Barth of course rejects ‘orders’ language altogether. Brunner makes a distinction between ‘orders of 
creation,’ which are founded before the fall (such as marriage) and ‘ordinances of sin,’ which have their purpose 
solely in the restraint of sin (such as the state). Bonhoeffer does not think it is possible to separate sin from the 
ordinances, and thus rejects Brunner’s assertion that some ordinances are ‘ordinances of creation.’ Interestingly, 
Althaus criticises Brunner on identical grounds. See Jordan Ballor, ‘Christ in Creation: Bonhoeffer’s Orders of 
Preservation and Natural Theology,’ The Journal of Religion 86:1 (2006), especially 5–10.   
24 Bethel Confession, 387–89.  
25 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethik, ed. Eberhard Bethge (München: Christian Kaiser Verlag, 1949), 61–69.  
 
 251 
Christ.’26 And while Bonhoeffer does not name his opponent, I have shown that this 
is precisely what has occurred not only in Althaus’ theology of the ‘Jewish Question’ 
generally, but also in the ‘two-realm ecclesiology’ [Zwei-Sphären-Ekklesiologie] of 
the Erlangen Opinion more specifically.27 There, Althaus and Elert maintained 
segregation according to Volk even within the church, which is an accommodation to 
the ‘orders of this world,’ over and against the work of Christ, who in his own flesh 
has ‘broken down the dividing wall’ (Ephesians 2:14).  
Althaus’ gravest mistake, following Bonhoeffer’s logic, is a failure to subject 
the Volk to the one reality of Christ: 
There are not two realities, but only one reality, and that is the reality of God 
[Gotteswirklichkeit] that has become manifest in Christ in the reality of the 
world. In Christ we participate simultaneously in the reality of God and in the 
reality of the world. The reality of Christ contains the reality of the world 
within itself. The world has no reality of its own, independent of God’s 
revelation in Christ.28 
 
With his appeal to the singular Gotteswirklichkeit, which claims the realities of the 
world within itself, Bonhoeffer undermines any attempt to root Christian ethics in the 
autonomy of the orders of creation. But, again, it is important to recognise that for 
Bonhoeffer penultimate things—labour, marriage, government, and most importantly 
for my purposes, Volk—do have interim value, but they are to be distinguished from 
the ultimate (i.e., the final coming of God) both temporally and qualitatively.29 He 
therefore interprets the penultimate through the tripartite formula of incarnation–
                                                 
26 Ibid., 61.  
27 The term is Berndt Hamm’s. See ‘Werner Elert als Kriegstheologe,’ 225, note 60. Hamm sees in the 
Erlangen Opinion the influence of Elert’s faulty understanding of Zwei-Reiche-Lehre wherein the realm of 
Gospel is sealed off completely from the realm of Law. Tragically, says Hamm, Elert has imported his ‘extremely 
sharp’ distinction between Law and Gospel into his ecclesiology in his recommendations regarding Jewish 
pastors in the DEK. Though Hamm traces this element of the Erlangen Opinion to Elert, the document’s 
formulations are also consistent with, and representative of, Althaus’ theology of the orders of creation, as I have 
argued throughout.  
28 Bonhoeffer, Ethik, 62. Emphasis in the original.  
29 Jennifer Moberly emphasises the temporal and qualitative distinction between the penultimate and 
the ultimate in ‘Bonhoeffer’s Everyday Ethics for the Life of the Church’ (paper presented at Reading Bonhoeffer 
for the Life of the Church, St. John’s College, University of Durham, UK, September 20–22, 2016).   
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crucifixion–resurrection.30 The incarnation shows that God affirms the created order; 
the crucifixion evidences God’s radical judgment over and rejection of the fallen 
created order; the resurrection signals God’s intention to remake the created order. 
As subject to God’s affirmation, rejection, and restoration of creation in Christ, the 
ordinances of this world are neither totally ‘destroyed’ nor totally ‘sanctioned’ but 
are instead chastened and brought into submission to the reign of God in Christ.31  
In this respect, Bonhoeffer maintains a proper ‘eschatological distance’ from 
the penultimate world of fallen creation.32 As structures of a crucified social order 
that has not yet been resurrected, ethnic identities and national allegiances are 
therefore relativised eschatologically. To put it another way, as Bonhoeffer does in 
the christology lectures he delivered in Berlin over the summer semester of 1933, the 
continuity between God’s original word of creation and the present state of creation 
has been ‘lost.’ In light of this disruption, things are not so simple. ‘Volk is no longer 
Volk’ in the sense that God intended.33 So, while the orders of this age have their 
penultimate functions of restraining evil and preserving the world from chaos, they 
are also fundamentally questionable. In Bonhoefferian terms, the judgment of God in 
Christ exposes the universal provisionality of all human attempts to organise society, 
eliminating any basis for ethnic hierarchies and chauvinistic nationalisms. One of 
several problems with Althaus’ ethic of the orders, on the other hand, is this ‘loss of 
distance’ between the ultimate and the penultimate.34 As a result of this ruinous 
failure of perspective, Althaus holds his Germanness much too tightly. The 
                                                 
30 See ‘Das Vorletzte,’ in Bonhoeffer, Ethik, 79–85. 
31 Ibid., 85. 
32 The term is Mildenberger’s, who argues that this ‘eschatological distance’ from the present order is a 
critical corrective needed in some forms of Lutheran theology. See Theology of the Lutheran Confessions, 127.  
33 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Wer ist und wer war Jesus Christus? Seine Geschichte und sein Geheimnis, 
Studentenbuch 4 (Hamburg: Furche-Verlag, 1962), 41–42. 
34 Dieter, “Das Volk als Schöpfungsordnung,’ 185–86.  
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Schöpfungsordnungslehre turns toxic when it is asked to bear the weight of the 
ultimate. This is work, as Wolfhart Pannenberg has argued, that the doctrine is 
simply unable to do.35  
Hence Bonhoeffer offers vital resources for the renewal of the orders of 
creation tradition and for a partial repair of Althaus’ xenophobic framing of the 
doctrine. As Bonhoeffer well knew, Lutheran social ethics rests on a complex of 
paradoxes—Deus absconditus et Deus revelatus, law and gospel, the two kingdoms, 
simul iustus et peccator, the ultimate and the penultimate—which must be held in 
delicate balance or else lapse into static dichotomies. This dichotomous distortion, in 
the words of Carl Braaten, is a ‘Lutheran heresy.’36 Had Althaus overcome his 
stringent ‘two realm thinking’ by subjecting the claims of the Volk to the ‘one reality 
of God’ made manifest in Christ, he might have avoided the Lutheran heresy of 
dichotomy and formulated a socio-ecclesial theology in which genuine communion 
with Christians of Jewish descent is possible. 
TWO | BOUND BY BAPTISM: RUDOLF BULTMANN (1884–1976) 
Althaus and Bonhoeffer were not the only Lutheran theologians to find 
themselves at the center of Aryan Paragraph controversy. Famed New Testament 
scholar Rudolf Bultmann also contributed to the debate in several key essays in 
1933. Like Bonhoeffer, Bultmann makes critical adjustments to the 
Schöpfungsordnungslehre to form an ethics more dynamic than Althaus’ static 
system and, consequently, better able to handle the moral challenge posed by the 
                                                 
35 Pannenberg singles out Althaus’ concept of the ‘imperative of loyalty to the Volk’ (Grundriß der 
Ethik, 2nd ed., 124–27) as an especially problematic example of demanding ultimate allegiances from penultimate 
categories: ‘The mere existence of a people is no basis at all for the content that the preservation of national 
distinctions is the will of God . . . The mere fact of an existing national unit cannot provide the basis of an 
“imperative of loyalty to the people.”’ See ‘The Nation and Humanity,’ in Ethics, trans. Keith Crim 
(Philadelphia, PA: The Westminster Press, 1981), 146.  
36 See Braaten, ‘God the Creator,’ 120 and Braaten, Principles of Lutheran Theology, 2nd ed. 
(Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2007), 151–52. 
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Aryan Paragraph. The reader will recall that Bultmann recruited Althaus to sign the 
September 1933 statement ‘Neues Testament und Rassenfrage,’ which was published 
concurrently with the Marburg Opinion. Althaus evidently never responded to 
Bultmann’s petition, and the Erlangen Opinion appeared in print just days later.37 
Bultmann’s letter of September 18, 1933 marks the last significant correspondence 
between the two for a number of years. They resumed their exchange in 1940, but the 
question of the Volk did not surface again.38 
 The fall of 1933 was the critical juncture: Althaus and Elert finished the 
Erlangen Opinion in September, and the Marburg Opinion, drafted primarily by 
Bultmann, was published in October. The stark difference between the two 
documents garnered interest abroad; Anders Nygren, for one, had hoped that the 
Erlangers would have followed Bultmann and his colleagues.39 The theological 
imaginations animating the respective declarations, however, could not be 
reconciled. Like Bonhoeffer, the Marburg faculty saw the implementation of the 
Aryan Paragraph as ‘irreconcilable with the essence of the Christian church.’40 
Bultmann knows that it is a historical fact that church bodies have typically formed 
on the basis of natural bonds, like shared language, or for political and legal reasons. 
This statement more or less coheres with the Erlangen Opinion, but here Bultmann 
makes a critical inference: the fact that churches have organised themselves in this 
way does not mean that they must do so. The community of the church is qualified 
solely by the criteria of baptism and faith; there is no other relevant ‘marker.’41 
                                                 
37 See 112–14 above.  
38 See Rudolf Bultmann/Paul Althaus Briefwechsel, 1929–1966, ed. Matthias Dreher and Gotthard 
Jasper (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012).  
39 Nygren, The Church Controversy in Germany, 44–45.  
40 Marburg Opinion, 290. 
41 Ibid., 290–91.  
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Hence for Bultmann the sacrament of baptism relativises all differences within the 
visible church. This distinction is vital, as he will not accept the quasi-Lutheran 
argument—as put forth, for instance, in the Erlangen Opinion—that this trans-ethnic 
principle applies to the invisible church, but not to the concrete manifestation and 
external organisation of the visible church.42  
 Limitations appear, however, just at the point where Bultmann’s theology of 
baptism shows promise for the genuine inclusion of Jewish persons in the church. 
This theology of baptism, in other words, is in constant danger of drastically 
obscuring, if not obliterating, Jewish particularity. He puts the matter bluntly: ‘The 
baptised Jew is for the church no longer a Jew.’43 This conclusion threatens to 
swallow Jewish identity. Here again, like Althaus and Bonhoeffer, Bultmann is 
working within a deeply supersessionist framework wherein Jewishness is almost 
totally eclipsed by Christianness, even though he insists that both the Jew and the 
Gentile are to sacrifice their respective ethnic identities in exchange for a new 
identity ‘beyond Jewishness and Greekness [jenseits von Judentum und 
Greichentum].’44 Nevertheless, the Marburg Opinion does call the entire order of 
Volkstum into question before the reality of the church: 
Further, one may not argue that Rasse and Volkstum, as 
Schöpfungsordnungen, are not to be ignored, but rather respected by the 
church. . . . The maintenance of Rasse and Volkstum as goods of creation is 
not otherwise possible other than in the fact that it joins these things together 
in itself and proclaims to each the vocation of its particularity [Berufung 
                                                 
42 ‘One may not say that this unity only applies to the invisible church while in the visible church the 
barriers which divide people must otherwise be respected and allowed’ (Marburg Opinion, 290–91). This 
statement can be read as a direct contradiction of the claims of the Erlangen Opinion.  
43 Marburg Opinion, 292. This insight proves problematic. In separating the ‘Jewish Question’ into two 
separate questions, one theological and one political, Bultmann, like Bonhoeffer, authorises the state to restrict 
the rights of Jews in the secular sphere even while he refuses to enforce those regulations in the church.  
44 See Bultmann, ‘Der Arier-Paragraph,’ 369. He argues elsewhere that the New Testament writers 
were not thinking in terms of racial identity; for the biblical writers, ‘Jew’ and ‘Pagan’ are categories used to 
describe a spiritual condition, not a distinction regarding ‘ethnic-individualities [Volksindividualitäten].’ Strictly 
speaking, then, the New Testament can offer no solution to the Rassenfrage. Since for the New Testament authors 
race has no bearing on the question of fitness for ministry, Bultmann concludes that race and ethnicity are 
likewise irrelevant in his own context. See Bultmann, et al., ‘Neues Testament und Rassenfrage,’ 294–95. 
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seiner Besonderheit] as well as the responsibility of its segregation 
[Verschuldung seiner Absonderung]. Otherwise, veneration of the creation 
usurps the place of veneration of the creator.45 
 
Though the Marburg Faculty are trafficking in the language of ethnic segregation, the 
statement still represents an improvement over the Erlangen Opinion insofar as it 
casts a trans-ethnic vision of the church. The accompanying essay, ‘Neues Testament 
und Rassenfrage,’ reinforces the point by emphasising the ‘total equality’ [völlige 
Gleichheit] accomplished by baptism. Where it concerns baptised Jewish-Christians, 
‘the thought that confirmation to pastoral office in the community should be 
governed according to the standpoint of ethnic-racial belonging is out of the 
question.’46 
 Most important for this present study, however, is the way Bultmann 
positions the orders of creation with respect to the church in his December 1933 
essay, ‘Der Arier-Paragraph im Raume der Kirche.’ Here Bultmann is engaging 
directly with the Erlangen Opinion by targeting its confused ecclesiology. In his 
view the Erlangen theologians have fundamentally misunderstood the nature of the 
church and have grossly misconstrued biblical counsel.47 Whereas a Jew might be a 
Jew in the secular world of state and government, says Bultmann, ‘[f]or the church, 
Jewish Christians are simply Christians.’48 Here again we encounter the danger 
mentioned above; namely, Bultmann seems to dissolve Jewish particularity. 
However, the isolation of Althaus and Elert’s distorted ecclesiology is part of his 
wider critique of their application of the Schöpfungsordnungslehre. Bultmann’s 
                                                 
45 Marburg Opinion, 292–93. 
46 Bultmann, et al., ‘Neues Testament und Rassenfrage,’ 295.  
47 Bultmann suggests that the Erlangen Opinion’s conclusions rest on an erroneous interpretation of 1 
Corinthians 7:20 (‘Let each of you remain in the condition in which you were called’). In Bultmann’s reading, the 
Apostle is affirming the various stations (gender, marital status, occupation, etc.) for a Christian’s existence in 
society, but is making the explicit point that these stations do not claim any validity in the church. For Bultmann, 
Althaus and Elert have got this passage exactly wrong. See ‘Der Arier-Paragraph,’ 363. 
48 Ibid., 366.  
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supersessionist impulses aside, his insight nonetheless offers useful resources for 
repair of the doctrine.  
 Perhaps the most serious problem with the Erlangen Opinion, in Bultmann’s 
view, is that it does not know when to surrender its commitment to the orders of 
creation in the face of God’s absolute command. ‘Do the Erlangers not realise,’ he 
wonders, ‘that under certain circumstances, God’s claim demands precisely that we 
ignore, break, and surrender such ordinances?’ He interrogates the assumptions of 
the Erlangen Opinion further: ‘Can we really talk about the mood of the Volk 
[Volksempfinden] as sacrosanct when it comes to the claim of God?’49 As a Lutheran 
dogmatician, Bultmann affirms the orders, but not in every circumstance. In 
particular, the orders can gain no currency inside the church, where every ‘natural’ 
determination is called into question and deprived of any claim to ultimate validity. 
After all, he reasons, if one is simply going to obey the orders universally and 
without qualification in every circumstance, the Schöpfungsordnungslehre is a faulty 
basis for Christian ethics.50 The dynamism of Bultmann’s proposal thus provides a 
critical counterbalance to Althaus’ ethical schema, which can at times appear rigid 
and static in its unsophisticated obedience to the dictates of nature.  
 Indeed, Bultmann exposes a gaping blind spot in Althausian theology simply 
by raising a pointed question: ‘Is not German spiritual life itself a historical 
phenomenon?’ If this is the case, then the divine spiritual vocation of the Volk, upon 
which Althaus places enormous weight, is itself subject to the profound ambiguity of 
all created existence and thus capable not only of good, but of immense evil. This, as 
we have seen, is something that Althaus knew but did not always practice. As the 
                                                 
49 Ibid., 364. 
50 Ibid.  
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essay builds toward its climax, Bultmann strikes the raw nerve of Althaus’ 
ecclesiology as expressed in the Erlangen Opinion: 
If the church wants to have an effect toward the blessing of the Volk and state 
in the new Reich, it can do this only if it fulfills its own specific mission 
unflinchingly and courageously; only when it does not deceive itself about 
the fact that its critical task [ihre kritische Aufgabe] must hold it in constant 
tension with Volk-consciousness [Volksbewußtsein]. . . . A church which 
constantly speaks only out of its efforts to conform to the sensibility of the 
Volk [aus deren Bemühungen um Volkstümlichkeit] and out of a faddish 
concern with relevance, whether out of industrious zeal or thinly-veiled fear, 
will only make itself despicable.51 
 
When the church accommodates a penultimate phenomenon—in this case, crazed 
völkisch nationalism—it forfeits its true prophetic task. Any church that obsesses 
with national identity, either out of zeal or out of fear, will become pathetic. Here, 
then, Bultmann calls the church away from capitulation to prevailing culture to 
courageous criticism of prevailing culture—a kritische Aufgabe which, he warns, is 
dangerous and not glorious. 
 As is the case with Bonhoeffer, Bultmann’s solution is not without its 
problems. In particular, Jewishness is washed away, if not drowned, by the waters of 
baptism. Yet that same theology of baptism holds great promise for thinking about 
how the church might position itself to so-called ‘foreigners’ in its own midst, even 
while it is unclear whether it offers much in the way of engaging Jews as such, that 
is, outside the Christian community. Nevertheless, Bultmann produces an alternative 
Lutheran vision in which the structuring institutions of creation are preserved but put 
in their right order—that is, subordinated to the church rather than subordinated to 
the Volk. By appealing to the sacramental character of the church, Bultmann 
articulates the Schöpfungsordnungslehre in such a way as to avoid the pitfall of 
                                                 
51 Ibid., 369. 
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xenophobic ecclesiology.   
THREE | AGAINST VÖLKISCH HERESY: HERMANN SASSE (1895–1976) 
 Challenges to the underpinnings of Althaus’ völkisch theological system 
came, as we have seen, from both Germany and farther afield, yet among the most 
incisive critiques came from the office of Hermann Sasse, just a few steps down the 
hallway in Erlangen’s theology faculty. As Erlangen theologians, Althaus and Sasse 
shared a passionate commitment to the Lutheran Confessions. Both were concerned 
for the ongoing health and vitality of Lutheranism in Germany—and both feared for 
its future. Yet in spite of their commonalities, their ecclesial decisions during the 
early years of the Third Reich show a significant divergence. Sasse, for instance, 
worked with Bonhoeffer on the early drafts of the Bethel Confession, which rejected 
any attempt to divide the church along völkisch lines. Sasse’s public record of 
opposition to National Socialist ideology—he had been arrested by the party for 
denouncing its political platform in 1933—made him a natural candidate to 
collaborate on the Confession.52 Sasse had also been an outspoken opponent of the 
implementation of the Aryan Paragraph in the DEK, which put him at odds with his 
colleagues Althaus and Elert.53 In this regard Sasse represents a strain of Lutheran 
thought—indeed, within Althaus’ very own Erlangen tradition—that is uneasy with 
the codification of the Volk as a theologically prescriptive entity.54 As such, he is a 
                                                 
52 For Sasse’s criticism of point 24 (‘positive Christianity’) of the party platform, see Cochrane, The 
Church’s Confession, 78. Loewenich recounts the story of Sasse’s arrest and acquittal in Erlebte Theologie, 133. 
For Sasse’s role in the drafting of the Bethel Confession, see Guy Carter, ‘Confession at Bethel, August 1933—
Enduring Witness: The Formation, Revision, and Significance of the First Full Theological Confession of the 
Evangelical Church Struggle in Nazi Germany’ (PhD diss., Marquette University, 1987), 66–67, 73–83.  
53 Green reports that Sasse and Althaus had a contentious relationship. Sasse had apparently questioned 
the Lutheranness of Althaus’ theology of the Lord’s Supper to begin with, and matters were only made worse by 
Sasse’s ‘unflattering descriptions’ of the other members of the Erlangen faculty during denazification. See The 
Erlangen School, 295–96. 
54 Walter Künneth, who joined Althaus and Sasse on the Erlangen faculty in the mid-1940s, is another 
such representative. Künneth also emphasised the ‘ambiguity’ [Zweideutigkeit] of the Volk, which, like all other 
ordinances of creation, is suspended between God and the devil. Interestingly, though, his account of the Volk 
evidences clear signs of Althaus’ influence—including a sympathetic reference to the Verdrängungsgesetz. Still, 
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useful guide in the construction of non-essentialising and non-totalising theologies of 
creation and church.  
 We can only stretch Sasse’s differences from Althaus so far. Indeed, what 
makes Sasse such an interesting foil to Althaus is the fact that, at least in the secular 
sphere, the two mostly share a commitment to the same völkisch ontology. Even 
though, as mentioned above, Sasse suggests that the Lutheran Confessions do not 
prescribe an authoritative theology of Volkstum, he does consider them to provide 
some resources for the theological interpretation of ethnic identity, insofar as they are 
concerned with God’s preservation of the world.55 Even so, for Sasse, the Volk does 
not qualify as an ordinance of creation.56 With that said, however, he does at times 
sympathise with Althaus’ romanticised portrait of the Volk, and his schema shows a 
close ideological proximity to Althaus on this point. Even while he stresses that an 
exclusive focus on the biological factors of ethnic origination leads ad absurdum, for 
example, Sasse also speaks of ‘the peculiar We’ [das merkwürdige Wir] of the 
Volk—a concept cognate to Althaus’ ‘we-consciousness [Wir-Bewußtsein].’ This 
‘peculiar We’ is a mystery that originates in the ‘call’ [Beruf] of the ‘Lord of 
History.’ Once a Volk accepts this call, it behaves as a ‘collective person 
                                                 
Künneth concludes that Völker are ‘interim realities in world history’ that can express no ‘ultimate or permanent 
value.’ See Künneth, Politik zwischen Dämon und Gott, 199–204. It is not insignificant that Künneth, like Sasse, 
rejected the adoption of the Aryan Paragraph in German churches, although his rhetoric on the ‘Jewish Question’ 
is similar to that of Althaus. See Ruth Zerner, ‘German Protestant Responses to Nazi Persecution of the Jews,’ in 
Perspectives on the Holocaust, ed. Randolph L. Braham, Holocaust Studies Series (Boston, MA: Kluwer-Nijhoff, 
1983), 62–63. 
55 For Sasse, the Lutheran Confessions are fundamentally documents for the church, and thus show 
little interest in the ‘national question [die nationale Frage].’ One reason for this is that the reformers have no 
awareness of the modern consciousness of the biological makeup of a particular Volk; more than this, however, 
they are more concerned with unity of doctrine, which can transcend ethnic differences while maintaining ethnic 
particularity. 
56 Sasse, Das Volk, 14–18, 24–25. Sasse finds the terms Schöpfungsordnung and Erhaltungsordnung 
equally confusing and problematic, and prefers the language of ‘divine order’ [göttliche Ordnung] or ‘God’s 
order’ [Gottesordnung] instead (22).  
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[Kollektivperson].’57 These similarities notwithstanding, Althaus and Sasse disagreed 
about how the doctrine of Volkstum should be applied in the church’s witness and 
practice. The crucial distinction between them, it seems to me, is that Sasse will not 
allow the Volk—or indeed any arbitrary human standard—to determine the 
constitution of the church. This is a point that comes through strongly in his 1936 
book Was heißt lutherisch?, to which we turn now.  
 Like Bonhoeffer, Sasse sees the glorification of Volkstum as a symptom of a 
larger problematic within Lutheran theology: namely, a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the nature of the Lutheran Reformation which manifests in a 
distorted version of contemporary Lutheranism. Sasse therefore seeks to dispel three 
erroneous construals of the Reformation: 1) the ‘heroic interpretation’ [die heroische 
Deutung], which reduces the Reformation to a cult of personality around Luther; 2) 
the ‘history of culture interpretation’ [die kulturgeschichtliche Deutung], which sees 
the Reformation as an epoch-making turning point within universal intellectual 
culture; and 3) the ‘national interpretation’ [die nationale Deutung], according to 
which the Reformation is conceived as a triumph of Germanness over and against 
other peoples.58 It is the third misunderstanding that Sasse considers most dangerous 
in his own context, for reasons that he first suggests in the work’s prolegomenon. 
Though he is a Lutheran confessionalist, Sasse argues that the temptation to identify 
‘Germanness’ with ‘Lutheranness’ must be resisted: ‘The Lutheran church holds a 
special place in the history of the German Volk [but] we distance ourselves 
                                                 
57 Ibid., 28. Althaus and Sasse are likely both drawing on their common Erlangen tradition here. A 
generation earlier, Hofmann had spoken of the Bewußtsein der Zugehörigkeit (‘consciousness of belonging’) that 
each member of a given Volk shares. See Yoder, Ordnung in Gemeinschaft, 43.  
58 See Hermann Sasse, Was heißt lutherisch?, 2nd ed. (München: Christian Kaiser Verlag, 1936), 31–59. 
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completely, however, from the national-ecclesial misunderstanding of the 
Reformation and the false equation of “Lutheran” and “German.”’59 
 This insight indicates just how widely the Ecumenical Movement had 
broadened Sasse’s horizons.60 But this rejection of the essential identification of 
Germanness and Lutheranness is also part of his larger effort to discredit any notion 
of a ‘species-specific confession’ [artgemäße Konfession], a concept with troubling 
ramifications. At the same time, Sasse is willing to acknowledge that Lutheranism is 
‘at home’ in Germany and the Scandinavian nations. Of course, that national 
churches have developed around shared cultural dispositions (as is the case with, for 
example, Anglicanism in England or Calvinism in Switzerland, Holland, and 
Scotland) is simply a ‘historical fact [geschichtliche Tatsache].’61 But Sasse stops 
here; the mere ‘historical fact’ that Germany has traditionally been Lutheran is no 
basis at all upon which to conclude that Lutheranism is essentially German. More 
critically, the mere historical reality of these churches does not mean that national 
boundaries and confessional boundaries are coterminous.  
 We return now to the ‘national interpretation’ of the Reformation to flesh out 
the ethical implications of Sasse’s insight:  
[This interpretation] is the view that the Reformation which had its beginning 
in Wittenberg is to be understood in its deepest essence as an event of 
                                                 
59 Ibid., 19. Cf. Sasse, Das Volk, 6–7. 
60 Sasse had been involved in the Ecumenical Movement since 1927, including a term on the Executive 
Committee of the First World Conference on Faith and Order in Lausanne, Switzerland. Though he remained a 
strict Lutheran confessionalist for his entire career, he was always an active player in ecumenical conversions, 
including with Rome. In 1949 Sasse accepted a call to Immanuel Seminary in North Adelaide, Australia, where 
he served until the end of his life. See Ronald R. Feuerhahn, ‘Hermann Sasse (1895–1976): A Biographical 
Sketch,’ in Hermann Sasse, The Lonely Way: Selected Essays and Letters, Volume 1 (1927–1939), trans. Matthew 
C. Harrison, et al. (St. Louis, MO: Concordia Publishing House, 2002), 13–21.  
61 Sasse, Was heißt lutherisch?, 2nd ed., 19–20. Sasse had begun to develop this point his earlier work, 
where he described the ‘social form’ [Sozialgestalt] of the church as determined by the particularities of 
individual peoples (language, cultural custom, etc.). However, this development is merely accidental, not 
essential: ‘It does not belong to the essence of the church that it must exist in any one particular sociological 
relationship. It can also subsist, and has subsisted, where there is no talk of the existence of a Volk or a nation.’ In 
short, there is only one Gospel—not a German gospel, an English gospel, or a Spanish gospel—that determines 
the church (Sasse, Das Volk, 11–12).  
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German national history . . . and that its goal—unfortunately left unachieved 
at that time but open to be accomplished today—is the establishment of a 
German national-church [deutsche Nationalkirche] which could become the 
religious home [Heimat] of the German Volk.62 
 
Sasse deals with this misconception of the Reformation in the harshest possible 
terms, labeling it a ‘heresy [Irrlehre].’ This kind of thinking, he warns, is especially 
dangerous precisely because it is partially correct—that is, because it ‘clothes lies in 
half-truths.’63 Sasse does not dispute, in other words, that the Lutheran Reformation 
is of central significance for German history and even for German identity. What he 
does reject, however, is an essentialising and totalising conflation of Lutheranness 
and Germanness: ‘Whoever understands the Reformation as a Germanisation of the 
church . . . has misunderstood the Reformation.’64 
 Sasse’s criticisms should be understood as directed primarily at the Deutsche 
Christen and more radical völkisch elements within the DEK. However, they are 
relevant also for an appraisal of Althaus, who had already drawn a disastrously 
shortsighted connection between Martin Luther and Adolf Hitler based exactly on the 
kind of Germanist interpretation of the Reformation that Sasse is concerned with 
here.65 As I have shown, Althaus also comes perilously close to a complete 
                                                 
62 Ibid., 49.  
63 Ibid.  
64 Ibid., 50. He continues:  
 
The Lutheran Reformation does not call for German Christianity, but for the truth of the gospel. . . . The 
Lutheran Reformation never and nowhere calls for that which is German, but it does call for that which 
is true, calls for that which is the saving truth of God for all people and therefore—and only therefore—
for Germans as well. . . . There is only one gospel for all peoples, just as there is only one Christ for all 
humans and ethnic groups. There is no ‘German Christ’ and there is likewise no German faith in Christ 
which is ‘species-specific’ [artgemäße] for us Germans (58–59).  
 
65 The analogy appears in Paul Althaus, ‘Luther,’ Zeitwende 9:2 (1933), 353:  
 
Martin Luther, the reformer and church father, is still the most monumental leader and prophet with 
which our Volk has been gifted, the most German of Germans, our incomparable tutor in Germanness. 
At one time the German Volk celebrated him as the liberator from foreign [artfremder] spiritual and 
religious tyranny, as the voice of German wrath against the Roman essence both in church and in 
nation. Germans of 1933 are right to praise him as the most powerful awakener of our Volk to itself, as 
a magnificent incarnation of German Volkstum—and here one may place the name of Martin Luther 
and the name of the German Führer side by side. 
 
 264 
identification of the German spirit with Lutheran belief and practice.66 He had used 
this conflation of ‘German’ and ‘Lutheran’ in his wider writings on the ‘Jewish 
Question’ to make genuine inclusion in German society almost completely 
impossible for Jewish persons. This same ethno-spiritual amalgamation animates the 
Erlangen Opinion, which makes authentic ‘Germanness’ a prerequisite for full and 
unqualified belonging in the DEK. In fact, argues Axel Töllner, conversion to 
Lutheranism and conversion to German Volkstum amount essentially to the same 
thing in the Althausian paradigm.67 Ironically, though, according to Althaus’ concept 
of ‘spiritual types,’ Jews could not be fully Lutheran because they could not be fully 
German, and they could not be fully German because they could not be fully 
Lutheran—and this meant that they would always be second-class citizens in the 
church and in wider society.  
 The logic of Sasse’s account, however, subverts Althaus’ völkisch 
programme specifically by undermining the notion of ‘incompatible spiritual types,’ 
a concept that forms the bedrock of Althaus’ theology of the ‘Jewish Question.’68 He 
does so by retrieving the Reformation emphasis on the utter passivity of faith, which 
he sees as the basis for an authentically Lutheran ecclesiology. Faith alone dictates 
the character of the church; the true community of God will not be determined by 
any external human factor, including ethnic identity. Thus for Sasse a correct 
understanding of the Reformation is vital for clear ethical judgment in his 
contemporary situation:  
                                                 
 It must be said, however, that Althaus, like Sasse, believes Luther’s most important legacy is not for German 
Volkstum but for the church. Still, as this citation makes clear, Althaus was susceptible to nationalist readings of 
the Reformation.  
66 See 55–57 and 134–38 above.  
67 See Töllner, Eine Frage der Rasse?, 62–63.  
68 See 65–66 and 123–25 above. 
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But when one starts not with humanity but with God, as the Confessions of 
the Reformation do; when one starts not with human religion—not even with 
Christian religion—but with the Gospel; when one has understood what faith, 
in the evangelical sense, really is, faith which is awakened by the Holy Spirit, 
faith in the Word of God, in distinction to all human religion within the 
bounds of pure and practical rationality and which is never brought forth ‘out 
of our own reason or strength’: then one comes to an understanding of the 
church in the Reformation sense, an understanding of the church which we do 
not build, but which God alone creates, where God truly is God, where Jesus 
Christ truly is Lord, where the Word of God, the Word of the creator and the 
perfector, of the judge and the reconciler, is the greatest power in the world. 
The concept of the church, both for Luther and for Lutheranism, springs from 
faith in this Word. In this concept of the church, man [der Mensch]—whether 
as an individual or as a Volk—can never play a founding or a co-founding 
role in the church. He is passive.69 
  
It is precisely for this reason that Sasse considers the Volk-church impulse to be ‘one 
of the most dangerous heresies [einer der gefährlichsten Irrlehren].’70 Even 
moderate expressions of this impulse—such as Althaus’ vision of Volkskirchentum, 
by which the church conforms its proclamation and external organisation to the 
demands of the Volk’s historical destiny71—represents a mortal threat to the church’s 
essence. By Sasse’s rubric, then, an ecclesial schematic such as Althaus’ rests on a 
fundamental misunderstanding of Lutheranism.  
CONCLUSION | ALTHAUS AS PSEUDO-LUTHERAN?  
 Is Althaus, in Bonhoefferian terms, a pseudo-Lutheran? Such a conclusion, in 
my view, overstates the case. However, it is worth remembering that it was not only 
the Reformed, but also Lutherans who questioned the assumptions and outcomes of 
Althaus’ unique formulation of the Schöpfungsordnungslehre. Though his critics 
share his supersessionist framework, along with its mischaracterisation of Jewish 
existence, each nevertheless offers an important corrective to Althausian theology. 
                                                 
69 Sasse, Das Volk, 14.  
70 Sasse, Was heißt lutherisch?, 2nd ed., 49.  
71 See 224– 25 above. 
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Bonhoeffer helps us to diagnose Althaus’ tendency toward ‘two-realm’ thinking, 
which fails to subject the Volk to the total claim of the single Gotteswirklichkeit 
manifest in Jesus Christ. Bultmann exposes Althaus’ impoverished ecclesiology, 
which denies the unifying power of the church’s sacraments. Sasse undercuts the 
segregationist logic that drives Althaus’ nativist application of the doctrine of the 
orders of creation. All three call for a sola fide ecclesiology: the church, both visible 
and invisible, must have faith as its lone criterion. Viewed from this perspective, one 
might say, when Althaus prioritises the autonomy of Volkstum above the communio, 
the problem is not that he is being too Lutheran, but rather that he is not being 
Lutheran enough. 
 It is difficult to dispute that Althaus’ ethics, rooted in a particularly militant 
permutation of the Schöpfungsordnungslehre, took virulent xenophobic shape—a 
development that proved especially problematic in his theology of the ‘Jewish 
Question.’ But there is room, it seems to me, to suggest that this did not necessarily 
have to be the case. That is to say, if we read Althaus against himself, we discover 
that there are mechanisms in place in his theology to prevent the demonic distortion 
of the orders that culminates in the idolisation of the Volk. The issue is that in his 
ecclesial practice—in the performance of his theology—Althaus overrides these 
mechanisms. Indeed, the most perverse irony in Althausian social ethics is that it is 
precisely the continued existence of Jewish persons that is meant to hold völkisch 
hyper-nationalism in check. Having reckoned carefully with these self-defeating 
tendencies, I think at least this much can be said: the destructive glorification of the 
Volk—and the troubling byproduct of a system in which the Volk is normative for 
ethics—is neither the natural and inevitable outcome of Althausian theology (chapter 
8), nor is it the natural and inevitable outcome of Lutheran theology (chapter 9). 
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CHAPTER X | CONCLUSION 
 
A theologian of glory calls evil good and good evil; a theologian of the cross 
calls a thing what it is. 
 
Martin Luther, Disputatio Heidelbergae habita1 
 
ONE | ‘DARK, DEPRESSING RIDDLE’: ALTHAUS, JEWS, AND THE POST-SHOAH 
IMAGINATION  
 
 ‘Dark, depressing riddle’—that is how Paul Althaus characterised the nature 
of Jewish existence in 1932.2 Beginning with his earliest writings on the Judenfrage 
during the years of the Weimar Republic, Althaus puzzled over the Jews, a strange 
and dangerous people who threaten to infect German society and yet who bear a 
mysterious theological meaning. As I have shown in chapters two and three, Althaus 
came to interpret Jewish existence according to a dialectic of pathology and 
performance. On the one hand, he always confronted Jewish nature as pathological; 
that is, he believed the demoralising spirituality of the Jews to be infectious and, if 
not contained, lethal. He conceived of Jews as pathogens who must be quarantined to 
protect German Volkstum and to safeguard the German destiny. On the other hand, 
though, he saw Jewish existence as performative. He never envisioned the expulsion 
or eradication of German Jews because, despite the danger they pose, their stubborn 
existence signifies deep spiritual truths.  
 Althausian theology is thoroughly supersessionist. He rejected expressions of 
chiliasm which require the Jews for the consummation of salvation-history. The 
ambitions of ‘Israel,’ and any concomitant salvific purpose, have met their end in 
Jesus of Nazareth, says Althaus, and the church is now the true people of God. But 
                                                 
1 Martin Luther, Disputatio Heidelbergae habita (1518), in D. Martin Luthers Werke, Kritische 
Gesamtausgabe (Weimar: Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger, 1883–2009), 1:354. Translation mine.  
2 Althaus, Römer (1932), 100–01.  
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his system still needs ‘Jews’ to fulfill a number of indirect salvation-historical tasks: 
namely, to interrupt ethnic and racial homogeneity, to frustrate the presumptive 
hubris of all societies, and to portend the coming Kingdom of God. The ‘eternal Jew’ 
now wanders restless about the earth as a sign and warning to all other peoples. But 
beyond these broad theological functions, Jews also hold a unique value for Germans 
in particular. Althaus considered the Jews, as well as their history as recounted in the 
Old Testament, cryptic keys to German self-understanding. He made this point most 
explicitly in his postwar sermons, where he very nearly identifies the German and 
Jewish destinies. The story of Germany is the story of Israel narrated in a different 
register: both peoples are a royal priesthood entrusted (and burdened) with 
uncommon insight into the things of God. Germans, like Jews, must follow a long 
and lonely road; but while there is yet hope for Germans, the historical fate of the 
Jews has been sealed at the crucifixion.  
 The deep-seated paradox of Althaus’ theology of the ‘Jewish Question’ is 
best expressed, then, according to the dialect of pathology and performance which I 
have offered throughout: to include the Jews fully is to contract their sickness which 
leads unto spiritual and moral death (pathology); to exclude the Jews fully is to lose a 
critical component of both the Christian and the German identity (performance). The 
resultant theological vision is inclusive quarantine, wherein Jews are retained within 
German societies, both civil and ecclesial, but always confined to the margins. This, 
of course, is an innovative but recognisable permutation of the witness people 
mythology. In Althaus’ thought-world, the Jews can neither thrive nor perish, but 
must always negotiate a perilous existence on the peripheries of communities that 
simultaneously fear them and need them. André Fischer was near the mark when he 
wrote that Althaus thinks of Jews as ‘a foreign Volk next to—but not against—
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Germans.’3 While this conclusion is true enough, I would add that, for Althaus, Jews 
are against Germans inasmuch as they threaten German Volkstum (such as when they 
manifest as Weltjudentum), but they are also an indispensable ingredient for healthy 
Volksgemeinschaft. In the final analysis, then, they must remain a part of and apart 
from the peoples around them.  
 By using this dialectic as an interpretive grid, as I have done in chapters four 
and five, we can illuminate elements of the Erlangen Opinion on the Aryan 
Paragraph—an important artefact both of the Kirchenkampf and of the history of 
Christian antisemitism—that remain obscured without a thorough understanding of 
Althaus’ wider theologies of creation, the Volk, and the ‘Jewish Question.’ This 
research, then, contributes to our understanding of how Christian theology has 
struggled to engage with Christians of Jewish descent (not to mention Jews as such) 
on account of impoverished ecclesiologies that issue from corrupted doctrines of 
creation. As became clear across chapters six and seven, Althaus could not quite 
relinquish his dialectical theology of the ‘Jewish Question’ even after the horrors of 
the National Socialism and its ‘Final Solution’ had come to light. While he did 
recognise that his völkisch views had become untenable after the Shoah, he only 
gradually came to de-emphasise the pathological dimension of Jewish existence. As 
he did that, however, he simultaneously stripped contemporary Jewish life and 
practice of any purpose.  
 Chapters eight and nine wrestled with the consequences of Althaus’ toxic 
formulation of the Schöpfungsordnungslehre for Lutheran dogmatics and social 
ethics, with particular reference to ecclesiology vis-à-vis ‘foreigners.’ In this respect, 
                                                 
3 Fischer, Zwischen Zeugnis und Zeitgeist, 522. Emphasis in the original.  
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the thesis, while focused narrowly on Althaus, also opens up broader vistas for 
considering articulations of Lutheran doctrine—including proposals from 
Bonhoeffer, Bultmann, and Sasse—which hold greater promise for meaningful 
engagement with Christians of Jewish descent and, perhaps, with Jews as Jews. The 
full scope of repair, of course, lies beyond the purview of this project; however, I 
have endeavored to show that inclusive quarantine (or other expressions of ethnic 
segregation more generally) was not an inevitable outcome of the Althausian 
theological system; it is not the inevitable outcome of Lutheran ethics as such; and it 
need not be an inevitable outcome for Christian theology after the Shoah. 
Nevertheless, Althaus is useful for diagnosing serious problems with Christian 
theologies of Judaism, precisely because, contextually speaking, his theology of the 
‘Jewish Question’ was quite moderate. That is, his is not the kind of rabid 
antisemitism that one can easily dismiss as ‘un-Christian.’ On the contrary, his 
proposal to both reject and accept Jews is the product of a diseased imagination, the 
traces of which contemporary Christian theologians can still find in themselves if 
they know where to look.  
 In the end, the dialectic of pathology and performance collapsed because if 
Althaus could not speak of Jews as reprobate, he found that he had very little else to 
say about them. Because Christian thinkers have so deeply imbibed the witness 
people tradition, where pathology (read: curse) is so closely linked to performance 
(read: witness), they still find themselves in Althaus’ same dilemma. Theological 
speech, not least theological speech about Jews, is remarkably difficult after the 
Shoah, in part because the relationship between Jews and Christians is not reciprocal. 
This is the case on a number of levels, but at the centre of the dilemma is the reality 
that Christians must account for Judaism as part of Christian self-understanding 
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while the inverse is not true for Jews.4 In short, Christian theologians know they 
must say something about Jews, but they are not sure what—especially in light of the 
Shoah. This often makes ‘dialogue’ between Christians and Jews a clumsy affair, as 
the conversation sometimes struggles to go beyond (superficial and platitudinous) 
moral commonalities or agreements to ‘work together’ in and for the world.5 
 Moreover, Christian reflection upon ecclesiology in particular is fraught with 
difficulties in a post-Shoah world. Christians, as Katie Leggett has shown, continue 
to recycle anti-Judaic ideas and distorted conceptions of Jews and Jewish practice, 
even when (especially when?) making a conscious effort not to do so.6 Indeed, a 
persistent tendency to interpret Jewish experience theologically reveals the profound 
irony of much Holocaust Theology, as Stephen Haynes has observed:  
In its contention that the church’s departure from God’s purposes is disclosed 
in oppression of the Jew, Christian Holocaust Theology reiterates a tenet of 
Christian theologians of nearly two millennia: God’s presence and activity in 
a fallen and ambiguous world can nevertheless be perceived in the fortunes of 
the Jew. . . . In earlier theologies the fate of the Jew functioned as a sign of 
God’s judgment upon Israel for refusing to embrace the truth manifest in the 
church. By contrast, Holocaust Theology divines in the fate of the Jews a 
sign of God’s judgment on the church for refusing to recognize the truth 
manifest in Israel. Thus, the notion that history is the arena of God’s 
judgment—a notion long relied on by Christian thinkers to explain or justify 
Jewish misfortune—undergoes an inversion in the creative rethinking of the 
                                                 
4 The dilemma is summarised well by Immanuel Jakobovits:  
 
. . . any parleys between Judaism and Christianity would be between two essentially unequal partners 
on several counts, quite apart from the gross disparity in dominance and numbers in Christian lands. 
Christianity may well have seen a need officially to define its doctrinal attitudes towards the faith from 
which it emerged and eventually broke away. But neither the recognition of this need nor the resultant 
relationship can be entirely reciprocal. Judaism, antedating Christianity by many centuries, had no 
occasion or cause to include in its official doctrines any formal views on a faith which sprang up long 
after these doctrines were formulated in all essentials. It lies in the nature of their history that the New 
Testament can refer to the Old, whilst the Old cannot refer to the New.  
 
See ‘Inter-Faith Relations—Advances and Limits’ (12 June 1971), in The Timely and the Timeless: Jews, 
Judaism and Society in a Storm-Tossed Decade (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 1977), 120.  
5 For a Jewish critique, for example, of the problematic concessions made by the authors of Dabru 
Emet, see Jon Levenson, ‘How Not to Conduct Jewish-Christian Dialogue, Commentary 112:5 (2001), 31–37.  
6 See Katie Leggett, ‘Reconsidering Otherness in the Shadow of the Holocaust: Some Proposals for 
Post-Holocaust Ecclesiology’ (PhD diss., University of Edinburgh, 2014), especially 192–217. Leggett notes that 
some Holocaust Theologians, in their compensatory efforts to reconcile with Judaism, stress the commonalities 
between the two faiths in ways that are facile, historically dubious, or theologically untrue.  
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Holocaust Theologians. However, despite their intention to overturn the 
tradition they have inherited, the Holocaust Theologians actually recapitulate 
the formal characteristics of this tradition: as superlative symbols of Christian 
apostasy, Jewish history, Jewish survival, and Jews themselves are reinvested 
with the unique signifying function they have so often possessed in the 
Christian imagination.7 
 
The witness people mythology is not overcome but rather is perpetuated even when 
Jewish existence is assigned a positive or constructive value—as it is, at least 
partially, in the Althausian theology of the ‘Jewish Question.’ Regardless of whether 
Jews play an ‘angelic’ or a ‘demonic’ role, the matrix through which Jewish 
existence is interpreted remains fundamentally unchanged.8 Put another way: even if, 
in the words of K. Hannah Holtschneider, the mythology has been ‘turned inside out’ 
in post-Holocaust theology—that is, even if ‘negative connotations have been 
invested with positive meaning’9—Jews are nonetheless instrumentalised when they 
are made to perform.  
 Although in much Christian Holocaust Theology the Jews’ function in the 
mythology has changed from curse to blessing, they remain objects and didactic tools 
when Christians interpret Jewish experience, chiefly the Shoah, as a locus of 
revelation for Christianity. Yet, so far as I can see, there is no straightforward 
solution to this dilemma. Christians must continue to do Christian theology and must 
continue to talk about Christianity’s relationship to Judaism—and all of that speech 
must reckon with the Shoah. Althaus’ eventual silence about the ‘Jewish Question’ 
may point to a larger crisis in Christian theology: is it appropriate for Christians to 
comment on the meaning of Jewish experience after the Shoah? In this sense, Jewish 
existence remains as much a riddle for Christian theology after the Shoah as it was 
                                                 
7 Stephen Haynes, ‘Christian Holocaust Theology: A Critical Reassessment,’ Journal of the American 
Academy of Religion LXII:2 (1994), 555–56. Emphasis in the original.  
8 Haynes, Reluctant Witnesses, 5–6.  
9 Holtschneider, German Protestants, 36.  
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for Althaus. I am afraid I can give little in the way of answers except a warning 
against saying too much, a practice still characteristic of much post-Holocaust 
theology. This is where, perhaps, Luther’s theologia crucis might offer a place to 
start—or, better, a place to stop.  
TWO | ‘OPEN WOUNDS’: TOWARD AN ECCLESIOLOGY OF THE CROSS  
 A theologian of glory, says Luther, calls evil good and good evil. This has 
proven true for the predominance of Christian thinking about Jews since the very 
beginnings of the Adversus Judaeos tradition. Yet specifically modern ‘theologies of 
glory’—of which the Althausian theology of Volk is a good example—are at their 
core a perversion of the Lutheran tradition.10 As an almost inevitable byproduct, 
theologies of glory assign positive value to Jewish suffering and displacement. These 
approaches to Judaism are at once supersessionist and triumphalist (and what is 
triumphalism if not the obverse of supersessionism?): Jewish pathology—Jewish 
‘failure’ and misery—is performative. By demanding that Jews perform this or that 
theological task, whether it be the negative tasks of the classic expression of the 
witness people mythology or even the ‘positive’ tasks of testifying to God’s 
providence or to the limits of human achievement (as in Althaus), these theologies 
call evil good. That is to say, they try to invest the senseless suffering of Jewish 
persons with a spiritual significance for the benefit of others. In short, these 
theologies seek to make Jewish pain redemptive, a tendency reflected in the use of 
the word ‘Holocaust’ to describe the genocide of the Jews.  
                                                 
10 Haustein warns: any theology of the Volk which claims ‘“God is on our side” is un-Lutheran!’ The 
theology of the Volk expressed in the Ansbacher Ratschlag, and the one-sided interpretation of Luther upon 
which it rests, says Haustein, has forgotten the theologia crucis: ‘Finally, God’s acting in history is only to be 
conceived according to the “theologia crucis,” that is, in the affliction and downfall of a Volk or a country, never 
in its victories’ (see ‘Der “Ansbacher Ratschlag,”’ 226–27).  
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 And yet the industrialised murder of the Jews threatens to dismantle all 
logics, every system of coherence. The fact that Western tongues have strained under 
the burden of naming the Event reflects this paradigmatic breakdown; the 
multiplicity of (inadequate) terms, argues Omer Bartov, ‘may signify a confusion as 
to [the Event’s] essence, an unease with its presence, fear and anxiety at calling it 
what it really is.’11 But a theologian of the cross must make some attempt to call the 
thing what it really is. Given the disputed semantic range and connotations of the 
available terms, any linguistic choice can only be made to bear so much rhetorical 
weight. Even so, there are good theological reasons for using ‘Shoah’ rather than 
‘Holocaust’ to describe what was done to Jews under the Third Reich. Shoah comes 
closer to calling the thing what it actually is: destruction (and not a burnt offering or 
a redemptive sacrifice). Theologians of the cross refuse to domesticate Jewish 
suffering by making it intelligible theologically. Instead, the theologia crucis names 
the historical plight of the Jews, so often perpetrated by Christians, as evil—and then 
stops.  
 Theologiae crucis are anti-triumphalist and repentant. This means that the 
first step in any kind of dialogue, it seems to me, must be silence. The church will 
find space for this quiet repentance only in ‘vulnerability’ [Verwundbarkeit] to and 
an openness to be wounded by criticism, in the terminology of Lutheran ethicist 
                                                 
11 Omer Bartov, Murder in our Midst: The Holocaust, Industrial Killing, and Representation (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1996), 57. Emphasis in the original. Bartov notes that all the options are deficient: the 
English ‘Holocaust’ is too closely tied to notions of Judeo-Christian sacrifice and instills the murder of the Jews 
with unwarranted empirical or metaphysical meanings; the French génocide implies an analogous relationship 
between the murder of the Jews and the heroic suffering of the French under German occupation; and the German 
Judenvernichtung, language used by the Nazis themselves, is disturbingly clinical. And even while speakers of 
modern Hebrew use the more mundane shoah (‘disaster’), this term has sometimes been made to serve a Zionist 
agenda (56–60). John Petrie offers an alternative account, arguing that the word ‘holocaust’ is a ‘sensitive, 
chameleonic instrument’ with a wide range of (predominantly) secular meanings, none of them fixed. Petrie also 
raises the point that the Hebrew shoah, like the Greek holokauston, has its etymological roots in biblical texts and 
can also signify divine judgment. See ‘The secular word holocaust: Scholarly myths, history, and 20th century 
meanings,’ Journal of Genocide Research 2:1 (2000), 31–63. 
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Hans Jochen Margull.12 Perhaps more than anything else, then, a careful study of 
Althaus’ theology of the ‘Jewish Question’ warns the Christian theologian not to 
interpret the experience (suffering) of Jewish persons theologically. For the Lutheran 
theologian, a repudiation of theologia gloriae must allow that Jews speak for 
themselves in defining their own self-understanding. Put bluntly, the most critical 
lesson Christian theologians can take from Althaus is to stop telling Jews what their 
existence means. This fruitless effort to resolve the ‘Jewish Question’ by 
harmonising Judaism and Christianity into a ‘single paradigm’13 of intelligibility is 
the dead end to which theologies of glory lead. 
 In his 1932 Romans commentary Althaus depicted contemporary Jews as a 
‘scattered, homeless Volk’ who are an ‘open wound’ [offene Wunde] on the bodies of 
their host societies. No other phrase in the Althausian corpus captures the 
pathological dimension of his dialectical theology of the ‘Jewish Question’ more 
poignantly: the Jews are like a wound, viscerally repulsive and liable to infection. In 
his own commentary ten years earlier, Karl Barth had also used offene Wunde 
language in his remarks on Romans 9–11. For Barth, however, it is Christians—and 
not Jews—who are the pathological community whose diseased spirituality threatens 
to infect others. The ‘open wound’ persists on the ecclesial body as a symptom of the 
church’s perennial forgetfulness of its own sin. This incurable lesion is, 
paradoxically, also the remedy for triumphalist ecclesiology; it reminds the church 
that it exists solely by a miracle of God.14 If the church is going to learn to wound 
others less often and less deeply, it will do so by attending to its own wounds.  
                                                 
12 Hans Jochen Margull, ‘Verwundbarkeit: Bemerkungen zum Dialog,’ Evangelische Theologie 34 
(1974): 410–20.  
13 See Conway-Jones, ‘Contempt or Respect?,’ 71. 
14 See Karl Barth, Der Römerbrief, 2nd ed. (1922; repr., Zürich: Theologischer Verlag, 1978), 350f. Of 
course, Barth’s account is not without its problems. His exegesis of Romans 9–11 is thoroughly supersessionist to 
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 There is Verwundbarkeit to Althaus’ thought, but he never brought these anti-
triumphalist themes to full expression in his ecclesiology. He does at times, like 
Barth, emphasise the chronic illness of the church. Tellingly, however, he can only 
draw on these themes by bringing the church into problematic connection with the 
Jews. Ironically, when Althaus’ theology of the church is at it its best, he is calling 
for Christians to behave like his own caricature of the Jews. To say that the church 
needs to learn from the Jews would be merely to repeat the witness people myth; 
however, Althaus’ depiction of Jewish existence would have been better applied as a 
description of the purpose of the church’s existence. Instead of focusing on and 
interpreting the alleged failure of Israel, therefore, an ecclesiologia crucis would take 
on the vocation theologians like Althaus assign to the Jews.  
 This is a move toward which Althaus gestured in 1935, though its articulation 
is obviously flawed: 
The church of Christ wants to take shape within every Volk. But no Volk 
should confuse its mission with that of the people of God or the church of 
Christ. No one Volk brings the world ‘the Redeemer and a redeemed 
humanity,’ but rather it is the community of Jesus Christ through its witness 
to Jesus Christ that does this. It is not the German Volk, but the church that is 
the Gegenvolk of the Jews.15 
 
The language of Gegenvolk is too problematic to be put to constructive use, but the 
underlying concept might prove helpful. The cognate ‘counter-part’ [das Gegenüber] 
may allow us to envision the church as a counterpart to the Jews, holding a vocation 
analogous to the Jewish task as Althaus understands it. In such a scheme, the church 
pursues its own vocation as a people who are homeless, rootless, and scattered 
                                                 
the point that he parabalises Israel’s history as a didactic lesson for the church and ignores living Jewish persons 
almost totally. Nevertheless, Barth manages to avoid the strident antisemitic rhetoric of Althaus’ commentary on 
the same passage.  
15 Althaus, ‘Politisches Christentum,’ 13–14. The notion of the German Volk as the Gegenvolk (anti-
people) to the Jews was a widely-circulated trope during the Nazi years and appeared regularly in antisemitic 
propaganda. See Michael and Doerr, Nazi-Deutsch/Nazi-German, 178.  
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‘within every Volk.’ Instead of assigning suffering as an intrinsic dimension of 
Jewish existence, the church embarks on its own ‘diaspora Christianity’ as it wanders 
on the margins of every society, perpetually dispossessed, and transgressing over 
each ethnic boundary to testify to the limits of every human achievement.16 In the 
ecclesiologia crucis, in other words, the church should perform the functions Althaus 
imagines for Jews—functions for which the Jews did not ask and do not accept.  
 Grave challenges remain, but the Lutheran theologia crucis may yet open 
new possibilities for an anti-triumphalist and anti-supersessionist theology of Israel. 
The cross of Christ frustrates any human presumption—any Christian presumption—
which would claim special knowledge of the counsels of God, including the meaning 
and destiny of Israel. Only after the church has been rendered silent by the word of 
the cross—the word before which ‘all our deductions and conclusions; our efforts to 
illuminate, clarify, and provide metaphysical explanations; and our attempts at moral 
legitimization and aesthetic assessment come to naught’17—can it dare to speak. In 
the meantime, though, the Christian theologian would do well to remember the open 
wounds of the crucified Jew from Nazareth, and remember, too, that his body still 





                                                 
16 The term ‘diaspora Christianity’ is George Lindbeck’s. See ‘Confession and Community: An Israel-
like View of the Church,’ The Christian Century 107:16 (1990), 492. In his early work, Lindbeck had welcomed 
the decline of Christendom as the necessary precondition for ecclesial renewal. Even though he equivocated on 
that point in his later work, he continued to see ‘Israel,’ particularly as it exists in diaspora, as the type of 
community after which the church can model itself. Lindbeck is confident that Christians can ‘apply Israel’s story 
to themselves without supersessionism or triumphalism,’ but I am more skeptical about that possibility.  
17 Ingolf U. Dalferth, Crucified and Resurrected: Restructuring the Grammar of Christology, trans. Jo 




APPENDIX I | THEOLOGISCHES GUTACHTEN ÜBER DIE ZULASSUNG VON CHRISTEN 
JÜDISCHER HERKUNFT ZU DEN ÄMTERN DER DEUTSCHEN EVANGELISCHEN KIRCHE 
(ERLANGER GUTACHTEN) 
 
An die Theologische Fakultät der 
Universität ist folgende Eingabe ergangen:  
 
‚Die in Marburg versammelten Pfarrer und 
geistlichen und weltlichen Abgeordneten 
des kurhessischen Kirchentages aus den 3 
Oberhessisischen Kirchenkreisen der Evang. 
Landeskirche in Hessen-Kassel bitten die 
hochwürdigen Theologischen Fakultäten zu 
Marburg und Erlangen um eine feierliche 
und verantworthliche Belehrung der 
deutschen evangelischen Christenheit 
darüber, ob das von der Generalsynode der 
Kirche der Altpreußischen Union in diesen 
Tagen beschlossene und für die ganze 
Deutsche Evangelische Kirche in Aussicht 
genommene Gesetz über die 
Anstellungsbedingungen für Geistliche und 
Beamte der kirchlichen Verwaltung—den 
Arier-Paragraph enthaltend—der Lehre der 
heiligen Schrift, dem Evangelium von Jesus 
Christus und der Lehre der Apostel, dem 
Wesen der Sakramente, der Taufe und des 
heiligen Abendmahls, den ökumenischen 
Bekenntnissen und der Lehre der 
Reformation von der Erlösung durch Jesus 
Christus, von der Kirche und ihrem Amt, 
von Taufe und heiligem Abendmahl, sowie 
der Präambel der Verfassung der Deutschen 





Die Theologische Fakultät hat nach 
eingehender Beratung, welche die völlige 
Übereinstimmung in den fachlichen 
Forderungen ergab, ihre Vertreter der 
systematischen Theologie beauftragt, die 
Eingabe zu beantworten. Ihr Gutachten 
lautet wie folgt:  
 
Die Eingabe bezieht sich auf folgende 
grundlegende Bestimmungen aus dem von 
The following petition has been issued to 
the theological faculty of the university:  
 
‘The pastors and the clerical and secular 
representatives of the Kurhessen church 
congress of the three Oberhessian church 
circles of the Protestant regional state 
church in Hessen-Kassel, who have 
assembled in Marburg, appeal to the highly 
respected theological faculties in Marburg 
and Erlangen for the solemn and 
responsible special instruction of German 
Protestant Christianity regarding the 
following questions: whether the law 
regarding the conditions of employment 
for clergy and officials1 in the church 
administration—including the Aryan 
Paragraph—which in recent days has been 
decreed by General Synod of the church of 
the Old Prussian Union and is being 
considered for the entire Deutsche 
Evangelische Kirche, is in accordance with 
the teaching of Holy Scripture, the Gospel 
of Jesus Christ and the teaching of the 
Apostles, the nature of the sacraments of 
baptism and the holy Eucharist, the 
ecumenical creeds and the doctrines of the 
Reformation regarding salvation through 
Jesus Christ, the church and its office, 
baptism and the holy Eucharist, as well as 
the preamble of the constitution of the 
Deutschen Evangelischen Kirche, or 
whether the law contradicts these things.’   
 
The faculty of theology, after in-depth 
deliberations which yielded a full 
consensus regarding the professional 
requirements for clergy, has commissioned 
its representatives in systematic theology 
to respond to the petition. Their expert 
opinion is as follows:  
 
The petition refers to the following basic 
provisions from the law regarding the legal 
                                                 
1 I have rendered the term as ‘official,’ but it is important to note that a Beamte is a civil servant. Pursuant to the 
Staatskirchenvertrag, church officials are employed under the same conditions as civil servants in state bodies 
and are thus subject to similar duties and rights. That the effects of the Aryan Paragraph were being discussed in 
the church at all is a consequence of this fact.  
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der preußischen Generalsynode 
angenommenen Gesetze über die 
Rechtsverhältnisse der Geistlichen und 
Kirchenbeamten:  
 
§I, Abs. 2. Wer nichtarischer Abstammung 
oder mit einer Person nichtarischer 
Abstammung verheiratet ist, darf nicht als 
Geistlicher oder Beamter der allgemeinen 
kirchlichen Verwaltung berufen werden. 
Geistliche oder Beamte arischer 
Abstammung, die mit einer Person 
nichtarischer Abstammung die Ehe 
eingehen, sind zu entlassen. Wer als Person 
nichtarischer Abstammung gelten hat 
bestimmt sich nach den Vorschriften der 
Reichsgesetze. 
 
§3, Abs. 2. Geistliche oder Beamte, die 
nichtarischer Abstammung oder mit einer 
Person nichtarischer Abstammung 
verheiratet sind, sind in den Ruhestand zu 
versetzen.  
Abs. 3. Von der Anwendung des Abs. 2 
kann abgesehen werden, wenn besondere 
Verdienst um den Aufbau der Kirche im 
deutschen Geiste vorliegen.  
Abs. 4. Die Vorschriften des Abs. 2 gelten 
nicht für Geistliche und Beamte, die bereits 
seit dem 1. August 1914 Geistliche oder 
Beamte der Kirche, des Reiches, eines 
Landes oder einer anderen Körperschaft des 
öffentlichen Rechtes gewesen sind oder die 
im Weltkriege an der Front für das Deutsche 
Reich oder für seine Verbündeten gestanden 
haben oder deren Vater oder Söhne im 
Weltkriege gefallen sind.  
 
§11. Für die Mitglieder der kirchlichen 
Körperschaften sowie für die Träger 
kirchlicher Ehrenämter gelten die 
Vorschriften der §§1 and 3 sinngemäß.  
 
Die preußische Generalsynode folgt mit 
diesen Bestimmungen formell der 
Gepflogenheit der christlichen Kirchen aller 
Zeiten, die Zulassung zu ihren Ämtern von 
der Erfüllung bestimmter persönlicher 
Voraussetzungen der Bewerber abhängig zu 
machen (1. Tim. 3,1-13). Zu diesen 
Voraussetzungen gehören z.B. für das 
geistliche Amt bereits in den bisherigen 
deutschen Landeskirchen außer der 
relationships of clergy and church officials, 
which has been adopted by the Prussian 
General Synod:  
 
 
§1, Section 2. Whoever is of non-Aryan 
descent or is married to a person of non-
Aryan descent may not be appointed as 
clergy or as an official of the general 
church administration. Clergy or officials 
of Aryan descent who enter into marriage 
with a person of non-Aryan descent are to 
be dismissed. The question of who 
qualifies as person of non-Aryan descent is 
to be determined according to the 
provisions of the Reich’s statutes.  
 
 
§3, Section 2. Clergy or officials who are 
of non-Aryan descent or are married to a 
person of non-Aryan descent are to be 
placed into retirement.  
Section 3. The implementation of Section 2 
may be waived if there exists extraordinary 
service toward the formation of the church 
in the German spirit.  
Section 4. The provisions of Section 2 do 
not apply for clergy and officials who have 
already been clergy or officials of the 
church, the Reich, a federal state or of 
another institution of a public agency since 
August 1, 1914, or who served at the front 
during the World War for the German 
Reich or for its allies, or who whose father 




§11. The provisions in clauses 1 and 3 
apply in the same way for members of the 
church body as well as for bearers of 
honorary church positions. 
 
With these stipulations, the Prussian 
General Synod is formally following the 
custom of Christian churches in all times 
by making admission to its offices 
dependent upon the fulfillment of certain 
personal requirements on the part of the 
candidate (1 Timothy 3:1-13). These 
prerequisite conditions for the clerical 
office in the German regional state 
churches also include, for example, 
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deutschen Reichsangehörigkeit auch 
biologische Merkmale, des Alters, des 
Geschlechts und der körperlichen Eignung. 
In den angeführten Bestimmungen ist die 
Forderung arischer Abstammung neu 
hinzugekommen. Für die theologisches 
Beurteilung dieser Forderung ist das 
Verhältnis der christlichen Kirchen zu den 
völkischen Unterschieden, insbesondere die 
Wirkung dieses Verhältnisses auf die 
Zulassung zu den kirchlichen Ämtern zu 
prüfen.  
 
§1. Nach dem Zeugnis des Neuen 
Testaments ist in Jesus Christus unserem 
Herrn, in seinem Sterben und Auferstehen 
der Wille Gottes zu Erfüllung gekommen, 
daß allen Menschen geholfen werde. Von 
der universalen Geltung diese Evangeliums 
ist kein Mensch, geschweige ein ganzes 
Volk auszuschließen. Alle zum Glauben 
gekommen sind nach dem Zeugnis des 
Apostels Eins in Christo. In der 
Verbundenheit mit Christus gibt es vor Gott 
keinen Unterschied zwischen Juden und 
Nichtjuden. Aber die allen Christen 
gemeinsame Gotteskindschaft hebt die 
biologischen und gesellschaftlichen 
Unterschiede nicht auf, sondern bindet jeden 
an den Stand, in dem er berufen ist (1. Kor. 
7,20). Die biologische Bindung an ein 
bestimmtes Volk, der wir schicksalhaft nicht 
entrinnen können, ist vom Christen mit 
Gesinnung und Tat auch anzuerkennen. 
 
§2. Die äußere Ordnung der christlichen 
Kirche hat nach reformatorischer Lehre im 
Unterschied von der römischen-katholischen 
nicht nur der Universalität des Evangeliums, 
sondern auch der historisch-völkischen 
Gliederung der christlichen Menschen zu 
entsprechen. Nach der Conf. Aug. VII ist 
die Forderung der Einheit auf die Reinheit 
der Lehre und der Sakramentsverwaltung zu 
beschränken. Die daneben mögliche 
Unterschiedenheit in anderen Fragen der 
Kirchenordnung wird von der Apologie 
erläutert durch den Hinweis darauf, daß in 
der alten Kirche die Judenchristen einer 
anderen Kirchenordnung folgten als die 
Heidenchristen (Apol. 4,42ff., Müller, 161). 
Das Eins-Sein in Christus ist für die 
lutherischen Bekenntnisse keine Frage der 
biological criteria such as age, gender, and 
physical suitability, aside from the already 
existing criterion of belonging to the 
German Reich. In the stipulations quoted 
above, the requirement of Aryan ancestry 
has been newly added. To come to a 
theological assessment of this requirement, 
it is necessary to examine the relationship 
of the Christian churches to ethnic 
differences, especially the effect of this 
relationship on admission to ecclesial 
offices.  
 
§1. According to the witness of the New 
Testament, in Christ Jesus our Lord, in his 
death and resurrection, the will of God has 
come to fulfillment so that all people might 
be helped. No person, let alone an entire 
Volk, is to be excluded from the universal 
application of the Gospel. According to the 
testimony of the Apostle, all who have 
come to faith are one in Christ. In 
communion with Christ there is no 
distinction between Jew and non-Jew 
before God. But the status that all 
Christians share as children of God does 
not abolish biological and societal 
differences, but rather binds each person 
into the station into which he has been 
called (1 Corinthians 7:20). The biological 
bond to a particular Volk, which is a 
destiny that cannot be escaped, is to be 
respected by Christians both in disposition 
and deed.  
 
§2. According to Reformation doctrine, 
and in distinction from Roman Catholic 
teaching, the external ordinance of the 
church must correspond not only to the 
universality of the Gospel, but must also 
conform to the historical-ethnic 
classification of Christian peoples. 
According to Article VII of the Augsburg 
Confession, the requirement of unity is to 
be limited to purity of doctrine and 
administration of the sacraments. The 
Apology illustrates possible differences in 
other questions of church ordinance with 
evidence that, in the early church, the 
Jewish-Christians followed a different 
church-order than Gentile Christians 
(Apology 4:42ff., Müller, 161). Being one 
in Christ is for the Lutheran confessions 
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äußeren Organisation, sondern des 
Glaubens.  
 
Diesen Grundsätzen entsprechen haben sich 
die aus der Wittenberger Reformation 
hervorgegangen Kirchentümer den Grenzen 
der verschiedenen Völker eingefügt und in 
ihrer Kirchensprache, in Kultus und 
Verfassung die nationalen 
Eigentümlichkeiten nicht nur geschont, 
sondern zu ihrer Pflege und Erhaltung 
wesentliche beigetragen. Auch die äußere 
Mission der lutherischen Kirche war in 
steigendem Maße darauf bedacht, die 
Verkündigung des Evangeliums bei fremden 
Völkern in der Ordnung neuer, ihrer 
völkischen Art besonders entsprechender 




§3. Ist die völkische Mannigfaltigkeit der 
äußeren Kirchenordnung eine notwendige 
Folge der sowohl schicksalhaften wie 
ethisch zu bejahenden völkischen 
Gliederung überhaupt, so ist ihr auch bei der 
Zulassung zu den Ämtern der Kirche von 
dem Zeitpunkt ab Rechnung zu tragen, wo 
eine Missionskirche zu Volkskirche 
geworden ist. Der Träger des geistlichen 
Amtes soll mit seiner Gemeinde in ihrer 
irdischen Existenz so verbunden sein, daß 
die ihr daraus erwachsenden Bindungen 
auch die seinen sind. Dazu gehört die 
Bindung an das gleiche Volkstum. Die 
reformatorischen Kirchen haben diesen 
Grundsatz in der Regel praktisch befolgt, 
auch schon ehe er theorisch formuliert 
wurde.  
 
§4. Ob und wieweit dieser Grundsatz auch 
gegenüber den unter uns wohnenden 
Christen jüdischer Abstammung 
anzuwenden ist, bedarf besondere 
Erörterung. Es fragt sich zunächst, ob die in 
Deutschland ansässigen Juden im vollen 
Sinne dem deutschen Volke angehören oder 
eigenen Volkstums und somit ein Gastvolk 
sind. Die Kirche als solche kann das nicht 
entscheiden. Für sie ist freilich das jüdische 
Volk auch heute nicht ein Volk wie andere: 
es bleibt in Erwählung und Fluch das 
heilsgeschichtliche Volk, das Volk Jesu und 
not a question of external organisation, but 
of faith. 
 
The national churches which emerged from 
the Wittenberg Reformation, according to 
these fundamental principles, have adapted 
themselves to the boundaries between 
different peoples, and have not only 
protected those boundaries in the 
vernacular language, the worship, and the 
makeup of each national particularity, but 
they have also contributed essentially to 
the cultivation and maintenance of those 
boundaries. The outward mission of the 
Lutheran church also increasingly came to 
consider how the proclamation of the 
Gospel among foreign peoples might be 
accomplished in the form of new ethno-
national churches that specially correspond 
to their ethnic type.  
 
§3. Because the ethnic plurality of external 
church ordinance is a necessary result of 
ethnic classification in general, which is to 
be affirmed as both a matter of destiny and 
as a matter of ethics, admission to the 
offices of the church must be taken into 
account from the point in time at which a 
mission-church has become a ethno-
national church. The bearer of the spiritual 
office should be so closely bound to his 
community in its earthly existence that the 
ties that bind his community are also his. 
This includes a bond to the same Volkstum. 
As a rule, the churches of the Reformation 
followed this principle in practice even 




§4. Whether and to what extent this 
principle is to be applied also to those 
Christians of Jewish descent living among 
us requires special consideration. The first 
question is whether the Jews residing in 
Germany are members of the German Volk 
in a full sense or whether they are their 
own Volkstum living as a guest-people. 
The church as such cannot decide that. For 
the church, the Jewish Volk is certainly not, 
even today, a Volk just like any other: it 
remains the salvation-historical Volk in its 
election and curse, the Volk of Jesus and of 
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der Apostel nach dem Fleisch, als Volk 
aufbewahrt für eine endliche Geschichte 
Jesu Christi mit ihm (Matth. 23,39; Röm. 
11). In seiner landlosen Zerstreuung durch 
die Völker erinnert es an die Grenzen aller 
völkischen Geschlossenheit, die 
Vorläufigkeit der Sonderung der Völker, 
and das eine Reiche Gottes, das durch den 
Israel verheißenen Christus kommt. Aber 
aus diesem Wissen der Kirche um die 
heilsgeschichtliche Einzigkeit und das 
Geheimnis des jüdischen Volkes ergibt sich 
nicht die Möglichkeit, die Frage zu 
entscheiden, ob das unter uns wohnende 
Judentum im vollen Sinne zum deutschen 
Volke gehört oder ein fremdes, ein Gastvolk 
ist. Auch nicht für die Judenchristen kann 
die Kirche diese Frage allgemeingültig, 
etwa durch den Hinweis auf das Sakrament 
der Taufe, beantworten. Das Bekenntnis der 
Kirche zur Heilsbedeutung der Taufe 
schließt als solches z.B. kein Urteil darüber 
ein, ob Eheschließungen zwischen 
Deutschen und getauften, christusgläubigen 
Juden im ganzen erwünscht oder zu 
wiederraten sind. Die Frage nach dem 
völkischen Verhältnis von Deutschtum und 
Judentum ist biologisch-geschictlicher Art. 
Sie kann nur von unserem Volke, wie 
entsprechend von jedem anderen, im Blick 
auf seine besondere biologisch-
geschichtliche Lage beantwortet werden. 
 
 
§5. Das deutsche Volk empfindet heute die 
Juden in seiner Mitte mehr denn je als 
fremdes Volkstum. Es hat die Bedrohung 
seines Eingenlebens durch das emanzipierte 
Judentum erkannt und wehrt sich gegen 
diese Gefahr mit rechtlichen 
Ausnahmebestimmungen. Im Ringen um die 
Erneuerung unseres Volkes schließt der 
neue Staat Männer jüdischer oder 
halbjüdischer Abstammung von führenden 
Ämtern aus. Die Kirche muß das 
grundsätzliche Recht des Staates zu solchen 
gesetzgeberischen Maßnahmen anerkennen. 
Sie weiß sich selber in der gegenwärtigen 
Lage zu neuer Besinnung auf ihre Aufgabe, 
Volkskirche der Deutschen zu sein, gerufen. 
the apostles (according to the flesh), and 
the Volk being preserved for its final 
history with Jesus Christ (Matthew 23:39; 
Romans 11). In its landless dispersion 
throughout the peoples, Jewry reminds us 
of the limits of all ethnic national 
solidarity, the provisional nature of ethnic 
segregation, and of the Kingdom of God, 
which will come through the Christ who 
has been promised to Israel. But the 
church’s knowledge of the salvation-
historical uniqueness and the mystery of 
the Jewish Volk does not yield the 
possibility of deciding the question of 
whether the Jews living among us belong 
to the German Volk in the fullest sense, or 
whether it is a foreign guest-people. The 
church cannot give a universally valid 
answer to this question, even for Jewish 
Christians, through, for example, reference 
to the sacrament of baptism. The church’s 
confession of baptism’s salvific 
significance, as such, does not include, for 
instance, a judgment about whether 
marriages between Germans and baptised 
Jews who believe in Christ are wholly 
desirable or whether they are to be advised 
against. The question of the ethnic 
relationship between Germanness and 
Jewishness is biological and historical in 
nature. It can only be answered by our Volk 
as it relates to another Volk in view of its 
particular biological-historical situation.2  
 
§5. Today more than ever the German Volk 
perceives the Jews in its midst as an alien 
Volkstum. It has recognised the threat to its 
own life posed by emancipated Jewry and 
has defended itself against this danger with 
legal exclusion clauses [i.e. barring Jews 
from civil service]. In the struggle for the 
renewal of our Volk the new state is 
excluding men of Jewish or half-Jewish 
descent from offices of leadership. The 
church must respect the fundamental right 
of the state to take such legislative 
measures. In this present situation, the 
church knows itself to be called to a new 
consciousness of its task: to be an ethno-
national church for Germans. Today, this 
                                                 
2 Althaus and Elert mean to communicate that every Volk has to answer the question of its own relationship to the 
Jews individually.  
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Dazu gehört, daß sie heute ihren Grundsatz 
von der völkischen Verbundenheit der 
Amsträger mit ihrer Gemeinde bewußt neu 
geltend macht und ihn auch auf die Christen 
jüdischer Abstammung anwendet. Für die 
Stellung der Kirche im Volksleben und für 
die Erfüllung ihrer Aufgabe würde in der 
jetzigen Lage die Besetzung ihrer Ämter mit 
Judenstämmigen im allgemeinen eine 
schwere Belastung und Hemmung bedeuten. 
Die Kirche muß daher die Zurückhaltung 
ihrer Judenchristen von den Ämtern fordern. 
Ihre volle Gliedschaft in der Deutschen 
Evangelischen Kirchen wird dadurch nicht 
bestritten oder eingeschränkt, so wenig wie 
die anderer Glieder unserer Kirche, welche 
die Voraussetzungen für die Zulassung zu 





§6. Diese grundsätzliche Haltung bedeutet 
kein starres Gesetz, sondern läßt Raum für 
Ausnahmen von der Regel. Das staatliche 
‚Gesetz zur Widerherstellung des 
Berufsbeamtentums’ erkennt in der 
Feststellung der Ausnahmen von seinen 
Bestimmungen an, daß Juden z.B. durch die 
Bereitschaft zum Opfer des Lebens für 
Deutschland sich dem deutschen Volke 
eingliedern können. Damit ist zugestanden, 
daß die Grenze zwischen den Juden und 
dem deutschen Volke im einzelnen nicht 
starr, sondern fließend ist. Die Kirche selber 
weiß, daß auch und gerade die echte 
Bekehrung zu Jesus Christus einen Juden 
durch sein Einwurzeln in der Kirche aus der 
Fremdheit zur Gliedschaft am deutschen 
Volke führen kann.  
 
 
Dem allen entspricht es, daß die Kirche in 
ihrer Ordnung ausdrücklich Raum läßt für 
die Ausnahme, daß zu ihren Ämtern 
Christen jüdischer oder halbjüdischer 
Abstammung zugelassen werden. Die 
Versehung kirchlicher Ämter durch 
Judenstämmige ist in unserer Kirche immer 
selten gewesen und soll auch in Zukunft den 
Charakter der Ausnahme behalten, muß als 
solche aber bei besonderen Führungen 
möglich bleiben.  
task requires that the church must once 
again consciously assert its principle of 
ethnic solidarity between the bearer of a 
spiritual office and his community and 
apply this principle also to Christians of 
Jewish descent. In the present situation, to 
have men of Jewish stock occupy the 
church’s offices would mean a severe 
strain on and inhibition of the church’s 
position in the life of the Volk and for the 
fulfillment of its tasks. Therefore the 
church must require that its Jewish 
Christians be restrained from taking 
pastoral office. Their full membership in 
the Deutsche Evangelische Kirche, 
however, is not thereby denied or 
otherwise restricted, just as little as it is 
denied or restricted for those other 
members of our church who fail to meet 
the criteria for admission to the offices of 
the church in some other respect.   
 
§6. This basic position does not represent a 
hard and fast law, but rather leaves room 
for exceptions from the rule. In its 
statement of exceptions from its 
stipulations, the state’s ‘Law for the 
Restoration of the Professional Civil 
Service’ acknowledges, for example, that 
Jews can incorporate themselves into the 
German Volk through their willingness to 
sacrifice their lives for Germany. By this it 
is granted that the boundary between the 
Jews and the German Volk, in individual 
situations, is not rigid, but fluid. The 
church itself knows that a genuine 
conversion to Jesus Christ can lead a Jew 
directly out of foreignness from the 
German people to membership in the 
German people through his being rooted 
into the church. 
 
It follows from all of this that the church, 
in its ordinance, explicitly leaves room for 
exceptions in which Christians of Jewish 
or half-Jewish descent may be admitted to 
its offices. The administration of the 
ecclesial office by men of Jewish stock has 
always been rare in our church and it 
should continue to maintain the character 
of an exception also in the future, but as 
such it must remain a possibility according 




§7. Diese Ausnahme betrifft in erster Linie 
die Geistlichen und Amsträger jüdischer 
oder halbjüdischer Abstammung, die schon 
im Amte stehen. Es verletzt das Wesen 
insonderheit des geistlichen Amtes, der 
Ordination und Berufung zu ihm, wenn die 
Kirche allgemein Geistliche jüdischer oder 
halbjüdischer Abstammung, die sich im 
Dienste bewährt haben, lediglich wegen 
ihrer Abstammung aus dem Dienste entläßt. 
Nicht—wie im §3 des preußischen 
Kichengesetztes—ihre Belassung im Amte, 
sondern ihre Entlassung bedarf von Fall zu 
Fall besonderer Begründung. Die Fälle, in 
denen aus Anlaß der jüdischen Abstammung 
des Geistlichen unüberwindliche 
Schwierigkeiten zwischen den Pfarrer und 
der Gemeinde entstehen, sind nach den 
kirchlichen Vorschriften zu behandeln, die 
auch sonst für Fälle der Zerrüttung des 
Vertrauensverhältnisses zwischen Pfarrer 
und Gemeinde gelten. Die Kirche kann hier 
überall nicht einfach die Bestimmungen der 
staatlichen Gesetzgebung übernehmen, 
sondern muß nach Regeln handeln, die sich 
aus ihrem Wesen als Kirche ergeben.  
 
 
Was schließlich die Fälle künftiger 
Zulassung von Männern jüdischer Herkunft 
zu den kirchlichen Ämtern anlangt, so wird 
die Kirche auch für die Begründung und 
Begrenzung dieser Ausnahmen eigene 
Grundsätze kirchlicher Art finden müssen. 
Sie weist die Entscheidung der einzelnen 
Fälle am besten ihren Bischöfen zu.  
 
Erlangen, den 25. September 1933 
D. Paul Althaus D. Dr. Werner Elert 
Ordentliche Professoren der Theologie 
 
 
§7. This exception concerns first of all 
those clergy and officials of Jewish or half-
Jewish descent who are already in office. It 
would violate the essence of the pastoral 
office in particular, including ordination 
and calling to that office, if the church 
were, as a rule, to relieve from duty pastors 
of Jewish or half-Jewish descent, who have 
proven themselves faithful in service to the 
church, solely on the basis of their 
ancestry. Statement of extraordinary 
grounds should be required on a case-by-
case basis not for their retention in office—
as in Clause 3 of Prussian church bylaw—
but for their dismissal. Cases in which 
insurmountable difficulties arise between 
the pastor and the community on account 
of the Jewish ancestry of the pastor should 
be handled according to the ecclesial 
regulations, which ordinarily apply in the 
event of a breakdown of the relationship of 
trust between the pastor and the 
congregation. Here the church cannot 
simply adopt the regulations of the state’s 
legislation in every respect, but rather it 
must act according to the rules which arise 
out of its nature as the church.  
 
Finally, as it concerns the admission of 
men of Jewish descent to the church’s 
offices in future cases, the church must 
establish ecclesial principles to determine 
the justification for and limits of these 
exceptions. It is best that the church assign 
the decision of these individual cases to its 
bishops. 
 
Erlangen, September 25, 1933 
DD. Paul Althaus and  
DD. Dr. Werner Elert 











APPENDIX II | DER ‘ANSBACHER RATSCHLAG’ ZU DER BARMER ‘THEOLOGISCHEN 
ERKLÄRUNG’  
 
Die in der Deutschen Evangelischen Kirche 
seit ihrer Bildung im Jahre 1933 enstandene 
Spaltungen [sic] nötigen alle ihre Glieder zu 
Besinnung auf den Grund und den Umfang 
ihr eigenen kirchlichen Bindung. 
Insbesondere sind alle Träger des Pfarramts 
dazu verpflichtet, um den fragenden oder 
irre gewordenen Gliedern unserer Kirche 
kraft ihres Lehramts antworten und helfen 
zu können. Daher schließen wir uns im 
Glauben an die Verheißung unseres Herrn 
für alle, die sich in seinem Namen 
versammeln, zu gemeinsamer theologischer 
Arbeit zusammen. Wir unterscheiden dabei 
die Grundlagen und die Aufgaben unserer 
Arbeit wie folgt:  
 
 
A. Die Grundlagen.  
1. Die Kirche Jesu Christi als Werkstatt des 
heiligen Geistes ist gebunden an Gottes 
Wort. Daher sind ihre Glider dem Worte 
Gottes zum Gehorsam verpflichtet.  
 
 
In den Bekenntnissen unserer evangelisch-
lutherischen Kirche erkennen wir die reine 
Darlegung des Inhalts der Heiligen Schrift. 
Daher sind die Glieder der Kirche auch 
ihnen zum Gehorsam verpflichtet.  
 
 
Wir stimmen überein mit Löhes Verständnis 
der Reformation: ‚Sie ist vollendet in der 
Lehre, sie ist unvollendet in den Folgen der 
Lehre.’  
 
Ebenso stimmen wir dem Wort des Erlanger 
Theologen Gottfried Thomasius zu: ‚Ich 
weiß mich überhaupt im Hause meiner 
Kirche nicht als Knecht, sondern als ein 
Kind und finde in diesem Stande beides, die 
Gebundenheit der Pietät und die 
Kindesfreiheit.’  
 
2. Das Wort Gottes redet zu uns als Gesetz 
und Evangelium. Die kirchliche 
Verkündigung hat sich danach zu richten. 
Das Evangelium ist die Botschaft von dem 
für unsere Sünde gestorbenen und um 
The divisions which have arisen within the 
Deutsche Evangelische Kirche since its 
formation in 1933 compel all of its 
members to reflection on the foundation 
and the scope of their own ecclesial 
commitment. In particular, all bearers of 
the pastoral office are obligated to do so, in 
order to be able, by virtue of their teaching 
responsibility, to respond to and to help 
those members of our church who are 
questioning or have fallen into error. 
Therefore we join in this shared theological 
work, united by faith in the promise of our 
Lord for all who gather together in his 
name. We distinguish the fundamental 
principles and the tasks of our theological 
work as follows: 
 
A. The fundamental principles.  
1. The church of Jesus Christ, as a 
workplace of the Holy Spirit, is bound to 
the Word of God. Its members are 
therefore obligated to obedience to the 
Word of God.  
 
In the confessions of our evangelical 
Lutheran church we recognise the pure 
explanation of the content of the Holy 
Scripture. The members of the church are 
likewise obligated to obedience to these 
confessions.  
 
We concur with Wilhelm Löhe’s 
understanding of the Reformation: ‘It is 
perfect in doctrine, but it is imperfect in the 
implementation of that doctrine.’  
 
Likewise, we agree with the word of the 
Erlangen theologian Gottfried Thomasius: 
‘In the household of my church I perceive 
myself by no means as a servant, but as a 
child, and in this station I find both the 
duty to piety and the freedom of a beloved 
child.’  
 
2. The Word of God addresses us as Law 
and Gospel. The church’s proclamation 
must conform to this fact. The Gospel is 
the message of the Lord Jesus Christ, who 
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unserer Gerechtigkeit willen auferweckten 
Herrn Jesus Christus.  
 
3. Das Gesetz, ‚nämlich der unwandelbare 
Wille Gottes’ (Form. Conc. Epit. VI,6), 
begegnet uns in der Gesamtwirklichkeit 
unseres Lebens, wie sie durch die 
Offenbarung Gottes ins Licht gesetzt wird. 
Es bindet jeden an den Stand, in den er von 
Gott berufen ist, und verpflichtet uns auf die 
natürliche Ordnungen [sic], denen wir 
unterworfen sind, wie Familie, Volk, Rasse 
(d.h. Blutzusammenhang). Und zwar sind 
wir einer bestimmten Familie, einem 
bestimmten Volk und einer bestimmten 
Rasse zugeordnet. Indem uns der Wille 
Gottes ferner stets in unserem Heute und 
Hier trifft, bindet er uns auch an den 
bestimmten historischen Augenblick der 
Familie, des Volkes, der Rasse, d.h. An 
einen bestimmten Moment ihrer Geschichte. 
 
4. Die natürlichen Ordnungen geben uns 
aber nicht nur den fordernden Willen Gottes 
kund. Indem sie in ihrer Verbindung unsere 
gesamte natürliche Existenz begründen, 
sind sie zugleich die Mittel, durch die Gott 
unser irdische Leben schafft und erhält. Wer 
im Glauben an Jesus Christus der Gnade des 
Vaters gewiß wird, erfährt auch in ihnen 
‚lauter väterliche, göttliche Güte und 
Barmherzigkeit.’  
 
Als Christen ehren wir mit Dank gegen Gott 
jede Ordnung, also auch jede Obrigkeit, 
selbst in der Entstellung, als Werkzeug 
göttlicher Entfaltung, aber wir 
unterscheiden auch als Christen gütige und 
wunderliche Herren, gesunde und entstellte 
Ordnungen.  
 
5. In dieser Erkenntnis danken wir als 
glaubende Christen Gott dem Herrn, daß er 
unserem Volk in seiner Not den Führer als 
‚frommen und getreuen Oberherrn’ 
geschenkt hat und in der 
nationalsozialistischen Staatsordnung ‚gut 
Regiment,’ ein Regiment mit ‚Zucht und 
Ehre’ bereiten will.  
 
died for our sins and rose from the dead for 
the sake of our justification.  
 
3. The Law, “namely the unchangeable will 
of God” (Formula of Concord, Article 
VI:6), confronts us in the total reality of 
our life as it is brought to light through the 
revelation of God. It binds each person to 
the station into which he has been called by 
God, and obligates us to the natural orders 
to which we are subject, such as family, 
Volk, and race (that is, blood relationship). 
And indeed we have been assigned to a 
particular family, a particular Volk, and a 
particular race. As the will of God meets us 
always in our here and now, it binds us also 
to the particular historical moment of our 
family, our Volk, and our race—that is, to a 




4. The natural orders, however, do not 
merely make known to us the demanding 
will of God. While the orders ground our 
complete natural existence, they are at the 
same time the means by which God creates 
and maintains our earthly life.1 Whoever is 
certain of the grace of the Father through 
faith in Jesus Christ also experiences 
‘genuine fatherly and divine goodness and 
mercy’ in the orders.  
 
With thanks to God we as Christians 
honour each ordinance, as well as each 
authority, even in their distortion, as the 
instrument of divine unfolding, but we also 
distinguish as Christians between 
benevolent and strange rulers, between 
healthy and sick ordinances. 
 
5. In this knowledge we thank the Lord 
God as believing Christians that he has 
gifted our Volk, in its time of crisis, with a 
Führer as a ‘pious and faithful ruler,’ and, 
in the National Socialist system of 
government, God wishes to give a ‘good 
regiment,’ a regiment with ‘discipline and 
honour.’  
 
                                                 
1 This is a critical point for the Althausian articulation of the Schöpfungsordnungslehre: by laying claim to 
humanity’s total reality, the orders ground human existence, rather than the other way around.  
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Wir wissen uns daher vor Gott 
verantwortlich, zu dem Werk des Führers in 
unserem Beruf und Stand mitzuhelfen.  
 
 
B. Die Aufgabe.  
6. Die Kirche hat zu den natürlichen 
Ordnungen ein dreifaches Verhältnis. Sie 
hat erstens das Gesetz Gottes zu 
verkündigen. In dieser Hinsicht ist ihre 
Aufgabe zu allen Zeiten die gleiche. Das 
bedeutet Begründung der Ordnungen in 
ihrer Hoheit und Erinnerung an ihre 
Aufgabe.  
 
Zweitens sind ihre Glieder selbst den 
natürlichen Ordnungen unterworfen. Indem 
sie immer einem bestimmten Volk und 
einem bestimmten Augenblick zugeordnet 
sind, emfängt ihre Verpflichtung gegenüber 
ihrem Volk den konkreten Inhalt durch die 
gegenwärtige völkische Staatsordnung. In 
dieser Hinsicht unterliegt die Beziehung der 
Kirchenglieder auf die natürliche 
Ordnungen der geschichtlichen 
Veränderung. Unveränderlich ist dabei nur 
das Verpflichtsein als solches. 
 
Drittens trägt die Kirche selbst 
Ordnungsmerkmale, die auch den 
natürlichen Ordnungen anhaften. So folgt 
sie z.B. in der Sprache ihrer Verkündigung 
der Mannigfaltigkeit der Volkssprachen. In 
dieser Hinsicht ist ihre Ordnung ebenfalls 
der geschichtlichen Veränderung 
unterworfen.  
 
7. Durch die Veränderlichkeit der 
Beziehung zu den konkreten Ordnungen im 
dritten Sinne ist die Kirche vor die Aufgabe 
gestellt, ihre eigene Ordnung immer aufs 
neue zu überprüfen.  
 
Der unbedingt gütlige Maßstabe für diese 
Überprüfung ist der Auftrag, den sie von 
ihrem Herrn erhalten hat. Er erstreckt sich 
auf den Vollzug und den Inhalt ihrer 
Verkündigung, auf Verwaltung der 
Sakramente und der Schlüsselgewalt durch 
das geordnete Predigtamt. Alle sonstigen 
Merkmale ihrer geschichtlichen Gestalt, 
hauptsächlich ihre Verfassung und ihr 
Kultur, sind zu messen an diesem Maßstab. 
We acknowledge ourselves, therefore, to be 
responsible before God to assist in the 
work of the Führer in our vocation and 
station.   
 
B. The task.  
6. The church has a threefold relationship 
to the natural orders. In the first place, it 
must proclaim the Law of God. In this 
respect its task is the same in all ages. This 
entails giving reasons for the sovereignty 
of the ordinances and bearing their function 
in mind.  
 
 
Second, the church’s members are 
themselves subject to the natural orders. As 
they are always assigned to a particular 
Volk and to a specific moment, their duty 
to the Volk receives its concrete content 
through the peoples’ present national 
system of government. In this respect the 
relationship of church members to the 
natural ordinances is subject to historical 
change. The only thing that is 
unchangeable is the existence of the 
obligation itself.  
 
Third, the church itself bears characteristics 
of an ordinance, which also adhere to the 
natural orders. Thus the church follows, for 
example, the plurality of folk-languages in 
the language of its proclamation. In this 
respect the church’s ordinance is likewise 
subject to historical change.  
 
 
7. Through the variability of the 
relationship to the concrete ordinances in 
the third sense, this task is posed to the 
church: to continually examine its own 
ordinance.  
 
The unconditionally valid standard for this 
examination is the mission that the church 
has received from its Lord. This mission 
comes to bear on the implementation and 
the content of its proclamation, on the 
administration of the sacraments, and on 
the key power of the established preaching 
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In diesem Sinne ist die Aufgabe einer 
Reformation der Kirche in jedem 




8. Der Erfüllung dieser Aufgabe in der 
Kirche unserer Tage soll auch unsere 
theologische Arbeit und unser kirchlicher 
Einsatz dienen. 
 
Ansbach, den 11. Juni 1934 
Ansbacher Kreis 
Pfarrer und Direktor Sommerer – 
Bruckberg,  
D. Althaus – Erlangen,  
D. Dr. Elert – Erlangen,  
Studienrat Fikenscher – Ansbach, 
Stadtpfarrer Fuchs – Ansbach, 
Pfarrer Grießbach – Ansbach, 
Pfarrer Seiler – Wildenholz,  
Pfarrer Werlin – Kleinhaslach über 
Ansbach 
 
office.2 All other characteristics of its 
historical form, chiefly its constitution and 
its culture, are to be measured against this 
standard. In this sense the task of reforming 
the church is posed anew in each moment.  
 
8. Our theological work and church 
mission should also serve the 
accomplishment of this task in the church 
of our day.  
  
Ansbach, June 11, 1934 
The Ansbach Circle 
Sommerer, Pastor and Director – 
Bruckberg, 
DD. Althaus – Erlangen, 
DD. Dr. Elert – Erlangen, 
Fikenscher, Teacher – Ansbach, 
Fuchs, Parish Priest – Ansbach,  
Grießbach, Pastor – Ansbach,  
Seiler, Pastor – Wildenholz,  

























                                                 
2 Predigtamt is a technical term used to describe one of the primary roles of the Protestant pastor: a ‘servant of 
the Word.’ In the context of a state church, this term also communicates the preaching office as instituted or 
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